diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c | 853 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 853 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 96e629a930..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,853 +0,0 @@ -/* v3_purp.c */ -/* - * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project - * 2001. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include "cryptlib.h" -#include <openssl/x509v3.h> -#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> - -static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); - -static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); -static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); -static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); -static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); - -static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); -static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); - -static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { - {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, - check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, - check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, - check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, - "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, - check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, - "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", - NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, - "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, - check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", - NULL}, -}; - -#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) - -IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) - -static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; - -static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) -{ - return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; -} - -/* - * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I - * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const - * things. - */ -int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) -{ - int idx; - const X509_PURPOSE *pt; - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - x509v3_cache_extensions(x); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } - if (id == -1) - return 1; - idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); - if (idx == -1) - return -1; - pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); - return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) -{ - if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); - return 0; - } - *p = purpose; - return 1; -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) -{ - if (!xptable) - return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; - return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; -} - -X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) -{ - if (idx < 0) - return NULL; - if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) - return xstandard + idx; - return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) -{ - int i; - X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; - for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { - xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); - if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) - return i; - } - return -1; -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) -{ - X509_PURPOSE tmp; - int idx; - if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) - return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; - tmp.purpose = purpose; - if (!xptable) - return -1; - idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); - if (idx == -1) - return -1; - return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, - int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), - char *name, char *sname, void *arg) -{ - int idx; - X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; - /* - * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it - */ - flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; - /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ - flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; - /* Get existing entry if any */ - idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); - /* Need a new entry */ - if (idx == -1) { - if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; - } else - ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); - - /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ - if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { - OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); - OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); - } - /* dup supplied name */ - ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); - ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); - if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ - ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; - /* Set all other flags */ - ptmp->flags |= flags; - - ptmp->purpose = id; - ptmp->trust = trust; - ptmp->check_purpose = ck; - ptmp->usr_data = arg; - - /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ - if (idx == -1) { - if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - } - return 1; -} - -static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) -{ - if (!p) - return; - if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { - if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { - OPENSSL_free(p->name); - OPENSSL_free(p->sname); - } - OPENSSL_free(p); - } -} - -void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) -{ - unsigned int i; - sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); - for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) - xptable_free(xstandard + i); - xptable = NULL; -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->purpose; -} - -char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->name; -} - -char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->sname; -} - -int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) -{ - return xp->trust; -} - -static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) -{ - return *a - *b; -} - -DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); -IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); - -int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) -{ - /* - * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is - * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is - * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will - * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical - * order because it will be searched using bsearch. - */ - - static const int supported_nids[] = { - NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ - NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ - NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ - NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ - NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ - NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */ - NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 - NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ - NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ -#endif - NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ - NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ - NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ - NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ - NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ - }; - - int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); - - if (ex_nid == NID_undef) - return 0; - - if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, - sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int))) - return 1; - return 0; -} - -static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) -{ - X509_NAME *iname = NULL; - int i; - if (dp->reasons) { - if (dp->reasons->length > 0) - dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; - if (dp->reasons->length > 1) - dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); - dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; - } else - dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; - if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) - return; - for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { - GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); - if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { - iname = gen->d.directoryName; - break; - } - } - if (!iname) - iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); - - DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); - -} - -static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) -{ - int i; - x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); - for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) - setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); -} - -#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) -#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) -#define xku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) -#define ns_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) - -static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) -{ - BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; - PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; - ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; - ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; - EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; - X509_EXTENSION *ex; - - int i; - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) - return; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); -#endif - /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ - if (!X509_get_version(x)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; - /* Handle basic constraints */ - if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { - if (bs->ca) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; - if (bs->pathlen) { - if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) - || !bs->ca) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - x->ex_pathlen = 0; - } else - x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); - } else - x->ex_pathlen = -1; - BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; - } - /* Handle proxy certificates */ - if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA - || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 - || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - } - if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { - x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); - } else - x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; - PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; - } - /* Handle key usage */ - if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { - if (usage->length > 0) { - x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; - if (usage->length > 1) - x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; - } else - x->ex_kusage = 0; - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; - ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); - } - x->ex_xkusage = 0; - if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; - for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { - switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { - case NID_server_auth: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; - break; - - case NID_client_auth: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; - break; - - case NID_email_protect: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; - break; - - case NID_code_sign: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; - break; - - case NID_ms_sgc: - case NID_ns_sgc: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; - break; - - case NID_OCSP_sign: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; - break; - - case NID_time_stamp: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; - break; - - case NID_dvcs: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; - break; - - case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: - x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; - break; - } - } - sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); - } - - if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { - if (ns->length > 0) - x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; - else - x->ex_nscert = 0; - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; - ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); - } - x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); - x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); - /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ - if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; - /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ - if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && - !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; - } - x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); - x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); - if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - setup_crldp(x); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 - x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); - x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, - NULL, NULL); -#endif - for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { - ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); - if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) - == NID_freshest_crl) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; - if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) - continue; - if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; - break; - } - } - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; -} - -/*- - * CA checks common to all purposes - * return codes: - * 0 not a CA - * 1 is a CA - * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA - * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. - * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. - */ - -static int check_ca(const X509 *x) -{ - /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - return 0; - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) - return 1; - /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ - else - return 0; - } else { - /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ - if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) - return 3; - /* - * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it - */ - else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) - return 4; - /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ - else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) - return 5; - /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ - return 0; - } -} - -int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) -{ - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - x509v3_cache_extensions(x); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } - - return check_ca(x); -} - -/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ -static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) -{ - int ca_ret; - ca_ret = check_ca(x); - if (!ca_ret) - return 0; - /* check nsCertType if present */ - if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; -} - -static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) - return 0; - if (ca) - return check_ssl_ca(x); - /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) - return 0; - /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ - if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -/* - * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or - * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual - * key types. - */ -#define KU_TLS \ - KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT - -static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) - return 0; - if (ca) - return check_ssl_ca(x); - - if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) - return 0; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) - return 0; - - return 1; - -} - -static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - int ret; - ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) - return ret; - /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - return ret; -} - -/* common S/MIME checks */ -static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) - return 0; - if (ca) { - int ca_ret; - ca_ret = check_ca(x); - if (!ca_ret) - return 0; - /* check nsCertType if present */ - if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; - } - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { - if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) - return 1; - /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ - if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) - return 2; - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - int ret; - ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) - return ret; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) - return 0; - return ret; -} - -static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - int ret; - ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) - return ret; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - return ret; -} - -static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - if (ca) { - int ca_ret; - if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; - } - if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -/* - * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA - * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. - */ - -static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - /* - * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value - * (2)? - */ - if (ca) - return check_ca(x); - /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ - return 1; -} - -static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) -{ - int i_ext; - - /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ - if (ca) - return check_ca(x); - - /* - * Check the optional key usage field: - * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature - * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall - * be rejected). - */ - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) - && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || - !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) - return 0; - - /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) - return 0; - - /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ - i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); - if (i_ext >= 0) { - X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); - if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) -{ - return 1; -} - -/*- - * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. - * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates - * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by - * subject name. - * These are: - * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) - * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer - * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing - * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match - * codes for X509_verify_cert() - */ - -int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) -{ - if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), - X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) - return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; - x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); - x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); - - if (subject->akid) { - int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); - if (ret != X509_V_OK) - return ret; - } - - if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { - if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) - return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; - return X509_V_OK; -} - -int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) -{ - - if (!akid) - return X509_V_OK; - - /* Check key ids (if present) */ - if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && - ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) - return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; - /* Check serial number */ - if (akid->serial && - ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) - return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; - /* Check issuer name */ - if (akid->issuer) { - /* - * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF - * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but - * we only take any notice of the first. - */ - GENERAL_NAMES *gens; - GENERAL_NAME *gen; - X509_NAME *nm = NULL; - int i; - gens = akid->issuer; - for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { - gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); - if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { - nm = gen->d.dirn; - break; - } - } - if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) - return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; - } - return X509_V_OK; -} |