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-rw-r--r--thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c970
1 files changed, 970 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
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index 0000000000..47a0ec9fe0
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+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
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+/* ssl/s3_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+
+static unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p);
+static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX m5;
+ EVP_MD_CTX s1;
+ unsigned char buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char c = 'A';
+ unsigned int i, j, k;
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ c = os_toascii[c]; /* 'A' in ASCII */
+#endif
+ k = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
+ for (i = 0; (int)i < num; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ k++;
+ if (k > sizeof buf) {
+ /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < k; j++)
+ buf[j] = c;
+ c++;
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&s1, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, buf, k);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&s1, smd, NULL);
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&m5, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if ((int)(i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num) {
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5, smd, NULL);
+ memcpy(km, smd, (num - i));
+ } else
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5, km, NULL);
+
+ km += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+ unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv, *er1, *er2;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *comp;
+#endif
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ int is_exp, n, i, j, k, cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_exp = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
+ OPENSSL_assert(m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else
+ comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
+#endif
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /*
+ * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+
+ if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* COMPRESS */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+ if (s->expand == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ } else {
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /*
+ * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* COMPRESS */
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+ if (s->compress == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i = EVP_MD_size(m);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err2;
+ cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j = is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(is_exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ ms = &(p[0]);
+ n = i + i;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + j;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k + k;
+ er1 = &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ er2 = &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ } else {
+ n = i;
+ ms = &(p[n]);
+ n += i + j;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + k;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k;
+ er1 = &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ er2 = &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);
+ memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+ if (is_exp) {
+ /*
+ * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
+ * since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, key, j);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er1, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er2, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, &(exp_key[0]), NULL);
+ key = &(exp_key[0]);
+
+ if (k > 0) {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er1, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er2, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, &(exp_iv[0]), NULL);
+ iv = &(exp_iv[0]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
+
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ if (s->msg_callback) {
+
+ int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ?
+ TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ;
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
+ mac_secret, EVP_MD_size(m), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (c->key_len)
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
+ key, c->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (k) {
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV,
+ iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_key[0]), sizeof(exp_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_iv[0]), sizeof(exp_iv));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, &comp)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+#else
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+#endif
+
+ num = EVP_MD_size(hash);
+ if (num < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + num + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num *= 2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
+
+ ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s, p, num);
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) {
+ /*
+ * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+ * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3->tmp.key_block, s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ * occured.
+ */
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send) {
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ } else {
+ ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+ memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+ rec->input = rec->data;
+ } else {
+ l = rec->length;
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ /* COMPRESS */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+
+ /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
+ l += i;
+ /*
+ * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
+ * padding length.
+ */
+ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
+ rec->length += i;
+ rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (!send) {
+ if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE);
+}
+
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_dgst)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer
+ && !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len);
+ } else {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] != NULL)
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ long mask;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ long hdatalen;
+ void *hdata;
+
+ /* Allocate handshake_dgst array */
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst, 0, SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
+ for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) {
+ if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (EVP_MD_nid(md) == NID_md5) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ }
+#endif
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], md, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], hdata, hdatalen);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ /* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ return (ssl3_handshake_mac(s, md_nid, NULL, 0, p));
+}
+
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ int ret, sha1len;
+ ret = ssl3_handshake_mac(s, NID_md5, sender, len, p);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ p += ret;
+
+ sha1len = ssl3_handshake_mac(s, NID_sha1, sender, len, p);
+ if (sha1len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret += sha1len;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ int npad, n;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst array
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
+ && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
+ d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
+ n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ npad = (48 / n) * n;
+ if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i) <= 0
+
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return ((int)ret);
+}
+
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ unsigned char *p, rec_char;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
+ int npad;
+ int t;
+
+ if (send) {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->write_hash;
+ } else {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ if (t < 0)
+ return -1;
+ md_size = t;
+ npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
+
+ /*
+ * kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
+ */
+ orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
+ /*
+ * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+ * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+ */
+
+ /*-
+ * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+ * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+ *
+ * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+ * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+ * total size.
+ */
+ unsigned char header[75];
+ unsigned j = 0;
+ memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
+ j += md_size;
+ memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+ j += npad;
+ memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
+ j += 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->type;
+ header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+ /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
+ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ unsigned int md_size_u;
+ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ rec_char = rec->type;
+ p = md;
+ s2n(rec->length, p);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ md_size = md_size_u;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ }
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+ return (md_size);
+}
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+ int len)
+{
+ static const unsigned char *salt[3] = {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ (const unsigned char *)"A",
+ (const unsigned char *)"BB",
+ (const unsigned char *)"CCC",
+#else
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x41",
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
+#endif
+ };
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned int n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ unsigned char *tmpout = out;
+#endif
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i],
+ strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n) <= 0
+
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ out += n;
+ ret += n;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ if (ret > 0 && s->msg_callback) {
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
+ p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
+ tmpout, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof buf);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+{
+ switch (code) {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return (-1); /* Don't send it :-) */
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}