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Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c')
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c275
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 275 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index efa1fd3e99..0000000000
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include "constant_time_locl.h"
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
-{
- int j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with 0xff data */
- j = tlen - 3 - flen;
- memset(p, 0xff, j);
- p += j;
- *(p++) = '\0';
- memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen,
- int num)
-{
- int i, j;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- p = from;
- if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
- RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* scan over padding data */
- j = flen - 1; /* one for type. */
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (*p != 0xff) { /* should decrypt to 0xff */
- if (*p == 0) {
- p++;
- break;
- } else {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
- RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
- return (-1);
- }
- }
- p++;
- }
-
- if (i == j) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
- RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (i < 8) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
- RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
- return (-1);
- }
- i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
- j -= i;
- if (j > tlen) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- return (-1);
- }
- memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
-
- return (j);
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
-{
- int i, j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with non-zero random data */
- j = tlen - 3 - flen;
-
- if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
- return (0);
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (*p == '\0')
- do {
- if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
- return (0);
- } while (*p == '\0');
- p++;
- }
-
- *(p++) = '\0';
-
- memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen,
- int num)
-{
- int i;
- /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
-
- if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /*
- * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
- * section 7.2.2.
- */
-
- if (flen > num)
- goto err;
-
- if (num < 11)
- goto err;
-
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (em == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- memset(em, 0, num);
- /*
- * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
- * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
- * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
- *
- * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
- */
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
-
- found_zero_byte = 0;
- for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
- zero_index =
- constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
- zero_index);
- found_zero_byte |= equals0;
- }
-
- /*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
- * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
- * also fails.
- */
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
-
- /*
- * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
- * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
- */
- msg_index = zero_index + 1;
- mlen = num - msg_index;
-
- /*
- * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
- * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
- */
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
-
- /*
- * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
- * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
- * information at the API boundary.
- * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
- * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
- */
- if (!good) {
- mlen = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
-
- err:
- if (em != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(em);
- if (mlen == -1)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
- RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
- return mlen;
-}
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