diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/mbedtls')
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 21 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c | 2 |
6 files changed, 92 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index d076c2352f..93de091c4d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -546,6 +546,23 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ) +#error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \ + "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) @@ -669,6 +686,10 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h index 8e2ce03c32..e0a2e7f6d6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -40,16 +40,16 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 5 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 6 /** * The single version number has the following structure: * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100500 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.5" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.5" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100600 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.6" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.6" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c index 040c20bd38..725e176df2 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c @@ -1938,6 +1938,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, final_norm: #endif + /* + * Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + if( f_rng != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) ); @@ -2308,6 +2322,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); } + /* + * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + if( f_rng != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) ); cleanup: diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c index afced7a99c..c5c3af69df 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -1417,6 +1417,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) ); + /* Check that there is enough room for: + * - 2 bytes of version + * - 1 byte of cookie_len + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + /* * struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; @@ -1445,8 +1458,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } cookie_len = *p++; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); - if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, @@ -1455,6 +1466,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c index b8f35fec5d..cbec74fe8c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1004,8 +1004,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL ) { - int ret = 0; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, transform->keylen, @@ -2885,15 +2883,18 @@ static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /* * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones */ -static void ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + int ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); - return; + return( 0 ); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); @@ -2920,7 +2921,9 @@ static void ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); } } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + + return( 0 ); } /* @@ -2957,7 +2960,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; - ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; } @@ -2980,7 +2984,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); - ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); } ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); @@ -3017,7 +3022,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) { if( is_finished ) - ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + { + if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -3997,17 +4005,23 @@ static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) { + int send_ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_buf, len ); /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ - (void) ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); + send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret ); + (void) send_ret; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); } if( ret == 0 ) { - /* Got a valid cookie, partially reset context */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c index 2e0b0e8f6c..4d25303206 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c @@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert ); #else ((void) verbose); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ return( ret ); } |