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path: root/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c168
1 files changed, 150 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 4d34dbac93..b1472018ba 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
@@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* cannot do another one.
*/
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -229,6 +232,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -253,8 +257,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if (ok < 0)
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto err;
+ }
/*
* If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
* again later.
@@ -271,6 +277,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (xtmp != NULL) {
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -352,14 +359,17 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if (ok < 0)
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto err;
+ }
if (ok == 0)
break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = -1;
goto err;
}
@@ -386,8 +396,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
while (j-- > 1) {
xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
- if (ok < 0)
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto err;
+ }
/* Check if we found an alternate chain */
if (ok > 0) {
/*
@@ -515,6 +527,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL)
X509_free(chain_ss);
+
+ /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
+ if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
return ok;
}
@@ -697,13 +713,27 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
*/
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
- if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ /*
+ * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
+ * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
+ * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
+ * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
+ *
+ * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
+ * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
+ * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
+ * increment proxy_path_length.
+ */
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
+ if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
@@ -726,6 +756,81 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
+ * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
+ * added.
+ * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+ X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
+ int last_object_nid = 0;
+ int err = X509_V_OK;
+ int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
+
+ /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
+ if (last_object_loc < 1) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
+ * there is in issuer.
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
+ != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
+ * multivalued RDN
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
+ == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ goto proxy_name_done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
+ * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
+ */
+ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
+ if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ tmpentry =
+ X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
+ last_object_nid =
+ OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
+
+ if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
+ || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
+ X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
+
+ proxy_name_done:
+ if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = err;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
* including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
@@ -736,12 +841,19 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
if (nc) {
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
- if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ switch (rv) {
+ case X509_V_OK:
+ continue;
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ ctx->error = rv;
+ return 0;
+ default:
ctx->error = rv;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
+ break;
}
}
}
@@ -880,6 +992,8 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ return 1;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
@@ -1010,13 +1124,25 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-
- if (crl_score > best_score) {
- best_crl = crl;
- best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
- best_score = crl_score;
- best_reasons = reasons;
+ if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
+ continue;
+ /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
+ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
+ int day, sec;
+ if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+ X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+ * and |sec|.
+ */
+ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
+ continue;
}
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ best_reasons = reasons;
}
if (best_crl) {
@@ -1630,6 +1756,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ret == 0) {
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return 0;
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
@@ -1658,7 +1785,12 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ /*
+ * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
+ * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
+ * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
+ * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
+ */
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
return 0;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-27 09:29:26 +0000