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-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/1453.diff120
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c29
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c32
3 files changed, 172 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/1453.diff b/thirdparty/mbedtls/1453.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..acc3654cd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/1453.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
+index 67900c46c8..cefe882d2a 100644
+--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
+@@ -54,28 +54,43 @@
+ #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
+ #endif
+ #include <windows.h>
+-#include <wincrypt.h>
++#include <bcrypt.h>
++#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
++/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
++ * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
++ * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
++ * warning when including intsafe.h.
++ */
++#pragma warning( push )
++#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
++#endif
++#include <intsafe.h>
++#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
++#pragma warning( pop )
++#endif
+
+ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
+ size_t *olen )
+ {
+- HCRYPTPROV provider;
++ ULONG len_as_ulong = 0;
+ ((void) data);
+ *olen = 0;
+
+- if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL,
+- PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE )
++ /*
++ * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
++ * 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into
++ * a ULONG.
++ */
++ if ( FAILED( SizeTToULong( len, &len_as_ulong ) ) )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+ }
+
+- if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE )
++ if ( !BCRYPT_SUCCESS( BCryptGenRandom( NULL, output, len_as_ulong, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG ) ) )
+ {
+- CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+ }
+
+- CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
+ *olen = len;
+
+ return( 0 );
+diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
+index afff4e18bf..7960fa1a1a 100644
+--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,19 @@
+
+ #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+ #include <windows.h>
++#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
++/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
++ * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
++ * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
++ * warning when including intsafe.h.
++ */
++#pragma warning( push )
++#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
++#endif
++#include <intsafe.h>
++#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
++#pragma warning( pop )
++#endif
+ #else
+ #include <time.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -1130,6 +1143,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
+ char filename[MAX_PATH];
+ char *p;
+ size_t len = strlen( path );
++ int lengthAsInt = 0;
+
+ WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
+ HANDLE hFind;
+@@ -1144,7 +1158,18 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
+ p = filename + len;
+ filename[len++] = '*';
+
+- w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,
++ if ( FAILED ( SizeTToInt( len, &lengthAsInt ) ) )
++ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
++
++ /*
++ * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming
++ * string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the
++ * incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to
++ * change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the
++ * incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with
++ * MultiByteToWideChar().
++ */
++ w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, lengthAsInt, szDir,
+ MAX_PATH - 3 );
+ if( w_ret == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+@@ -1161,8 +1186,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
+ if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )
+ continue;
+
++ if ( FAILED( SizeTToInt( wcslen( file_data.cFileName ), &lengthAsInt ) ) )
++ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
++
+ w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
+- lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),
++ lengthAsInt,
+ p, (int) len - 1,
+ NULL, NULL );
+ if( w_ret == 0 )
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
index a116e605d2..ed350735d0 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
@@ -54,28 +54,43 @@
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#endif
#include <windows.h>
-#include <wincrypt.h>
+#include <bcrypt.h>
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
+/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
+ * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
+ * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
+ * warning when including intsafe.h.
+ */
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
+#endif
+#include <intsafe.h>
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
size_t *olen )
{
- HCRYPTPROV provider;
+ ULONG len_as_ulong = 0;
((void) data);
*olen = 0;
- if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL,
- PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE )
+ /*
+ * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
+ * 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into
+ * a ULONG.
+ */
+ if ( FAILED( SizeTToULong( len, &len_as_ulong ) ) )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
}
- if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE )
+ if ( !BCRYPT_SUCCESS( BCryptGenRandom( NULL, output, len_as_ulong, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG ) ) )
{
- CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
}
- CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
*olen = len;
return( 0 );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
index daa316367b..2a5dbb8783 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
+/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
+ * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
+ * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
+ * warning when including intsafe.h.
+ */
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
+#endif
+#include <intsafe.h>
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
#else
#include <time.h>
#endif
@@ -1114,6 +1127,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
char filename[MAX_PATH];
char *p;
size_t len = strlen( path );
+ int lengthAsInt = 0;
WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
HANDLE hFind;
@@ -1128,7 +1142,18 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
p = filename + len;
filename[len++] = '*';
- w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,
+ if ( FAILED ( SizeTToInt( len, &lengthAsInt ) ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
+
+ /*
+ * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming
+ * string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the
+ * incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to
+ * change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the
+ * incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with
+ * MultiByteToWideChar().
+ */
+ w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, lengthAsInt, szDir,
MAX_PATH - 3 );
if( w_ret == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -1145,8 +1170,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )
continue;
+ if ( FAILED( SizeTToInt( wcslen( file_data.cFileName ), &lengthAsInt ) ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
+
w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
- lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),
+ lengthAsInt,
p, (int) len - 1,
NULL, NULL );
if( w_ret == 0 )
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-22 04:42:48 +0000