diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 291 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 291 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9a01b4afc1..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,291 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */ -/* - * Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, - * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - */ - -/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */ - -/* - * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL: - * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security - * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new - * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, - * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL: - * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements - * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of - * one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion. - */ - -#include "constant_time_locl.h" - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) -# include <stdio.h> -# include "cryptlib.h" -# include <openssl/bn.h> -# include <openssl/rsa.h> -# include <openssl/evp.h> -# include <openssl/rand.h> -# include <openssl/sha.h> - -int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, - const unsigned char *param, int plen) -{ - return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, - param, plen, NULL, NULL); -} - -int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, - const unsigned char *param, int plen, - const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) -{ - int i, emlen = tlen - 1; - unsigned char *db, *seed; - unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int mdlen; - - if (md == NULL) - md = EVP_sha1(); - if (mgf1md == NULL) - mgf1md = md; - - mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); - - if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); - return 0; - } - - if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, - RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - return 0; - } - - to[0] = 0; - seed = to + 1; - db = to + mdlen + 1; - - if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL)) - return 0; - memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1); - db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01; - memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen); - if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0) - return 0; -# ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT - memcpy(seed, - "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f", - 20); -# endif - - dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen); - if (dbmask == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) - goto err; - for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++) - db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) - goto err; - for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) - seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; - - OPENSSL_free(dbmask); - return 1; - - err: - OPENSSL_free(dbmask); - return 0; -} - -int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, - const unsigned char *param, int plen) -{ - return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num, - param, plen, NULL, NULL); -} - -int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, - int num, const unsigned char *param, - int plen, const EVP_MD *md, - const EVP_MD *mgf1md) -{ - int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; - unsigned int good, found_one_byte; - const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; - /* - * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em = - * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB - */ - unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], - phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int mdlen; - - if (md == NULL) - md = EVP_sha1(); - if (mgf1md == NULL) - mgf1md = md; - - mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); - - if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) - return -1; - /* - * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the - * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by - * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, - * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of - * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. - * This does not leak any side-channel information. - */ - if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) - goto decoding_err; - - dblen = num - mdlen - 1; - db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); - em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (db == NULL || em == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto cleanup; - } - - /* - * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid - * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel - * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access - * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. - * - * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. - */ - memset(em, 0, num); - memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); - - /* - * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is - * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA - * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). - */ - good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); - - maskedseed = em + 1; - maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) - goto cleanup; - for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) - seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; - - if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) - goto cleanup; - for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) - db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; - - if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL)) - goto cleanup; - - good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen)); - - found_one_byte = 0; - for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) { - /* - * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. - */ - unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); - unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); - one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, - i, one_index); - found_one_byte |= equals1; - good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); - } - - good &= found_one_byte; - - /* - * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, - * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a - * concern. - */ - if (!good) - goto decoding_err; - - msg_index = one_index + 1; - mlen = dblen - msg_index; - - if (tlen < mlen) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); - mlen = -1; - } else { - memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen); - goto cleanup; - } - - decoding_err: - /* - * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not - * reveal which kind of decoding error happened. - */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, - RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); - cleanup: - if (db != NULL) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen); - OPENSSL_free(db); - } - if (em != NULL) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num); - OPENSSL_free(em); - } - return mlen; -} - -int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, - const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) -{ - long i, outlen = 0; - unsigned char cnt[4]; - EVP_MD_CTX c; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int mdlen; - int rv = -1; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); - mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); - if (mdlen < 0) - goto err; - for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { - cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); - cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255); - cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255; - cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255); - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4)) - goto err; - if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL)) - goto err; - outlen += mdlen; - } else { - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL)) - goto err; - memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); - outlen = len; - } - } - rv = 0; - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c); - return rv; -} - -#endif |