diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 616 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 616 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c deleted file mode 100644 index 29e465b075..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,616 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP - -#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG -# ifndef NDEBUG -# define NDEBUG -# endif -#endif - -#include <assert.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include "e_os.h" - -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include "rand_lcl.h" - -#include <openssl/err.h> - -#ifdef BN_DEBUG -# define PREDICT -#endif - -/* #define PREDICT 1 */ - -#define STATE_SIZE 1023 -static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; -static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; - -static double entropy = 0; -static int initialized = 0; - -static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread - * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to - * prevent double locking) */ -/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ -/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ -static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; - -#ifdef PREDICT -int rand_predictable = 0; -#endif - -const char RAND_version[] = "RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; - -static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); -static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -static int ssleay_rand_status(void); - -RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth = { - ssleay_rand_seed, - ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, - ssleay_rand_cleanup, - ssleay_rand_add, - ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, - ssleay_rand_status -}; - -RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) -{ - return (&rand_ssleay_meth); -} - -static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) -{ - OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); - state_num = 0; - state_index = 0; - OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - md_count[0] = 0; - md_count[1] = 0; - entropy = 0; - initialized = 0; -} - -static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -{ - int i, j, k, st_idx; - long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_MD_CTX m; - int do_not_lock; - - if (!num) - return; - - /* - * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) - * - * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for - * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash - * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function - * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' - * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as - * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' - * (which is incremented after each use). - * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the - * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the - * hash function. - */ - - /* check if we already have the lock */ - if (crypto_lock_rand) { - CRYPTO_THREADID cur; - CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - } else - do_not_lock = 0; - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - st_idx = state_index; - - /* - * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread - * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's - * _some_ difference - */ - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); - - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - state_index += num; - if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { - state_index %= STATE_SIZE; - state_num = STATE_SIZE; - } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { - if (state_index > state_num) - state_num = state_index; - } - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - - /* - * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we - * will use now, but other threads may use them as well - */ - - md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); - for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { - j = (num - i); - j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; - - if (!MD_Init(&m) || - !MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; - if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k) || - !MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k)) - goto err; - } else - if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j)) - goto err; - - /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ - if (!MD_Update(&m, buf, j)) - goto err; - /* - * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind - * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, - * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get - * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very - * insecure keys. - */ - - if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) || - !MD_Final(&m, local_md)) - goto err; - md_c[1]++; - - buf = (const char *)buf + j; - - for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { - /* - * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte - * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and - * local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking - * could hurt performance more than necessary given that - * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the - * random state. - */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; - if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) - st_idx = 0; - } - } - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - /* - * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other - * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented - * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into - * md. - */ - for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { - md[k] ^= local_md[k]; - } - if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ - entropy += add; - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) - assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); -#endif - - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); -} - -static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -{ - ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); -} - -int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock) -{ - static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; - int i, j, k; - size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; - int ok; - long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_MD_CTX m; -#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS - pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); -#endif - int do_stir_pool = 0; - -#ifdef PREDICT - if (rand_predictable) { - static unsigned char val = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < num; i++) - buf[i] = val++; - return (1); - } -#endif - - if (num <= 0) - return 1; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); - /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - num_ceil = - (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); - - /* - * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) - * - * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: - * - * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from - * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to - * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' - * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept - * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the - * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. - * - * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the - * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' - * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the - * global 'md'. - */ - if (lock) - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - - /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - crypto_lock_rand = 1; - - if (!initialized) { - RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; - } - - if (!stirred_pool) - do_stir_pool = 1; - - ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); - if (!ok) { - /* - * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG - * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have - * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial - * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, - * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* - * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before - * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate - * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the - * entropy limit has been reached. - */ - entropy -= num; - if (entropy < 0) - entropy = 0; - } - - if (do_stir_pool) { - /* - * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we - * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly - * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input - * function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more - * suitable for this purpose. - */ - - int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ - while (n > 0) { -#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 -# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." -#endif -#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ - /* - * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that - * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. - */ - ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); - n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; - } - if (ok) - stirred_pool = 1; - } - - st_idx = state_index; - st_num = state_num; - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); - - state_index += num_ceil; - if (state_index > state_num) - state_index %= state_num; - - /* - * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now - * ours (but other threads may use them too) - */ - - md_count[0] += 1; - - /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ - crypto_lock_rand = 0; - if (lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - - while (num > 0) { - /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; - num -= j; - if (!MD_Init(&m)) - goto err; -#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS - if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid)) - goto err; - curr_pid = 0; - } -#endif - if (!MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || - !MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) - goto err; - -#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ - /* - * The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small source of - * entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised it may cause - * programs such as purify or valgrind to complain. So for those - * builds it is not used: the removal of such a small source of - * entropy has negligible impact on security. - */ - if (!MD_Update(&m, buf, j)) - goto err; -#endif - - k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; - if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k) || - !MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) - goto err; - } - if (!MD_Final(&m, local_md)) - goto err; - - for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { - /* may compete with other threads */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; - if (st_idx >= st_num) - st_idx = 0; - if (i < j) - *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; - } - } - - if (!MD_Init(&m) || - !MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) || - !MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - if (lock) - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - if (!MD_Update(&m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || - !MD_Final(&m, md)) { - if (lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - goto err; - } - if (lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); - if (ok) - return (1); - else if (pseudo) - return 0; - else { - RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); - ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " - "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); - return (0); - } - - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); - return (0); -} - -static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 1); -} - -/* - * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable - */ -static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1, 1); -} - -static int ssleay_rand_status(void) -{ - CRYPTO_THREADID cur; - int ret; - int do_not_lock; - - CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); - /* - * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() - * implementation calls RAND_status()) - */ - if (crypto_lock_rand) { - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - } else - do_not_lock = 0; - - if (!do_not_lock) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - - /* - * prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again - */ - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - crypto_lock_rand = 1; - } - - if (!initialized) { - RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; - } - - ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; - - if (!do_not_lock) { - /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ - crypto_lock_rand = 0; - - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - } - - return ret; -} |