diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c index a858c1892b..69ac29e4f7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -54,28 +54,43 @@ #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 #endif #include -#include +#include +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600 +/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both and + * are included, as they redefine a number of _MAX constants. + * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the + * warning when including intsafe.h. + */ +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4005 ) +#endif +#include +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600 +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) { - HCRYPTPROV provider; + ULONG len_as_ulong = 0; ((void) data); *olen = 0; - if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL, - PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE ) + /* + * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on + * 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into + * a ULONG. + */ + if ( FAILED( SizeTToULong( len, &len_as_ulong ) ) ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); } - if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE ) + if ( !BCRYPT_SUCCESS( BCryptGenRandom( NULL, output, len_as_ulong, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG ) ) ) { - CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); } - CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 ); *olen = len; return( 0 ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c index def1414eca..4361f43ed0 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c @@ -58,6 +58,19 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) #include +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600 +/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both and + * are included, as they redefine a number of _MAX constants. + * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the + * warning when including intsafe.h. + */ +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4005 ) +#endif +#include +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600 +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif #else #include #endif @@ -1549,6 +1562,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) char filename[MAX_PATH]; char *p; size_t len = strlen( path ); + int lengthAsInt = 0; WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; HANDLE hFind; @@ -1563,7 +1577,18 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) p = filename + len; filename[len++] = '*'; - w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir, + if ( FAILED ( SizeTToInt( len, &lengthAsInt ) ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + /* + * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming + * string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the + * incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to + * change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the + * incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with + * MultiByteToWideChar(). + */ + w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, lengthAsInt, szDir, MAX_PATH - 3 ); if( w_ret == 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1580,8 +1605,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ) continue; + if ( FAILED( SizeTToInt( wcslen( file_data.cFileName ), &lengthAsInt ) ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, - lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ), + lengthAsInt, p, (int) len - 1, NULL, NULL ); if( w_ret == 0 )