diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c | 1376 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1376 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c deleted file mode 100644 index b6d1ee95a5..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1376 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/t1_enc.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -# include <openssl/comp.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG -# include <openssl/des.h> -#endif - -/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ -static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, - int sec_len, - const void *seed1, int seed1_len, - const void *seed2, int seed2_len, - const void *seed3, int seed3_len, - const void *seed4, int seed4_len, - const void *seed5, int seed5_len, - unsigned char *out, int olen) -{ - int chunk; - size_t j; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init; - EVP_PKEY *mac_key; - unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t A1_len; - int ret = 0; - - chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); - OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init); - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); - if (!mac_key) - goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) - goto err; - if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init)) - goto err; - if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) - goto err; - if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) - goto err; - if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) - goto err; - if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) - goto err; - if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) - goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) - goto err; - - for (;;) { - /* Reinit mac contexts */ - if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init)) - goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) - goto err; - if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) - goto err; - if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) - goto err; - if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) - goto err; - if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) - goto err; - if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) - goto err; - if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) - goto err; - - if (olen > chunk) { - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) - goto err; - out += j; - olen -= j; - /* calc the next A1 value */ - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) - goto err; - } else { /* last one */ - - if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) - goto err; - memcpy(out, A1, olen); - break; - } - } - ret = 1; - err: - EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init); - OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); - return ret; -} - -/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ -static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, - const void *seed1, int seed1_len, - const void *seed2, int seed2_len, - const void *seed3, int seed3_len, - const void *seed4, int seed4_len, - const void *seed5, int seed5_len, - const unsigned char *sec, int slen, - unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) -{ - int len, i, idx, count; - const unsigned char *S1; - long m; - const EVP_MD *md; - int ret = 0; - - /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ - count = 0; - for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { - if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) - count++; - } - if (!count) { - /* Should never happen */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - len = slen / count; - if (count == 1) - slen = 0; - S1 = sec; - memset(out1, 0, olen); - for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { - if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { - if (!md) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1), - seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, - seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, - out2, olen)) - goto err; - S1 += len; - for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { - out1[i] ^= out2[i]; - } - } - } - ret = 1; - err: - return ret; -} - -static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, - unsigned char *tmp, int num) -{ - int ret; - ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), - TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, - TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, - s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num); -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", - s->session->master_key_length); - { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) { - fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); - } - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - return ret; -} - -int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) -{ - static const unsigned char empty[] = ""; - unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; - unsigned char *exp_label; - unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; - unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; - unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; - int client_write; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; - const EVP_CIPHER *c; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - const SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - const EVP_MD *m; - int mac_type; - int *mac_secret_size; - EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; - EVP_PKEY *mac_key; - int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl; - int reuse_dd = 0; - - is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); - c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; - m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; - mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression; -#endif - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); - fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp); - fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); - fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", - c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len); - fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", - s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); - { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) - s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; - else - s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; - - if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) - reuse_dd = 1; - else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = - OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) - goto err; - else - /* - * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error - */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); - dd = s->enc_read_ctx; - mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); - if (mac_ctx == NULL) - goto err; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (s->expand != NULL) { - COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); - s->expand = NULL; - } - if (comp != NULL) { - s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); - if (s->expand == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, - SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); - goto err2; - } - if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) - s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); - if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) - goto err; - } -#endif - /* - * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8); - mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); - mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); - } else { - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) - s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; - else - s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; - if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - reuse_dd = 1; - else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - dd = s->enc_write_ctx; - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (mac_ctx == NULL) - goto err; - s->write_hash = mac_ctx; - } else { - mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); - if (mac_ctx == NULL) - goto err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (s->compress != NULL) { - COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); - s->compress = NULL; - } - if (comp != NULL) { - s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); - if (s->compress == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, - SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); - goto err2; - } - } -#endif - /* - * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8); - mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); - mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); - } - - if (reuse_dd) - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); - - p = s->s3->tmp.key_block; - i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; - - cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); - j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? - cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; - /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ - /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; - else - k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); - if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || - (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { - ms = &(p[0]); - n = i + i; - key = &(p[n]); - n += j + j; - iv = &(p[n]); - n += k + k; - exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; - exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; - client_write = 1; - } else { - n = i; - ms = &(p[n]); - n += i + j; - key = &(p[n]); - n += j + k; - iv = &(p[n]); - n += k; - exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; - exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; - client_write = 0; - } - - if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; - } - - memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); - - if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { - mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, - mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); - if (mac_key == NULL - || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { - EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; - } - EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); - } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < i; z++) - printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } -#endif - if (is_export) { - /* - * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value - * since only the correct one will be used :-). - */ - if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), - exp_label, exp_label_len, - s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) - goto err2; - key = tmp1; - - if (k > 0) { - if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), - TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, - s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2)) - goto err2; - if (client_write) - iv = iv1; - else - iv = &(iv1[k]); - } - } - - s->session->key_arg_length = 0; -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - int i; - fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); - fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= "); - for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= "); - for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) - || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; - } - } else { - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; - } - } - /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ - if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size - && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, - *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO - if (s->msg_callback) { - int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0; - if (*mac_secret_size) - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC, - mac_secret, *mac_secret_size, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - if (c->key_len) - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY, - key, c->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - if (k) { - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV; - else - wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV; - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - } - } -#endif - -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) - printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } - printf("\niv="); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < k; z++) - printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } - printf("\n"); -#endif - - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2)); - return (1); - err: - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - err2: - return (0); -} - -int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL; - const EVP_CIPHER *c; - const EVP_MD *hash; - int num; - SSL_COMP *comp; - int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; - int ret = 0; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) - return (1); - - if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp - (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); - return (0); - } - - s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c; - s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; - s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; - s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; - num = - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); - num *= 2; - - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num; - s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1; - - if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("client random\n"); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) - printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z], - ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } - printf("server random\n"); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) - printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z], - ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } - printf("pre-master\n"); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++) - printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z], - ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } -#endif - if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num)) - goto err; -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("\nkey block\n"); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < num; z++) - printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } -#endif - - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) - && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { - /* - * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV - * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) - */ - s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; - - if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { - if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) - s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 - if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) - s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; -#endif - } - } - - ret = 1; - err: - if (p2) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num); - OPENSSL_free(p2); - } - return (ret); -} - -/*- - * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. - * - * Returns: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too - * short etc). - * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. - * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, - * an internal error occured. - */ -int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) -{ - SSL3_RECORD *rec; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; - unsigned long l; - int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc; - - if (send) { - if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { - int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); - } - ds = s->enc_write_ctx; - rec = &(s->s3->wrec); - if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) - enc = NULL; - else { - int ivlen; - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); - /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ - if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) - && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); - else - ivlen = 0; - if (ivlen > 1) { - if (rec->data != rec->input) - /* - * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever - * happen?? (steve) - */ - fprintf(stderr, - "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__); - else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) - return -1; - } - } - } else { - if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { - int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); - } - ds = s->enc_read_ctx; - rec = &(s->s3->rrec); - if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) - enc = NULL; - else - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); - } - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { - memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); - rec->input = rec->data; - ret = 1; - } else { - l = rec->length; - bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); - - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { - unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq; - - seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence; - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; - - s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p); - memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); - memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8); - } else { - memcpy(buf, seq, 8); - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ - ++seq[i]; - if (seq[i] != 0) - break; - } - } - - buf[8] = rec->type; - buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); - buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); - buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; - buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; - pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, - EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf); - if (pad <= 0) - return -1; - if (send) { - l += pad; - rec->length += pad; - } - } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { - i = bs - ((int)l % bs); - - /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ - - /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ - j = i - 1; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) { - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) - j++; - } - for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) - rec->input[k] = j; - l += i; - rec->length += i; - } -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - unsigned long ui; - fprintf(stderr, - "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", - ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); - fprintf(stderr, - "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n", - ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ, - DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len); - fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: "); - for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input="); - for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++) - fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (!send) { - if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) - return 0; - } - - i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); - if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) - ? (i < 0) - : (i == 0)) - return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { - rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - } -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - unsigned long i; - fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data="); - for (i = 0; i < l; i++) - fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - ret = 1; - if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - if ((bs != 1) && !send) - ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); - if (pad && !send) - rec->length -= pad; - } - return ret; -} - -int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) -{ - unsigned int ret; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; - int i; - - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return 0; - - for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { - if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] - && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { - d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; - break; - } - } - if (!d) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0) - ret = 0; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return ((int)ret); -} - -int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, - const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) -{ - unsigned int i; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; - unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; - int idx; - long mask; - int err = 0; - const EVP_MD *md; - - q = buf; - - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return 0; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - - for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { - if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) { - int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); - EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; - if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 - || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { - /* - * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! - */ - err = 1; - } else { - if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || - !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || - (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) - err = 1; - q += hashsize; - } - } - } - - if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), - str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, - out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) - err = 1; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2)); - if (err) - return 0; - else - return sizeof buf2; -} - -int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) -{ - SSL3_RECORD *rec; - unsigned char *seq; - EVP_MD_CTX *hash; - size_t md_size, orig_len; - int i; - EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; - unsigned char header[13]; - int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) - : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); - int t; - - if (send) { - rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec); - seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); - hash = ssl->write_hash; - } else { - rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec); - seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); - hash = ssl->read_hash; - } - - t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); - OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); - md_size = t; - - /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ - if (stream_mac) { - mac_ctx = hash; - } else { - if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) - return -1; - mac_ctx = &hmac; - } - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; - - s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); - memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); - - memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); - } else - memcpy(header, seq, 8); - - /* - * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type - */ - orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); - rec->type &= 0xff; - - header[8] = rec->type; - header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); - header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); - header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; - header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; - - if (!send && - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { - /* - * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any - * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we - * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. - */ - /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ - if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, orig_len, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { - if (!stream_mac) - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); - return -1; - } - } else { - if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { - if (!stream_mac) - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); - return -1; - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (!send && FIPS_mode()) - tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, - mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len); -#endif - } - - if (!stream_mac) - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "seq="); - { - int z; - for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } - fprintf(stderr, "rec="); - { - unsigned int z; - for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif - - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { - ++seq[i]; - if (seq[i] != 0) - break; - } - } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - { - unsigned int z; - for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) - fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -#endif - return (md_size); -} - -int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, - int len) -{ - unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; - int col = 0, sol = 0; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p, - len); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL - && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL - && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 - && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { - co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; - col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; - so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; - /* - * must be same as col (see - * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) - */ - sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; - } -#endif - - tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), - TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, - s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - co, col, - s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); - OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff); -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); - BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); - fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); - BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); - BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); - BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, - SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); -#endif - -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO - if (s->msg_callback) { - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER, - p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM, - s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM, - s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER, - s->session->master_key, - SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - } -#endif - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); -} - -int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, - const char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *context, - size_t contextlen, int use_context) -{ - unsigned char *buff; - unsigned char *val = NULL; - size_t vallen, currentvalpos; - int rv; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", - s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); - if (buff == NULL) - goto err2; - - /* - * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather - * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the - * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label. - */ - vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; - if (use_context) { - vallen += 2 + contextlen; - } - - val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); - if (val == NULL) - goto err2; - currentvalpos = 0; - memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); - currentvalpos += llen; - memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - if (use_context) { - val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; - currentvalpos++; - val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; - currentvalpos++; - if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { - memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); - } - } - - /* - * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited - * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and - * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow - */ - if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) - goto err1; - if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) - goto err1; - if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, - TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) - goto err1; - if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, - TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) - goto err1; - - rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), - val, vallen, - NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, - s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, - out, buff, olen); - OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen); - OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen); - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - goto ret; - err1: - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, - SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); - rv = 0; - goto ret; - err2: - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rv = 0; - ret: - if (buff != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(buff); - if (val != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(val); - return (rv); -} - -int tls1_alert_code(int code) -{ - switch (code) { - case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: - return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); - case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: - return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: - return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); - case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: - return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: - return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); - case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: - return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); - case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: - return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: - return (-1); - case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: - return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); - case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: - return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); - case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: - return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); - case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: - return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); - case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: - return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); - case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: - return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: - return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); - case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: - return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); - case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: - return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: - return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); - case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: - return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); - case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: - return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: - return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); - case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: - return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: - return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); - case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: - return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: - return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); - case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: - return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); - case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: - return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); - case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: - return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); - case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: - return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); - case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: - return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); - case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: - return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); -#if 0 - /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ - case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: - return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); -#endif - default: - return (-1); - } -} |