diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c | 1773 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1773 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c deleted file mode 100644 index b914568430..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1773 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <limits.h> -#include <errno.h> -#define USE_SOCKETS -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> - -#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK -# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 -#endif - -#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ - !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ - defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \ - defined(__INTEL__) ) \ - ) -# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK -# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 -#endif - -static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); -static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); - -/* - * Return values are as per SSL_read() - */ -int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) -{ - /* - * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase - * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of - * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If - * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus - * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) - */ - int i, len, left; - long align = 0; - unsigned char *pkt; - SSL3_BUFFER *rb; - - if (n <= 0) - return n; - - rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); - if (rb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return -1; - - left = rb->left; -#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); -#endif - - if (!extend) { - /* start with empty packet ... */ - if (left == 0) - rb->offset = align; - else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - /* - * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload - * alignment... - */ - pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; - if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA - && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { - /* - * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field - * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about - * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no - * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer - * overrun can be triggered. - */ - memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); - rb->offset = align; - } - } - s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; - s->packet_length = 0; - /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ - } - - /* - * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read - * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into - * the buffer). - */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (left == 0 && extend) - return 0; - if (left > 0 && n > left) - n = left; - } - - /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ - if (left >= n) { - s->packet_length += n; - rb->left = left - n; - rb->offset += n; - return (n); - } - - /* else we need to read more data */ - - len = s->packet_length; - pkt = rb->buf + align; - /* - * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already - * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end - */ - if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ - memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); - s->packet = pkt; - rb->offset = len + align; - } - - if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ - if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - /* ignore max parameter */ - max = n; - else { - if (max < n) - max = n; - if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) - max = rb->len - rb->offset; - } - - while (left < n) { - /* - * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and - * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if - * possible) - */ - - clear_sys_error(); - if (s->rbio != NULL) { - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); - i = -1; - } - - if (i <= 0) { - rb->left = left; - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - if (len + left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - return (i); - } - left += i; - /* - * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the - * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to - * byte oriented as in the TLS case. - */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (n > left) - n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ - } - } - - /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ - rb->offset += n; - rb->left = left - n; - s->packet_length += n; - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return (n); -} - -/* - * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that - * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an - * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and - * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. - */ -#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 - -/*- - * Call this to get a new input record. - * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error - * or non-blocking IO. - * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in - * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data - * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes - */ -/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ -static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) -{ - int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; - int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - short version; - unsigned mac_size, orig_len; - size_t extra; - unsigned empty_record_count = 0; - - rr = &(s->s3->rrec); - sess = s->session; - - if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) - extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; - else - extra = 0; - if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { - /* - * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after - * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - again: - /* check if we have the header */ - if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || - (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; - - p = s->packet; - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ - rr->type = *(p++); - ssl_major = *(p++); - ssl_minor = *(p++); - version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; - n2s(p, rr->length); -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); -#endif - - /* Lets check version */ - if (!s->first_packet) { - if (version != s->version) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) - && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { - /* - * The record is using an incorrect version number, but - * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't - * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or - * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't - * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end. - */ - goto err; - } - /* - * Send back error using their minor version number :-) - */ - s->version = (unsigned short)version; - } - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - } - - if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto err; - } - - if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } - - /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ - - if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - i = rr->length; - n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ - /* - * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - * + rr->length - */ - } - - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ - - /* - * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, - * and we have that many bytes in s->packet - */ - rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); - - /* - * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points - * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either - * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into - * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer - */ - - /* - * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length - * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. - */ - - /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr->data = rr->input; - - enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); - /*- - * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. - * 1: if the padding is valid - * -1: if the padding is invalid - */ - if (enc_err == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); - { - unsigned int z; - for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) - printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } - printf("\n"); -#endif - - /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && - (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { - /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ - unsigned char *mac = NULL; - unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - - /* - * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type - */ - orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); - - /* - * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was - * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, - * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount - * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. - */ - if (orig_len < mac_size || - /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ - (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - /* - * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be - * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in - * constant time from within the record, without leaking the - * contents of the padding bytes. - */ - mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); - rr->length -= mac_size; - } else { - /* - * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals - * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for - * |mac_size| above. - */ - rr->length -= mac_size; - mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; - } - - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL - || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) - enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) - enc_err = -1; - } - - if (enc_err < 0) { - /* - * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, - * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption - * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should - * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become - * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) - */ - al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); - goto f_err; - } - - /* r->length is now just compressed */ - if (s->expand != NULL) { - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - rr->off = 0; - /*- - * So at this point the following is true - * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ - - /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ - s->packet_length = 0; - - /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) { - empty_record_count++; - if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; - } - goto again; - } -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, - rr->length); -#endif - - return (1); - - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - return (ret); -} - -int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int i; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - - rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); - i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, - (int)rr->length); - if (i < 0) - return (0); - else - rr->length = i; - rr->data = rr->comp; -#endif - return (1); -} - -int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int i; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - - wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); - i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, - SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, - wr->input, (int)wr->length); - if (i < 0) - return (0); - else - wr->length = i; - - wr->input = wr->data; -#endif - return (1); -} - -/* - * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if - * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. - */ -int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) -{ - const unsigned char *buf = buf_; - int tot; - unsigned int n, nw; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK - unsigned int max_send_fragment; -#endif - SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); - int i; - - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); - tot = s->s3->wnum; - s->s3->wnum = 0; - - if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - } - - /* - * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out - * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for - * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for - * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be - * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then - * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and - * report the error in a way the user will notice - */ - if ((len < tot) || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot)))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); - return (-1); - } - - /* - * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This - * will happen with non blocking IO - */ - if (wb->left != 0) { - i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot); - if (i <= 0) { - /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ - s->s3->wnum = tot; - return i; - } - tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ - } -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK - /* - * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* - * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate - * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the - * compromise is considered worthy. - */ - if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && - s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && - SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && - s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && - EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { - unsigned char aad[13]; - EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; - int packlen; - - /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ - if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) - max_send_fragment -= 512; - - if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - - packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, - EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, - max_send_fragment, NULL); - - if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment) - packlen *= 8; - else - packlen *= 4; - - wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen); - if (!wb->buf) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - wb->len = packlen; - } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ - OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ - wb->buf = NULL; - return tot; - } - - n = (len - tot); - for (;;) { - if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { - OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ - wb->buf = NULL; - break; - } - - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { - i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - if (i <= 0) { - s->s3->wnum = tot; - return i; - } - } - - if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) - nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); - else - nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); - - memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8); - aad[8] = type; - aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); - aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); - aad[11] = 0; - aad[12] = 0; - mb_param.out = NULL; - mb_param.inp = aad; - mb_param.len = nw; - - packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, - EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, - sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); - - if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ - OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ - wb->buf = NULL; - break; - } - - mb_param.out = wb->buf; - mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; - mb_param.len = nw; - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, - EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, - sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) - return -1; - - s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; - if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { - int j = 6; - while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; - } - - wb->offset = 0; - wb->left = packlen; - - s->s3->wpend_tot = nw; - s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; - s->s3->wpend_type = type; - s->s3->wpend_ret = nw; - - i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); - if (i <= 0) { - if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { - OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); - wb->buf = NULL; - } - s->s3->wnum = tot; - return i; - } - if (i == (int)n) { - OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ - wb->buf = NULL; - return tot + i; - } - n -= i; - tot += i; - } - } else -#endif - if (tot == len) { /* done? */ - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - - return tot; - } - - n = (len - tot); - for (;;) { - if (n > s->max_send_fragment) - nw = s->max_send_fragment; - else - nw = n; - - i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); - if (i <= 0) { - /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ - s->s3->wnum = tot; - return i; - } - - if ((i == (int)n) || - (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { - /* - * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment - * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: - */ - s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; - - if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - - return tot + i; - } - - n -= i; - tot += i; - } -} - -static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) -{ - unsigned char *p, *plen; - int i, mac_size, clear = 0; - int prefix_len = 0; - int eivlen; - long align = 0; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); - SSL_SESSION *sess; - - /* - * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This - * will happen with non blocking IO - */ - if (wb->left != 0) - return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); - - /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { - i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - if (i <= 0) - return (i); - /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ - } - - if (wb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) - return -1; - - if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) - return 0; - - wr = &(s->s3->wrec); - sess = s->session; - - if ((sess == NULL) || - (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { -#if 1 - clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ -#else - clear = 1; -#endif - mac_size = 0; - } else { - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); - if (mac_size < 0) - goto err; - } - - /* - * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself - */ - if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { - /* - * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see - * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) - */ - - if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { - /* - * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this - * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these - * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual - * payload) - */ - prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); - if (prefix_len <= 0) - goto err; - - if (prefix_len > - (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) - { - /* insufficient space */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; - } - - if (create_empty_fragment) { -#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - /* - * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be - * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real - * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers. - */ - align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); -#endif - p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } else if (prefix_len) { - p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; - } else { -#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); -#endif - p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } - - /* write the header */ - - *(p++) = type & 0xff; - wr->type = type; - - *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); - /* - * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes - * and record version number > TLS 1.0 - */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B - && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) - *(p++) = 0x1; - else - *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; - - /* field where we are to write out packet length */ - plen = p; - p += 2; - /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ - if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { - int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (eivlen <= 1) - eivlen = 0; - } - /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - else - eivlen = 0; - } else - eivlen = 0; - - /* lets setup the record stuff. */ - wr->data = p + eivlen; - wr->length = (int)len; - wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; - - /* - * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data - */ - - /* first we compress */ - if (s->compress != NULL) { - if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } else { - memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); - wr->input = wr->data; - } - - /* - * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from - * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the - * wb->buf - */ - - if (mac_size != 0) { - if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) - goto err; - wr->length += mac_size; - } - - wr->input = p; - wr->data = p; - - if (eivlen) { - /* - * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; - */ - wr->length += eivlen; - } - - if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) - goto err; - - /* record length after mac and block padding */ - s2n(wr->length, plen); - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* - * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is - * wr->length long - */ - wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ - wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - - if (create_empty_fragment) { - /* - * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write - * out anything here - */ - return wr->length; - } - - /* now let's set up wb */ - wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; - - /* - * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write - * retries later - */ - s->s3->wpend_tot = len; - s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; - s->s3->wpend_type = type; - s->s3->wpend_ret = len; - - /* we now just need to write the buffer */ - return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); - err: - return -1; -} - -/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this - * - * Return values are as per SSL_write(), i.e. - */ -int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len) -{ - int i; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); - -/* XXXX */ - if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) - || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && - !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) - || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); - return (-1); - } - - for (;;) { - clear_sys_error(); - if (s->wbio != NULL) { - s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - i = BIO_write(s->wbio, - (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), - (unsigned int)wb->left); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); - i = -1; - } - if (i == wb->left) { - wb->left = 0; - wb->offset += i; - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return (s->s3->wpend_ret); - } else if (i <= 0) { - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* - * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in - * using a datagram service - */ - wb->left = 0; - } - return i; - } - wb->offset += i; - wb->left -= i; - } -} - -/*- - * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. - * 'type' is one of the following: - * - * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) - * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) - * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) - * - * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first - * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). - * - * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as - * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really - * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. - * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store - * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol - * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): - * Change cipher spec protocol - * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored - * Alert protocol - * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) - * Handshake protocol - * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have - * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages - * here, anything else is handled by higher layers - * Application data protocol - * none of our business - */ -int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) -{ - int al, i, j, ret; - unsigned int n; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return (-1); - - if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) - && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek - && (type != - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) - /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ - { - unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; - unsigned char *dst = buf; - unsigned int k; - - /* peek == 0 */ - n = 0; - while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { - *dst++ = *src++; - len--; - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; - n++; - } - /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ - for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) - s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; - return n; - } - - /* - * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. - */ - - if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { - /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - } - start: - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - /*- - * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * s->s3->rrec.data, - data - * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read - * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. - */ - rr = &(s->s3->rrec); - - /* get new packet if necessary */ - if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { - ret = ssl3_get_record(s); - if (ret <= 0) - return (ret); - } - - /* - * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty - * record that isn't an alert. - */ - if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) - s->cert->alert_count = 0; - - /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ - - if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, - * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ - && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in - * 'peek' mode) - */ - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { - rr->length = 0; - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return (0); - } - - if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or - * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ - /* - * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are - * doing a handshake for the first time - */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && - (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (len <= 0) - return (len); - - if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) - n = rr->length; - else - n = (unsigned int)len; - - memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); - if (!peek) { - rr->length -= n; - rr->off += n; - if (rr->length == 0) { - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - rr->off = 0; - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS - && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - } - } - return (n); - } - - /* - * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, - * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). - */ - - /* - * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill - * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. - */ - { - unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; - unsigned char *dest = NULL; - unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; - dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; - dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; - } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { - dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; - dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; - dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { - i = tls1_process_heartbeat(s); - - if (i < 0) - return i; - - rr->length = 0; - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) - goto start; - - /* Exit and notify application to read again */ - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - return (-1); - } -#endif - - if (dest_maxlen > 0) { - n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ - if (rr->length < n) - n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ - - /* now move 'n' bytes: */ - while (n-- > 0) { - dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; - rr->length--; - } - - if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) - goto start; /* fragment was too small */ - } - } - - /*- - * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. - * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) - */ - - /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ - if ((!s->server) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; - - if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && - !s->s3->renegotiate) { - ssl3_renegotiate(s); - if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ - BIO *bio; - /* - * In the case where we try to read application data, - * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with - * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may - * cause nasty problems in the blocking world - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - } - } - } - /* - * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try - * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for - */ - goto start; - } - /* - * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't - * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: - * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) - */ - if (s->server && - SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !s->s3->send_connection_binding && - (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; - */ - rr->length = 0; - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto start; - } - if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { - int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; - int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; - - s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, - s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) { - j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; - cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); - } - - if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { - s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; - - s->cert->alert_count++; - if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); - goto f_err; - } - - if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { - s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return (0); - } - /* - * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested - * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal - * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it - * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In - * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if - * the peer refused it where we carry on. - */ - else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME - else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) - return (0); -#endif - } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { - char tmp[16]; - - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); - BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); - s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); - return (0); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - goto start; - } - - if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a - * shutdown */ - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - rr->length = 0; - return (0); - } - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - /* - * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly - * what the record payload has to look like - */ - if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || - (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; - } - - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - - rr->length = 0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; - if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) - goto err; - else - goto start; - } - - /* - * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) - */ - if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { - if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { -#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences - * are not as expected (and because this is - * not really needed for clients except for - * detecting protocol violations): */ - s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) - ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; -#else - s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; -#endif - s->renegotiate = 1; - s->new_session = 1; - } - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ - BIO *bio; - /* - * In the case where we try to read application data, but we - * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry - * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty - * problems in the blocking world - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - } - goto start; - } - - switch (rr->type) { - default: - /* - * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but - * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the - * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where - * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised - * record types, using up resources processing them. - */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - case SSL3_RT_ALERT: - case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: - /* - * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of - * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not - * happen when type != rr->type - */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: - /* - * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have - * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() - * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read - * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet - * started), we will indulge it. - */ - if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && - (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && - (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) - ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) - ) - )) { - s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; - return (-1); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - } - } - /* not reached */ - - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - return (-1); -} - -int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) -{ - int i; - const char *sender; - int slen; - - if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; - else - i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; - - if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { - if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { - /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - return (0); - } - - s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) - return (0); - } - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) - return (0); - - /* - * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it - * before we read the finished message - */ - if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { - sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; - slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; - } else { - sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; - slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; - } - - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, slen, - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; - - return (1); -} - -int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) -{ - /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ - desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) - desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have - * protocol_version alerts */ - if (desc < 0) - return -1; - /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ - if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); - - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; - s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; - s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; - if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ - return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - /* - * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in - * the future - */ - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) -{ - int i, j; - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; - i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); - if (i <= 0) { - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; - } else { - /* - * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the - * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not - * worry too much. - */ - if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) - (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, - 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) { - j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; - cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); - } - } - return (i); -} |