diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/mbedtls/library')
94 files changed, 21765 insertions, 14037 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c index af19a3849f..31824e75cf 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) @@ -63,6 +32,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) #include "mbedtls/padlock.h" #endif @@ -87,29 +57,6 @@ #define AES_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) ) static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; @@ -439,7 +386,7 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void ) { pow[i] = x; log[x] = i; - x = ( x ^ XTIME( x ) ) & 0xFF; + x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ^ XTIME( x ) ); } /* @@ -448,7 +395,7 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void ) for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++ ) { RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x; - x = XTIME( x ) & 0xFF; + x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); } /* @@ -461,10 +408,10 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void ) { x = pow[255 - log[i]]; - y = x; y = ( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ) & 0xFF; - x ^= y; y = ( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ) & 0xFF; - x ^= y; y = ( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ) & 0xFF; - x ^= y; y = ( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ) & 0xFF; + y = x; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); x ^= y ^ 0x63; FSb[i] = (unsigned char) x; @@ -477,8 +424,8 @@ static void aes_gen_tables( void ) for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) { x = FSb[i]; - y = XTIME( x ) & 0xFF; - z = ( y ^ x ) & 0xFF; + y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); + z = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( y ^ x ); FT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) y ) ^ ( (uint32_t) x << 8 ) ^ @@ -620,7 +567,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, for( i = 0; i < ( keybits >> 5 ); i++ ) { - GET_UINT32_LE( RK[i], key, i << 2 ); + RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, i << 2 ); } switch( ctx->nr ) @@ -630,10 +577,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, for( i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4 ) { RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[3] ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[3] ) ] << 24 ); RK[5] = RK[1] ^ RK[4]; RK[6] = RK[2] ^ RK[5]; @@ -646,10 +593,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, for( i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6 ) { RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[5] ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[5] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[5] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[5] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[5] ) ] << 24 ); RK[7] = RK[1] ^ RK[6]; RK[8] = RK[2] ^ RK[7]; @@ -664,20 +611,20 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, for( i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8 ) { RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[7] ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[7] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[7] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[7] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[7] ) ] << 24 ); RK[9] = RK[1] ^ RK[8]; RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9]; RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10]; RK[12] = RK[4] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( RK[11] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[11] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[11] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[11] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[11] ) ] << 24 ); RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12]; RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13]; @@ -743,10 +690,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, { for( j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++ ) { - *RK++ = AES_RT0( FSb[ ( *SK ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - AES_RT1( FSb[ ( *SK >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - AES_RT2( FSb[ ( *SK >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - AES_RT3( FSb[ ( *SK >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] ); + *RK++ = AES_RT0( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT1( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT2( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT3( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *SK ) ] ); } } @@ -792,7 +739,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; @@ -817,7 +764,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; @@ -839,52 +786,52 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ -#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ - do \ - { \ - (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y0) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( (Y1) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( (Y2) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( (Y3) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y1) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( (Y2) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( (Y3) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( (Y0) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y2) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( (Y3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( (Y0) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( (Y1) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ - \ - (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( ( (Y3) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( ( (Y0) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( ( (Y1) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( ( (Y2) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ +#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ } while( 0 ) #define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ do \ { \ - (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y0) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( (Y3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( (Y2) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( (Y1) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ \ - (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y1) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( (Y0) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( (Y3) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( (Y2) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ \ - (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y2) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( (Y1) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( (Y0) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( (Y3) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ \ - (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( ( (Y3) ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( ( (Y2) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( ( (Y1) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( ( (Y0) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ } while( 0 ) /* @@ -903,10 +850,10 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, uint32_t Y[4]; } t; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) { @@ -917,33 +864,33 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[3] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); @@ -956,7 +903,7 @@ void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ) { - mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ); + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ @@ -976,10 +923,10 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, uint32_t Y[4]; } t; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; - GET_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) { @@ -990,33 +937,33 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[3] ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[2] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[1] >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ ( t.Y[0] >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] << 24 ); + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); @@ -1029,7 +976,7 @@ void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ) { - mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ); + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ @@ -1082,7 +1029,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[16]; AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -1152,35 +1099,6 @@ exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) -/* Endianess with 64 bits values */ -#ifndef GET_UINT64_LE -#define GET_UINT64_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 7] << 56 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 6] << 48 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 5] << 40 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 4] << 32 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) ] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT64_LE -#define PUT_UINT64_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) + 7] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 56 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 6] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 48 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 5] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 40 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 4] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 32 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; /* @@ -1196,14 +1114,14 @@ static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16], { uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; - GET_UINT64_LE( a, x, 0 ); - GET_UINT64_LE( b, x, 8 ); + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 8 ); ra = ( a << 1 ) ^ 0x0087 >> ( 8 - ( ( b >> 63 ) << 3 ) ); rb = ( a >> 63 ) | ( b << 1 ); - PUT_UINT64_LE( ra, r, 0 ); - PUT_UINT64_LE( rb, r, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( ra, r, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( rb, r, 8 ); } /* @@ -1216,7 +1134,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t blocks = length / 16; size_t leftover = length % 16; unsigned char tweak[16]; @@ -1329,7 +1247,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -1397,7 +1315,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char c; unsigned char ov[17]; @@ -1489,7 +1407,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int c, i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -1884,7 +1802,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memset( buf, 0, 16 ); @@ -1946,7 +1864,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memset( iv , 0, 16 ); @@ -2021,7 +1939,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memcpy( iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16 ); @@ -2084,7 +2002,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) mode = i & 1; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3d (%s): ", keybits, + mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); memcpy( iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16 ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c index 358d4ad860..996292ff6d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * AES-NI support functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -49,11 +22,7 @@ * [CLMUL-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode/ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c index 6729bab002..b34dc5e754 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. @@ -49,11 +22,7 @@ * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c index 50ccb91c70..bc05c4a319 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * ARIA implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5794 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) @@ -87,29 +56,6 @@ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) /* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE( n, b, i ) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE( n, b, i ) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - -/* * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes * * This is submatrix P1 in [1] Appendix B.1 @@ -266,22 +212,22 @@ static inline void aria_sl( uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, const uint8_t sa[256], const uint8_t sb[256], const uint8_t sc[256], const uint8_t sd[256] ) { - *a = ( (uint32_t) sa[ *a & 0xFF] ) ^ - (((uint32_t) sb[(*a >> 8) & 0xFF]) << 8) ^ - (((uint32_t) sc[(*a >> 16) & 0xFF]) << 16) ^ - (((uint32_t) sd[ *a >> 24 ]) << 24); - *b = ( (uint32_t) sa[ *b & 0xFF] ) ^ - (((uint32_t) sb[(*b >> 8) & 0xFF]) << 8) ^ - (((uint32_t) sc[(*b >> 16) & 0xFF]) << 16) ^ - (((uint32_t) sd[ *b >> 24 ]) << 24); - *c = ( (uint32_t) sa[ *c & 0xFF] ) ^ - (((uint32_t) sb[(*c >> 8) & 0xFF]) << 8) ^ - (((uint32_t) sc[(*c >> 16) & 0xFF]) << 16) ^ - (((uint32_t) sd[ *c >> 24 ]) << 24); - *d = ( (uint32_t) sa[ *d & 0xFF] ) ^ - (((uint32_t) sb[(*d >> 8) & 0xFF]) << 8) ^ - (((uint32_t) sc[(*d >> 16) & 0xFF]) << 16) ^ - (((uint32_t) sd[ *d >> 24 ]) << 24); + *a = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *a ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *a ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *a ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *a ) ]) << 24); + *b = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *b ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *b ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *b ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *b ) ]) << 24); + *c = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *c ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *c ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *c ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *c ) ]) << 24); + *d = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *d ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *d ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *d ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *d ) ]) << 24); } /* @@ -439,7 +385,8 @@ static void aria_fe_xor( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], * Big endian 128-bit rotation: r = a ^ (b <<< n), used only in key setup. * * We chose to store bytes into 32-bit words in little-endian format (see - * GET/PUT_UINT32_LE) so we need to reverse bytes here. + * MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE / MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE ) so we need to reverse + * bytes here. */ static void aria_rot128( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t a[4], const uint32_t b[4], uint8_t n ) @@ -487,21 +434,21 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* Copy key to W0 (and potential remainder to W1) */ - GET_UINT32_LE( w[0][0], key, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( w[0][1], key, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( w[0][2], key, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( w[0][3], key, 12 ); + w[0][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ); + w[0][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ); + w[0][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ); + w[0][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ); memset( w[1], 0, 16 ); if( keybits >= 192 ) { - GET_UINT32_LE( w[1][0], key, 16 ); // 192 bit key - GET_UINT32_LE( w[1][1], key, 20 ); + w[1][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); // 192 bit key + w[1][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); } if( keybits == 256 ) { - GET_UINT32_LE( w[1][2], key, 24 ); // 256 bit key - GET_UINT32_LE( w[1][3], key, 28 ); + w[1][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); // 256 bit key + w[1][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); } i = ( keybits - 128 ) >> 6; // index: 0, 1, 2 @@ -578,10 +525,10 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - GET_UINT32_LE( a, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( b, input, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( c, input, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( d, input, 12 ); + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); + c = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); + d = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); i = 0; while( 1 ) @@ -613,10 +560,10 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; - PUT_UINT32_LE( a, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( b, output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( c, output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( d, output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( a, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( b, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( c, output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( d, output, 12 ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c index 10239fdd15..22747d3ba4 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Generic ASN.1 parsing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,39 +15,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -149,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN ) ) != 0 ) @@ -164,21 +134,41 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - int *val ) +static int asn1_get_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int tag, int *val ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, tag ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( len == 0 || len > sizeof( int ) || ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + /* + * len==0 is malformed (0 must be represented as 020100 for INTEGER, + * or 0A0100 for ENUMERATED tags + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + /* This is a cryptography library. Reject negative integers. */ + if( ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); - *val = 0; + /* Skip leading zeros. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0 ) + { + ++( *p ); + --len; + } + /* Reject integers that don't fit in an int. This code assumes that + * the int type has no padding bit. */ + if( len > sizeof( int ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + if( len == sizeof( int ) && ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + *val = 0; while( len-- > 0 ) { *val = ( *val << 8 ) | **p; @@ -188,12 +178,26 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, val) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, val) ); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_mpi *X ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) @@ -210,7 +214,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* Certificate type is a single byte bitstring */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &bs->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) @@ -238,82 +242,145 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, } /* - * Get a bit string without unused bits + * Traverse an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF <tag>" + * and call a callback for each entry found. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - size_t *len ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( (*len)-- < 2 || *(*p)++ != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); - - return( 0 ); -} - - - -/* - * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF <tag>" - */ -int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, - int tag) +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ) { int ret; size_t len; - mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; /* Get main sequence tag */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { return( ret ); + } if( *p + len != end ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); while( *p < end ) { - buf = &(cur->buf); - buf->tag = **p; + unsigned char const tag = *(*p)++; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &buf->len, tag ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); + if( ( tag & tag_must_mask ) != tag_must_val ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); - buf->p = *p; - *p += buf->len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); - /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ - if( *p < end ) + if( ( tag & tag_may_mask ) == tag_may_val ) { - cur->next = (mbedtls_asn1_sequence*)mbedtls_calloc( 1, - sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( ctx, tag, *p, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } - if( cur->next == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); + *p += len; + } - cur = cur->next; - } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get a bit string without unused bits + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + --( *len ); + + if( **p != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + ++( *p ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ) +{ + while( seq != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq, sizeof( *seq ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq ); + seq = next; } +} - /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ - cur->next = NULL; +typedef struct +{ + int tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur; +} asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t; + +static int asn1_get_sequence_of_cb( void *ctx, + int tag, + unsigned char *start, + size_t len ) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *cb_ctx = + (asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *) ctx; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = + cb_ctx->cur; - if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + cur->next = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + cur->buf.p = start; + cur->buf.len = len; + cur->buf.tag = tag; + + cb_ctx->cur = cur; return( 0 ); } +/* + * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF <tag>" + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t cb_ctx = { tag, cur }; + memset( cur, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + return( mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + p, end, 0xFF, tag, 0, 0, + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb, &cb_ctx ) ); +} + int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, @@ -357,7 +424,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf params; memset( ¶ms, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c index d94d0a7605..3811ef27a3 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,38 +15,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -90,8 +60,8 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len if( *p - start < 3 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - *--(*p) = ( len ) & 0xFF; - *--(*p) = ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF; + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); *--(*p) = 0x82; return( 3 ); } @@ -101,9 +71,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len if( *p - start < 4 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - *--(*p) = ( len ) & 0xFF; - *--(*p) = ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - *--(*p) = ( len >> 16 ) & 0xFF; + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( len ); *--(*p) = 0x83; return( 4 ); } @@ -115,10 +85,10 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len if( *p - start < 5 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - *--(*p) = ( len ) & 0xFF; - *--(*p) = ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - *--(*p) = ( len >> 16 ) & 0xFF; - *--(*p) = ( len >> 24 ) & 0xFF; + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( len ); *--(*p) = 0x84; return( 5 ); } @@ -156,7 +126,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; // Write the MPI @@ -193,7 +163,7 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; // Write NULL @@ -207,7 +177,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ) int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, @@ -222,7 +192,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *s const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( par_len == 0 ) @@ -241,7 +211,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *s int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( *p - start < 1 ) @@ -256,36 +226,49 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolea return( (int) len ); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +static int asn1_write_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val, int tag ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; - if( *p - start < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - - len += 1; - *--(*p) = val; - - if( val > 0 && **p & 0x80 ) + do { if( *p - start < 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + len += 1; + *--(*p) = val & 0xff; + val >>= 8; + } + while( val > 0 ); + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); *--(*p) = 0x00; len += 1; } MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); return( (int) len ); } +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED ) ); +} + int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag, const char *text, size_t text_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, @@ -315,10 +298,53 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) ); } +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ) +{ + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + const unsigned char *cur_byte; + unsigned char cur_byte_shifted; + unsigned char bit; + + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; + + /* + * Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding + * of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits + * when encoding this value in the first content octet + */ + if( bits != 0 ) + { + cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1; + cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits; + + for( ; ; ) + { + bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1; + cur_byte_shifted >>= 1; + + if( bit != 0 ) + break; + + bits--; + if( bits == 0 ) + break; + + if( bits % 8 == 0 ) + cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte; + } + } + + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( p, start, buf, bits ) ); +} + int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; size_t unused_bits, byte_len; @@ -351,7 +377,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, buf, size ) ); @@ -411,18 +437,26 @@ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( memcpy( cur->oid.p, oid, oid_len ); cur->val.len = val_len; - cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); - if( cur->val.p == NULL ) + if( val_len != 0 ) { - mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); - mbedtls_free( cur ); - return( NULL ); + cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); + if( cur->val.p == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } } cur->next = *head; *head = cur; } - else if( cur->val.len < val_len ) + else if( val_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + cur->val.p = NULL; + } + else if( cur->val.len != val_len ) { /* * Enlarge existing value buffer if needed diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c index b1bd330ddd..83daa0bcc6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,38 +15,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" #include <stdint.h> @@ -68,38 +38,6 @@ #define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ -/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. - * - * Constant flow with respect to c. - */ -static unsigned char mask_of_range( unsigned char low, unsigned char high, - unsigned char c ) -{ - /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ - unsigned low_mask = ( (unsigned) c - low ) >> 8; - /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ - unsigned high_mask = ( (unsigned) high - c ) >> 8; - return( ~( low_mask | high_mask ) & 0xff ); -} - -/* Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). - */ -static unsigned char enc_char( unsigned char val ) -{ - unsigned char digit = 0; - /* For each range of values, if val is in that range, mask digit with - * the corresponding value. Since val can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change digit. */ - digit |= mask_of_range( 0, 25, val ) & ( 'A' + val ); - digit |= mask_of_range( 26, 51, val ) & ( 'a' + val - 26 ); - digit |= mask_of_range( 52, 61, val ) & ( '0' + val - 52 ); - digit |= mask_of_range( 62, 62, val ) & '+'; - digit |= mask_of_range( 63, 63, val ) & '/'; - return( digit ); -} - /* * Encode a buffer into base64 format */ @@ -140,10 +78,12 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, C2 = *src++; C3 = *src++; - *p++ = enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); - *p++ = enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ); - *p++ = enc_char( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) & 0x3F ); - *p++ = enc_char( C3 & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( C3 & 0x3F ); } if( i < slen ) @@ -151,11 +91,12 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, C1 = *src++; C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0; - *p++ = enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); - *p++ = enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) + & 0x3F ); if( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) - *p++ = enc_char( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ); else *p++ = '='; *p++ = '='; @@ -167,34 +108,6 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, return( 0 ); } -/* Given a Base64 digit, return its value. - * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), - * return -1. - * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). - * - * The implementation is constant-flow (no branch or memory access depending - * on the value of c) unless the compiler inlines and optimizes a specific - * access. - */ -static signed char dec_value( unsigned char c ) -{ - unsigned char val = 0; - /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with - * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus - * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ - val |= mask_of_range( 'A', 'Z', c ) & ( c - 'A' + 0 + 1 ); - val |= mask_of_range( 'a', 'z', c ) & ( c - 'a' + 26 + 1 ); - val |= mask_of_range( '0', '9', c ) & ( c - '0' + 52 + 1 ); - val |= mask_of_range( '+', '+', c ) & ( c - '+' + 62 + 1 ); - val |= mask_of_range( '/', '/', c ) & ( c - '/' + 63 + 1 ); - /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is - * a digit with the value v. */ - return( val - 1 ); -} - /* * Decode a base64-formatted buffer */ @@ -247,7 +160,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, { if( equals != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); - if( dec_value( src[i] ) < 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( src[i] ) < 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); } n++; @@ -282,14 +195,14 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, if( *src == '=' ) ++equals; else - x |= dec_value( *src ); + x |= mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( *src ); if( ++accumulated_digits == 4 ) { accumulated_digits = 0; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( x >> 16 ); - if( equals <= 1 ) *p++ = (unsigned char)( x >> 8 ); - if( equals <= 0 ) *p++ = (unsigned char)( x ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ); + if( equals <= 1 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ); + if( equals <= 0 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); } } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c index c553d0c5af..62e7f76727 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Multi-precision integer library * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -60,17 +33,15 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> @@ -212,8 +183,35 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) return( 0 ); } +/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ +static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs ) +{ + if( limbs == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + else if( X->n == limbs ) + { + memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL ); + X->s = 1; + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); + } +} + /* - * Copy the contents of Y into X + * Copy the contents of Y into X. + * + * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. + * + * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, + * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example + * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). */ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) { @@ -227,7 +225,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) if( Y->n == 0 ) { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + if( X->n != 0 ) + { + X->s = 1; + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + } return( 0 ); } @@ -268,168 +270,12 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); } -/** - * Select between two sign values in constant-time. - * - * This is functionally equivalent to second ? a : b but uses only bit - * operations in order to avoid branches. - * - * \param[in] a The first sign; must be either +1 or -1. - * \param[in] b The second sign; must be either +1 or -1. - * \param[in] second Must be either 1 (return b) or 0 (return a). - * - * \return The selected sign value. - */ -static int mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( int a, int b, unsigned char second ) -{ - /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonnably assume about - * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned - * by taking advantage of the fact that a and b are either +1 or -1. */ - unsigned ua = a + 1; - unsigned ub = b + 1; - - /* second was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are ua and ub */ - const unsigned mask = second << 1; - - /* select ua or ub */ - unsigned ur = ( ua & ~mask ) | ( ub & mask ); - - /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */ - return( (int) ur - 1 ); -} - -/* - * Conditionally assign dest = src, without leaking information - * about whether the assignment was made or not. - * dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n. - * assign must be 0 or 1. - */ -static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char assign ) -{ - size_t i; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ - const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -assign; - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); -} - -/* - * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information - * about whether the assignment was made or not. - * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* make sure assign is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */ - assign = (assign | (unsigned char)-assign) >> (sizeof( assign ) * 8 - 1); - /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ - limb_mask = -assign; - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); - - X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, assign ); - - mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); - - for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) - X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information - * about whether the swap was made or not. - * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to - * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char swap ) -{ - int ret, s; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - if( X == Y ) - return( 0 ); - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* make sure swap is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */ - swap = (swap | (unsigned char)-swap) >> (sizeof( swap ) * 8 - 1); - /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ - limb_mask = -swap; - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) ); - - s = X->s; - X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, swap ); - Y->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( Y->s, s, swap ); - - - for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) - { - tmp = X->p[i]; - X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask ); - Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask ); - } - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - /* * Set value from integer */ int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) ); @@ -572,7 +418,7 @@ static int mpi_get_digit( mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c ) */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, j, slen, n; int sign = 1; mbedtls_mpi_uint d; @@ -585,6 +431,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + if( s[0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + if( s[0] == '-' ) { ++s; @@ -637,7 +489,7 @@ cleanup: static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, char **p, const size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi_uint r; size_t length = 0; char *p_end = *p + buflen; @@ -802,7 +654,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n, slen, plen; /* * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, @@ -932,11 +784,37 @@ static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs ) } /* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ ) + X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen; unsigned char *Xp; @@ -945,17 +823,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bu MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ - if( X->n != limbs ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); - /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source argument, + /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, * even if buflen is 0. */ - if( buf != NULL ) + if( buflen != 0 ) { Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen ); @@ -965,10 +837,54 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bu cleanup: + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ return( ret ); } /* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + size_t i; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } + else + { + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + buf[i] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset( buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, @@ -1019,7 +935,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, v0, t1; mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); @@ -1176,107 +1092,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) return( 0 ); } -/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. - * - * \param x First integer. - * \param y Second integer. - * - * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, 0 otherwise - */ -static unsigned ct_lt_mpi_uint( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; - mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; - - /* - * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. - */ - cond = ( x ^ y ); - /* - * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and - * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y. - */ - ret = ( x - y ) & ~cond; - /* - * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the - * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if - * the MSB of y is 0.) - */ - ret |= y & cond; - - - ret = ret >> ( biL - 1 ); - - return (unsigned) ret; -} - -/* - * Compare signed values in constant time - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned *ret ) -{ - size_t i; - /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ - unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL ); - - if( X->n != Y->n ) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - - /* - * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. - * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. - */ - X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1; - Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1; - - /* - * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. - * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it - * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). - */ - cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative ); - *ret = cond & X_is_negative; - - /* - * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still - * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. - */ - done = cond; - - for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) - { - /* - * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are negative. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] ); - *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative; - done |= cond; - - /* - * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are positive. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] ); - *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative ); - done |= cond; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - /* * Compare signed values */ @@ -1299,7 +1114,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) */ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); @@ -1356,29 +1171,32 @@ cleanup: /** * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. * - * Calculate d - s where d and s have the same size. + * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry - * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `d < s`, and 0 otherwise). + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). * - * \param n Number of limbs of \p d and \p s. - * \param[in,out] d On input, the left operand. - * On output, the result of the subtraction: - * \param[in] s The right operand. + * d may be aliased to l or r. * - * \return 1 if `d < s`. - * 0 if `d >= s`. + * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. + * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] l The left operand. + * \param[in] r The right operand. + * + * \return 1 if `l < r`. + * 0 if `l >= r`. */ static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s ) + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) { size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c, z; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; - for( i = c = 0; i < n; i++, s++, d++ ) + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) { - z = ( *d < c ); *d -= c; - c = ( *d < *s ) + z; *d -= *s; + z = ( l[i] < c ); t = l[i] - c; + c = ( t < r[i] ) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; } return( c ); @@ -1389,32 +1207,13 @@ static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - mbedtls_mpi TB; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); - - if( X == B ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); - B = &TB; - } - - if( X != A ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); - - /* - * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. - */ - X->s = 1; - - ret = 0; - for( n = B->n; n > 0; n-- ) if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) break; @@ -1425,7 +1224,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi goto cleanup; } - carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, B->p ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, A->n ) ); + + /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs + * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the + * significant digits of B. */ + if( A->n > n ) + memcpy( X->p + n, A->p + n, ( A->n - n ) * ciL ); + if( X->n > A->n ) + memset( X->p + A->n, 0, ( X->n - A->n ) * ciL ); + + carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, A->p, B->p ); if( carry != 0 ) { /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ @@ -1441,10 +1250,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi --X->p[n]; } -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ + X->s = 1; +cleanup: return( ret ); } @@ -1554,8 +1363,21 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint return( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); } -/* - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication +/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. + * + * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. + * + * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. + * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. + * It may overlap with \p d, but only if + * \p d <= \p s. + * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. + * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. + * It must be sufficiently large to store the + * result of the multiplication. This means + * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b + * is not known a priori. + * \param b A scalar to multiply. */ static #if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) @@ -1565,7 +1387,10 @@ static */ __attribute__ ((noinline)) #endif -void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) { mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; @@ -1620,10 +1445,10 @@ void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, mbedtls_mp t++; - do { + while( c != 0 ) + { *d += c; c = ( *d < c ); d++; } - while( c != 0 ); } /* @@ -1631,7 +1456,7 @@ void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, mbedtls_mp */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; int result_is_zero = 0; @@ -1683,17 +1508,37 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) { - mbedtls_mpi B; - mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - B.s = 1; - B.n = 1; - B.p = p; - p[0] = b; + /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ + size_t n = A->n; + while( n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0 ) + --n; + + /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance + * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + if( b == 0 || n == 0 ) + { + return( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + } - return( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If + * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same + * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since + * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, + * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer + * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the + * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly + * grow to its final size. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, A->p, X->p, b - 1 ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); } /* @@ -1798,9 +1643,10 @@ static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n, t, k; mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); @@ -1808,7 +1654,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); + /* + * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. + * + * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, + * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack + * buffer. + */ + T2.s = 1; + T2.n = sizeof( TP2 ) / sizeof( *TP2 ); + T2.p = TP2; if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) { @@ -1823,8 +1679,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Z, A->n + 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Z, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, 2 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T2, 3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, A->n + 2 ) ); k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &Y ) % biL; if( k < biL - 1 ) @@ -1856,6 +1711,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, Y.p[t], NULL); } + T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; + T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; + T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; + Z.p[i - t - 1]++; do { @@ -1865,11 +1724,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, T1.p[0] = ( t < 1 ) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &T2, 0 ) ); - T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; - T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; - T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T1, &T2 ) > 0 ); @@ -1905,7 +1759,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( TP2, sizeof( TP2 ) ); return( ret ); } @@ -1934,7 +1789,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, */ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); @@ -2090,14 +1945,14 @@ static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ d[n] += 1; - d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, N->p ); + d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, d, N->p ); /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ - mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); } /* @@ -2117,42 +1972,6 @@ static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); } -/* - * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: - * return x == y - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with - * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(). - * - * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those - * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. - */ -static size_t mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y ) -{ - /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ - const size_t diff = x ^ y; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ - const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff ); - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); - - return( 1 ^ diff1 ); -} - /** * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. * @@ -2170,13 +1989,12 @@ static size_t mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y ) */ static int mpi_select( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx ) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i], - (unsigned char) mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); } cleanup: @@ -2190,7 +2008,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t wbits, wsize, one = 1; size_t i, j, nblimbs; size_t bufsize, nbits; @@ -2272,14 +2090,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( A, N ) >= 0 ) + { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &W[1], A, N ) ); + /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow + * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n + 1 ) ); + } else MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); - /* Re-grow W[1] if necessary. This should be only necessary in one corner - * case: when A == 0 represented with A.n == 0, mbedtls_mpi_copy shrinks - * W[1] to 0 limbs. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n +1 ) ); + /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs + * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); /* @@ -2421,15 +2243,15 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t lz, lzt; - mbedtls_mpi TG, TA, TB; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TG ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); @@ -2450,9 +2272,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B if( lzt < lz ) lz = lzt; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, lz ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, lz ) ); - TA.s = TB.s = 1; /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some @@ -2476,7 +2295,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. * - * At the beginning, we have TA = |A|/2^a and TB = |B|/2^b. + * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). * The code maintains the following invariant: * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) */ @@ -2528,8 +2347,35 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TG ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). + * The size and sign of X are unchanged. + * n_bytes must not be 0. + */ +static int mpi_fill_random_internal( + mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes ); + const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes; + + if( X->n < limbs ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( X->p, 0, overhead ); + memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) ); + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); +cleanup: return( ret ); } @@ -2544,29 +2390,95 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size ); - size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - size; - unsigned char *Xp; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ - if( X->n != limbs ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + int count; + unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ); + size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8; + mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; + + if( min < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &lower_bound ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs + * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. + * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &lower_bound, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &lower_bound, min ) ); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) ); - Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, Xp + overhead, size ) ); + if( --count == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } - mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, &lower_bound, <_lower ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, <_upper ) ); + } + while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &lower_bound ); return( ret ); } @@ -2575,7 +2487,7 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); @@ -2828,7 +2740,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi XX; MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); @@ -3165,7 +3077,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ) cleanup: if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", ret ); + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c index a3f9be959f..621e9f76cd 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Blowfish implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The Blowfish block cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993. @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) @@ -71,29 +40,6 @@ #define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - static const uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2] = { 0x243F6A88L, 0x85A308D3L, 0x13198A2EL, 0x03707344L, 0xA4093822L, 0x299F31D0L, 0x082EFA98L, 0xEC4E6C89L, @@ -110,13 +56,13 @@ static uint32_t F( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t x ) unsigned short a, b, c, d; uint32_t y; - d = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); + d = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); x >>= 8; - c = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); x >>= 8; - b = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); + b = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); x >>= 8; - a = (unsigned short)(x & 0xFF); + a = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); y = ctx->S[0][a] + ctx->S[1][b]; y = y ^ ctx->S[2][c]; y = y + ctx->S[3][d]; @@ -273,8 +219,8 @@ int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - GET_UINT32_BE( X0, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( X1, input, 4 ); + X0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + X1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) { @@ -285,8 +231,8 @@ int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, blowfish_enc( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); } - PUT_UINT32_BE( X0, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X1, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X0, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X1, output, 4 ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c index 6cf265e578..29d730ab53 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Camellia implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/01espec.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -80,29 +49,6 @@ #define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] = { { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b }, @@ -332,14 +278,14 @@ static void camellia_feistel( const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], I0 = x[0] ^ k[0]; I1 = x[1] ^ k[1]; - I0 = ((uint32_t) SBOX1((I0 >> 24) & 0xFF) << 24) | - ((uint32_t) SBOX2((I0 >> 16) & 0xFF) << 16) | - ((uint32_t) SBOX3((I0 >> 8) & 0xFF) << 8) | - ((uint32_t) SBOX4((I0 ) & 0xFF) ); - I1 = ((uint32_t) SBOX2((I1 >> 24) & 0xFF) << 24) | - ((uint32_t) SBOX3((I1 >> 16) & 0xFF) << 16) | - ((uint32_t) SBOX4((I1 >> 8) & 0xFF) << 8) | - ((uint32_t) SBOX1((I1 ) & 0xFF) ); + I0 = ((uint32_t) SBOX1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( I0 )) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( I0 )) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( I0 )) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( I0 )) ); + I1 = ((uint32_t) SBOX2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( I1 )) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( I1 )) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( I1 )) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( I1 )) ); I0 ^= (I1 << 8) | (I1 >> 24); I1 ^= (I0 << 16) | (I0 >> 16); @@ -407,8 +353,8 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, * Prepare SIGMA values */ for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) { - GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA[i][0], SIGMA_CHARS[i], 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA[i][1], SIGMA_CHARS[i], 4 ); + SIGMA[i][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA_CHARS[i], 0 ); + SIGMA[i][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA_CHARS[i], 4 ); } /* @@ -419,7 +365,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, /* Store KL, KR */ for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - GET_UINT32_BE( KC[i], t, i * 4 ); + KC[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( t, i * 4 ); /* Generate KA */ for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) @@ -545,10 +491,10 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, NR = ctx->nr; RK = ctx->rk; - GET_UINT32_BE( X[0], input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( X[1], input, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( X[2], input, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( X[3], input, 12 ); + X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 8 ); + X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 12 ); X[0] ^= *RK++; X[1] ^= *RK++; @@ -583,10 +529,10 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, X[0] ^= *RK++; X[1] ^= *RK++; - PUT_UINT32_BE( X[2], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X[3], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X[0], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X[1], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[2], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[3], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[0], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[1], output, 12 ); return( 0 ); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c index b2e5a4763d..a21a37f55f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -53,16 +26,13 @@ * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -99,13 +69,14 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); if( cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -180,7 +151,7 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char i; unsigned char q; size_t len_left, olen; @@ -204,7 +175,7 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); - if( add_len > 0xFF00 ) + if( add_len >= 0xFF00 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; @@ -229,7 +200,7 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, memcpy( b + 1, iv, iv_len ); for( i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8 ) - b[15-i] = (unsigned char)( len_left & 0xFF ); + b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left ); if( len_left > 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -250,8 +221,7 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, src = add; memset( b, 0, 16 ); - b[0] = (unsigned char)( ( add_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - b[1] = (unsigned char)( ( add_len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( add_len, b, 0 ); use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2; memcpy( b + 2, src, use_len ); @@ -390,7 +360,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; unsigned char i; int diff; @@ -454,34 +424,34 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, /* * The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes */ -static const unsigned char key[] = { +static const unsigned char key_test_data[] = { 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f }; -static const unsigned char iv[] = { +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[] = { 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b }; -static const unsigned char ad[] = { +static const unsigned char ad_test_data[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 }; -static const unsigned char msg[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { +static const unsigned char msg_test_data[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, }; -static const size_t iv_len [NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; -static const size_t add_len[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; -static const size_t msg_len[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; -static const size_t tag_len[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; +static const size_t iv_len_test_data [NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; +static const size_t add_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; +static const size_t msg_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; +static const size_t tag_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; -static const unsigned char res[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { +static const unsigned char res_test_data[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { { 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d }, { 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d, @@ -503,11 +473,12 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN]; unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN]; size_t i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); - if( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, 8 * sizeof key ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data, + 8 * sizeof key_test_data ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " CCM: setup failed" ); @@ -522,15 +493,18 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); memset( ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN ); - memcpy( plaintext, msg, msg_len[i] ); + memcpy( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ); - ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len[i], - iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i], + ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], plaintext, ciphertext, - ciphertext + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] ); + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 || - memcmp( ciphertext, res[i], msg_len[i] + tag_len[i] ) != 0 ) + memcmp( ciphertext, res_test_data[i], + msg_len_test_data[i] + tag_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); @@ -539,13 +513,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) } memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); - ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len[i], - iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i], + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], ciphertext, plaintext, - ciphertext + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] ); + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 || - memcmp( plaintext, msg, msg_len[i] ) != 0 ) + memcmp( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c index cb43f53368..a5695e3c8e 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 test certificates * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/certs.h" @@ -279,7 +248,7 @@ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ @@ -289,88 +258,88 @@ "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA\r\n" \ - "A4IBAQB0ZiNRFdia6kskaPnhrqejIRq8YMEGAf2oIPnyZ78xoyERgc35lHGyMtsL\r\n" \ - "hWicNjP4d/hS9As4j5KA2gdNGi5ETA1X7SowWOGsryivSpMSHVy1+HdfWlsYQOzm\r\n" \ - "8o+faQNUm8XzPVmttfAVspxeHSxJZ36Oo+QWZ5wZlCIEyjEdLUId+Tm4Bz3B5jRD\r\n" \ - "zZa/SaqDokq66N2zpbgKKAl3GU2O++fBqP2dSkdQykmTxhLLWRN8FJqhYATyQntZ\r\n" \ - "0QSi3W9HfSZPnFTcPIXeoiPd2pLlxt1hZu8dws2LTXE63uP6MM4LHvWxiuJaWkP/\r\n" \ - "mtxyUALj2pQxRitopORFQdn7AOY5\r\n" \ + "A4IBAQABE3OEPfEd/bcJW5ZdU3/VgPNS4tMzh8gnJP/V2FcvFtGylMpQq6YnEBYI\r\n" \ + "yBHAL4DRvlMY5rnXGBp3ODR8MpqHC6AquRTCLzjS57iYff//4QFQqW9n92zctspv\r\n" \ + "czkaPKgjqo1No3Uq0Xaz10rcxyTUPrf5wNVRZ2V0KvllvAAVSzbI4mpdUXztjhST\r\n" \ + "S5A2BeWQAAOr0zq1F7TSRVJpJs7jmB2ai/igkh1IAjcuwV6VwlP+sbw0gjQ0NpGM\r\n" \ + "iHpnlzRAi/tIbtOvMIGOBU2TIfax/5jq1agUx5aPmT5TWAiJPOOP6l5xXnDwxeYS\r\n" \ + "NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ\r\n" \ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" /* END FILE */ /* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der. */ /* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der */ #define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ - 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ - 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ - 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ - 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ - 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ - 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ - 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ - 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ - 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ - 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ - 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ - 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ - 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ - 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ - 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ - 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ - 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ - 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ - 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ - 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ - 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ - 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ - 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ - 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ - 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ - 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ - 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x74, 0x66, 0x23, 0x51, 0x15, 0xd8, 0x9a, \ - 0xea, 0x4b, 0x24, 0x68, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0xae, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0x21, 0x1a, 0xbc, \ - 0x60, 0xc1, 0x06, 0x01, 0xfd, 0xa8, 0x20, 0xf9, 0xf2, 0x67, 0xbf, 0x31, \ - 0xa3, 0x21, 0x11, 0x81, 0xcd, 0xf9, 0x94, 0x71, 0xb2, 0x32, 0xdb, 0x0b, \ - 0x85, 0x68, 0x9c, 0x36, 0x33, 0xf8, 0x77, 0xf8, 0x52, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0x38, \ - 0x8f, 0x92, 0x80, 0xda, 0x07, 0x4d, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0x44, 0x4c, 0x0d, 0x57, \ - 0xed, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x58, 0xe1, 0xac, 0xaf, 0x28, 0xaf, 0x4a, 0x93, 0x12, \ - 0x1d, 0x5c, 0xb5, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x5f, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x18, 0x40, 0xec, 0xe6, \ - 0xf2, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x69, 0x03, 0x54, 0x9b, 0xc5, 0xf3, 0x3d, 0x59, 0xad, \ - 0xb5, 0xf0, 0x15, 0xb2, 0x9c, 0x5e, 0x1d, 0x2c, 0x49, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x8e, \ - 0xa3, 0xe4, 0x16, 0x67, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x94, 0x22, 0x04, 0xca, 0x31, 0x1d, \ - 0x2d, 0x42, 0x1d, 0xf9, 0x39, 0xb8, 0x07, 0x3d, 0xc1, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x43, \ - 0xcd, 0x96, 0xbf, 0x49, 0xaa, 0x83, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0xba, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0xb3, \ - 0xa5, 0xb8, 0x0a, 0x28, 0x09, 0x77, 0x19, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0xe7, 0xc1, \ - 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x9d, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x50, 0xca, 0x49, 0x93, 0xc6, 0x12, 0xcb, \ - 0x59, 0x13, 0x7c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xa1, 0x60, 0x04, 0xf2, 0x42, 0x7b, 0x59, \ - 0xd1, 0x04, 0xa2, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0x47, 0x7d, 0x26, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x54, 0xdc, \ - 0x3c, 0x85, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x23, 0xdd, 0xda, 0x92, 0xe5, 0xc6, 0xdd, 0x61, \ - 0x66, 0xef, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x4d, 0x71, 0x3a, 0xde, 0xe3, 0xfa, \ - 0x30, 0xce, 0x0b, 0x1e, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x8a, 0xe2, 0x5a, 0x5a, 0x43, 0xff, \ - 0x9a, 0xdc, 0x72, 0x50, 0x02, 0xe3, 0xda, 0x94, 0x31, 0x46, 0x2b, 0x68, \ - 0xa4, 0xe4, 0x45, 0x41, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x00, 0xe6, 0x39 \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ + 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ + 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ + 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ + 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ + 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ + 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ + 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ + 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ + 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ + 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ + 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ + 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ + 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ + 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ + 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ + 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ + 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ + 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ + 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ + 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ + 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ + 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ + 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ + 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ + 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ + 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x13, 0x73, 0x84, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x1d, \ + 0xfd, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x7f, 0xd5, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x52, \ + 0xe2, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x87, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x24, 0xff, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x57, 0x2f, \ + 0x16, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0x94, 0xca, 0x50, 0xab, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x10, 0x16, 0x08, \ + 0xc8, 0x11, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0xbe, 0x53, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xb9, 0xd7, \ + 0x18, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x38, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x32, 0x9a, 0x87, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x2a, \ + 0xb9, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x38, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0xb8, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xff, 0xff, \ + 0xe1, 0x01, 0x50, 0xa9, 0x6f, 0x67, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0xca, 0x6f, \ + 0x73, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0x75, 0x2a, \ + 0xd1, 0x76, 0xb3, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0xdc, 0xc7, 0x24, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0xb7, 0xf9, \ + 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x67, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x65, 0xbc, 0x00, 0x15, \ + 0x4b, 0x36, 0xc8, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0x51, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x8e, 0x14, 0x93, \ + 0x4b, 0x90, 0x36, 0x05, 0xe5, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0xab, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xb5, \ + 0x17, 0xb4, 0xd2, 0x45, 0x52, 0x69, 0x26, 0xce, 0xe3, 0x98, 0x1d, 0x9a, \ + 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x92, 0x1d, 0x48, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x95, \ + 0xc2, 0x53, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x34, 0x82, 0x34, 0x34, 0x36, 0x91, 0x8c, \ + 0x88, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x97, 0x34, 0x40, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0x48, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0xaf, \ + 0x30, 0x81, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x21, 0xf6, 0xb1, 0xff, 0x98, 0xea, \ + 0xd5, 0xa8, 0x14, 0xc7, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x53, 0x58, 0x08, 0x89, \ + 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x5e, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x70, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0x12, \ + 0x35, 0x6a, 0xa2, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0xba, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xda, \ + 0x09, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x30, 0xcb, 0x53, 0x4a, 0x90 \ } /* END FILE */ @@ -730,101 +699,101 @@ /* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt. */ /* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/server2.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ - "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ - "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ - "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ - "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ - "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ - "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ - "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ - "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3Q4\r\n" \ - "cB7v7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A\r\n" \ - "O/7c+Hw7hDFEIvZk98aBGjCLqn3DmgHIv8ToQ67nellQxx2Uj309PdgjNi/r9HOc\r\n" \ - "KNAYPbBcg6MJGWWj2TI6vNaceios/DhOYx5V0j5nfqSJ/pnU0g9Ign2LAhgYpGJE\r\n" \ - "iEM9wW7hEMkwmk0h/sqZsrJsGH5YsF/VThSq/JVO1e2mZH2vruyZKJVBq+8tDNYp\r\n" \ - "HkK6tSyVYQhzIt3StMJWKMl/o5k2AYz6tSC164+1oG+ML3LWg8XrGKa91H4UOKap\r\n" \ - "Awgk0+4m0T25cNs=\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ +"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ +"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ +"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ +"MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ +"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ +"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ +"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ +"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ +"tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ +"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ +"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ +"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ +"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3Q4\r\n" \ +"cB7v7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A\r\n" \ +"O/7c+Hw7hDFEIvZk98aBGjCLqn3DmgHIv8ToQ67nellQxx2Uj309PdgjNi/r9HOc\r\n" \ +"KNAYPbBcg6MJGWWj2TI6vNaceios/DhOYx5V0j5nfqSJ/pnU0g9Ign2LAhgYpGJE\r\n" \ +"iEM9wW7hEMkwmk0h/sqZsrJsGH5YsF/VThSq/JVO1e2mZH2vruyZKJVBq+8tDNYp\r\n" \ +"HkK6tSyVYQhzIt3StMJWKMl/o5k2AYz6tSC164+1oG+ML3LWg8XrGKa91H4UOKap\r\n" \ +"Awgk0+4m0T25cNs=\r\n" \ +"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" /* END FILE */ /* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt.der. */ /* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/server2.crt.der */ #define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ - 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ - 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ - 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ - 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 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0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ + 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x73, 0x0b, 0x4a, 0xc5, \ + 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xde, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x1c, 0x76, 0x04, 0x2b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0xc0, \ + 0x84, 0x11, 0xc5, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x35, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xb8, \ + 0x20, 0x14, 0x82, 0xee, 0x54, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xce, \ + 0x59, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x51, 0x69, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x09, 0xe7, 0x85, \ + 0x92, 0xd8, 0xba, 0xb1, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x2d, 0xe9, 0x86, \ + 0xb5, 0xde, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x3f, 0x53, 0x28, 0x42, 0x86, 0x83, 0x73, 0x43, \ + 0xe0, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x07, 0x90, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xbc, \ + 0x58, 0x19, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0x39, 0x72, 0x51, 0x92, 0xd7, 0xb4, 0x1d, \ + 0x75, 0x2f, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0x2b, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xdb, 0x50, 0xae, 0xe2, 0xf1, \ + 0xd4, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x3c, 0xbb, 0x41, 0x2b, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0xe2, 0x4a, 0x02, \ + 0xe5, 0x60, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0xa6, 0xcc, 0x06, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x89, \ + 0x4e, 0x96, 0x30, 0x22, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xc3, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x6e, \ + 0x50, 0x1e, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x17, 0x35, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x43, 0xb2, \ + 0x29, 0xb7, 0xa8, 0x5e, 0x35, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x60, 0x42, 0x1a, 0x01, 0xcb, \ + 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc1, 0x90, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xd1, 0x2c, \ + 0x02, 0xf4, 0x76, 0x41, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x15, 0x98, 0x71, 0xf9, 0x35, \ + 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x34, 0x96, 0x91, 0xbe, 0x32, 0x67, 0x2d, 0x6b, \ + 0xd3, 0x55, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x50, 0xb4, 0xe3, 0x62, 0x78, 0x6c, 0x11, \ + 0x15, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x1c, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x10, 0x65, 0x60, \ + 0x87, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x69, 0x59, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xfe, 0x6b, \ + 0xe2, 0x63, 0x78, 0x95, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0xd7, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8 \ } /* END FILE */ @@ -993,54 +962,54 @@ "IwQYMBaAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADaAAwZQIx\r\n" \ "AMqme4DKMldUlplDET9Q6Eptre7uUWKhsLOF+zPkKDlfzpIkJYEFgcloDHGYw80u\r\n" \ "IgIwNftyPXsabTqMM7iEHgVpX/GRozKklY9yQI/5eoA6gGW7Y+imuGR/oao5ySOb\r\n" \ - "a9Vk\r\n" \ + "a9Vk\r\n" \ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" /* END FILE */ /* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ /* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der */ #define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x63, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, \ - 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, \ - 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x41, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, \ - 0x32, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, \ - 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, \ - 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, \ - 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, \ - 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, \ - 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, \ - 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, \ - 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, \ - 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x00, \ - 0x5f, 0x86, 0x64, 0xfc, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x10, 0x3b, 0xb2, 0xe6, \ - 0x3b, 0xc4, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, \ - 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, \ - 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, \ - 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, \ - 0x00, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xca, 0x32, 0x57, 0x54, 0x96, 0x99, 0x43, \ - 0x11, 0x3f, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0xad, 0xee, 0xee, 0x51, 0x62, 0xa1, \ - 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x33, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x39, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x92, 0x24, \ - 0x25, 0x81, 0x05, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x98, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x2e, \ - 0x22, 0x02, 0x30, 0x35, 0xfb, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x8c, \ - 0x33, 0xb8, 0x84, 0x1e, 0x05, 0x69, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xa4, \ - 0x95, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x65, 0xbb, \ - 0x63, 0xe8, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x23, 0x9b, \ - 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x64 \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x63, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, \ + 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, \ + 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x41, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, \ + 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, \ + 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, \ + 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, \ + 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, \ + 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, \ + 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, \ + 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, \ + 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x00, \ + 0x5f, 0x86, 0x64, 0xfc, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x10, 0x3b, 0xb2, 0xe6, \ + 0x3b, 0xc4, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, \ + 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, \ + 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, \ + 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, \ + 0x00, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xca, 0x32, 0x57, 0x54, 0x96, 0x99, 0x43, \ + 0x11, 0x3f, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0xad, 0xee, 0xee, 0x51, 0x62, 0xa1, \ + 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x33, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x39, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x92, 0x24, \ + 0x25, 0x81, 0x05, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x98, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x2e, \ + 0x22, 0x02, 0x30, 0x35, 0xfb, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x8c, \ + 0x33, 0xb8, 0x84, 0x1e, 0x05, 0x69, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xa4, \ + 0x95, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x65, 0xbb, \ + 0x63, 0xe8, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x23, 0x9b, \ + 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x64 \ } /* END FILE */ @@ -1100,76 +1069,76 @@ using `xxd -i.` */ /* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der */ #define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1a, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x11, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, \ - 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x32, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, \ - 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ - 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 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0x49, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x47, 0x1d, 0x4d, 0xf8, \ + 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x5c, 0x89, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x62, 0x8a, 0xf3, 0x56, 0x2f, \ + 0xaf, 0x17, 0x33, 0x46, 0x13, 0x00, 0x13, 0xae, 0x22, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xda, \ + 0xc8, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0x77, 0x65, 0xee, 0x58, 0x94, 0x74, 0xe4, 0xf5, 0x4f, \ + 0xa1, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xd8, 0x16, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x67, \ + 0x63, 0x2d, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xed, 0x1b, 0x22, \ + 0xef, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x11, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0xb8, \ + 0xd8, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0x35, 0x41, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x96, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0x8e, \ + 0x3f, 0x47, 0x68, 0x33, 0x17, 0x83, 0x44, 0x0f, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x0a, \ + 0xa9, 0x32, 0xcb, 0x59, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x81, \ + 0x90, 0x16, 0x91, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x79, 0x62, 0xff, 0x4b, 0x04, 0xf1, 0x5c, \ + 0x34, 0xeb, 0x69, 0xce, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x6e, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0x40, 0x55, 0xca, \ + 0x24, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x70, 0xee, 0x74, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xc2, 0x82, \ + 0x9a, 0x20, 0x38, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x26, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x75, 0x77, \ + 0xe3, 0xce, 0x65, 0xec, 0x71, 0x10, 0x35, 0xcb, 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x19, 0x43, \ + 0xeb, 0x30, 0xd0, 0xca, 0x2d, 0x3f, 0xca, 0x46, 0x14, 0x61, 0x99, 0x30, \ + 0x41, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x97 \ } /* END FILE */ @@ -1643,7 +1612,6 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = #define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_EC #define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_EC #define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_EC - #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ /* API stability forces us to declare diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c index 80fe50cc67..658f046901 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c @@ -6,13 +6,7 @@ * \author Daniel King <damaki.gh@gmail.com> * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -25,39 +19,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <stddef.h> #include <string.h> @@ -84,13 +54,6 @@ #define CHACHA20_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) -#define BYTES_TO_U32_LE( data, offset ) \ - ( (uint32_t) (data)[offset] \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ - ) - #define ROTL32( value, amount ) \ ( (uint32_t) ( (value) << (amount) ) | ( (value) >> ( 32 - (amount) ) ) ) @@ -201,10 +164,7 @@ static void chacha20_block( const uint32_t initial_state[16], { size_t offset = i * 4U; - keystream[offset ] = (unsigned char)( working_state[i] ); - keystream[offset + 1U] = (unsigned char)( working_state[i] >> 8 ); - keystream[offset + 2U] = (unsigned char)( working_state[i] >> 16 ); - keystream[offset + 3U] = (unsigned char)( working_state[i] >> 24 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(working_state[i], keystream, offset); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize( working_state, sizeof( working_state ) ); @@ -242,14 +202,14 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, ctx->state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* Set key */ - ctx->state[4] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 0 ); - ctx->state[5] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 4 ); - ctx->state[6] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 8 ); - ctx->state[7] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 12 ); - ctx->state[8] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 16 ); - ctx->state[9] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 20 ); - ctx->state[10] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 24 ); - ctx->state[11] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 28 ); + ctx->state[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ); + ctx->state[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ); + ctx->state[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ); + ctx->state[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ); + ctx->state[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); + ctx->state[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + ctx->state[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); + ctx->state[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -265,9 +225,9 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, ctx->state[12] = counter; /* Nonce */ - ctx->state[13] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( nonce, 0 ); - ctx->state[14] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( nonce, 4 ); - ctx->state[15] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( nonce, 8 ); + ctx->state[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 0 ); + ctx->state[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 4 ); + ctx->state[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 8 ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); @@ -350,7 +310,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], unsigned char* output ) { mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); @@ -544,6 +504,9 @@ static const size_t test_lengths[2] = 375U }; +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + #define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ do \ { \ @@ -561,7 +524,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ) { unsigned char output[381]; unsigned i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) { diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c index c8b5bba4b2..dc75b2030a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c @@ -4,13 +4,7 @@ * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539. * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -23,38 +17,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -147,7 +117,7 @@ void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); @@ -160,7 +130,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); @@ -216,7 +186,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || input != NULL ); CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || output != NULL ); @@ -265,7 +235,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char len_block[16]; CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); @@ -293,22 +263,8 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, /* The lengths of the AAD and ciphertext are processed by * Poly1305 as the final 128-bit block, encoded as little-endian integers. */ - len_block[ 0] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len ); - len_block[ 1] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 8 ); - len_block[ 2] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 16 ); - len_block[ 3] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 24 ); - len_block[ 4] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 32 ); - len_block[ 5] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 40 ); - len_block[ 6] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 48 ); - len_block[ 7] = (unsigned char)( ctx->aad_len >> 56 ); - len_block[ 8] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len ); - len_block[ 9] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 8 ); - len_block[10] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 16 ); - len_block[11] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 24 ); - len_block[12] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 32 ); - len_block[13] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 40 ); - len_block[14] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 48 ); - len_block[15] = (unsigned char)( ctx->ciphertext_len >> 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->aad_len, len_block, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->ciphertext_len, len_block, 8); ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, len_block, 16U ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -329,7 +285,7 @@ static int chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned char tag[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( ctx, nonce, mode ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -379,7 +335,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; size_t i; int diff; @@ -500,6 +456,9 @@ static const unsigned char test_mac[1][16] = } }; +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + #define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ do \ { \ @@ -517,7 +476,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ) { mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; unsigned i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output[200]; unsigned char mac[16]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d7ad16a617 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** + * \file check_crypto_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for PSA configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your crypto_config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c index 4ea0221f4d..4ec40d2cac 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c @@ -6,13 +6,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com> * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -25,40 +19,17 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> @@ -83,6 +54,15 @@ #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -95,26 +75,6 @@ #define CIPHER_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) -/* Compare the contents of two buffers in constant time. - * Returns 0 if the contents are bitwise identical, otherwise returns - * a non-zero value. - * This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. - */ -static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t len ) -{ - const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1; - const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2; - size_t i; - unsigned char diff; - - for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < len; i++ ) - diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i]; - - return( (int)diff ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ - static int supported_init = 0; const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ) @@ -138,7 +98,8 @@ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ) return( mbedtls_cipher_supported ); } -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -149,7 +110,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher return( NULL ); } -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name ) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( + const char *cipher_name ) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -163,9 +125,10 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher return( NULL ); } -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, - int key_bitlen, - const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( + const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -189,6 +152,29 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) if( ctx == NULL ) return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + if( ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + if( cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED ) + { + /* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key( cipher_psa->slot ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cipher_psa, sizeof( *cipher_psa ) ); + mbedtls_free( cipher_psa ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) if( ctx->cmac_ctx ) { @@ -204,7 +190,8 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); } -int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) { CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); if( cipher_info == NULL ) @@ -231,6 +218,38 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_in return( 0 ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa; + + if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are + * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( cipher_info->mode, taglen ); + if( alg == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + if( mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( cipher_info->type ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); + + cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa ) ); + if( cipher_psa == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + cipher_psa->alg = alg; + ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa; + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + ctx->psa_enabled = 1; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, int key_bitlen, @@ -243,6 +262,64 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + size_t const key_bytelen = ( (size_t) key_bitlen + 7 ) / 8; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + /* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */ + if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */ + if( cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + ctx->cipher_info->type ); + if( key_type == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation + * (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption + * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this + * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + /* mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */ + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, cipher_psa->alg ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, key, key_bytelen, + &cipher_psa->slot ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + break; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to + * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ + cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED; + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 && (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen ) { @@ -281,6 +358,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH ) @@ -324,6 +410,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* We don't support resetting PSA-based + * cipher contexts, yet. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; return( 0 ); @@ -338,6 +433,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { @@ -374,7 +479,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t block_size; CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -384,6 +489,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + *olen = 0; block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); if ( 0 == block_size ) @@ -787,6 +902,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + *olen = 0; if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || @@ -879,6 +1004,19 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding + * schemes, we currently don't make them + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + if( mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + switch( mode ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -930,6 +1068,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, @@ -943,8 +1091,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ( tag_len != 16U ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, - tag ) ); + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag ) ); } #endif @@ -955,7 +1103,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { unsigned char check_tag[16]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); @@ -967,6 +1115,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. It would make sense * to return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT or perhaps * MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, but at the time I write this our @@ -979,14 +1137,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if( tag_len > sizeof( check_tag ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, - check_tag, tag_len ) ) ) + if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( + (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + check_tag, tag_len ) ) ) { return( ret ); } /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ - if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; goto exit; @@ -1001,15 +1160,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ( tag_len != sizeof( check_tag ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, - check_tag ); + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag ); if ( ret != 0 ) { return( ret ); } /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ - if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; goto exit; @@ -1031,7 +1190,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t finish_olen; CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -1040,16 +1199,79 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t part_len; + + if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* In the following, we can immediately return on an error, + * because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations + * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), + * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) + { + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &cipher_op, + output + *olen, ilen - *olen, + &part_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen += part_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( ctx, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, output, olen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, &finish_olen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, + &finish_olen ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); *olen += finish_olen; @@ -1059,30 +1281,55 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( output == NULL || tag != output + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, + output, ilen + tag_len, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen -= tag_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { *olen = ilen; - return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen, - iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, - tag_len, tag ) ); + return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag_len, tag ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) @@ -1114,27 +1361,53 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } /* - * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( input == NULL || tag != input + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen + tag_len, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + else if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, @@ -1150,7 +1423,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, @@ -1166,7 +1439,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ if ( ( iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size ) || @@ -1188,6 +1461,166 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( output_len < ilen + tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + output + ilen, tag_len ); + *olen += tag_len; + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen, + input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len ) ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c index 5973ca6ba2..57eb3cb67f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -6,13 +6,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com> * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -25,38 +19,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" @@ -98,6 +68,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #include <string.h> #endif @@ -1937,7 +1911,7 @@ static int chacha20_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( ctx, length, input, output ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) @@ -2144,6 +2118,131 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { }; #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +static void *kw_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void kw_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 1 ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_unwrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 0 ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + kw_aes_setkey_wrap, + kw_aes_setkey_unwrap, + kw_ctx_alloc, + kw_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 128, + "AES-128-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 192, + "AES-192-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 256, + "AES-256-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 128, + "AES-128-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 192, + "AES-192-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 256, + "AES-256-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) @@ -2284,6 +2383,15 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &chachapoly_info }, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ @@ -2291,7 +2399,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL } }; -#define NUM_CIPHERS sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions / sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0] +#define NUM_CIPHERS ( sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \ + sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]) ) int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c index 409f67958e..3cc49d10cc 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c @@ -4,13 +4,7 @@ * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -23,27 +17,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -65,32 +38,17 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include <string.h> - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include <stdlib.h> -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#include <stdio.h> -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* @@ -161,7 +119,7 @@ static int cmac_multiply_by_u( unsigned char *output, static int cmac_generate_subkeys( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char* K1, unsigned char* K2 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; size_t olen, block_size; @@ -340,7 +298,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, block_size; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL || @@ -418,7 +376,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, unsigned char *output ) { mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -452,7 +410,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length, const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; unsigned char zero_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char int_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -808,7 +766,7 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) { if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC subkey #%u: ", testname, i + 1 ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC subkey #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); @@ -823,6 +781,18 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key, keybits, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 may be unavailable. This should not cause the selftest + * function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + goto next_test; + } + if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "test execution failed\n" ); @@ -850,6 +820,7 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +next_test: mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); } @@ -889,11 +860,24 @@ static int cmac_test_wth_cipher( int verbose, for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) { if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC #%u: ", testname, i + 1 ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, key, keybits, messages, message_lengths[i], output ) ) != 0 ) { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 and/or 3DES may be unavailable. This should not cause + * the selftest function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + ( cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB || + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ) ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); goto exit; @@ -919,12 +903,12 @@ exit: static int test_aes128_cmac_prf( int verbose ) { int i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; for( i = 0; i < NB_PRF_TESTS; i++ ) { - mbedtls_printf( " AES CMAC 128 PRF #%u: ", i ); + mbedtls_printf( " AES CMAC 128 PRF #%d: ", i ); ret = mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, output ); if( ret != 0 || memcmp( output, PRFT[i], MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) != 0 ) @@ -946,7 +930,7 @@ static int test_aes128_cmac_prf( int verbose ) int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /* AES-128 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c06472418d --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/** + * \file common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#endif + +#include <stdint.h> + +/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. + * + * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be + * declared `static` to allow the compiler to optimize for code size, + * but that function has unit tests, define it with + * ``` + * MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_foo(...) { ... } + * ``` + * and declare it in a header in the `library/` directory with + * ``` + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + * int mbedtls_foo(...); + * #endif + * ``` + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static +#endif + +/** Byte Reading Macros + * + * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th + * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( x ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 8 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 16 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 24 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 32 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 40 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 48 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 56 ) & 0xff ) ) + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data , offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 56 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 48 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 40 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 32 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] << 56 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 48 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 40 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 32 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n ); \ +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18f1b20daa --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,819 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + + /* + * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#include "constant_time_invasive.h" +#endif + +#include <string.h> + +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; + volatile unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. + * This avoids IAR compiler warning: + * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + diff |= x ^ y; + } + + return( (int)diff ); +} + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: + * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ + const size_t sub = x - y; + + /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 ); + + /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask( sub1 ); + + return( mask ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + return( ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( x, y ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. + * + * Constant flow with respect to c. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c ) +{ + /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ + unsigned low_mask = ( (unsigned) c - low ) >> 8; + /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ + unsigned high_mask = ( (unsigned) high - c ) >> 8; + return( ~( low_mask | high_mask ) & 0xff ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const size_t diff = x ^ y; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ + const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff ); + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return( 1 ^ diff1 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: + * return x > y + * + * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ + return( ( y - x ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; + mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; + + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + */ + cond = ( x ^ y ); + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y. + */ + ret = ( x - y ) & ~cond; + /* + * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the + * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if + * the MSB of y is 0.) + */ + ret |= y & cond; + + + ret = ret >> ( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return (unsigned) ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0 ) +{ + unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( condition ); + return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Select between two sign values without branches. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0` but uses only bit + * operations in order to avoid branches. + * + * \note if1 and if0 must be either 1 or -1, otherwise the result + * is undefined. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 The first sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * \param if0 The second sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + * */ +static int mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( unsigned char condition, + int if1, + int if0 ) +{ + /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonably assume about + * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned + * by taking advantage of the fact that if1 and if0 are either +1 or -1. */ + unsigned uif1 = if1 + 1; + unsigned uif0 = if0 + 1; + + /* condition was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are uif1 and uif0 */ + const unsigned mask = condition << 1; + + /* select uif1 or uif0 */ + unsigned ur = ( uif0 & ~mask ) | ( uif1 & mask ); + + /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */ + return( (int) ur - 1 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char condition ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ) +{ + unsigned char digit = 0; + /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with + * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change digit. */ + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 0, 25, value ) & ( 'A' + value ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 26, 51, value ) & ( 'a' + value - 26 ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 52, 61, value ) & ( '0' + value - 52 ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 62, 62, value ) & '+'; + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 63, 63, value ) & '/'; + return( digit ); +} + +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ) +{ + unsigned char val = 0; + /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with + * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus + * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'A', 'Z', c ) & ( c - 'A' + 0 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'a', 'z', c ) & ( c - 'a' + 26 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '0', '9', c ) & ( c - '0' + 52 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '+', '+', c ) & ( c - '+' + 62 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '/', '/', c ) & ( c - '/' + 63 + 1 ); + /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is + * a digit with the value v. */ + return( val - 1 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. + * + * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally + * equivalent to + * ``` + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); + * ``` + * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) + * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at + * the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset ) +{ + volatile unsigned char *buf = start; + size_t i, n; + if( total == 0 ) + return; + for( i = 0; i < total; i++ ) + { + unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( total - offset, i ); + /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last + * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and + * zero out the last byte. */ + for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ ) + { + unsigned char current = buf[n]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, current, next ); + } + buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, + size_t c2 ) +{ + /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 ); + const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask( equal ); + + /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t offsetval; + + for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ ) + { + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len, + offsetval, offset ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); + /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); + +#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if( ret != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) + { + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, + offset, data_len_secret ); + + if( offset < max_data_len ) + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) ); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +/* + * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char assign ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ + limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( assign );; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); + + X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( assign, Y->s, X->s ); + + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); + + for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information + * about whether the swap was made or not. + * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to + * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char swap ) +{ + int ret, s; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + if( X == Y ) + return( 0 ); + + /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ + limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( swap ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) ); + + s = X->s; + X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, Y->s, X->s ); + Y->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, s, Y->s ); + + + for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) + { + tmp = X->p[i]; + X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask ); + Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values in constant time + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ) +{ + size_t i; + /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ + unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL ); + + if( X->n != Y->n ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* + * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1; + Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1; + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative ); + *ret = cond & X_is_negative; + + /* + * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still + * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. + */ + done = cond; + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + /* + * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are negative. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative; + done |= cond; + + /* + * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are positive. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative ); + done |= cond; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode, + unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + unsigned bad = 0; + unsigned char pad_done = 0; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + unsigned output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad |= input[0]; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) + { + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; + pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + } + } + else + { + /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */ + bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. + * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( input[i], 0, 1 ); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); + bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF ); + } + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt( 8, pad_count ); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) ); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = - (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, + - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, + 0 ) ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large ); + for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ ) + input[i] &= ~bad; + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size ); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size ); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if( output_max_len != 0 ) + memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bbb3a90670 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,329 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#endif + +#include <stddef.h> + + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: + * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y, + * otherwise zero. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, + size_t y ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: + * return x == y + * + * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, + size_t y ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** Choose between two integer values without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Conditionally assign a value without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely + * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n. + * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char condition ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * + * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ); + +/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. + * + * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), + * return -1. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param c A base64 digit. + * + * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + */ +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Conditional memcpy without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely + * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to. + * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition. + * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, size_t c2 ); + +/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. + * + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p + * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p + * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. + * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`. + * + * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len + * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. + * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater + * than \p offset_max. + * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. + * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len ); + +/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being + * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p add_data_len bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the + * message. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode, + unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4620ca1379 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/** + * \file constant_time_invasive.h + * + * \brief Constant-time module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, + * return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * + * \param low The value to analyze. + * \param high The value to analyze. + * \param c The value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, otherwise zero. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c index 90264e844a..a604ec0761 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. @@ -49,16 +22,13 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -81,6 +51,9 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. + * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; } @@ -102,19 +75,49 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; } -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ) +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ) { ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; } -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) { ctx->entropy_len = len; } -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's + * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX + /* This shouldn't be an issue because + * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible + * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ + if( len > INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#endif + + /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the + * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't + * used until after the initial seeding. */ + /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */ + ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len; + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ) { ctx->reseed_interval = interval; } @@ -122,7 +125,8 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int in static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) { - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; @@ -136,7 +140,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); /* @@ -147,11 +152,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) */ p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 24 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 16 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 8 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len ) & 0xff; - p += 3; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( data_len, p, 0); + p += 4 + 3; *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; memcpy( p, data, data_len ); p[data_len] = 0x80; @@ -161,7 +163,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ ) key[i] = i; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) { goto exit; } @@ -183,7 +186,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) { goto exit; } @@ -200,7 +204,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, /* * Do final encryption with reduced data */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) { goto exit; } @@ -209,7 +214,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) { goto exit; } @@ -245,7 +251,7 @@ exit: * ctx->counter = V */ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) + const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) { unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = tmp; @@ -266,8 +272,11 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /* * Crypt counter block */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) + { goto exit; + } p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; } @@ -278,9 +287,13 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /* * Update key and counter */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { goto exit; - memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + } + memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); @@ -304,7 +317,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t add_len ) { unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( add_len == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -333,7 +346,7 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) - * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) * implements * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input) * -> new_working_state @@ -341,51 +354,57 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * ctx contains working_state * additional[:len] = additional_input * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes * and with output * ctx contains new_working_state */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t len, + size_t nonce_len ) { unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; size_t seedlen = 0; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT || - len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) + if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); - /* - * Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state - */ - if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, - ctx->entropy_len ) ) + /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */ + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); } - seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; - /* - * Add additional data - */ - if( additional && len ) + /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */ + if( nonce_len != 0 ) + { + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += nonce_len; + } + + /* Add additional data if provided. */ + if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) { memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); seedlen += len; } - /* - * Reduce to 384 bits - */ + /* Reduce to 384 bits. */ if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - /* - * Update state - */ + /* Update state. */ if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; ctx->reseed_counter = 1; @@ -395,6 +414,25 @@ exit: return( ret ); } +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); +} + +/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length + * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key + * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial + * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and + * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */ +static size_t good_nonce_len( size_t entropy_len ) +{ + if( entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( ( entropy_len + 1 ) / 2 ); +} + /* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len) * implements @@ -412,8 +450,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + size_t nonce_len; memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); @@ -429,33 +468,30 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; - - /* - * Initialize with an empty key - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to + * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set + * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */ + nonce_len = ( ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ? + (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter : + good_nonce_len( ctx->entropy_len ) ); + + /* Initialize with an empty key. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 ) + /* Do the initial seeding. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, custom, len, + nonce_len ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } return( 0 ); } -/* Backward compatibility wrapper */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_entropy, - const unsigned char *custom, size_t len, - size_t entropy_len ) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( ctx, entropy_len ); - return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len ) ); -} - /* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2) * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len) * implements @@ -525,11 +561,14 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, /* * Crypt counter block */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + { goto exit; + } - use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : - output_len; + use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; /* * Copy random block to destination */ @@ -549,9 +588,10 @@ exit: return( ret ); } -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -570,7 +610,8 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_l } #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; FILE *f; @@ -579,13 +620,19 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } else + { ret = 0; + } exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); @@ -594,7 +641,8 @@ exit: return( ret ); } -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) { int ret = 0; FILE *f = NULL; @@ -633,45 +681,135 @@ exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[96] = - { 0xc1, 0x80, 0x81, 0xa6, 0x5d, 0x44, 0x02, 0x16, - 0x19, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xb1, 0xc9, 0x20, 0x02, - 0x6a, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0x81, 0x49, 0x8b, - 0x6e, 0xa6, 0x62, 0x52, 0x6d, 0x51, 0xb1, 0xcb, - 0x58, 0x3b, 0xfa, 0xd5, 0x37, 0x5f, 0xfb, 0xc9, - 0xff, 0x46, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x22, 0x3e, 0x95, - 0x45, 0x9d, 0x82, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x22, 0x9f, 0x63, - 0x31, 0x69, 0xd2, 0x6b, 0x57, 0x47, 0x4f, 0xa3, - 0x37, 0xc9, 0x98, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x91, 0x31, - 0x4d, 0x55, 0xb9, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x5a, 0x5e, 0xe4, - 0x93, 0x92, 0xcf, 0xc5, 0x23, 0x12, 0xd5, 0x56, - 0x2c, 0x4a, 0x6e, 0xff, 0xdc, 0x10, 0xd0, 0x68 }; - -static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[64] = - { 0x5a, 0x19, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x2b, 0x31, 0x58, 0x14, - 0x54, 0xde, 0xf6, 0x75, 0xfb, 0x79, 0x58, 0xfe, - 0xc7, 0xdb, 0x87, 0x3e, 0x56, 0x89, 0xfc, 0x9d, - 0x03, 0x21, 0x7c, 0x68, 0xd8, 0x03, 0x38, 0x20, - 0xf9, 0xe6, 0x5e, 0x04, 0xd8, 0x56, 0xf3, 0xa9, - 0xc4, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0xbd, 0xc1, 0xd0, 0x08, 0x46, - 0xf5, 0x98, 0x3d, 0x77, 0x1c, 0x1b, 0x13, 0x7e, - 0x4e, 0x0f, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x2e }; - -static const unsigned char nonce_pers_pr[16] = - { 0xd2, 0x54, 0xfc, 0xff, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x69, 0xd2, - 0x29, 0xc9, 0xcf, 0xad, 0x85, 0xfa, 0x48, 0x6c }; - -static const unsigned char nonce_pers_nopr[16] = - { 0x1b, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xff, 0x06, 0x42, 0xbf, 0xf5, - 0x21, 0xf1, 0x5c, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0x66, 0x5f, 0x3f }; - -static const unsigned char result_pr[16] = - { 0x34, 0x01, 0x16, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x29, 0x00, 0x8f, - 0x35, 0x63, 0xec, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x59, 0x07, 0x23 }; - -static const unsigned char result_nopr[16] = - { 0xa0, 0x54, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x88, - 0x9d, 0x90, 0x3e, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0x21, 0x8f }; +/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at + * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip + * + * The parameters used to derive the test data are: + * + * [AES-128 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 128] + * [NonceLen = 64] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + * [AES-256 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 256] + * [NonceLen = 128] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb, + 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92, + 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8, + 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20, + 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0, + 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad, + 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45, + 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9, + 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20, + 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f, + 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a, + 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c, + 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66, + 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10, + 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30, + 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4, + 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc, + 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06, + 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13, + 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0, + 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf, + 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2, + 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7, + 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2, + 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02, + 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 }; +#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49, + 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a, + 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85, + 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e, + 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15, + 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45, + 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8, + 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c, + 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3, + 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce, + 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e, + 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76, + 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77, + 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d, + 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0, + 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73, + 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c, + 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2, + 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1, + 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a, + 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb, + 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a, + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33, + 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e, + 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0, + 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29, + 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf, + 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85, + 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d, + 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62, + 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d, + 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb, + 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39, + 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40, + 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad, + 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3, + 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b, + 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14, + 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54, + 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30, + 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a, + 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ static size_t test_offset; static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, @@ -690,13 +828,15 @@ static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, return( 1 ); \ } +#define SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64 + /* * Checkup routine */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) { mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; - unsigned char buf[16]; + unsigned char buf[ sizeof( result_pr ) ]; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); @@ -707,15 +847,16 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " ); test_offset = 0; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, 32 ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_source_pr, - nonce_pers_pr, 16 ) ); + pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ); - CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); @@ -731,15 +872,16 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); test_offset = 0; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, 32 ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_source_nopr, - nonce_pers_nopr, 16 ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, 16 ) ); + pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, 16 ) ); - CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, 16 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c index 9caa361d44..e1086008af 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Debugging routines * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) @@ -60,9 +29,11 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #define mbedtls_time_t time_t #define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf #endif #include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <stdarg.h> #include <stdio.h> @@ -103,13 +74,14 @@ static inline void debug_send_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, #endif } +MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6) void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ... ) { va_list argp; char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( NULL == ssl || NULL == ssl->conf || @@ -120,20 +92,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } va_start( argp, format ); -#if defined(_WIN32) -#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__) - ret = _vsnprintf_s( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, _TRUNCATE, format, argp ); -#else - ret = _vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); - if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == DEBUG_BUF_SIZE ) - { - str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE-1] = '\0'; - ret = -1; - } -#endif -#else - ret = vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); -#endif + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); va_end( argp ); if( ret >= 0 && ret < DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 ) @@ -168,7 +127,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, return; mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s() returned %d (-0x%04x)\n", - text, ret, -ret ); + text, ret, (unsigned int) -ret ); debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c index 0867064403..91d22b5d90 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) @@ -76,29 +45,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) /* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - -/* * Expanded DES S-boxes */ static const uint32_t SB1[64] = @@ -455,8 +401,8 @@ void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KE int i; uint32_t X, Y, T; - GET_UINT32_BE( X, key, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( Y, key, 4 ); + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, 4 ); /* * Permuted Choice 1 @@ -665,8 +611,8 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, SK = ctx->sk; - GET_UINT32_BE( X, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( Y, input, 4 ); + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); DES_IP( X, Y ); @@ -678,8 +624,8 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, DES_FP( Y, X ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -697,7 +643,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[8]; if( length % 8 ) @@ -759,8 +705,8 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, SK = ctx->sk; - GET_UINT32_BE( X, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( Y, input, 4 ); + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); DES_IP( X, Y ); @@ -784,8 +730,8 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, DES_FP( Y, X ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -803,7 +749,7 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { int i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[8]; if( length % 8 ) @@ -874,16 +820,16 @@ static const unsigned char des3_test_buf[8] = static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_dec[3][8] = { - { 0xCD, 0xD6, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x5D }, - { 0x69, 0x96, 0xC8, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xA2, 0xAB, 0xEB }, - { 0x83, 0x25, 0x39, 0x76, 0x44, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x0A } + { 0x37, 0x2B, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x52, 0x65, 0xB0, 0x59 }, + { 0xC2, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x65, 0xA1 }, + { 0xA2, 0x70, 0x56, 0x68, 0x69, 0xE5, 0x15, 0x1D } }; static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_enc[3][8] = { - { 0x6A, 0x2A, 0x19, 0xF4, 0x1E, 0xCA, 0x85, 0x4B }, - { 0x03, 0xE6, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xFA, 0x58, 0xEB, 0x42 }, - { 0xDD, 0x17, 0xE8, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x32 } + { 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x84, 0x26, 0x73, 0xFB }, + { 0xB3, 0x92, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB5, 0x42, 0x93 }, + { 0xDA, 0x37, 0x64, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x6F } }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -894,16 +840,16 @@ static const unsigned char des3_test_iv[8] = static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_dec[3][8] = { - { 0x12, 0x9F, 0x40, 0xB9, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x56, 0xB3 }, - { 0x47, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0x9A, 0x6B, 0x8E, 0xE3, 0x93 }, - { 0xC5, 0xCE, 0xCF, 0x63, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x4C } + { 0x58, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xEF, 0x85, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9A }, + { 0x5F, 0xC8, 0x78, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x92, 0xD9, 0x54 }, + { 0x25, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x85, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x48, 0xBF } }; static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_enc[3][8] = { - { 0x54, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0xEB, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xB4 }, - { 0x35, 0x76, 0x11, 0x56, 0x5F, 0xA1, 0x8E, 0x4D }, - { 0xCB, 0x19, 0x1F, 0x85, 0xD1, 0xED, 0x84, 0x39 } + { 0x91, 0x1C, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x4D }, + { 0x60, 0x1A, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x66, 0xF1 }, + { 0xA1, 0x50, 0x0F, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x64, 0x76 } }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -970,7 +916,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) { if( u == 0 ) ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, buf, buf ); @@ -1051,7 +997,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) if( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) { - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) { if( u == 0 ) ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); @@ -1063,7 +1009,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) } else { - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) { unsigned char tmp[8]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c index 535b698ce6..88e148bb80 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation @@ -52,16 +25,13 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -109,7 +79,7 @@ static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) ); (*p) += n; @@ -161,7 +131,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); DHM_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL && *p != NULL ); DHM_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); @@ -185,20 +155,10 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret, count; - size_t m_size = mbedtls_mpi_size( M ); - size_t m_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( M ); - - count = 0; - do - { - if( count++ > 30 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + int ret; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( R, m_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( R, ( m_size * 8 ) - m_bitlen ) ); - } - while( dhm_check_range( R, M ) != 0 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) ); cleanup: return( ret ); @@ -271,8 +231,8 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( ( X ), \ p + 2, \ ( n ) ) ); \ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) >> 8 ); \ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) ); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ p += ( n ); \ } while( 0 ) @@ -291,7 +251,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, cleanup: if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED + ret ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -302,7 +262,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *G ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); DHM_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); DHM_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); @@ -310,7 +270,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->G, G ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret ) ); } ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); @@ -323,7 +283,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); DHM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); @@ -331,7 +291,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -362,8 +322,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, cleanup: if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); - + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -443,7 +402,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi GYb; DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); @@ -487,7 +446,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -521,7 +480,7 @@ void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, size_t dhminlen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p, *end; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) @@ -569,7 +528,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); goto exit; } @@ -578,7 +537,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); goto exit; } @@ -592,13 +551,13 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec ); if ( ret != 0 ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); goto exit; } if ( p != end ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); goto exit; } } @@ -675,7 +634,7 @@ static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) */ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); @@ -727,7 +686,7 @@ static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_param */ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c index 8c27e4e196..9dfa868063 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -51,16 +24,13 @@ * RFC 4492 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) #include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -84,6 +54,13 @@ static mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( #endif } +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + /* At this time, all groups support ECDH. */ + (void) gid; + return( 1 ); +} + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) /* * Generate public key (restartable version) @@ -98,7 +75,7 @@ static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -139,7 +116,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point P; mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); @@ -217,7 +194,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) static int ecdh_setup_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, grp_id ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -240,6 +217,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) #else switch( grp_id ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + return( mbedtls_everest_setup( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, grp_id ) ); +#endif default: ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0; @@ -291,6 +275,11 @@ void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + mbedtls_everest_free( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh ); + break; +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: ecdh_free_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); break; @@ -313,7 +302,7 @@ static int ecdh_make_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, void *p_rng, int restart_enabled ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t grp_len, pt_len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; @@ -356,7 +345,7 @@ static int ecdh_make_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, } /* - * Setup and write the ServerKeyExhange parameters (RFC 4492) + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) * struct { * ECParameters curve_params; * ECPoint public; @@ -385,6 +374,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: return( ecdh_make_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, @@ -415,7 +409,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); @@ -434,6 +428,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, end) ); +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: return( ecdh_read_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, buf, end ) ); @@ -447,7 +446,7 @@ static int ecdh_get_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */ if( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) @@ -471,7 +470,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS || @@ -498,6 +497,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + { + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ? + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS : + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS; + return( mbedtls_everest_get_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + key, s) ); + } +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: return( ecdh_get_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, key, side ) ); @@ -516,7 +525,7 @@ static int ecdh_make_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, void *p_rng, int restart_enabled ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; #endif @@ -569,6 +578,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: return( ecdh_make_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, @@ -583,7 +597,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, static int ecdh_read_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p, @@ -610,6 +624,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: return( ecdh_read_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, buf, blen ) ); @@ -628,7 +647,7 @@ static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, void *p_rng, int restart_enabled ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; #endif @@ -662,6 +681,10 @@ static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ( ( ctx->grp.pbits % 8 ) != 0 ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &ctx->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); } @@ -688,6 +711,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, #else switch( ctx->var ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_calc_secret( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c index 2456238b17..640eb24a26 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curve DSA * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) @@ -76,6 +45,7 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" /* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ #define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ @@ -257,7 +227,7 @@ static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; @@ -294,7 +264,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r; /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ - if( grp->N.p == NULL ) + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ @@ -413,6 +383,20 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + switch( gid ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0; +#endif +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0; +#endif + default: return 1; + } +} + /* * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message */ @@ -445,7 +429,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, void *p_rng_blind, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx; unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; @@ -486,6 +470,8 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, sign: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) f_rng_blind; + (void) p_rng_blind; ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng ); #else @@ -509,7 +495,6 @@ sign: mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind ); p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind; - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len ); ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det, @@ -567,6 +552,8 @@ cleanup: /* * Deterministic signature wrappers */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, @@ -581,6 +568,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, @@ -613,7 +601,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; mbedtls_ecp_point R; mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2; @@ -623,7 +611,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ - if( grp->N.p == NULL ) + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver ); @@ -737,8 +725,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen ) { - int ret; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0}; unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf ); size_t len = 0; @@ -766,7 +754,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi r, s; ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); @@ -861,7 +849,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; size_t len; @@ -882,8 +870,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, if( p + len != end ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); goto cleanup; } @@ -943,7 +931,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c index 0532a295e6..368b6c7124 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curve J-PAKE * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -49,16 +22,13 @@ * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) #include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -135,7 +105,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *secret, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || @@ -184,7 +154,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point( unsigned char **p, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */ @@ -196,10 +166,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point( unsigned char **p, if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); - (*p)[0] = (unsigned char)( ( len >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); - (*p)[1] = (unsigned char)( ( len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); - (*p)[2] = (unsigned char)( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - (*p)[3] = (unsigned char)( ( len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( len, *p, 0 ); *p += 4 + len; @@ -224,7 +191,7 @@ static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *id, mbedtls_mpi *h ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN]; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof( buf ); @@ -239,10 +206,8 @@ static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, if( end - p < 4 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( id_len, p, 0 ); + p += 4; if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < id_len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); @@ -274,7 +239,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV; mbedtls_mpi r, h; size_t r_len; @@ -303,7 +268,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, r_len = *(*p)++; - if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len ) + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len || r_len == 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; @@ -349,7 +314,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point V; mbedtls_mpi v; mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */ @@ -382,7 +347,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, goto cleanup; } - *(*p)++ = (unsigned char)( len & 0xFF ); + *(*p)++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, *p, len ) ); /* r */ *p += len; @@ -407,7 +372,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( end < *p ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -447,7 +412,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( end < *p ) @@ -482,7 +447,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; @@ -520,7 +485,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; @@ -578,7 +543,7 @@ static int ecjpake_ecp_add3( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *B, const mbedtls_ecp_point *C ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi one; mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); @@ -600,7 +565,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; @@ -664,7 +629,7 @@ static int ecjpake_mul_secret( mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */ mbedtls_mpi_init( &b ); @@ -693,7 +658,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */ mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */ @@ -775,7 +740,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point K; mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; @@ -983,7 +948,7 @@ static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len1 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len2 ) ); @@ -1033,7 +998,7 @@ static int ecjpake_lgc( void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli; mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv; unsigned char buf[512], pms[32]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c index a7486c198a..7f9e1045d4 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -66,11 +39,7 @@ * <http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/342.pdf> */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" /** * \brief Function level alternative implementation. @@ -106,8 +75,11 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + #include <string.h> #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) @@ -135,10 +107,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" #elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #else #error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." #endif @@ -210,6 +178,12 @@ static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0]; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); @@ -266,6 +240,12 @@ static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, int ret; unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); @@ -278,110 +258,9 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - -/* This will be used in the self-test function */ -#define ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF - -/* - * We need to expand secret data (the scalar) into a longer stream of bytes. - * - * We'll use the One-Step KDF from NIST SP 800-56C, with option 1 (H is a hash - * function) and empty FixedInfo. (Though we'll make it fit the DRBG API for - * convenience, this is not a full-fledged DRBG, but we don't need one here.) - * - * We need a basic hash abstraction layer to use whatever SHA-2 is available. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - -#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha512_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 ); -#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 512 / 8 ) - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - -#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha256_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 ); -#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 256 / 8 ) - -#endif /* SHA512/SHA256 abstraction */ - -/* - * State consists of a 32-bit counter plus the secret value. - * - * We stored them concatenated in a single buffer as that's what will get - * passed to the hash function. - */ -typedef struct { - size_t total_len; - uint8_t buf[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; -} ecp_drbg_context; - -static void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) ); -} - -static void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) ); -} - -static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) -{ - ctx->total_len = 4 + secret_len; - memset( ctx->buf, 0, 4); - return( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, ctx->buf + 4, secret_len ) ); -} - -static int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) -{ - ecp_drbg_context *ctx = p_rng; - int ret; - size_t len_done = 0; - uint8_t tmp[HASH_BLOCK_BYTES]; - - while( len_done < output_len ) - { - uint8_t use_len; - - /* This function is only called for coordinate randomisation, which - * happens only twice in a scalar multiplication. Each time needs a - * random value in the range [2, p-1], and gets it by drawing len(p) - * bytes from this function, and retrying up to 10 times if unlucky. - * - * So for the largest curve, each scalar multiplication draws at most - * 20 * 66 bytes. The minimum block size is 32 (SHA-256), so with - * rounding that means a most 20 * 3 blocks. - * - * Since we don't need to draw more that 255 blocks, don't bother - * with carry propagation and just return an error instead. We can - * change that it we even need to draw more blinding values. - */ - ctx->buf[3] += 1; - if( ctx->buf[3] == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); - - ret = HASH_FUNC( ctx->buf, ctx->total_len, tmp ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( output_len - len_done > HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ) - use_len = HASH_BLOCK_BYTES; - else - use_len = output_len - len_done; - - memcpy( output + len_done, tmp, use_len ); - len_done += use_len; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#else /* DRBG/SHA modules */ +#else #error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." -#endif /* DRBG/SHA modules */ +#endif /* DRBG modules */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -623,39 +502,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#define ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -#define ECP_MONTGOMERY -#endif - -/* - * Curve types: internal for now, might be exposed later - */ -typedef enum -{ - ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0, - ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */ - ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */ -} ecp_curve_type; - /* * List of supported curves: * - internal ID - * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2) + * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7) * - size in bits * - readable name * @@ -699,6 +549,12 @@ static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" }, +#endif { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, }; @@ -801,15 +657,15 @@ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name /* * Get the type of a curve */ -static inline ecp_curve_type ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { if( grp->G.X.p == NULL ) - return( ECP_TYPE_NONE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE ); if( grp->G.Y.p == NULL ) - return( ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); else - return( ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); } /* @@ -920,7 +776,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) */ int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); @@ -948,7 +804,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src */ int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->X , 1 ) ); @@ -994,7 +850,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, const char *x, const char *y ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( x != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( y != NULL ); @@ -1008,14 +864,14 @@ cleanup: } /* - * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3) + * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748) */ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int format, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t plen; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); @@ -1024,56 +880,72 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); - /* - * Common case: P == 0 - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - if( buflen < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - buf[0] = 0x00; - *olen = 1; - - return( 0 ); - } - plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); - if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) { - *olen = 2 * plen + 1; - + *olen = plen; if( buflen < *olen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - buf[0] = 0x04; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &P->X, buf, plen ) ); } - else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) { - *olen = plen + 1; + /* + * Common case: P == 0 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( buflen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - if( buflen < *olen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + buf[0] = 0x00; + *olen = 1; - buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = 2 * plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x04; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + } + else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + } } +#endif cleanup: return( ret ); } /* - * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4) + * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) */ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t plen; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); @@ -1082,25 +954,47 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, if( ilen < 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) { - if( ilen == 1 ) - return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); - else + if( plen != ilen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &pt->X, buf, plen ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &pt->Y ); - if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0 ) ); - if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) + { + if( ilen == 1 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, + buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif cleanup: return( ret ); @@ -1152,7 +1046,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp int format, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); @@ -1185,7 +1079,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); @@ -1266,8 +1160,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, /* * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ - buf[0] = curve_info->tls_id >> 8; - buf[1] = curve_info->tls_id & 0xFF; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( curve_info->tls_id, buf, 0 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -1280,7 +1173,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, */ static int ecp_modp( mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( grp->modp == NULL ) return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); @@ -1332,6 +1225,18 @@ cleanup: INC_MUL_COUNT \ } while( 0 ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_MUL( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + /* * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 @@ -1340,6 +1245,26 @@ cleanup: while( (N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &(N), 0 ) != 0 ) \ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) ) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) ) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_SUB( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + /* * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and @@ -1349,7 +1274,35 @@ cleanup: while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &(N), &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( X, count ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in * Jacobian coordinates. @@ -1364,9 +1317,6 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) { - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -1375,20 +1325,25 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); /* * X = X / Z^2 mod p */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( ZZi ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->X ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); /* * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); /* * Z = 1 @@ -1400,6 +1355,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ } /* @@ -1416,10 +1372,6 @@ cleanup: static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t T_size ) { - int ret; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; - if( T_size < 2 ) return( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, *T ) ); @@ -1428,6 +1380,13 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, T, T_size ) ); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; + if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); @@ -1442,8 +1401,7 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &c[0], &T[0]->Z ) ); for( i = 1; i < T_size; i++ ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z ) ); - MOD_MUL( c[i] ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z ) ); } /* @@ -1462,17 +1420,17 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &Zi, &u, &c[i-1] ) ); MOD_MUL( Zi ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u, &u, &T[i]->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( u ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Zi, &u, &c[i-1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &u, &u, &T[i]->Z ) ); } /* * proceed as in normalize() */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( ZZi ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( T[i]->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( T[i]->Y ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( T[i]->Y ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi ) ); /* * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates @@ -1496,6 +1454,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_free( c ); return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) */ } /* @@ -1506,7 +1465,7 @@ static int ecp_safe_invert_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, unsigned char inv ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char nonzero; mbedtls_mpi mQY; @@ -1540,9 +1499,6 @@ cleanup: static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) { - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) dbl_count++; #endif @@ -1552,58 +1508,64 @@ static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); /* Special case for A = -3 */ if( grp->A.p == NULL ) { /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &T, &U ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &T, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &U, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &U ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); } else { /* M = 3.X^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 ) { /* M += A.Z^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &S, &S ) ); MOD_MUL( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &S, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &M, &M, &S ) ); } } /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->X, &T ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &S, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( S ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &S, 1 ) ); /* U = 8.Y^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &U, &T, &T ) ); MOD_MUL( U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &U, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( U ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &T, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &M, &M ) ); MOD_MUL( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( T ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( T ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &M, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); /* S = M(S - T) - U */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S, &S, &T ) ); MOD_SUB( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &S, &M ) ); MOD_MUL( S ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S, &S, &U ) ); MOD_SUB( S ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &S, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &U ) ); /* U = 2.Y.Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( U ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &U, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( U ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &T ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &S ) ); @@ -1613,6 +1575,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ } /* @@ -1636,9 +1599,6 @@ cleanup: static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) { - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) add_count++; #endif @@ -1648,6 +1608,12 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, P, Q ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; + /* * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) */ @@ -1666,12 +1632,12 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T4 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T2, &T1, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( T2 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T1, &Q->X ) ); MOD_MUL( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T2, &T2, &Q->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T2 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T1, &T1, &P->X ) ); MOD_SUB( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T2, &T2, &P->Y ) ); MOD_SUB( T2 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T1, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &P->Y ) ); /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T1, 0 ) == 0 ) @@ -1688,18 +1654,19 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, } } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &Z, &P->Z, &T1 ) ); MOD_MUL( Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T3, &T1, &T1 ) ); MOD_MUL( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T4, &T3, &T1 ) ); MOD_MUL( T4 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T3, &T3, &P->X ) ); MOD_MUL( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T3, 2 ) ); MOD_ADD( T1 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &T2, &T2 ) ); MOD_MUL( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); MOD_SUB( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T4 ) ); MOD_SUB( X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T3, &T3, &X ) ); MOD_SUB( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T3, &T3, &T2 ) ); MOD_MUL( T3 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T4, &T4, &P->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T4 ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &Y, &T3, &T4 ) ); MOD_SUB( Y ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Z, &P->Z, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T1, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T3, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &T3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &X, &T2, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T4 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T4, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &Y, &T3, &T4 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &X ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &Y ) ); @@ -1711,6 +1678,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ } /* @@ -1723,49 +1691,40 @@ cleanup: static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi l, ll; - size_t p_size; - int count = 0; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ - p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l, ll; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll ); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - do - { - if( count++ > 30 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, ( p_size * 8 ) - grp->pbits ) ); - } - while( ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 ) || - ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); /* Z = l * Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Z ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l ) ); /* X = l^2 * X */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ll, &l, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( ll ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->X ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &l, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll ) ); /* Y = l^3 * Y */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ll, &ll, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( ll ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &ll, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll ) ); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ll ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */ } /* @@ -1897,7 +1856,7 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char w, size_t d, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char i; size_t j = 0; const unsigned char T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); @@ -2033,7 +1992,7 @@ static int ecp_select_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, unsigned char i ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char ii, j; /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */ @@ -2066,7 +2025,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; size_t i; @@ -2148,7 +2107,7 @@ static int ecp_comb_recode_scalar( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char w, unsigned char *parity_trick ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi M, mm; mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); @@ -2194,7 +2153,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char parity_trick; unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; @@ -2276,8 +2235,10 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * Make sure w is within bounds. * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) */ +#if( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) if( w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE ) w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif if( w >= grp->nbits ) w = 2; @@ -2303,7 +2264,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char w, p_eq_g, i; size_t d; unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; @@ -2455,9 +2416,9 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) /* * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is @@ -2472,19 +2433,22 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) { - int ret; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, P ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( P->X ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); cleanup: return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ } /* @@ -2498,41 +2462,31 @@ cleanup: static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi l; - size_t p_size; - int count = 0; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ - p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l; mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - do - { - if( count++ > 30 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, ( p_size * 8 ) - grp->pbits ) ); - } - while( ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 ) || - ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->X, &P->X, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( P->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) ); MOD_MUL( P->Z ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) ); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ } /* @@ -2555,36 +2509,39 @@ static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d ) { - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( A ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &AA, &A, &A ) ); MOD_MUL( AA ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_SUB( B ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &BB, &B, &B ) ); MOD_MUL( BB ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &E, &AA, &BB ) ); MOD_SUB( E ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( C ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); MOD_SUB( D ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DA, &D, &A ) ); MOD_MUL( DA ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &CB, &C, &B ) ); MOD_MUL( CB ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); MOD_MUL( S->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); MOD_MUL( S->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); MOD_SUB( S->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); MOD_MUL( R->X ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); MOD_MUL( R->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( R->Z ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( R->Z ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &AA, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &BB, &B, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &E, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &DA, &D, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &CB, &C, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); @@ -2592,6 +2549,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &CB ); return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ } /* @@ -2603,7 +2561,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; unsigned char b; mbedtls_ecp_point RP; @@ -2690,7 +2648,7 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ /* * Restartable multiplication R = m * P @@ -2713,6 +2671,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; +#else + (void) rs_ctx; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) @@ -2734,12 +2694,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, } ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); #endif -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); #endif @@ -2772,14 +2732,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); } -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) */ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ @@ -2795,8 +2755,8 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_ * YY = Y^2 * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( YY ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); /* Special case for A = -3 */ if( grp->A.p == NULL ) @@ -2805,11 +2765,11 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_ } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; @@ -2820,10 +2780,11 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* - * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 1 and m == -1 + * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! */ static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, @@ -2832,9 +2793,13 @@ static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); } @@ -2864,7 +2829,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point mP; mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; @@ -2878,7 +2843,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) != ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP ); @@ -2967,8 +2932,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); return( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL ) ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) #define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ @@ -3079,7 +3045,7 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_ return( ecp_check_bad_points_mx( &pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id ) ); } -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ /* * Check that a point is valid as a public key @@ -3094,12 +3060,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) ); #endif -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) ); #endif return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -3114,8 +3080,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) { /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || @@ -3129,9 +3095,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return( 0 ); } -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) { /* see SEC1 3.2 */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || @@ -3140,11 +3106,61 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, else return( 0 ); } -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1; + + /* [Curve25519] page 5 */ + /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough + * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary + * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_random_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, high_bit, 1 ) ); + + /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for + Curve25519 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); + if( high_bit == 254 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( + const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + default: + return( ret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + /* * Generate a private key */ @@ -3153,97 +3169,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - size_t n_size; -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - mbedtls_mpi one; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); -#endif - ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; - -#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) - { - /* [M225] page 5 */ - size_t b; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ - do { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - } while( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( &grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ - /* Make sure the most significant bit is nbits */ - b = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1; /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based */ - if( b > grp->nbits ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, b - grp->nbits ) ); - else - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); - - /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for - Curve25519 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); - if( grp->nbits == 254 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); - } - } -#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */ - -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) - { - /* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */ - int count = 0; - unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &one, grp->N.n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); - - /* - * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA): - * - use the same byte ordering; - * - keep the leftmost nbits bits of the generated octet string; - * - try until result is in the desired range. - * This also avoids any biais, which is especially important for ECDSA. - */ - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) ); - - /* - * Each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing (the msb has - * a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will be < N), - * so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). - * - * For most curves, 1 try is enough with overwhelming probability, - * since N starts with a lot of 1s in binary, but some curves - * such as secp224k1 are actually very close to the worst case. - */ - if( ++count > 30 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( d, &grp->N, <_upper ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( d, &one, <_lower ) ); - } - while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); - } -#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */ - -cleanup: -#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); -#endif - return( ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } /* @@ -3255,7 +3195,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); @@ -3291,7 +3231,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); @@ -3301,12 +3241,120 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); } +#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +/* + * Read a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* + * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + */ + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 2, 0 ) ); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0 ) + ); + + /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1 ) + ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key->grp, &key->d ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Write a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + + /* * Check a public-private key pair */ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point Q; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); @@ -3347,103 +3395,141 @@ cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF) -/* - * There are no test vectors from NIST for the One-Step KDF in SP 800-56C, - * but unofficial ones can be found at: - * https://github.com/patrickfav/singlestep-kdf/wiki/NIST-SP-800-56C-Rev1:-Non-Official-Test-Vectors - * - * We only use the ones with empty fixedInfo, and for brevity's sake, only - * 40-bytes output (with SHA-256 that's more than one block, and with SHA-512 - * less than one block). - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - -static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = { - 0x3b, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xe9, 0xbc, 0x5e, 0x3e, 0xc7, - 0x61, 0x30, 0x36, 0xb6, 0xf5, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xaa, -}; -static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = { - 0x3e, 0xf6, 0xda, 0xf9, 0x51, 0x60, 0x70, 0x5f, - 0xdf, 0x21, 0xcd, 0xab, 0xac, 0x25, 0x7b, 0x05, - 0xfe, 0xc1, 0xab, 0x7c, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x43, 0x25, - 0x8a, 0xfc, 0x40, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xf7, 0x98, 0x27, - 0x10, 0xfa, 0x7b, 0x93, 0x52, 0xd4, 0x16, 0xaa, -}; - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - -static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = { - 0xc8, 0x3e, 0x35, 0x8e, 0x99, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xc6, - 0x7d, 0xb4, 0xfe, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x8f, 0x26, 0xe1, -}; -static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = { - 0x7d, 0xf6, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x3c, 0x47, 0xdc, 0x28, - 0x5f, 0x7f, 0xaa, 0xde, 0x05, 0x64, 0xd6, 0x25, - 0x00, 0x6a, 0x47, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x8c, - 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x0c, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x66, - 0x69, 0x0e, 0x25, 0xaa, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x14, 0x79, -}; - +/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. + * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents + * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ +static int self_test_adjust_exponent( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + int ret = 0; + switch( grp->id ) + { + /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the + * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */ +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is + * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, 254, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); + /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not + * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits - 1, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 253 ) ) ); + break; #endif +#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */ + default: + /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */ + (void) grp; + (void) m; + goto cleanup; + } +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} -static int ecp_kdf_self_test( void ) +/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of + * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */ +static int self_test_point( int verbose, + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const char *const *exponents, + size_t n_exponents ) { - int ret; - ecp_drbg_context kdf_ctx; - mbedtls_mpi scalar; - uint8_t out[sizeof( test_kdf_out )]; - - ecp_drbg_init( &kdf_ctx ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &scalar ); - memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + int ret = 0; + size_t i = 0; + unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &scalar, - test_kdf_z, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &kdf_ctx, - &scalar, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) ); + for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ ) + { + add_c_prev = add_count; + dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; + mul_c_prev = mul_count; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_random( &kdf_ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); - if( memcmp( out, test_kdf_out, sizeof( out ) ) != 0 ) - ret = -1; + if( add_count != add_c_prev || + dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || + mul_count != mul_c_prev ) + { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } cleanup: - ecp_drbg_free( &kdf_ctx ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &scalar ); - + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } return( ret ); } -#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */ /* * Checkup routine */ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) { - int ret; - size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; mbedtls_mpi m; - unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; - /* exponents especially adapted for secp192r1 */ - const char *exponents[] = + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest + * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger + * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */ + const char *sw_exponents[] = { "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22830", /* N - 1 */ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */ "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + const char *m_exponents[] = + { + /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448 + * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in + * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */ + "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30", + "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8", + "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460", + "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550", + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8", + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &m ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) ); @@ -3452,104 +3538,53 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) #endif if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); - + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ ) - { - add_c_prev = add_count; - dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; - mul_c_prev = mul_count; - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); - - if( add_count != add_c_prev || - dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || - mul_count != mul_c_prev ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &P, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) ); - - for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ ) - { - add_c_prev = add_count; - dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; - mul_c_prev = mul_count; - add_count = 0; - dbl_count = 0; - mul_count = 0; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) ); - - if( add_count != add_c_prev || - dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || - mul_count != mul_c_prev ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #3 (internal KDF): " ); - - ret = ecp_kdf_self_test(); + mbedtls_printf( " ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): " ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) ); +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test" +#endif + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + m_exponents, + sizeof( m_exponents ) / sizeof( m_exponents[0] )); if( ret != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); -#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ cleanup: if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", ret ); + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c index afa3b6324e..ff26a18e8f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,41 +15,19 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + #include <string.h> #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) @@ -548,6 +520,22 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) /* * Create an MPI from embedded constants * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint) @@ -598,6 +586,7 @@ static int ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return( 0 ); } +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) /* Forward declarations */ @@ -639,6 +628,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); #endif +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) #define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \ @@ -654,6 +644,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) /* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ @@ -668,7 +659,7 @@ static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = { */ static int ecp_use_curve25519( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve25519_a24 ) ); @@ -717,7 +708,7 @@ static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = { static int ecp_use_curve448( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { mbedtls_mpi Ns; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ns ); @@ -844,7 +835,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ default: - mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } } @@ -908,7 +899,7 @@ static inline void carry64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) */ static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi *N ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; @@ -994,25 +985,20 @@ static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) #define ADD( j ) add32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); #define SUB( j ) sub32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ + /* * Helpers for the main 'loop' - * (see fix_negative for the motivation of C) */ #define INIT( b ) \ - int ret; \ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \ signed char c = 0, cc; \ uint32_t cur; \ size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \ - mbedtls_mpi C; \ - mbedtls_mpi_uint Cp[ (b) / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1 ]; \ - \ - C.s = 1; \ - C.n = (b) / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1; \ - C.p = Cp; \ - memset( Cp, 0, C.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); \ - \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, (b) * 2 / 8 / \ - sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ); \ + /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \ + /* limb for fix_negative */ \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, ( b ) * 2 / biL + 1 ) ); \ LOAD32; #define NEXT \ @@ -1027,33 +1013,41 @@ static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) STORE32; i++; \ cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ cur = 0; while( ++i < MAX32 ) { STORE32; } \ - if( c < 0 ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( fix_negative( N, c, &C, bits ) ); + if( c < 0 ) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( N, c, bits ); /* * If the result is negative, we get it in the form * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' */ -static inline int fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, mbedtls_mpi *C, size_t bits ) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ) { - int ret; - - /* C = - c * 2^bits */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) - ((void) bits); -#else - if( bits == 224 ) - C->p[ C->n - 1 ] = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c) << 32; - else -#endif - C->p[ C->n - 1 ] = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; + size_t i; - /* N = - ( C - N ) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( N, C, N ) ); + /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so + * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry + * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */ + for( i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++ ) + { + N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint)0 - N->p[i]; + } + /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */ + i = 0; + do + ++N->p[i]; + while( N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + /* Invert the sign. + * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */ N->s = -1; -cleanup: - - return( ret ); + /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are + * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + if( bits == 224 ) + msw <<= 32; +#endif + N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) @@ -1193,7 +1187,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi *N ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; mbedtls_mpi M; mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; @@ -1242,7 +1236,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi *N ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; mbedtls_mpi M; mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; @@ -1299,7 +1293,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi *N ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; mbedtls_mpi M, Q; mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; @@ -1361,7 +1355,7 @@ cleanup: static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz( mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; mbedtls_mpi M, R; mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71c7702758 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_invasive.h + * + * \brief ECP module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* Preconditions: + * - bits is a multiple of 64 or is 224 + * - c is -1 or -2 + * - 0 <= N < 2^bits + * - N has room for bits plus one limb + * + * Behavior: + * Set N to c * 2^bits + old_value_of_N. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). + * + * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys + * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value + * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical. + * + * \note - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748 + * + * \p high_bit The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate. + * This is the bit-size of the key minus 1: + * 254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448. + * \param d The randomly generated key. This is a number of size + * exactly \p n_bits + 1 bits, with the least significant bits + * masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t n_bits, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c index 9f1a32bdc1..12fd3b9b5f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Entropy accumulator implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) @@ -61,6 +30,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -266,7 +236,7 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -288,7 +258,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, */ static int entropy_gather_internal( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) { - int ret, i, have_one_strong = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + int i; + int have_one_strong = 0; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER]; size_t olen; @@ -336,7 +308,7 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -355,7 +327,8 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) { - int ret, count = 0, i, done; + int ret, count = 0, i, thresholds_reached; + size_t strong_size; mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -393,12 +366,17 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) if( ( ret = entropy_gather_internal( ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - done = 1; + thresholds_reached = 1; + strong_size = 0; for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + { if( ctx->source[i].size < ctx->source[i].threshold ) - done = 0; + thresholds_reached = 0; + if( ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) + strong_size += ctx->source[i].size; + } } - while( ! done ); + while( ! thresholds_reached || strong_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); @@ -493,7 +471,7 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; FILE *f = NULL; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c index 2095a7dd34..40f23fd2a6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ #if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) @@ -49,11 +22,7 @@ #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #include <string.h> @@ -61,6 +30,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #include "mbedtls/timing.h" @@ -76,7 +46,7 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) #error "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in config.h" #endif @@ -134,7 +104,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len * Since there is no wrapper in the libc yet, use the generic syscall wrapper * available in GNU libc and compatible libc's (eg uClibc). */ -#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__) +#if ((defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__)) || defined(__midipix__)) #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #if defined(SYS_getrandom) @@ -152,7 +122,57 @@ static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) return( syscall( SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags ) ); } #endif /* SYS_getrandom */ -#endif /* __linux__ */ +#endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) +#include <sys/param.h> +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || \ + (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/random.h> +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) +{ + return getrandom( buf, buflen, flags ); +} +#endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || + (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */ + +/* + * Some BSD systems provide KERN_ARND. + * This is equivalent to reading from /dev/urandom, only it doesn't require an + * open file descriptor, and provides up to 256 bytes per call (basically the + * same as getentropy(), but with a longer history). + * + * Documentation: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7 + */ +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#if defined(KERN_ARND) +#define HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND + +static int sysctl_arnd_wrapper( unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int name[2]; + size_t len; + + name[0] = CTL_KERN; + name[1] = KERN_ARND; + + while( buflen > 0 ) + { + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; + if( sysctl(name, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1 ) + return( -1 ); + buflen -= len; + buf += len; + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* KERN_ARND */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __NetBSD__ */ #include <stdio.h> @@ -161,7 +181,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, { FILE *file; size_t read_len; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ((void) data); #if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) @@ -178,6 +198,15 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, ((void) ret); #endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND) + ((void) file); + ((void) read_len); + if( sysctl_arnd_wrapper( output, len ) == -1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + *olen = len; + return( 0 ); +#else + *olen = 0; file = fopen( "/dev/urandom", "rb" ); @@ -195,6 +224,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, *olen = len; return( 0 ); +#endif /* HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND */ } #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ @@ -205,13 +235,13 @@ int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, { ((void) data); ((void) output); - *olen = 0; + *olen = 0; if( len < sizeof(unsigned char) ) return( 0 ); + output[0] = 0; *olen = sizeof(unsigned char); - return( 0 ); } #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c index b83b8d1f1b..afad38904f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Error message information * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,39 +15,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) +#include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) @@ -137,6 +106,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" #endif @@ -238,692 +211,751 @@ #endif -void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ) { - size_t len; - int use_ret; + int high_level_error_code; - if( buflen == 0 ) - return; - - memset( buf, 0x00, buflen ); + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; - if( ret < 0 ) - ret = -ret; + /* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */ + high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80; - if( ret & 0xFF80 ) + switch( high_level_error_code ) { - use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; - - // High level error codes - // - // BEGIN generated code + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED): + return( "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Bad input parameters" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the public value failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "DHM - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the public value failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The signature is not valid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The signature is not valid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY): + return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - The selected feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "MD - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "MD - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT): + return( "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA): + return( "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV): + return( "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG): + return( "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Read/write of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unsupported key version" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Invalid key tag or value" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Private key password can't be empty" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PK - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PK - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "PK - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PK - Unsupported key version" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PK - Invalid key tag or value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG): + return( "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PK - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY): + return( "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE): + return( "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The public key operation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The private key operation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The public key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The private key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE): + return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION): + return( "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE) ) - { - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); - return; - } - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a write call" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The operation timed out" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC): + return( "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD): + return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF): + return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER): + return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN): + return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG): + return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE): + return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY): + return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST): + return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY): + return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION): + return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): + return( "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED): + return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY): + return( "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR): + return( "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING): + return( "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO): + return( "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE): + return( "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ): + return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE): + return( "SSL - Connection requires a write call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT): + return( "SSL - The operation timed out" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT): + return( "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD): + return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL): + return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH): + return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID): + return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG): + return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Input invalid" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID): + return( "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL): + return( "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG): + return( "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME): + return( "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE): + return( "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS): + return( "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION): + return( "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "X509 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR): + return( "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ - // END generated code + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ - if( strlen( buf ) == 0 ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret ); + default: + break; } - use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; - - if( use_ret == 0 ) - return; - - // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both - // error strings. - // - len = strlen( buf ); + return( NULL ); +} - if( len > 0 ) - { - if( buflen - len < 5 ) - return; +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int low_level_error_code; - mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " ); + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; - buf += len + 3; - buflen -= len + 3; - } + /* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */ + low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80; - // Low level error codes - // - // BEGIN generated code + switch( low_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid key length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid input data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid key length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "AES - Invalid input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - Bad input data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ARIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Data is invalid. (not used)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG): + return( "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH): + return( "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH): + return( "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Data is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO): + return( "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES): + return( "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED): + return( "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE): + return( "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR): + return( "ERROR - Generic error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED): + return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to open a socket" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Binding of the socket failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not listen on the socket" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Connection was reset by peer" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Polling the net context failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED): + return( "NET - Failed to open a socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED): + return( "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Binding of the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not listen on the socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED): + return( "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET): + return( "NET - Connection was reset by peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST): + return( "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED): + return( "NET - Polling the net context failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "NET - Input invalid" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - OID is not found" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - output buffer is too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND): + return( "OID - OID is not found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "OID - output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED): + return( "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): + return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR): + return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); - if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) ) - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ - // END generated code + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t len; + int use_ret; + const char * high_level_error_description = NULL; + const char * low_level_error_description = NULL; + + if( buflen == 0 ) + return; + + memset( buf, 0x00, buflen ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = -ret; + + if( ret & 0xFF80 ) + { + use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; + + // Translate high level error code. + high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( high_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + // Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low + // level code. + if(use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE)) + return; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + } - if( strlen( buf ) != 0 ) + use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; + + if( use_ret == 0 ) return; - mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret ); + // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both + // error strings. + // + len = strlen( buf ); + + if( len > 0 ) + { + if( buflen - len < 5 ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " ); + + buf += len + 3; + buflen -= len + 3; + } + + // Translate low level error code. + low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( low_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description ); } #else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ @@ -941,4 +973,8 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c index 441ed69a82..43a5e1bec6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -54,16 +27,13 @@ * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -89,43 +59,6 @@ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) /* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT64_BE -#define PUT_UINT64_BE( n, b, i ) \ -{ \ - ( b )[( i ) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 56 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 48 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 40 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 32 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 4] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 5] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 6] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xff ); \ - ( b )[( i ) + 7] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xff ); \ -} -#endif - -/* * Initialize a context */ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) @@ -155,12 +88,12 @@ static int gcm_gen_table( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) return( ret ); /* pack h as two 64-bits ints, big-endian */ - GET_UINT32_BE( hi, h, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( lo, h, 4 ); + hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 0 ); + lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 4 ); vh = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; - GET_UINT32_BE( hi, h, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( lo, h, 12 ); + hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 8 ); + lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 12 ); vl = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; /* 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ @@ -207,14 +140,15 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 ); - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); if( cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); @@ -266,10 +200,10 @@ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL ) ) { unsigned char h[16]; - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8] >> 32, h, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8], h, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8] >> 32, h, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8], h, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8] >> 32, h, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8], h, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8] >> 32, h, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8], h, 12 ); mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( output, x, h ); return; @@ -284,7 +218,7 @@ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], for( i = 15; i >= 0; i-- ) { lo = x[i] & 0xf; - hi = x[i] >> 4; + hi = ( x[i] >> 4 ) & 0xf; if( i != 15 ) { @@ -305,10 +239,10 @@ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], zl ^= ctx->HL[hi]; } - PUT_UINT32_BE( zh >> 32, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( zh, output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( zl >> 32, output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( zl, output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zh >> 32, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zh, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zl >> 32, output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zl, output, 12 ); } int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, @@ -318,7 +252,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char work_buf[16]; size_t i; const unsigned char *p; @@ -354,7 +288,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, { memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 ); iv_bits = (uint64_t)iv_len * 8; - PUT_UINT64_BE( iv_bits, work_buf, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( iv_bits, work_buf, 8 ); p = iv; while( iv_len > 0 ) @@ -376,8 +310,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, - &olen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, + ctx->base_ectr, &olen ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } @@ -405,7 +339,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char ectr[16]; size_t i; const unsigned char *p; @@ -487,10 +421,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, { memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len ), work_buf, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len ), work_buf, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len ), work_buf, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len ), work_buf, 12 ); for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i]; @@ -516,7 +450,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t tag_len, unsigned char *tag ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); @@ -548,7 +482,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; size_t i; int diff; @@ -598,10 +532,10 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) */ #define MAX_TESTS 6 -static const int key_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char key[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, @@ -613,13 +547,13 @@ static const unsigned char key[MAX_TESTS][32] = 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }, }; -static const size_t iv_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 }; -static const int iv_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; -static const unsigned char iv[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -635,13 +569,13 @@ static const unsigned char iv[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }, }; -static const size_t add_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 }; -static const int add_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char additional[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, @@ -649,13 +583,13 @@ static const unsigned char additional[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }, }; -static const size_t pt_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 }; -static const int pt_index[MAX_TESTS] = +static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char pt[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -669,7 +603,7 @@ static const unsigned char pt[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, }; -static const unsigned char ct[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, @@ -778,7 +712,7 @@ static const unsigned char ct[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, }; -static const unsigned char tag[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = { { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, @@ -838,7 +772,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); /* * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when @@ -856,15 +791,28 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) } ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, - pt_len[i], - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i], - pt[pt_index[i]], buf, 16, tag_buf ); + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf, 16, tag_buf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + /* Allow alternative implementations to only support 12-byte nonces. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && + iv_len_test_data[i] != 12 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + break; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) */ if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if ( memcmp( buf, ct[j * 6 + i], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if ( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; @@ -881,22 +829,26 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "dec" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, - pt_len[i], - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i], - ct[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( memcmp( buf, pt[pt_index[i]], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; @@ -913,32 +865,40 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i] ); + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( pt_len[i] > 32 ) + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) { - size_t rest_len = pt_len[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, pt[pt_index[i]], buf ); + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, pt[pt_index[i]] + 32, - buf + 32 ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, + buf + 32 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len[i], pt[pt_index[i]], buf ); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } @@ -947,8 +907,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( memcmp( buf, ct[j * 6 + i], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; @@ -965,32 +926,38 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", key_len, i, "dec" ); - ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key[key_index[i]], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, - iv[iv_index[i]], iv_len[i], - additional[add_index[i]], add_len[i] ); + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( pt_len[i] > 32 ) + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) { - size_t rest_len = pt_len[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct[j * 6 + i], buf ); + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, ct[j * 6 + i] + 32, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, buf + 32 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len[i], ct[j * 6 + i], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; @@ -1000,8 +967,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( memcmp( buf, pt[pt_index[i]], pt_len[i] ) != 0 || - memcmp( tag_buf, tag[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c index 5e91f40d84..2a360a150c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The HAVEGE RNG was designed by Andre Seznec in 2002. @@ -51,11 +24,7 @@ * Contact: seznec(at)irisa_dot_fr - orocheco(at)irisa_dot_fr */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) @@ -63,19 +32,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/timing.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include <limits.h> +#include <stdint.h> #include <string.h> -/* If int isn't capable of storing 2^32 distinct values, the code of this - * module may cause a processor trap or a miscalculation. If int is more - * than 32 bits, the code may not calculate the intended values. */ -#if INT_MIN + 1 != -0x7fffffff -#error "The HAVEGE module requires int to be exactly 32 bits, with INT_MIN = -2^31." -#endif -#if UINT_MAX != 0xffffffff -#error "The HAVEGE module requires unsigned to be exactly 32 bits." -#endif - /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * On average, one iteration accesses two 8-word blocks in the havege WALK * table, and generates 16 words in the RES array. @@ -90,7 +49,7 @@ * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ -#define SWAP(X,Y) { unsigned *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; } +#define SWAP(X,Y) { uint32_t *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; } #define TST1_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; #define TST2_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; @@ -113,7 +72,7 @@ PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \ PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \ PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \ - CLK = (unsigned) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ \ i = 0; \ A = &WALK[PT1 ]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ @@ -136,7 +95,7 @@ \ IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \ *A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; CLK = (unsigned) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + *B = IN; CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ *C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \ *D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \ \ @@ -187,20 +146,20 @@ PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \ \ for( n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \ - POOL[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; + hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; /* * Entropy gathering function */ static void havege_fill( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) { - unsigned i, n = 0; - unsigned U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; - unsigned PT1, PT2, *WALK, *POOL, RES[16]; - unsigned PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; + size_t n = 0; + size_t i; + uint32_t U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; + uint32_t PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16]; + uint32_t PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; - WALK = (unsigned *) hs->WALK; - POOL = (unsigned *) hs->pool; + WALK = hs->WALK; PT1 = hs->PT1; PT2 = hs->PT2; @@ -249,7 +208,7 @@ void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) */ int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int val; + uint32_t val; size_t use_len; mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) p_rng; unsigned char *p = buf; @@ -257,8 +216,8 @@ int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) while( len > 0 ) { use_len = len; - if( use_len > sizeof(int) ) - use_len = sizeof(int); + if( use_len > sizeof( val ) ) + use_len = sizeof( val ); if( hs->offset[1] >= MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE ) havege_fill( hs ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c index 4a8bdfbe18..5013729d2a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869 * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,46 +15,22 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) #include <string.h> #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char prk[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk ); @@ -139,7 +109,7 @@ int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, n = okm_len / hash_len; - if( (okm_len % hash_len) != 0 ) + if( okm_len % hash_len != 0 ) { n++; } @@ -155,11 +125,13 @@ int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - if( (ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md, 1) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { goto exit; } + memset( t, 0, hash_len ); + /* * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N) * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3 diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c index b45d61616f..de9706885c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -50,16 +23,13 @@ * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -97,7 +67,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; unsigned char sep[1]; unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) { @@ -150,7 +120,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -186,7 +156,7 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, { unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; size_t seedlen = 0; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; { size_t total_entropy_len; @@ -278,7 +248,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t md_size; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -359,7 +329,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); size_t left = out_len; @@ -428,7 +398,7 @@ exit: */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -468,7 +438,7 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; FILE *f; unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c index 867b91462d..a10a835634 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ /** - * \file mbedtls_md.c + * \file md.c * * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS * * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com> * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -25,40 +19,24 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -74,6 +52,85 @@ #include <stdio.h> #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { + "MD2", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, + 16, + 16, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { + "MD4", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + "MD5", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + "RIPEMD160", + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + "SHA1", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + "SHA224", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + 28, + 64, +}; + +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + "SHA256", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + 32, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + "SHA384", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + 48, + 128, +}; +#endif + +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + "SHA512", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + 64, + 128, +}; +#endif + /* * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! */ @@ -81,8 +138,10 @@ static const int supported_digests[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, @@ -150,8 +209,10 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ) return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) ) return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) ) return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); #endif @@ -189,8 +250,10 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ) return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); #endif @@ -210,7 +273,54 @@ void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) return; if( ctx->md_ctx != NULL ) - ctx->md_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->md_ctx ); + { + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; + } + mbedtls_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + } if( ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL ) { @@ -232,7 +342,50 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - dst->md_info->clone_func( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + switch( src->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } return( 0 ); } @@ -244,35 +397,127 @@ int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_ } #endif +#define ALLOC( type ) \ + do { \ + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_##type##_context ) ); \ + if( ctx->md_ctx == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + mbedtls_##type##_init( ctx->md_ctx ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ) { if( md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( ( ctx->md_ctx = md_info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + ctx->md_info = md_info; + ctx->md_ctx = NULL; + ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + ALLOC( md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + ALLOC( md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + ALLOC( md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + ALLOC( ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + ALLOC( sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + ALLOC( sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + ALLOC( sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } if( hmac != 0 ) { ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 2, md_info->block_size ); if( ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) { - md_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->md_ctx ); + mbedtls_md_free( ctx ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); } } - ctx->md_info = md_info; - return( 0 ); } +#undef ALLOC int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) { if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ); + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } } int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) @@ -280,7 +525,43 @@ int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, si if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } } int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) @@ -288,7 +569,43 @@ int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } } int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, @@ -297,13 +614,51 @@ int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, si if( md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( md_info->digest_func( input, ilen, output ) ); + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; FILE *f; size_t n; mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; @@ -320,17 +675,17 @@ int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigne if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = md_info->starts_func( ctx.md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; while( ( n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) ) > 0 ) - if( ( ret = md_info->update_func( ctx.md_ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; if( ferror( f ) != 0 ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; else - ret = md_info->finish_func( ctx.md_ctx, output ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ); cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); @@ -343,7 +698,7 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *ipad, *opad; size_t i; @@ -353,11 +708,11 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, if( keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size ) { - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; keylen = ctx->md_info->size; @@ -376,10 +731,10 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] ); } - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, ipad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; cleanup: @@ -393,12 +748,12 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *inpu if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, input, ilen ) ); } int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *opad; @@ -407,22 +762,22 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, opad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, opad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, tmp, - ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, tmp, + ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - return( ctx->md_info->finish_func( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); + return( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); } int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *ipad; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) @@ -430,10 +785,9 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; - if( ( ret = ctx->md_info->starts_func( ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - return( ctx->md_info->update_func( ctx->md_ctx, ipad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); } int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, @@ -442,7 +796,7 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, unsigned char *output ) { mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -470,7 +824,43 @@ int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - return( ctx->md_info->process_func( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } } unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c index 58bd6d8f6b..7264e30313 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * RFC 1115/1319 compliant MD2 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The MD2 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1989. @@ -50,16 +23,13 @@ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) #include "mbedtls/md2.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -198,7 +168,7 @@ int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; while( ilen > 0 ) @@ -240,7 +210,7 @@ void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; unsigned char x; @@ -278,7 +248,7 @@ int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md2_context ctx; mbedtls_md2_init( &ctx ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c index 9a825327f4..eaa679a0a6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. @@ -50,16 +23,13 @@ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) #include "mbedtls/md4.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -74,29 +44,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); @@ -148,22 +95,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; } local; - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); #define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) @@ -284,7 +231,7 @@ int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; @@ -354,7 +301,7 @@ static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t last, padn; uint32_t high, low; unsigned char msglen[8]; @@ -363,8 +310,8 @@ int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); @@ -377,10 +324,10 @@ int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, return( ret ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -402,7 +349,7 @@ int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md4_context ctx; mbedtls_md4_init( &ctx ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c index a2e1ca77ad..4b53fcf367 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. @@ -49,16 +22,13 @@ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -73,29 +43,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); @@ -147,22 +94,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; } local; - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); #define S(x,n) \ ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( ( (x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> ( 32 - (n) ) ) ) @@ -290,7 +237,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; @@ -349,7 +296,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; @@ -383,8 +330,8 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( low, ctx->buffer, 56 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( high, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, ctx->buffer, 60 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -392,10 +339,10 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, /* * Output final state */ - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -417,7 +364,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md5_context ctx; mbedtls_md5_init( &ctx ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7459db2faf..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,611 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md_wrap.c - * - * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com> - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include <stdlib.h> -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - -static int md2_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int md2_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md2_update_ret( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int md2_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *md2_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_md2_init( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void md2_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_free( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void md2_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_md2_clone( (mbedtls_md2_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_md2_context *) src ); -} - -static int md2_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - ((void) data); - - return( mbedtls_internal_md2_process( (mbedtls_md2_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - "MD2", - 16, - 16, - md2_starts_wrap, - md2_update_wrap, - md2_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_md2_ret, - md2_ctx_alloc, - md2_ctx_free, - md2_clone_wrap, - md2_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - -static int md4_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int md4_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md4_update_ret( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int md4_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *md4_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_md4_init( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void md4_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_free( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void md4_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_md4_clone( (mbedtls_md4_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_md4_context *) src ); -} - -static int md4_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_md4_process( (mbedtls_md4_context *) ctx, data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - "MD4", - 16, - 64, - md4_starts_wrap, - md4_update_wrap, - md4_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_md4_ret, - md4_ctx_alloc, - md4_ctx_free, - md4_clone_wrap, - md4_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - -static int md5_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int md5_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md5_update_ret( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int md5_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *md5_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_md5_init( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void md5_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_free( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void md5_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_md5_clone( (mbedtls_md5_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_md5_context *) src ); -} - -static int md5_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( (mbedtls_md5_context *) ctx, data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, - "MD5", - 16, - 64, - md5_starts_wrap, - md5_update_wrap, - md5_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_md5_ret, - md5_ctx_alloc, - md5_ctx_free, - md5_clone_wrap, - md5_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - -static int ripemd160_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int ripemd160_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int ripemd160_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx, - output ) ); -} - -static void *ripemd160_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_ripemd160_init( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void ripemd160_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_free( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void ripemd160_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) src ); -} - -static int ripemd160_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( - (mbedtls_ripemd160_context *) ctx, data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, - "RIPEMD160", - 20, - 64, - ripemd160_starts_wrap, - ripemd160_update_wrap, - ripemd160_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_ripemd160_ret, - ripemd160_ctx_alloc, - ripemd160_ctx_free, - ripemd160_clone_wrap, - ripemd160_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - -static int sha1_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx ) ); -} - -static int sha1_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int sha1_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx, output ) ); -} - -static void *sha1_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_sha1_init( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void sha1_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_clone( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_sha1_context *) src ); -} - -static void sha1_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_free( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static int sha1_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( (mbedtls_sha1_context *) ctx, - data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - "SHA1", - 20, - 64, - sha1_starts_wrap, - sha1_update_wrap, - sha1_finish_wrap, - mbedtls_sha1_ret, - sha1_ctx_alloc, - sha1_ctx_free, - sha1_clone_wrap, - sha1_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ - -/* - * Wrappers for generic message digests - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - -static int sha224_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, 1 ) ); -} - -static int sha224_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int sha224_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, - output ) ); -} - -static int sha224_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); -} - -static void *sha224_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_sha256_init( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void sha224_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_free( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void sha224_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_clone( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_sha256_context *) src ); -} - -static int sha224_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, - data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - "SHA224", - 28, - 64, - sha224_starts_wrap, - sha224_update_wrap, - sha224_finish_wrap, - sha224_wrap, - sha224_ctx_alloc, - sha224_ctx_free, - sha224_clone_wrap, - sha224_process_wrap, -}; - -static int sha256_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha256_context *) ctx, 0 ) ); -} - -static int sha256_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - "SHA256", - 32, - 64, - sha256_starts_wrap, - sha224_update_wrap, - sha224_finish_wrap, - sha256_wrap, - sha224_ctx_alloc, - sha224_ctx_free, - sha224_clone_wrap, - sha224_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - -static int sha384_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, 1 ) ); -} - -static int sha384_update_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, - input, ilen ) ); -} - -static int sha384_finish_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, - output ) ); -} - -static int sha384_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); -} - -static void *sha384_ctx_alloc( void ) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); - - if( ctx != NULL ) - mbedtls_sha512_init( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx ); - - return( ctx ); -} - -static void sha384_ctx_free( void *ctx ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_free( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx ); - mbedtls_free( ctx ); -} - -static void sha384_clone_wrap( void *dst, const void *src ) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_clone( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) dst, - (const mbedtls_sha512_context *) src ); -} - -static int sha384_process_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, - data ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - "SHA384", - 48, - 128, - sha384_starts_wrap, - sha384_update_wrap, - sha384_finish_wrap, - sha384_wrap, - sha384_ctx_alloc, - sha384_ctx_free, - sha384_clone_wrap, - sha384_process_wrap, -}; - -static int sha512_starts_wrap( void *ctx ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( (mbedtls_sha512_context *) ctx, 0 ) ); -} - -static int sha512_wrap( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - "SHA512", - 64, - 128, - sha512_starts_wrap, - sha384_update_wrap, - sha384_finish_wrap, - sha512_wrap, - sha384_ctx_alloc, - sha384_ctx_free, - sha384_clone_wrap, - sha384_process_wrap, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c index 915ec3ae9d..0d5d27d3de 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Buffer-based memory allocator * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) #include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d20776f159 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_common.h + * + * \brief Common functions and macros used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H + +#include "mps_error.h" + +#include <stdio.h> + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Configuration + * + * \{ + */ + +/*! This flag controls whether the MPS-internal components + * (reader, writer, Layer 1-3) perform validation of the + * expected abstract state at the entry of API calls. + * + * Context: All MPS API functions impose assumptions/preconditions on the + * context on which they operate. For example, every structure has a notion of + * state integrity which is established by `xxx_init()` and preserved by any + * calls to the MPS API which satisfy their preconditions and either succeed, + * or fail with an error code which is explicitly documented to not corrupt + * structure integrity (such as WANT_READ and WANT_WRITE); + * apart from `xxx_init()` any function assumes state integrity as a + * precondition (but usually more). If any of the preconditions is violated, + * the function's behavior is entirely undefined. + * In addition to state integrity, all MPS structures have a more refined + * notion of abstract state that the API operates on. For example, all layers + * have a notion of 'abtract read state' which indicates if incoming data has + * been passed to the user, e.g. through mps_l2_read_start() for Layer 2 + * or mps_l3_read() in Layer 3. After such a call, it doesn't make sense to + * call these reading functions again until the incoming data has been + * explicitly 'consumed', e.g. through mps_l2_read_consume() for Layer 2 or + * mps_l3_read_consume() on Layer 3. However, even if it doesn't make sense, + * it's a design choice whether the API should fail gracefully on such + * non-sensical calls or not, and that's what this option is about: + * + * This option determines whether the expected abstract state + * is part of the API preconditions or not: If the option is set, + * then the abstract state is not part of the precondition and is + * thus required to be validated by the implementation. If an unexpected + * abstract state is encountered, the implementation must fail gracefully + * with error #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED. + * Conversely, if this option is not set, then the expected abstract state + * is included in the preconditions of the respective API calls, and + * an implementation's behaviour is undefined if the abstract state is + * not as expected. + * + * For example: Enabling this makes mps_l2_read_done() fail if + * no incoming record is currently open; disabling this would + * lead to undefined behavior in this case. + * + * Comment this to remove state validation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION + +/*! This flag enables/disables assertions on the internal state of MPS. + * + * Assertions are sanity checks that should never trigger when MPS + * is used within the bounds of its API and preconditions. + * + * Enabling this increases security by limiting the scope of + * potential bugs, but comes at the cost of increased code size. + * + * Note: So far, there is no guiding principle as to what + * expected conditions merit an assertion, and which don't. + * + * Comment this to disable assertions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + +/*! This flag controls whether tracing for MPS should be enabled. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + ( cond ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) do {} while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Configuration */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Common types + * + * Various common types used throughout MPS. + * \{ + */ + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in MPS structures. + * + * This is an unsigned integer type that should be large enough to + * hold the length of any buffer or message processed by MPS. + * + * The reason to pick a value as small as possible here is + * to reduce the size of MPS structures. + * + * \warning Care has to be taken when using a narrower type + * than ::mbedtls_mps_size_t here because of + * potential truncation during conversion. + * + * \warning Handshake messages in TLS may be up to 2^24 ~ 16Mb in size. + * If mbedtls_mps_[opt_]stored_size_t is smaller than that, the + * maximum handshake message is restricted accordingly. + * + * For now, we use the default type of size_t throughout, and the use of + * smaller types or different types for ::mbedtls_mps_size_t and + * ::mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t is not yet supported. + * + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t) -1 ) + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API + * and implementation. + * + * This must be at least as wide as ::mbedtls_stored_size_t but + * may be chosen to be strictly larger if more suitable for the + * target architecture. + * + * For example, in a test build for ARM Thumb, using uint_fast16_t + * instead of uint16_t reduced the code size from 1060 Byte to 962 Byte, + * so almost 10%. + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1 ) + +#if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX +#error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." +#endif + +/* \} SECTION: Common types */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f78d9a05f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_error.h + * + * \brief Error codes used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H + + +/* TODO: The error code allocation needs to be revisited: + * + * - Should we make (some of) the MPS Reader error codes public? + * If so, we need to adjust MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR() to hit + * a gap in the Mbed TLS public error space. + * If not, we have to make sure we don't forward those errors + * at the level of the public API -- no risk at the moment as + * long as MPS is an experimental component not accessible from + * public API. + */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS general error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE ( 0 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS general error codes */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE ( 1 << 8 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because + * the user hasn't yet read and committed all of it. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) + +/*! An invalid argument was passed to the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/*! An attempt to move a reader to consuming mode through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * after pausing failed because the provided data is not sufficient to serve the + * read requests that led to the pausing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x3 ) + +/*! A get request failed because not enough data is available in the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x4 ) + +/*!< A get request after pausing and reactivating the reader failed because + * the request is not in line with the request made prior to pausing. The user + * must not change it's 'strategy' after pausing and reactivating a reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x5 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the reader + * has no accumulator it can use to backup the data that hasn't been processed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x6 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the + * accumulator passed to the reader is not large enough to hold both the + * data that hasn't been processed and the excess of the last read-request. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x7 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9af5073cc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_reader.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include <string.h> + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) +static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ + +/* + * GENERAL NOTE ON CODING STYLE + * + * The following code intentionally separates memory loads + * and stores from other operations (arithmetic or branches). + * This leads to the introduction of many local variables + * and significantly increases the C-code line count, but + * should not increase the size of generated assembly. + * + * The reason for this is twofold: + * (1) It will ease verification efforts using the VST + * (Verified Software Toolchain) + * whose program logic cannot directly reason + * about instructions containing a load or store in + * addition to other operations (e.g. *p = *q or + * tmp = *p + 42). + * (2) Operating on local variables and writing the results + * back to the target contexts on success only + * allows to maintain structure invariants even + * on failure - this in turn has two benefits: + * (2.a) If for some reason an error code is not caught + * and operation continues, functions are nonetheless + * called with sane contexts, reducing the risk + * of dangerous behavior. + * (2.b) Randomized testing is easier if structures + * remain intact even in the face of failing + * and/or non-sensical calls. + * Moreover, it might even reduce code-size because + * the compiler need not write back temporary results + * to memory in case of failure. + * + */ + +static inline int mps_reader_is_accumulating( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining; + if( rd->acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + return( acc_remaining > 0 ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_producing( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *frag = rd->frag; + return( frag == NULL ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_consuming( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + return( !mps_reader_is_producing( rd ) ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset; + + if( acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + frag_offset = rd->acc_share.frag_offset; + return( frag_offset ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset, end; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + end = rd->end; + + return( end < frag_offset ); +} + +static inline void mps_reader_zero( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + /* A plain memset() would likely be more efficient, + * but the current way of zeroing makes it harder + * to overlook fields which should not be zero-initialized. + * It's also more suitable for FV efforts since it + * doesn't require reasoning about structs being + * interpreted as unstructured binary blobs. */ + static mbedtls_mps_reader const zero = + { .frag = NULL, + .frag_len = 0, + .commit = 0, + .end = 0, + .pending = 0, + .acc = NULL, + .acc_len = 0, + .acc_available = 0, + .acc_share = { .acc_remaining = 0 } + }; + *rd = zero; +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_init" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Accumulator size: %u bytes", (unsigned) acc_len ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + rd->acc = acc; + rd->acc_len = acc_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_free" ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *new_frag, + mbedtls_mps_size_t new_frag_len ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t copy_to_acc; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Fragment length: %u bytes", (unsigned) new_frag_len ); + + if( new_frag == NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_producing( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() requires reader to be in producing mode" ); + + if( mps_reader_is_accumulating( rd ) ) + { + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available = rd->acc_available; + + /* Skip over parts of the accumulator that have already been filled. */ + acc += acc_available; + + copy_to_acc = acc_remaining; + if( copy_to_acc > new_frag_len ) + copy_to_acc = new_frag_len; + + /* Copy new contents to accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc, new_frag, copy_to_acc ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Copy new data of size %u of %u into accumulator at offset %u", + (unsigned) copy_to_acc, (unsigned) new_frag_len, (unsigned) acc_available ); + + /* Check if, with the new fragment, we have enough data. */ + acc_remaining -= copy_to_acc; + if( acc_remaining > 0 ) + { + /* We need to accumulate more data. Stay in producing mode. */ + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = acc_remaining; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + } + + /* We have filled the accumulator: Move to consuming mode. */ + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Enough data available to serve user request" ); + + /* Remember overlap of accumulator and fragment. */ + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = acc_available; + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + } + else /* Not accumulating */ + { + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = 0; + } + + rd->frag = new_frag; + rd->frag_len = new_frag_len; + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ) +{ + unsigned char *frag; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_len, frag_offset, end, frag_fetched, frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_get" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Bytes requested: %u", (unsigned) desired ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_get() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + /* Check if we're still serving from the accumulator. */ + if( mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( rd ) ) + { + /* Illustration of supported and unsupported cases: + * + * - Allowed #1 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +-----v-------v-------------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Allowed #2 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +----------v----------------v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Not allowed #1 (could be served, but we don't actually use it): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +------v-------------v------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * + * - Not allowed #2 (can't be served with a contiguous buffer): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end + desired + * | | + * +------v--------------------+ v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * In case of Allowed #2 we're switching to serve from + * `frag` starting from the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + */ + + unsigned char *acc; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the accumulator" ); + if( frag_offset - end < desired ) + { + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available; + acc_available = rd->acc_available; + if( acc_available - end != desired ) + { + /* It might be possible to serve some of these situations by + * making additional space in the accumulator, removing those + * parts that have already been committed. + * On the other hand, this brings additional complexity and + * enlarges the code size, while there doesn't seem to be a use + * case where we don't attempt exactly the same `get` calls when + * resuming on a reader than what we tried before pausing it. + * If we believe we adhere to this restricted usage throughout + * the library, this check is a good opportunity to + * validate this. */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + } + } + + acc = rd->acc; + acc += end; + + *buffer = acc; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); + } + + /* Attempt to serve the request from the current fragment */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the current fragment." ); + + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + frag_fetched = end - frag_offset; /* The amount of data from the current + * fragment that has already been passed + * to the user. */ + frag_remaining = frag_len - frag_fetched; /* Remaining data in fragment */ + + /* Check if we can serve the read request from the fragment. */ + if( frag_remaining < desired ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There's not enough data in the current fragment " + "to serve the request." ); + /* There's not enough data in the current fragment, + * so either just RETURN what we have or fail. */ + if( buflen == NULL ) + { + if( frag_remaining > 0 ) + { + rd->pending = desired - frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Remember to collect %u bytes before re-opening", + (unsigned) rd->pending ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + + desired = frag_remaining; + } + + /* There's enough data in the current fragment to serve the + * (potentially modified) read request. */ + + frag = rd->frag; + frag += frag_fetched; + + *buffer = frag; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t end; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + rd->commit = end; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + int *paused ) +{ + unsigned char *frag, *acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t pending, commit; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len, frag_offset, frag_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim" ); + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + frag = rd->frag; + acc = rd->acc; + pending = rd->pending; + commit = rd->commit; + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + if( pending == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No unsatisfied read-request has been logged." ); + + /* Check if there's data left to be consumed. */ + if( commit < frag_offset || commit - frag_offset < frag_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There is data left to be consumed." ); + rd->end = commit; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT ); + } + + rd->acc_available = 0; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment has been fully processed and committed." ); + } + else + { + int overflow; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_len; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len_needed; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There has been an unsatisfied read with %u bytes overhead.", + (unsigned) pending ); + + if( acc == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No accumulator present" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR ); + } + acc_len = rd->acc_len; + + /* Check if the upper layer has already fetched + * and committed the contents of the accumulator. */ + if( commit < frag_offset ) + { + /* No, accumulator is still being processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = 0; + frag_backup_len = frag_len; + acc_backup_offset = commit; + acc_backup_len = frag_offset - commit; + } + else + { + /* Yes, the accumulator is already processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = commit - frag_offset; + frag_backup_len = frag_len - frag_backup_offset; + acc_backup_offset = 0; + acc_backup_len = 0; + } + + backup_len = acc_backup_len + frag_backup_len; + acc_len_needed = backup_len + pending; + + overflow = 0; + overflow |= ( backup_len < acc_backup_len ); + overflow |= ( acc_len_needed < backup_len ); + + if( overflow || acc_len < acc_len_needed ) + { + /* Except for the different return code, we behave as if + * there hadn't been a call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * since the last commit. */ + rd->end = commit; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "The accumulator is too small to handle the backup." ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Size: %u", (unsigned) acc_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Needed: %u (%u + %u)", + (unsigned) acc_len_needed, + (unsigned) backup_len, (unsigned) pending ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment backup: %u", (unsigned) frag_backup_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Accumulator backup: %u", (unsigned) acc_backup_len ); + + /* Move uncommitted parts from the accumulator to the front + * of the accumulator. */ + memmove( acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len ); + + /* Copy uncmmitted parts of the current fragment to the + * accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc + acc_backup_len, + frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len ); + + rd->acc_available = backup_len; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = pending; + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 1; + } + + rd->frag = NULL; + rd->frag_len = 0; + + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Final state: aa %u, al %u, ar %u", + (unsigned) rd->acc_available, (unsigned) rd->acc_len, + (unsigned) rd->acc_share.acc_remaining ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..427c1bd254 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_reader.h + * + * \brief This file defines reader objects, which together with their + * sibling writer objects form the basis for the communication + * between the various layers of the Mbed TLS messaging stack, + * as well as the communication between the messaging stack and + * the (D)TLS handshake protocol implementation. + * + * Readers provide a means of transferring incoming data from + * a 'producer' providing it in chunks of arbitrary size, to + * a 'consumer' which fetches and processes it in chunks of + * again arbitrary, and potentially different, size. + * + * Readers can thus be seen as datagram-to-stream converters, + * and they abstract away the following two tasks from the user: + * 1. The pointer arithmetic of stepping through a producer- + * provided chunk in smaller chunks. + * 2. The merging of incoming data chunks in case the + * consumer requests data in larger chunks than what the + * producer provides. + * + * The basic abstract flow of operation is the following: + * - Initially, the reader is in 'producing mode'. + * - The producer hands an incoming data buffer to the reader, + * moving it from 'producing' to 'consuming' mode. + * - The consumer subsequently fetches and processes the buffer + * content. Once that's done -- or partially done and a consumer's + * request can't be fulfilled -- the producer revokes the reader's + * access to the incoming data buffer, putting the reader back to + * producing mode. + * - The producer subsequently gathers more incoming data and hands + * it to the reader until it switches back to consuming mode + * if enough data is available for the last consumer request to + * be satisfiable. + * - Repeat the above. + * + * The abstract states of the reader from the producer's and + * consumer's perspective are as follows: + * + * - From the perspective of the consumer, the state of the + * reader consists of the following: + * - A byte stream representing (concatenation of) the data + * received through calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * - A marker within that byte stream indicating which data + * can be considered processed, and hence need not be retained, + * when the reader is passed back to the producer via + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * The marker is set via mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() + * which places it at the end of the current byte stream. + * The consumer need not be aware of the distinction between consumer + * and producer mode, because it only interfaces with the reader + * when the latter is in consuming mode. + * + * - From the perspective of the producer, the reader's state is one of: + * - Attached: The reader is in consuming mode. + * - Unset: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the reader, + * and all previously handed incoming data buffers have been + * fully processed. More data needs to be fed into the reader + * via mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * + * - Accumulating: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the + * reader, but some data from the previous incoming data + * buffer hasn't been processed yet and is internally + * held back. + * The Attached state belongs to consuming mode, while the Unset and + * Accumulating states belong to producing mode. + * + * Transitioning from the Unset or Accumulating state to Attached is + * done via successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(), while + * transitioning from Attached to either Unset or Accumulating (depending + * on what has been processed) is done via mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * + * The following diagram depicts the producer-state progression: + * + * +------------------+ reclaim + * | Unset +<-------------------------------------+ get + * +--------|---------+ | +------+ + * | | | | + * | | | | + * | feed +---------+---+--+ | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | Attached | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | feed, enough data available +---------+---+--+ | + * | to serve previous consumer request | | | + * | | | | + * +--------+---------+ | +------+ + * +----> Accumulating |<-------------------------------------+ commit + * | +---+--------------+ reclaim, previous read request + * | | couldn't be fulfilled + * | | + * +--------+ + * feed, need more data to serve + * previous consumer request + * | + * | + * producing mode | consuming mode + * | + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_READER_H +#define MBEDTLS_READER_H + +#include <stdio.h> + +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_error.h" + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader; +typedef struct mbedtls_mps_reader mbedtls_mps_reader; + +/* + * Structure definitions + */ + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader +{ + unsigned char *frag; /*!< The fragment of incoming data managed by + * the reader; it is provided to the reader + * through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). The reader + * does not own the fragment and does not + * perform any allocation operations on it, + * but does have read and write access to it. + * + * The reader is in consuming mode if + * and only if \c frag is not \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_len; + /*!< The length of the current fragment. + * Must be 0 if \c frag == \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t commit; + /*!< The offset of the last commit, relative + * to the first byte in the fragment, if + * no accumulator is present. If an accumulator + * is present, it is viewed as a prefix to the + * current fragment, and this variable contains + * an offset from the beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t end; + /*!< The offset of the end of the last chunk + * passed to the user through a call to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), relative to the first + * byte in the fragment, if no accumulator is + * present. If an accumulator is present, it is + * viewed as a prefix to the current fragment, and + * this variable contains an offset from the + * beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t pending; + /*!< The amount of incoming data missing on the + * last call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In particular, it is \c 0 if the last call + * was successful. + * If a reader is reclaimed after an + * unsuccessful call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * this variable is used to have the reader + * remember how much data should be accumulated + * so that the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * succeeds next time. + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + + /* The accumulator is only needed if we need to be able to pause + * the reader. A few bytes could be saved by moving this to a + * separate struct and using a pointer here. */ + + unsigned char *acc; /*!< The accumulator is used to gather incoming + * data if a read-request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * cannot be served from the current fragment. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_len; + /*!< The total size of the accumulator. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_available; + /*!< The number of bytes currently gathered in + * the accumulator. This is both used in + * producing and in consuming mode: + * While producing, it is increased until + * it reaches the value of \c acc_remaining below. + * While consuming, it is used to judge if a + * get request can be served from the + * accumulator or not. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_len. */ + union + { + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_remaining; + /*!< This indicates the amount of data still + * to be gathered in the accumulator. It is + * only used in producing mode. + * Must be at most acc_len - acc_available. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_offset; + /*!< If an accumulator is present and in use, this + * field indicates the offset of the current + * fragment from the beginning of the + * accumulator. If no accumulator is present + * or the accumulator is not in use, this is \c 0. + * It is only used in consuming mode. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_available. */ + } acc_share; +}; + +/* + * API organization: + * A reader object is usually prepared and maintained + * by some lower layer and passed for usage to an upper + * layer, and the API naturally splits according to which + * layer is supposed to use the respective functions. + */ + +/* + * Maintenance API (Lower layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be initialized. + * \param acc The buffer to be used as a temporary accumulator + * in case get requests through mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * exceed the buffer provided by mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * This buffer is owned by the caller and exclusive use + * for reading and writing is given to the reader for the + * duration of the reader's lifetime. It is thus the caller's + * responsibility to maintain (and not touch) the buffer for + * the lifetime of the reader, and to properly zeroize and + * free the memory after the reader has been destroyed. + * \param acc_len The size in Bytes of \p acc. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ); + +/** + * \brief Free a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be freed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +/** + * \brief Pass chunk of data for the reader to manage. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in producing mode. + * \param buf The buffer to be managed by the reader. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the reader will be + * moved to consuming mode and obtains read access + * of \p buf until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() + * is called. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to ensure that the \p buf persists and is not changed + * between successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * and mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE if more input data is + * required to fulfill a previous request to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In this case, the reader remains in producing mode and + * takes no ownership of the provided buffer (an internal copy + * is made instead). + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on + * different kinds of failures. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *buf, + mbedtls_mps_size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Reclaim reader's access to the current input buffer. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in consuming mode. + * \param paused If not \c NULL, the integer at address \p paused will be + * modified to indicate whether the reader has been paused + * (value \c 1) or not (value \c 0). Pausing happens if there + * is uncommitted data and a previous request to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has exceeded the bounds of the + * input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + int *paused ); + +/* + * Usage API (Upper layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Request data from the reader. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must + * be in consuming mode. + * \param desired The desired amount of data to be read, in Bytes. + * \param buffer The address to store the buffer pointer in. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buflen The address to store the actual buffer + * length in, or \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *buf holds the + * address of a buffer of size \c *buflen + * (if \c buflen != \c NULL) or \c desired + * (if \c buflen == \c NULL). The user has read access + * to the buffer and guarantee of stability of the data + * until the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA if there is not enough + * data available to serve the get request. In this case, the + * reader remains intact and in consuming mode, and the consumer + * should retry the call after a successful cycle of + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * If, after such a cycle, the consumer requests a different + * amount of data, the result is implementation-defined; + * progress is guaranteed only if the same amount of data + * is requested after a mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and + * mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() cycle. + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error + * code for different kinds of failure. + * + * \note Passing \c NULL as \p buflen is a convenient way to + * indicate that fragmentation is not tolerated. + * It's functionally equivalent to passing a valid + * address as buflen and checking \c *buflen == \c desired + * afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Mark data obtained from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() as processed. + * + * This call indicates that all data received from prior calls to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has been or will have been + * processed when mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called, + * and thus need not be backed up. + * + * This function has no user observable effect until + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. In particular, + * buffers received from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() remain + * valid until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_READER_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6026a07163 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Trace module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +#include "mps_trace.h" +#include <stdarg.h> + +static int trace_depth = 0; + +#define color_default "\x1B[0m" +#define color_red "\x1B[1;31m" +#define color_green "\x1B[1;32m" +#define color_yellow "\x1B[1;33m" +#define color_blue "\x1B[1;34m" +#define color_magenta "\x1B[1;35m" +#define color_cyan "\x1B[1;36m" +#define color_white "\x1B[1;37m" + +static char const * colors[] = +{ + color_default, + color_green, + color_yellow, + color_magenta, + color_cyan, + color_blue, + color_white +}; + +#define MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE 100 + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ) +{ + int ret; + char str[MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE]; + va_list argp; + va_start( argp, format ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + if( ret >= 0 && ret < MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE ) + { + str[ret] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( "[%d|L%d]: %s\n", id, line, str ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth() +{ + return trace_depth; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth() +{ + trace_depth--; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth() +{ + trace_depth++; +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ) +{ + if( id > (int) ( sizeof( colors ) / sizeof( *colors ) ) ) + return; + printf( "%s", colors[ id ] ); +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ) +{ + if( level > 0 ) + { + while( --level ) + printf( "| " ); + + printf( "| " ); + } + + switch( ty ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT: + mbedtls_printf( "@ " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL: + mbedtls_printf( "+--> " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR: + mbedtls_printf( "E " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN: + mbedtls_printf( "< " ); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c2360118a --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_trace.h + * + * \brief Tracing module for MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include <stdio.h> +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +/* + * Adapt this to enable/disable tracing output + * from the various layers of the MPS. + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER + +/* + * To use the existing trace module, only change + * MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_XXX above, but don't modify the + * rest of this file. + */ + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN +} mbedtls_mps_trace_type; + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER 5 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER 6 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER ) + +/* We have to avoid globals because E-ACSL chokes on them... + * Wrap everything in stub functions. */ +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth( void ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ); + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(), type ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( mbedtls_mps_trace_id ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( mbedtls_mps_trace_id, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( 0 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( val ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN, "%d (-%#04x)", \ + (int) (val), -((unsigned)(val)) ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) \ + do { \ + /* Breaks tail recursion. */ \ + int ret__ = val; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( ret__ ); \ + return( ret__ ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END do { } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) return( val ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c index 1e701a5000..5fbe1f764a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must @@ -50,24 +23,17 @@ #ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #endif - -#if defined(__NetBSD__) #ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE #define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */ #endif -#endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) #error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" #endif @@ -78,6 +44,7 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -86,8 +53,7 @@ #define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == WSAEINTR ) -#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) || (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) -#undef _WIN32_WINNT +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) /* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 #endif @@ -96,6 +62,9 @@ #include <winsock2.h> #include <windows.h> +#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) +#include <wspiapi.h> +#endif #if defined(_MSC_VER) #if defined(_WIN32_WCE) @@ -205,7 +174,7 @@ void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char *port, int proto ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) @@ -371,14 +340,14 @@ int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int type; struct sockaddr_storage client_addr; -#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ +#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \ - ( defined(__NetBSD__) && defined(socklen_t) ) + defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof( client_addr ); socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof( type ); #else @@ -514,7 +483,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; struct timeval tv; fd_set read_fds; @@ -600,7 +569,7 @@ void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ) */ int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); @@ -638,7 +607,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; struct timeval tv; fd_set read_fds; int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; @@ -682,7 +651,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, */ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); @@ -715,6 +684,19 @@ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) } /* + * Close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* * Gracefully close the connection */ void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c index 278b7e91ab..1aea0b6345 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c @@ -3,13 +3,7 @@ * only * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -22,27 +16,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * Definition of Key Wrapping: @@ -54,16 +27,14 @@ * the wrapping and unwrapping operation than the definition in NIST SP 800-38F. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) #include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include <stdint.h> #include <string.h> @@ -82,51 +53,11 @@ #define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH 8 #define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT 3 -/* constant-time buffer comparison */ -static inline unsigned char mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) -{ - size_t i; - volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; - volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; - volatile unsigned char diff = 0; - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - { - /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. - * This avoids IAR compiler warning: - * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ - unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; - diff |= x ^ y; - } - - return( diff ); -} - /*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */ static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = {0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6}; /*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */ static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV2[] = {0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6}; -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -do { \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} while( 0 ) -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -do { \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} while( 0 ) -#endif - /* * Initialize context */ @@ -141,7 +72,7 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, unsigned int keybits, const int is_wrap ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, @@ -273,7 +204,7 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, } memcpy( output, NIST_KW_ICV2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ( in_len & 0xffffffff ), output, + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( in_len & 0xffffffff ), output, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); memcpy( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len ); @@ -448,7 +379,7 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, goto cleanup; /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ - diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); if( diff != 0 ) { @@ -497,14 +428,14 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, } /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ - diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); if( diff != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; } - GET_UINT32_BE( Plen, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + Plen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); /* * Plen is the length of the plaintext, when the input is valid. diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c index 2414083f0c..19c8ac207c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c @@ -4,13 +4,7 @@ * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -23,39 +17,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> @@ -66,10 +36,6 @@ #define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" -#endif - /* * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs */ @@ -180,7 +146,6 @@ int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid , \ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) /* * For X520 attribute types */ @@ -287,24 +252,28 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = { { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ), "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ), "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, }, { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" }, - MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ), "id-ce-certificatePolicies", "Certificate Policies" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, }, { { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, @@ -317,18 +286,27 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, e static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = { - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ), "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ), "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING ), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION ), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING ), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, - { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING ), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ), "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ), "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING ), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION ), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING ), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING ), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN ), "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" }, { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, const char *, description) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = +{ + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY ), "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, const char *, description) #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /* @@ -644,6 +622,12 @@ static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 ), "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ { { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, @@ -743,7 +727,7 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pb int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n; unsigned int value; char *p; @@ -771,7 +755,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, if( !( oid->p[i] & 0x80 ) ) { /* Last byte */ - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%d", value ); + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%u", value ); OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; value = 0; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c index afb7e0ad42..837337413c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * VIA PadLock support functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide: @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * programming_guide.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) @@ -83,10 +52,10 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ) "cpuid \n\t" "cmpl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" "movl $0, %%edx \n\t" - "jb unsupported \n\t" + "jb 1f \n\t" "movl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" "cpuid \n\t" - "unsupported: \n\t" + "1: \n\t" "movl %%edx, %1 \n\t" "movl %2, %%ebx \n\t" : "=m" (ebx), "=m" (edx) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c index 50e663ccdb..fcfde94799 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) @@ -59,6 +28,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -110,7 +80,7 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1( unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, mbedtls_md5_context md5_ctx; unsigned char md5sum[16]; size_t use_len; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md5_init( &md5_ctx ); @@ -171,7 +141,7 @@ static int pem_des_decrypt( unsigned char des_iv[8], { mbedtls_des_context des_ctx; unsigned char des_key[8]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_des_init( &des_ctx ); @@ -199,7 +169,7 @@ static int pem_des3_decrypt( unsigned char des3_iv[8], { mbedtls_des3_context des3_ctx; unsigned char des3_key[24]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_des3_init( &des3_ctx ); @@ -229,7 +199,7 @@ static int pem_aes_decrypt( unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, { mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; unsigned char aes_key[32]; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); @@ -373,7 +343,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); if( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED ); @@ -382,7 +352,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); mbedtls_free( buf ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); } if( enc != 0 ) @@ -464,7 +434,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *encode_buf = NULL, *c, *p = buf; size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c index 8998271b97..05cc2134f1 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Public Key abstraction layer * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,40 +15,16 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" @@ -66,6 +36,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + #include <limits.h> #include <stdint.h> @@ -172,6 +146,42 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) return( 0 ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t *pk_ctx; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */ + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ; + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + pk_ctx = (psa_key_id_t *) ctx->pk_ctx; + *pk_ctx = key; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /* * Initialize an RSA-alt context @@ -231,7 +241,7 @@ static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) return( -1 ); - if ( *hash_len != 0 && *hash_len < mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + if ( *hash_len != 0 && *hash_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) return ( -1 ); *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); @@ -286,7 +296,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -343,7 +353,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, if( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX @@ -409,7 +419,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -500,12 +510,14 @@ int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_conte PK_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); if( pub->pk_info == NULL || - prv->pk_info == NULL || - prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL ) + prv->pk_info == NULL ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } + if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT ) { if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) @@ -571,4 +583,60 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) return( ctx->pk_info->type ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Load the key to a PSA key slot, + * then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot. + * + * Currently only works for EC private keys. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + ((void) pk); + ((void) key); + ((void) hash_alg); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec; + unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t d_len; + psa_ecc_family_t curve_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + size_t bits; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ); + d_len = ( ec->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, d, d_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + curve_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ec->grp.id, &bits ); + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( curve_id ); + + /* prepare the key attributes */ + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) ); + + /* import private key into PSA */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_import_key( &attributes, d, d_len, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* make PK context wrap the key slot */ + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( pk, *key ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c index 2c27552d9b..107e912ace 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,37 +15,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" /* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" @@ -66,10 +36,20 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -98,7 +78,7 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); @@ -263,7 +243,7 @@ static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); @@ -281,7 +261,7 @@ static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); @@ -355,7 +335,7 @@ static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; /* Should never happen */ @@ -380,7 +360,7 @@ static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; /* Should never happen */ @@ -497,11 +477,153 @@ static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of + * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *to, size_t to_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 ) + { + ( *from )++; + unpadded_len--; + } + + if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; + memset( to, 0x00, padding_len ); + memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len ); + ( *from ) += unpadded_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers + * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least + * twice as big as int_size. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tmp_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Extract r */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + /* Extract s */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context key; + int key_len; + /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */ + unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits ); + const size_t signature_part_size = ( ctx->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + ((void) md_alg); + + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context; + * re-construct one to make it happy */ + key.pk_info = &pk_info; + key.pk_ctx = ctx; + p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, buf, &key ); + if( key_len <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, psa_sig_md ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can + * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */ + if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char*) sig; + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf, + signature_part_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( psa_verify_hash( key_id, psa_sig_md, + hash, hash_len, + buf, 2 * signature_part_size ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != sig + sig_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + return( ret ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ((void) md_alg); ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, @@ -512,6 +634,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return( ret ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, @@ -528,7 +651,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ((void) md_alg); ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( @@ -644,6 +767,8 @@ static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, #endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ); + if( *sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); @@ -672,7 +797,7 @@ static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char hash[32]; size_t sig_len = 0; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); @@ -741,4 +866,204 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + + /* no _init() function to call, an calloc() already zeroized */ + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + size_t bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ) ) + return( 0 ); + + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( bits ); +} + +static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs, + * as checked by setup_psa(). + * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +/* + * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer + * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. + * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). + * + * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer + * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end + * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start + */ +static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + size_t n_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = n_len; + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect + * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 ) + { + ++(*p); + --len; + } + + /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. + * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. + * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of + * MPIs, and in-place. + * + * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding + * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding + * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer + */ +static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; + unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + memmove( sig, p, len ); + *sig_len = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ((void) ctx); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) ); + size_t buf_len; + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + /* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide + * that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a + * maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is + * buggy anyway). */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + if( buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* make the signature */ + status = psa_sign_hash( *key, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, buf_len, sig_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + + /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */ + return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, buf_len ) ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + "Opaque", + pk_opaque_get_bitlen, + pk_opaque_can_do, + NULL, /* verify - will be done later */ + pk_opaque_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */ + pk_opaque_alloc_wrap, + pk_opaque_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */ +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c index cf484b86eb..4deccf3f60 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c @@ -6,13 +6,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com> * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -25,27 +19,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ #include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c index 05ade49e93..cacf7dba22 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1 @@ -50,11 +23,7 @@ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1-1.asn */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) @@ -62,6 +31,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -78,7 +48,7 @@ static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char **p = ¶ms->p; const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; @@ -90,21 +60,21 @@ static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, * */ if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); salt->p = *p; *p += salt->len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -170,7 +140,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, ((void) output); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); #else - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char key[16]; mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; ((void) mode); @@ -289,7 +259,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int id, int iterations ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned int j; unsigned char diversifier[128]; @@ -400,8 +370,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) { j = salt_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; - c = (unsigned char) (j >> 8); - salt_block[i - 1] = j & 0xFF; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( j ); + salt_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( j ); } } @@ -412,8 +382,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) { j = pwd_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; - c = (unsigned char) (j >> 8); - pwd_block[i - 1] = j & 0xFF; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( j ); + pwd_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( j ); } } } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c index c4447f1546..2b014d91c8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c @@ -6,13 +6,7 @@ * \author Mathias Olsson <mathias@kompetensum.com> * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -25,27 +19,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more @@ -54,15 +27,12 @@ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070 (Test vectors) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) #include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" @@ -84,14 +54,14 @@ static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid; unsigned char *p = params->p; const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); /* * PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { * salt OCTET STRING, @@ -101,14 +71,15 @@ static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, * } * */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &salt->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); salt->p = p; p += salt->len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -116,21 +87,21 @@ static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, keylen ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( p == end ) return( 0 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( &p, end, &prf_alg_oid ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( &prf_alg_oid, md_type ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -163,11 +134,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * } */ if( pbe_params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, &kdf_alg_params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, + &kdf_alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); // Only PBKDF2 supported at the moment // @@ -188,7 +160,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, &enc_scheme_params ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( &enc_scheme_oid, &cipher_alg ) != 0 ) @@ -227,7 +199,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, @@ -242,12 +215,14 @@ exit: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, unsigned int iteration_count, uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret = 0, j; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int j; unsigned int i; unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -264,13 +239,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); #endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); while( key_length ) { // U1 ends up in work // - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; @@ -280,21 +254,24 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, work ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + memcpy( md1, work, md_size ); for( i = 1; i < iteration_count; i++ ) { // U2 ends up in md1 // - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, md1, md_size ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, md1 ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + // U1 xor U2 // for( j = 0; j < md_size; j++ ) @@ -334,10 +311,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) #define MAX_TESTS 6 -static const size_t plen[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t plen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 8, 8, 8, 24, 9 }; -static const unsigned char password[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char password_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { "password", "password", @@ -346,10 +323,10 @@ static const unsigned char password[MAX_TESTS][32] = "pass\0word", }; -static const size_t slen[MAX_TESTS] = +static const size_t slen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 4, 4, 4, 36, 5 }; -static const unsigned char salt[MAX_TESTS][40] = +static const unsigned char salt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][40] = { "salt", "salt", @@ -358,13 +335,13 @@ static const unsigned char salt[MAX_TESTS][40] = "sa\0lt", }; -static const uint32_t it_cnt[MAX_TESTS] = +static const uint32_t it_cnt_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 1, 2, 4096, 4096, 4096 }; -static const uint32_t key_len[MAX_TESTS] = +static const uint32_t key_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 20, 20, 20, 25, 16 }; -static const unsigned char result_key[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { { 0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06, @@ -410,10 +387,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i ); - ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &sha1_ctx, password[i], plen[i], salt[i], - slen[i], it_cnt[i], key_len[i], key ); + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &sha1_ctx, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key ); if( ret != 0 || - memcmp( result_key[i], key, key_len[i] ) != 0 ) + memcmp( result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c index 8471b51320..535ed70eb1 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) @@ -56,6 +25,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -155,7 +125,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path, const char *pwd ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -182,7 +152,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -213,11 +183,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if ( end - *p < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ params->tag = **p; @@ -227,21 +197,21 @@ static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #endif ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } params->p = *p; *p += params->len; if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -268,7 +238,7 @@ static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = params->p; const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; @@ -277,7 +247,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &ver ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ver < 1 || ver > 3 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); @@ -315,13 +285,13 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end_field, &grp->P ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); if( p != end_field ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* * Curve ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -345,7 +315,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->A, p, len ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -353,7 +323,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->B, p, len ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -363,14 +333,14 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ p += len; if( p != end_curve ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, &grp->G, ( const unsigned char *) p, len ) ) != 0 ) @@ -396,7 +366,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_ * order INTEGER */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &grp->N ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); @@ -458,7 +428,7 @@ cleanup: static int pk_group_id_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); @@ -485,7 +455,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; if( params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) @@ -525,7 +495,7 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *g static int pk_get_ecpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p ) ) == 0 ) @@ -553,20 +523,20 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* Import N */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -576,7 +546,7 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, /* Import E */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, *p, len ) ) != 0 ) @@ -591,8 +561,8 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -608,13 +578,13 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; memset( params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, &alg_oid, params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( &alg_oid, pk_alg ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); @@ -640,7 +610,7 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; @@ -654,7 +624,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = *p + len; @@ -663,11 +633,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); @@ -692,8 +662,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; if( ret == 0 && *p != end ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); if( ret != 0 ) mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); @@ -764,14 +734,14 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( version != 0 ) @@ -861,8 +831,8 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, if( p != end ) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); } cleanup: @@ -873,7 +843,7 @@ cleanup: { /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ if( ( ret & 0xff80 ) == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); else ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; @@ -892,7 +862,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int version, pubkey_done; size_t len; mbedtls_asn1_buf params; @@ -913,24 +883,24 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( version != 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &eck->d, p, len ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -954,7 +924,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } } @@ -970,11 +940,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, end2 = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( &p, end2, &len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( p + len != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); if( ( ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( &p, end2, eck ) ) == 0 ) pubkey_done = 1; @@ -991,7 +961,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } } @@ -1000,7 +970,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &eck->grp, &eck->d ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1058,26 +1028,28 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( version != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( &p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) + { return( ret ); + } if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( len < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); @@ -1160,16 +1132,16 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &pbe_alg_oid, &pbe_params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); buf = p; @@ -1245,7 +1217,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) size_t len; @@ -1460,7 +1432,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p; #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; @@ -1551,7 +1523,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return( ret ); } mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); - if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) ) { return( ret ); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c index a770dfb93e..566153dd93 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Public Key layer for writing key files and structures * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) @@ -56,6 +25,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -74,6 +44,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -98,7 +72,7 @@ static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_mpi T; @@ -137,7 +111,7 @@ end_of_export: static int pk_write_ec_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; @@ -165,7 +139,7 @@ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; const char *oid; size_t oid_len; @@ -184,11 +158,11 @@ static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, tmp, byte_length ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ec, tmp, byte_length ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length ); @@ -202,7 +176,7 @@ exit: int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); @@ -220,6 +194,29 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); else #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + size_t buffer_size; + psa_key_id_t* key_id = (psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx; + + if ( *p < start ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + buffer_size = (size_t)( *p - start ); + if ( psa_export_public_key( *key_id, start, buffer_size, &len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); return( (int) len ); @@ -227,9 +224,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; const char *oid; PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); @@ -255,18 +253,52 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ), - &oid, &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) { MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t bits; + + key_id = *((psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx ); + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( key_type ); + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( curve, bits, &oid, &oid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin + * to pk_write_ec_param() above. */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( &c, buf, + oid, oid_len ) ); + + /* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */ + pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( pk_type, &oid, + &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, oid, oid_len, par_len ) ); @@ -280,7 +312,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; size_t len = 0; @@ -523,7 +555,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output_buf[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; size_t olen = 0; @@ -548,7 +580,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char output_buf[PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; const char *begin, *end; size_t olen = 0; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c index c4c3fd332d..e742fde7cc 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Platform abstraction layer * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,39 +15,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" /* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime @@ -107,28 +77,15 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */ -#if defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) #include <stdarg.h> int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; va_list argp; - /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ - if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - va_start( argp, fmt ); -#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__) - ret = _vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, argp ); -#else - ret = _vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); - if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) - { - s[n-1] = '\0'; - ret = -1; - } -#endif + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); va_end( argp ); return( ret ); @@ -165,6 +122,62 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include <stdarg.h> +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ + if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(_TRUNCATE) + ret = vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg ); +#else + ret = vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, arg ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) + { + s[n-1] = '\0'; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_vsnprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + ((void) arg); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF platform_vsnprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) ) +{ + mbedtls_vsnprintf = vsnprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) /* diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c index c8cd52d52a..98fe5deb2d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c @@ -3,13 +3,7 @@ * library. * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -22,27 +16,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -53,11 +26,7 @@ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c index 5b023f04e4..7375a0c572 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c @@ -4,13 +4,7 @@ * \brief Poly1305 authentication algorithm. * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -23,38 +17,14 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -82,13 +52,6 @@ #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 16U ) -#define BYTES_TO_U32_LE( data, offset ) \ - ( (uint32_t) (data)[offset] \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | (uint32_t) ( (uint32_t) (data)[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ - ) - /* * Our implementation is tuned for 32-bit platforms with a 64-bit multiplier. * However we provided an alternative for platforms without such a multiplier. @@ -159,10 +122,10 @@ static void poly1305_process( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, for( i = 0U; i < nblocks; i++ ) { /* The input block is treated as a 128-bit little-endian integer */ - d0 = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( input, offset + 0 ); - d1 = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( input, offset + 4 ); - d2 = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( input, offset + 8 ); - d3 = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( input, offset + 12 ); + d0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 0 ); + d1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 4 ); + d2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 8 ); + d3 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 12 ); /* Compute: acc += (padded) block as a 130-bit integer */ d0 += (uint64_t) acc0; @@ -287,22 +250,10 @@ static void poly1305_compute_mac( const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, acc3 += ctx->s[3] + (uint32_t) ( d >> 32U ); /* Compute MAC (128 least significant bits of the accumulator) */ - mac[ 0] = (unsigned char)( acc0 ); - mac[ 1] = (unsigned char)( acc0 >> 8 ); - mac[ 2] = (unsigned char)( acc0 >> 16 ); - mac[ 3] = (unsigned char)( acc0 >> 24 ); - mac[ 4] = (unsigned char)( acc1 ); - mac[ 5] = (unsigned char)( acc1 >> 8 ); - mac[ 6] = (unsigned char)( acc1 >> 16 ); - mac[ 7] = (unsigned char)( acc1 >> 24 ); - mac[ 8] = (unsigned char)( acc2 ); - mac[ 9] = (unsigned char)( acc2 >> 8 ); - mac[10] = (unsigned char)( acc2 >> 16 ); - mac[11] = (unsigned char)( acc2 >> 24 ); - mac[12] = (unsigned char)( acc3 ); - mac[13] = (unsigned char)( acc3 >> 8 ); - mac[14] = (unsigned char)( acc3 >> 16 ); - mac[15] = (unsigned char)( acc3 >> 24 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc0, mac, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc1, mac, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc2, mac, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc3, mac, 12 ); } void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) @@ -327,15 +278,15 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ - ctx->r[0] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 0 ) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; - ctx->r[1] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 4 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; - ctx->r[2] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 8 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; - ctx->r[3] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 12 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; + ctx->r[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; - ctx->s[0] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 16 ); - ctx->s[1] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 20 ); - ctx->s[2] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 24 ); - ctx->s[3] = BYTES_TO_U32_LE( key, 28 ); + ctx->s[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); + ctx->s[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + ctx->s[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); + ctx->s[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); /* Initial accumulator state */ ctx->acc[0] = 0U; @@ -448,7 +399,7 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], unsigned char mac[16] ) { mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); @@ -537,6 +488,9 @@ static const unsigned char test_mac[2][16] = } }; +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + #define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ do \ { \ @@ -554,7 +508,7 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ) { unsigned char mac[16]; unsigned i; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) { diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c index c090c8f9d2..aed7322cff 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * RIPE MD-160 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -50,16 +23,13 @@ * http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/RIPEMD-160 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -74,29 +44,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE -#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE -#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ -} -#endif - void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); @@ -152,22 +99,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; } local; - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_LE( local.X[15], data, 60 ); + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); local.A = local.Ap = ctx->state[0]; local.B = local.Bp = ctx->state[1]; @@ -353,7 +300,7 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; @@ -421,7 +368,7 @@ static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t last, padn; uint32_t high, low; unsigned char msglen[8]; @@ -430,8 +377,8 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); @@ -444,11 +391,11 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -470,7 +417,7 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &ctx ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c index 47d784c1ba..8a5d40ff1e 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * The RSA public-key cryptosystem * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -62,11 +35,7 @@ * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) @@ -74,6 +43,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include <string.h> @@ -102,28 +74,12 @@ #define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -/* constant-time buffer comparison */ -static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) -{ - size_t i; - const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a; - const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b; - unsigned char diff = 0; - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - diff |= A[i] ^ B[i]; - - return( diff ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) || @@ -132,7 +88,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) || ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } if( N != NULL ) @@ -172,7 +128,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, cleanup: if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -323,7 +279,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); @@ -338,7 +294,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } else if( d_missing ) @@ -348,7 +304,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) &ctx->E, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } } @@ -363,7 +319,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ @@ -426,7 +382,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -470,7 +426,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -491,13 +447,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) || ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } #else if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); } #endif @@ -564,7 +520,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, void *p_rng, unsigned int nbits, int exponent ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; int prime_quality = 0; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -665,8 +621,9 @@ cleanup: if( ret != 0 ) { mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx ); + if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -761,7 +718,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; mbedtls_mpi T; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -799,7 +756,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -899,7 +856,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; /* Temporary holding the result */ @@ -1115,7 +1072,7 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free( &I ); if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ); return( ret ); } @@ -1192,7 +1149,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { size_t olen; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; unsigned int hlen; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; @@ -1202,7 +1159,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) @@ -1228,7 +1185,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Generate a random octet string seed */ if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); p += hlen; @@ -1238,7 +1195,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; *p++ = 1; - memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1278,14 +1236,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *output ) { size_t nb_pad, olen; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1316,7 +1274,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); p++; } @@ -1330,7 +1288,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } *p++ = 0; - memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) @@ -1352,7 +1311,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); switch( ctx->padding ) { @@ -1387,7 +1346,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t ilen, i, pad_len; unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -1508,7 +1467,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } *olen = ilen - (p - buf); - memcpy( output, p, *olen ); + if( *olen != 0 ) + memcpy( output, p, *olen ); ret = 0; cleanup: @@ -1520,126 +1480,21 @@ cleanup: #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -/** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches. - * - * \param value The value to analyze. - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. - */ -static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value ) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -/** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches. - * - * This is equivalent to `size > max`, but is likely to be compiled to - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param size Size to check. - * \param max Maximum desired value for \p size. - * \return \c 0 if `size <= max`. - * \return \c 1 if `size > max`. - */ -static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max ) -{ - /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */ - return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) ); -} - -/** Choose between two integer values, without branches. - * - * This is equivalent to `cond ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param cond Condition to test. - * \param if1 Value to use if \p cond is nonzero. - * \param if0 Value to use if \p cond is zero. - * \return \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. - */ -static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 ) -{ - unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond ); - return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) ); -} - -/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking - * the length of the data through side channels. - * - * `mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally equivalent to - * ``` - * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); - * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); - * ``` - * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) - * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at - * the expense of performance. - * - * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. - * \param total Total size of the buffer. - * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. - */ -static void mem_move_to_left( void *start, - size_t total, - size_t offset ) -{ - volatile unsigned char *buf = start; - size_t i, n; - if( total == 0 ) - return; - for( i = 0; i < total; i++ ) - { - unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i ); - /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last - * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and - * zero out the last byte. */ - for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ ) - { - unsigned char current = buf[n]; - unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; - buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next ); - } - buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 ); - } -} - /* * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + int mode, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ) { - int ret; - size_t ilen, i, plaintext_max_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must - * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than - * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise - * this would open the execution of the function to - * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle - * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory - * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access - * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to - * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared - * branch predictor). */ - size_t pad_count = 0; - unsigned bad = 0; - unsigned char pad_done = 0; - size_t plaintext_size = 0; - unsigned output_too_large; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || @@ -1649,9 +1504,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); ilen = ctx->len; - plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ? - ilen - 11 : - output_max_len ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1666,109 +1518,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; - /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant - * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ - bad |= buf[0]; - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) - { - /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ - bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ - for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) - { - pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; - pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; - } - } - else - { - /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */ - bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. - * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */ - for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) - { - pad_done |= if_int( buf[i], 0, 1 ); - pad_count += if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 ); - bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF ); - } - } - - /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ - bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 ); - - /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ - bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count ); - - /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of - * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding - * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the - * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output - * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding - * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the - * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ - plaintext_size = if_int( bad, - (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) ); - - /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output - * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ - output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size, - plaintext_max_size ); - - /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: - * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). - * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted - * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. - * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ - ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, - if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, - 0 ) ); - - /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the - * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. - * We need to copy the same amount of data - * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to - * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or - * through memory or cache access patterns. */ - bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large ); - for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ ) - buf[i] &= ~bad; - - /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. - * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because - * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity - * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ - plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large, - (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) plaintext_size ); - - /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in - * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from - * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that - * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the - * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive - * information. */ - mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size ); - - /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros - * into the output buffer. */ - memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size ); - - /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case - * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen - * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent - * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ - *olen = plaintext_size; + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( mode, buf, ilen, + output, output_max_len, olen ); cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); @@ -1816,23 +1567,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, unsigned char *sig ) { size_t olen; unsigned char *p = sig; - unsigned char salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t msb; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; @@ -1868,31 +1617,44 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - /* Calculate the largest possible salt length. Normally this is the hash - * length, which is the maximum length the salt can have. If there is not - * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is - * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most - * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 - * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ - min_slen = hlen - 2; - if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 ) + if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) + { + /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. + * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length + * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not + * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is + * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most + * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ + min_slen = hlen - 2; + if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 ) + slen = hlen; + else + slen = olen - hlen - 2; + } + else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) ) + { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 ) - slen = hlen; + } else - slen = olen - hlen - 2; + { + slen = (size_t) saltlen; + } memset( sig, 0, olen ); - /* Generate salt of length slen */ - if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); - /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; p += olen - hlen - slen - 2; *p++ = 0x01; - memcpy( p, salt, slen ); + + /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */ + salt = p; + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + p += slen; mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); @@ -1926,8 +1688,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; *p++ = 0xBC; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( salt, sizeof( salt ) ); - exit: mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); @@ -1938,6 +1698,40 @@ exit: ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) ); } + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with + * the option to pass in the salt length. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig ); +} + + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig ); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) @@ -2087,7 +1881,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -2139,7 +1933,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) ); - if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED; goto cleanup; @@ -2213,7 +2007,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int expected_salt_len, const unsigned char *sig ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t siglen; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *hash_start; @@ -2441,8 +2235,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Compare */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected, - sig_len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected, + sig_len ) ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; goto cleanup; @@ -2510,7 +2304,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c index 4d94ca685a..d6ba97a14b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Helper functions for the RSA module * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -22,34 +16,9 @@ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** - * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c index e99a5e8635..0a5edafaff 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. @@ -49,16 +22,13 @@ * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -78,29 +48,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) { SHA1_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); @@ -163,22 +110,22 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 0], data, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 1], data, 4 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 2], data, 8 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 3], data, 12 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 4], data, 16 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 5], data, 20 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 6], data, 24 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 7], data, 28 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 8], data, 32 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[ 9], data, 36 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[10], data, 40 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[11], data, 44 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[12], data, 48 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[13], data, 52 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[14], data, 56 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[15], data, 60 ); + local.W[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 0 ); + local.W[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 ); + local.W[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 8 ); + local.W[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 12 ); + local.W[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 16 ); + local.W[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 20 ); + local.W[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 24 ); + local.W[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 28 ); + local.W[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 32 ); + local.W[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 36 ); + local.W[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 40 ); + local.W[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 44 ); + local.W[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 48 ); + local.W[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 52 ); + local.W[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 56 ); + local.W[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 60 ); #define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) @@ -340,7 +287,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; @@ -401,7 +348,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; @@ -438,8 +385,8 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -447,11 +394,11 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, /* * Output final state */ - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -473,7 +420,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c index 75a8f8a2b2..db675efd1b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. @@ -49,16 +22,13 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include <string.h> @@ -80,29 +50,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -do { \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} while( 0 ) -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -do { \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} while( 0 ) -#endif - void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) { SHA256_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); @@ -244,7 +191,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, for( i = 0; i < 64; i++ ) { if( i < 16 ) - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[i], data, 4 * i ); + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); else R( i ); @@ -259,7 +206,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, } #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - GET_UINT32_BE( local.W[i], data, 4 * i ); + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 8 ) { @@ -327,7 +274,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; @@ -388,7 +335,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, unsigned char output[32] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; @@ -425,8 +372,8 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -434,16 +381,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, /* * Output final state */ - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 ); if( ctx->is224 == 0 ) - PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 ); return( 0 ); } @@ -466,7 +413,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, unsigned char output[32], int is224 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c index 3347afe5ff..02a135ca92 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. @@ -49,16 +22,13 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) #define UL64(x) x##ui64 @@ -86,36 +56,14 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) -/* - * 64-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT64_BE -#define GET_UINT64_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) ] << 56 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 48 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 40 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 32 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 4] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 5] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 6] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint64_t) (b)[(i) + 7] ); \ -} -#endif /* GET_UINT64_BE */ - -#ifndef PUT_UINT64_BE -#define PUT_UINT64_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 56 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 48 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 40 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 32 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 4] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 5] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 6] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 7] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) +static void sha512_put_uint64_be( uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i ) +{ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, b, i); } -#endif /* PUT_UINT64_BE */ +#else +#define sha512_put_uint64_be MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) { @@ -147,7 +95,11 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) { SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -166,6 +118,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#else /* SHA-384 */ ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); @@ -175,9 +130,12 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) ctx->is384 = is384; +#endif return( 0 ); } @@ -246,7 +204,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, struct { uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; - uint64_t A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H; + uint64_t A[8]; } local; SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); @@ -272,56 +230,68 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ } while( 0 ) + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + for( i = 0; i < 80; i++ ) + { + if( i < 16 ) + { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); + } + else + { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) { - GET_UINT64_BE( local.W[i], data, i << 3 ); + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); } for( ; i < 80; i++ ) { local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + - S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; } - local.A = ctx->state[0]; - local.B = ctx->state[1]; - local.C = ctx->state[2]; - local.D = ctx->state[3]; - local.E = ctx->state[4]; - local.F = ctx->state[5]; - local.G = ctx->state[6]; - local.H = ctx->state[7]; i = 0; - do { - P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, - local.F, local.G, local.H, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.H, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, - local.E, local.F, local.G, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.G, local.H, local.A, local.B, local.C, - local.D, local.E, local.F, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.F, local.G, local.H, local.A, local.B, - local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.E, local.F, local.G, local.H, local.A, - local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.D, local.E, local.F, local.G, local.H, - local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.F, local.G, - local.H, local.A, local.B, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.F, - local.G, local.H, local.A, local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; } while( i < 80 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ - ctx->state[0] += local.A; - ctx->state[1] += local.B; - ctx->state[2] += local.C; - ctx->state[3] += local.D; - ctx->state[4] += local.E; - ctx->state[5] += local.F; - ctx->state[6] += local.G; - ctx->state[7] += local.H; + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); @@ -345,7 +315,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; unsigned int left; @@ -405,7 +375,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, unsigned char output[64] ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned used; uint64_t high, low; @@ -442,8 +412,8 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -451,17 +421,19 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, /* * Output final state */ - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); - + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) if( ctx->is384 == 0 ) +#endif { - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); - PUT_UINT64_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); } return( 0 ); @@ -485,10 +457,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, unsigned char output[64], int is384 ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); @@ -536,8 +512,9 @@ static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = 3, 112, 1000 }; -static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[6][64] = +static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) /* * SHA-384 test vectors */ @@ -559,6 +536,7 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[6][64] = 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ /* * SHA-512 test vectors @@ -589,6 +567,8 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[6][64] = 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } }; +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( a ) ( sizeof( a ) / sizeof( ( a )[0] ) ) + /* * Checkup routine */ @@ -610,10 +590,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ) mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + for( i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++ ) { j = i % 3; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) k = i < 3; +#else + k = 0; +#endif if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1 ); @@ -669,6 +653,8 @@ exit: return( ret ); } +#undef ARRAY_LENGTH + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c index 1d2558a189..32188cf3f6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * SSL session cache implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,38 +15,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * These session callbacks use a simple chained list * to store and retrieve the session information. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) @@ -65,6 +34,7 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" #include <string.h> @@ -108,25 +78,31 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) continue; #endif - if( session->ciphersuite != entry->session.ciphersuite || - session->compression != entry->session.compression || - session->id_len != entry->session.id_len ) - continue; - - if( memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id, + if( session->id_len != entry->session.id_len || + memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id, entry->session.id_len ) != 0 ) + { continue; + } - memcpy( session->master, entry->session.master, 48 ); - - session->verify_result = entry->session.verify_result; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( session, &entry->session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) /* * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain) */ if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL ) { + /* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to + * mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries + * have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */ + if( ( session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ) ) == NULL ) { @@ -144,7 +120,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) goto exit; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ ret = 0; goto exit; @@ -264,9 +240,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) #endif } - memcpy( &cur->session, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) /* * If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first */ @@ -275,26 +250,43 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) mbedtls_free( cur->peer_cert.p ); memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf) ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the + * X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT. + * This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand + * parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert` + * field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( &cur->session, session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } - /* - * Store peer certificate - */ - if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */ + if( cur->session.peer_cert != NULL ) { - cur->peer_cert.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert->raw.len ); + cur->peer_cert.p = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len ); if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL ) { ret = 1; goto exit; } - memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, - session->peer_cert->raw.len ); + memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, + cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p, + cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len ); cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->session.peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( cur->session.peer_cert ); cur->session.peer_cert = NULL; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ ret = 0; @@ -336,9 +328,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &prv->session ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) mbedtls_free( prv->peer_cert.p ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ mbedtls_free( prv ); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c index 01df17a5f3..3826ad27fa 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -4,13 +4,7 @@ * \brief SSL ciphersuites for mbed TLS * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -23,34 +17,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) @@ -65,6 +34,11 @@ #include <string.h> +#undef HAVE_SHA384 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#define HAVE_SHA384 +#endif + /* * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. * @@ -442,7 +416,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -457,7 +431,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -491,13 +465,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -508,13 +482,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -583,7 +557,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, @@ -598,7 +572,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -610,13 +584,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -627,13 +601,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -672,13 +646,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -782,13 +756,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -807,13 +781,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -918,13 +892,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -991,7 +965,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, @@ -1006,7 +980,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -1018,13 +992,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1035,13 +1009,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -1110,7 +1084,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, @@ -1125,7 +1099,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -1137,13 +1111,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1154,13 +1128,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -1208,13 +1182,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1226,13 +1200,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", @@ -1282,13 +1256,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1300,13 +1274,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -1344,13 +1318,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1362,13 +1336,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", @@ -1418,13 +1392,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1436,13 +1410,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -1481,13 +1455,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", @@ -1515,13 +1489,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -1559,13 +1533,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1577,13 +1551,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", @@ -1611,13 +1585,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) @@ -1629,13 +1603,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = 0 }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -1719,7 +1693,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, @@ -1745,7 +1719,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, @@ -1771,7 +1745,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, @@ -1797,7 +1771,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, @@ -1836,7 +1810,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, @@ -1844,7 +1818,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, @@ -1873,7 +1847,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, @@ -1881,7 +1855,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, @@ -1910,7 +1884,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, @@ -1918,7 +1892,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, @@ -1947,7 +1921,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, @@ -1955,7 +1929,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, @@ -1984,7 +1958,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, @@ -1992,7 +1966,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, @@ -2021,7 +1995,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, @@ -2042,7 +2016,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -2050,7 +2024,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, @@ -2079,7 +2053,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, @@ -2087,7 +2061,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, @@ -2116,7 +2090,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, @@ -2124,7 +2098,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, @@ -2153,7 +2127,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, @@ -2161,7 +2135,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, 0 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, @@ -2378,7 +2352,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) @@ -2393,6 +2367,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) return( 0 ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c index b977e5b7b1..b87879ce6a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) @@ -60,9 +29,16 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include <string.h> @@ -76,6 +52,44 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -124,18 +138,19 @@ static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * } ServerNameList; * */ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 5, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 3, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len ); @@ -169,14 +184,12 @@ static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Secure renegotiation */ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) - & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) - & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF; - *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len & 0xFF; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len ); memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); @@ -190,7 +203,7 @@ static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, @@ -271,21 +284,21 @@ static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; */ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( sig_alg_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( sig_alg_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -342,20 +355,18 @@ static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, grp_id++ ) { info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id >> 8; - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id & 0xFF; + elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( info->tls_id ); + elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( info->tls_id ); } - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) - & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) - & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; @@ -376,10 +387,8 @@ static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) - & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) - & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 2; @@ -400,7 +409,7 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *end, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; size_t kkpp_len; @@ -415,8 +424,8 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; /* * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification. @@ -458,8 +467,8 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len ); } - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *olen = kkpp_len + 4; @@ -467,6 +476,52 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + *olen = 0; + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ); + + /* Add extension ID + size */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -485,10 +540,8 @@ static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) - & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) - & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 1; @@ -519,8 +572,8 @@ static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -550,8 +603,8 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -581,10 +634,8 @@ static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) - & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) - & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -615,11 +666,11 @@ static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *olen = 4; @@ -627,7 +678,7 @@ static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( 0 ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, - ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) ); + ( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) ); memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen ); @@ -659,8 +710,8 @@ static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + alpnlen ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0 ); + p += 2; /* * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; @@ -687,23 +738,139 @@ static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = p - buf; /* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ - buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 ); /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ - buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 ); return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length, + * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ), + * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value + */ + ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes + * - the extension tag (2 bytes) + * - the extension length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */ + /* micro-optimization: + * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0 + * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments + * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + * >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ); + + for( protection_profiles_index=0; + protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + protection_profiles_index++ ) + { + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x", + profile_value ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } + else + { + /* + * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles + * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, " + "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d", + ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] + ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + } + + *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF; + + if( mki_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + /* + * Increment p to point to the current position. + */ + p += mki_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + /* + * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes) + * + extension length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + 2 * number of protection profiles + * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte) + * + mki value + */ + *olen = p - buf; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Generate random bytes for ClientHello */ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t; @@ -722,12 +889,11 @@ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 ); + p += 4; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %lu", t ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); #else if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -782,12 +948,21 @@ static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( return( 1 ); #endif + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && + ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + return( 0 ); } static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; unsigned char *buf; @@ -927,7 +1102,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); /* @@ -994,8 +1169,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) != 0 ) continue; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x", - ciphersuites[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int)ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1005,12 +1180,12 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); n++; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ciphersuites[i], p, 0 ); + p += 2; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, - ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); + ( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); /* * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -1021,8 +1196,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; n++; } @@ -1033,8 +1208,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0 ); + p += 2; n++; } #endif @@ -1109,7 +1284,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) if( ( ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -1151,6 +1326,15 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext_len += olen; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1201,6 +1385,16 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext_len += olen; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1214,16 +1408,15 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ ((void) olen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) ); if( ext_len > 0 ) { /* No need to check for space here, because the extension * writing functions already took care of that. */ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); - p += ext_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + ext_len; } ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; @@ -1267,9 +1460,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || - mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 || - mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); @@ -1351,6 +1544,62 @@ static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */ + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( len == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, @@ -1479,9 +1728,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); @@ -1578,6 +1827,123 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i, mki_len = 0; + uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + * + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* + * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile (2 bytes) + * + mki_len(1 byte) + * and optional srtp_mki + */ + if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + + /* + * get the server protection profile + */ + + /* + * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only + * one protection profile in server Hello + */ + if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + + server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; + server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + server_protection_profile_value ); + if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* + * Check we have the server profile in our list + */ + for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + + /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */ + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep + * one as negotiated */ + if( len == 5 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0; + } + + /* + * RFC5764: + * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response + * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client + * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert. + */ + if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len || + ( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( len > 5 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +#endif + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type. */ @@ -1683,8 +2049,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) ); - buf = ssl->in_msg; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { /* No alert on a read error. */ @@ -1692,6 +2056,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } + buf = ssl->in_msg; + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) @@ -1788,10 +2154,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", - ( (uint32_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | - ( (uint32_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | - ( (uint32_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | - ( (uint32_t) buf[5] ) ) ); + ( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) ); memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 ); @@ -1870,22 +2236,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * Initialize update checksum functions */ - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); - - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, - ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) ); + ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info ); + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n ); /* @@ -1928,7 +2291,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) ); @@ -1971,7 +2334,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { @@ -1997,7 +2360,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext = buf + 40 + n; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, - ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); + ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) ); while( ext_len ) { @@ -2056,6 +2419,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, + ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); @@ -2135,9 +2512,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + default: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, - ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); + ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); } ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; @@ -2230,8 +2617,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %u < %u", - (unsigned) dhm_actual_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", + dhm_actual_bitlen, ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2288,6 +2675,68 @@ static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + size_t ecdh_bits = 0; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * Parse ECC group + */ + + if( end - *p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ + if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ + tls_id = *(*p)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*p)++; + + /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ + if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type = + mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + if( ecdh_bits > 0xffff ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; + + /* + * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. + */ + + ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; + if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( + *p, ecpoint_len, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ), + &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + *p += ecpoint_len; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -2309,7 +2758,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; #endif @@ -2329,13 +2778,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t len; + uint16_t len; ((void) ssl); /* @@ -2352,7 +2801,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; - if( end - (*p) < (int) len ) + if( end - (*p) < len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); @@ -2369,7 +2818,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( ret ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -2380,9 +2829,10 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t offset, size_t *olen, size_t pms_offset ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { @@ -2409,23 +2859,28 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* * Now write it out, encrypted */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk, p, ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes, @@ -2439,12 +2894,15 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( len_bytes == 2 ) { - ssl->out_msg[offset+0] = (unsigned char)( *olen >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[offset+1] = (unsigned char)( *olen ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen, ssl->out_msg, offset ); *olen += 2; } #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || @@ -2522,23 +2980,29 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } - peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk ); + peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 ) @@ -2553,6 +3017,13 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || @@ -2560,9 +3031,9 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) ); @@ -2602,7 +3073,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing ) { @@ -2651,7 +3122,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing; @@ -2661,7 +3132,7 @@ start_processing: end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || @@ -2677,7 +3148,7 @@ start_processing: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } /* FALLTROUGH */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -2705,6 +3176,26 @@ start_processing: else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) @@ -2748,17 +3239,23 @@ start_processing: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) { size_t sig_len, hashlen; - unsigned char hash[64]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#else + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); size_t params_len = p - params; void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + /* * Handle the digitally-signed structure */ @@ -2872,21 +3369,22 @@ start_processing: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* * Verify signature */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - pk_alg ) ) + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( @@ -2896,16 +3394,15 @@ start_processing: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; #endif - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( - &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk, md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) #endif mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( @@ -2913,14 +3410,21 @@ start_processing: MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; #endif return( ret ); } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ exit: ssl->state++; @@ -2930,11 +3434,11 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } -#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); @@ -2948,15 +3452,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *buf; size_t n = 0; size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); @@ -3118,11 +3622,11 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) ); @@ -3161,10 +3665,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; - size_t i, n; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t header_len; + size_t content_len; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) ); @@ -3174,15 +3680,14 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P */ - n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; - ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( n ); - i = 6; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + header_len = 6; ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), - &ssl->out_msg[i], n, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3207,6 +3712,93 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; + size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + + header_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) ); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits ); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes, + &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA + * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ + status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, sizeof( own_pubkey ), + &own_pubkey_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( own_pubkey, + own_pubkey_len, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, + own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ); + content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; + + /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ), + &ssl->handshake->pmslen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ @@ -3219,9 +3811,9 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value */ - i = 4; + header_len = 4; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) { if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret ) @@ -3232,13 +3824,13 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &n, - &ssl->out_msg[i], 1000, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; #endif @@ -3248,16 +3840,16 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = n; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len; ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret; } ecdh_calc_secret: if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) - n = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; + content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; #endif if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, @@ -3266,7 +3858,7 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; #endif @@ -3281,47 +3873,56 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; */ - if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - i = 4; - n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + header_len = 4; + content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; - if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); } - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len ); - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len, ssl->conf->psk_identity, ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); - i += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) { - n = 0; + content_len = 0; } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) { - if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 2 ) ) != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); } else @@ -3329,24 +3930,31 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) */ - n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; - if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); } - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len ); ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), - &ssl->out_msg[i], n, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3359,11 +3967,19 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; */ - ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n, - &ssl->out_msg[i], MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i, + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3381,6 +3997,18 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -3390,12 +4018,13 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) { - i = 4; - if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + header_len = 4; + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); } else @@ -3403,10 +4032,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { - i = 4; + header_len = 4; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - ssl->out_msg + i, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i, &n, + ssl->out_msg + header_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + &content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { @@ -3431,7 +4062,7 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - ssl->out_msglen = i + n; + ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; @@ -3448,17 +4079,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret: return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - int ret; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); @@ -3468,11 +4094,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -3482,22 +4104,22 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; size_t n = 0, offset = 0; unsigned char hash[48]; unsigned char *hash_start = hash; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - unsigned int hashlen; + size_t hashlen; void *rs_ctx = NULL; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign ) { @@ -3511,11 +4133,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -3538,14 +4156,14 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * Make a signature of the handshake digests */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign; sign: #endif - ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash ); + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) @@ -3563,7 +4181,6 @@ sign: * sha_hash * SHA(handshake_messages); */ - hashlen = 36; md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; /* @@ -3598,8 +4215,7 @@ sign: * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server * side. */ - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac == - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) { md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; @@ -3622,7 +4238,7 @@ sign: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; #endif @@ -3633,15 +4249,14 @@ sign: ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; #endif return( ret ); } - ssl->out_msg[4 + offset] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[5 + offset] = (unsigned char)( n ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4 ); ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; @@ -3659,17 +4274,12 @@ sign: return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t lifetime; size_t ticket_len; unsigned char *ticket; @@ -3727,7 +4337,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", ticket_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) ); /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; @@ -3740,6 +4350,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ticket_len == 0 ) return( 0 ); + if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket, + ssl->session->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket ); + ssl->session->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c index 9e2136865d..abf29ae717 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * DTLS cookie callbacks implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,38 +15,13 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * These session callbacks use a simple chained list * to store and retrieve the session information. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) @@ -65,7 +34,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include <string.h> @@ -129,7 +100,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, key, sizeof( key ) ) ) != 0 ) @@ -181,7 +152,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; unsigned long t; @@ -196,15 +167,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, t = ctx->serial++; #endif - (*p)[0] = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 ); - (*p)[1] = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 ); - (*p)[2] = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); - (*p)[3] = (unsigned char)( t ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, *p, 0); *p += 4; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); #endif ret = ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, *p - 4, @@ -212,8 +180,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + - MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ) ); #endif return( ret ); @@ -240,7 +208,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); #endif if( ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, cookie, @@ -250,14 +218,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - ret = ( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + - MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + } #endif if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 ) { ret = -1; goto exit; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b696dd561 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,5922 @@ +/* + * Generic SSL/TLS messaging layer functions + * (record layer + retransmission state machine) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, + * and became an IETF standard in 1999. + * + * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include <stdlib.h> +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include <string.h> + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); + +/* + * Start a timer. + * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ) +{ + if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) ); + ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs ); +} + +/* + * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen ); + + /* We don't support record checking in TLS because + * (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and + * (b) In SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state + * and we'd need to backup the transform here. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + else + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, buf, buflen, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +exit: + /* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make + * sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buflen ); + + /* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID + * as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 +#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ); +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ); +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + if( mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len ) + return( mtu ); + + return( out_buf_len ); +} + +static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; + size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl ); + + /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone + * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ + if( bytes_written > mtu ) + { + /* Should never happen... */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) ); +} + +static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t remaining, expansion; + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; + + /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension + * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory + * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size + * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's + * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. + * + * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never + * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. + */ + if( max_len <= ssl->out_left ) + return( 0 ); + + max_len -= ssl->out_left; +#endif + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + remaining = (size_t) ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + expansion = (size_t) ret; + + if( remaining <= expansion ) + return( 0 ); + + remaining -= expansion; + if( remaining >= max_len ) + remaining = max_len; + + return( (int) remaining ); +} + +/* + * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, + * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. + */ +static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t new_timeout; + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + return( -1 ); + + /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 + * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first + * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. + * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be + * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work + * on most non-IP stacks too. */ + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min ) + { + ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) ); + } + + new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + + /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ + if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || + new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + { + new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; + } + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, + size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, + size_t maclen ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +/* + * Encryption/decryption functions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length( size_t len, + size_t granularity ) +{ + return( ( granularity - ( len + 1 ) % granularity ) % granularity ); +} + +/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content + * type into an instance of the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. This is used + * in DTLS 1.2 + CID and within TLS 1.3 to allow flexible padding and to protect + * a record's content type. + * + * struct { + * opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length]; + * ContentType real_type; + * uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]; + * } (D)TLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * Input: + * - `content`: The beginning of the buffer holding the + * plaintext to be wrapped. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * - `max_len`: The number of Bytes available starting from + * `content`. This must be `>= *content_size`. + * - `rec_type`: The desired record content type. + * + * Output: + * - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * + * Returns: + * - `0` on success. + * - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space + * for the expansion. + */ +static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content, + size_t *content_size, + size_t remaining, + uint8_t rec_type, + size_t pad ) +{ + size_t len = *content_size; + + /* Write real content type */ + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + content[ len ] = rec_type; + len++; + remaining--; + + if( remaining < pad ) + return( -1 ); + memset( content + len, 0, pad ); + len += pad; + remaining -= pad; + + *content_size = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */ +static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content, + size_t *content_size, + uint8_t *rec_type ) +{ + size_t remaining = *content_size; + + /* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */ + do + { + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + remaining--; + } while( content[ remaining ] == 0 ); + + *content_size = remaining; + *rec_type = content[ remaining ]; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled, + * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */ +static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data, + size_t *add_data_len, + mbedtls_record *rec, + unsigned minor_ver ) +{ + /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * + * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows + * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type + + * DTLSPlaintext.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD + * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + */ + + unsigned char *cur = add_data; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + ((void) minor_ver); + memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ctr ); + } + + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + cur += rec->cid_len; + + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 ); + cur += 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 ); + cur += 2; + } + + *add_data_len = cur - add_data; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + +#define SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ + +/* + * SSLv3.0 MAC functions + */ +static int ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + const unsigned char *ctr, int type, + unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES] ) +{ + unsigned char header[11]; + unsigned char padding[48]; + int padlen; + int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); + int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info ); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) + padlen = 48; + else + padlen = 40; + + memcpy( header, ctr, 8 ); + header[8] = (unsigned char) type; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, header, 9); + + memset( padding, 0x36, padlen ); + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen ); + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + return( transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV ) + * + * Concretely, this occurs in two variants: + * + * a) Fixed and dynamic IV lengths add up to total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv || dynamic_iv + * + * This variant is used in TLS 1.2 when used with GCM or CCM. + * + * b) Fixed IV lengths matches total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv XOR ( 0 || dynamic_iv ) + * + * This variant occurs in TLS 1.3 and for TLS 1.2 when using ChaChaPoly. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_transform. + * + * This function has the precondition that + * + * dst_iv_len >= max( fixed_iv_len, dynamic_iv_len ) + * + * which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition + * violated, the behavior of this function is undefined. + */ +static void ssl_build_record_nonce( unsigned char *dst_iv, + size_t dst_iv_len, + unsigned char const *fixed_iv, + size_t fixed_iv_len, + unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, + size_t dynamic_iv_len ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ + memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len ); + memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len ); + + dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; + for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ ) + dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i]; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int auth_done = 0; + unsigned char * data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + size_t post_avail; + + /* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */ +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) ) + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + if( rec == NULL + || rec->buf == NULL + || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset + || rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + || rec->cid_len != 0 +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload", + data, rec->data_len ); + + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->data_len, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext + * structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID. + * + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + * + * Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously + * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There + * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Add CID information + */ + rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + /* + * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + */ + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + + /* + * Add MAC before if needed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED +#endif + ) ) + { + if( post_avail < transform->maclen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc, + data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac ); + if( ret == 0 ) + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + add_data, add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + /* + * Encrypt + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %d bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, 0 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = + ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ); + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( post_avail < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Build nonce for AEAD encryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + * However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes + * in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the + * dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the + * record sequence number here in all cases. + */ + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_enc, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)", + iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)", + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including 0 bytes of padding", + rec->data_len ) ); + + /* + * Encrypt and authenticate + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + &rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", + data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, + transform->taglen ); + /* Account for authentication tag. */ + post_avail -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit. + */ + if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 ) + { + if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len ); + rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len; + } + + auth_done++; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t padlen, i; + size_t olen; + + /* Currently we're always using minimal padding + * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ + padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen; + if( padlen == transform->ivlen ) + padlen = 0; + + /* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */ + if( post_avail < padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ ) + data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; + + rec->data_len += padlen + 1; + post_avail -= padlen + 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per + * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen ); + + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* + * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 + */ + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, + transform->ivlen ); + } + else +#endif + { + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + /* + * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + + * TLSCipherText.type + + * TLSCipherText.version + + * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + + * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); + */ + + if( post_avail < transform->maclen) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, + rec, transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + size_t olen; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int ret, auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; +#endif + unsigned char* data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) ); + if( rec == NULL || + rec->buf == NULL || + rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset || + rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Match record's CID with incoming CID. + */ + if( rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len || + memcmp( rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + padlen = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + + /* + * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + */ + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + if( ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ) == 1 ) + { + if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + dynamic_iv_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + dynamic_iv = data; + + data += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len; + } + else + { + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + } + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + rec->data_len -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts. + */ + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_dec, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + + /* Because of the check above, we know that there are + * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen + * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies + * the debug message and the invocation of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ); + + /* + * Decrypt and authenticate + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + + return( ret ); + } + auth_done++; + + /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ + if( olen != rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + size_t minlen = 0; + + /* + * Check immediate ciphertext sanity + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; + } +#endif + + /* Size considerations: + * + * - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence + * at least of size transform->ivlen. + * + * Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains + * the first of the two checks below. + * + * - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or + * encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC + * is used or not. + * - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix, + * the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC. + * - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence + * the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1 + * because there is at least the padding length byte. + * + * As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the + * lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which + * we test for in the second check below. + */ + if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen || + rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") " + "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len, + transform->ivlen, + transform->maclen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + + /* + * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + + /* Update data_len in tandem with add_data. + * + * The subtraction is safe because of the previous check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1. + * + * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at + * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to + * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below. + * + * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + /* Calculate expected MAC. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, + add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, + transform->maclen ); + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + + /* + * Check length sanity + */ + + /* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0, + * so the following check in particular implies that + * data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */ + if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen ); + + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* + * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1, where CBC decryption of consecutive + * records is equivalent to CBC decryption of the concatenation + * of the records; in other words, IVs are maintained across + * record decryptions. + */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, + transform->ivlen ); + } +#endif + + /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having + * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, + * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually + * >= ivlen ). */ + padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; + + if( auth_done == 1 ) + { + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")", + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + } +#endif + + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + + padlen++; + + /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, + * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* This is the SSL 3.0 path, we don't have to worry about Lucky + * 13, because there's a strictly worse padding attack built in + * the protocol (known as part of POODLE), so we don't care if the + * code is not constant-time, in particular branches are OK. */ + if( padlen > transform->ivlen ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "should be no more than %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + padlen, transform->ivlen ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char* const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ ) + { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx ); + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( check[idx], + padlen - 1 ); + pad_count += mask & equal; + } + correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) ); +#endif + padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask( correct ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 + * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, + * padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion + * data_len >= padlen still holds. */ + rec->data_len -= padlen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption", + data, rec->data_len ); +#endif + + /* + * Authenticate if not done yet. + * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + /* If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen + * got reset to 1, and the initial check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 + * guarantees that at this point we still + * have at least data_len >= maclen. + * + * If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have + * subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct) + * or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then, + * hence data_len >= maclen in any case. + */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + transform->mac_dec, + data, rec->data_len, + rec->ctr, rec->type, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + memcpy( mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret ); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_peer, transform->maclen ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Finally check the correct flag + */ + if( correct == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#undef MAC_NONE +#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT +#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) +/* + * Compression/decompression functions + */ +static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; + ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; + unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) ); + + if( len_pre == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = out_buf_len - bytes_written; + + ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); + if( ret != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len - + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; + ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; + unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) ); + + if( len_pre == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = in_buf_len - header_bytes; + + ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); + if( ret != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len - + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " + "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + uint32_t timeout; + + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ + + /* + * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable + */ + if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 ) + { + if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; + + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->next_record_offset ) ); + memmove( ssl->in_hdr, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, + ssl->in_left ); + } + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + /* + * Done if we already have enough data. + */ + if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but + * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something + * wrong. + */ + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Don't even try to read if time's out already. + * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages + * that will end up being dropped. + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } + else + { + len = in_buf_len - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + else + timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, + timeout ); + else + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->in_left = ret; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + while( ssl->in_left < nb_want ) + { + len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + else + { + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, + ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + else + { + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested", + ret, len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left += ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Flush any data not yet written + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_send == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " + "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ + if( ssl->out_left == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + while( ssl->out_left > 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) ); + + buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; + ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent", + ret, ssl->out_left ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->out_left -= ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + } + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight + */ +static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + /* Allocate space for current message */ + if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + mbedtls_free( msg ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ + memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; + msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; + msg->next = NULL; + + /* Append to the current flight */ + if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL ) + ssl->handshake->flight = msg; + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = msg; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free the current flight of handshake messages + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + + mbedtls_free( cur->p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + + cur = next; + } +} + +/* + * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones + */ +static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; + + if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); + + /* Swap transforms */ + tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; + + /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ + memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Retransmit the current flight of messages. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. + * + * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns + * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. + * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; + } + + while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL ) + { + size_t max_frag_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; + + int const is_finished = + ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ); + + uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + + /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after + * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. + * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ + if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; + + /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ + if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( max_frag_len == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; + } + else + { + const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; + const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; + const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 ); + const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; + size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; + + if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) + { + if( is_finished ) + { + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; + + cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? + max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; + + if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", + (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, + (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) ); + } + + /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, + * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. + * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 ); + + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( frag_off ); + ssl->out_msg[7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( frag_off ); + ssl->out_msg[8] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( frag_off ); + + ssl->out_msg[ 9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msg[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msg[11] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cur_hs_frag_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 ); + + /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; + } + + /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ + if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; + } + else + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; + } + } + + /* Actually send the message out */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Update state and set timer */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + else + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight ); + ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + + /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + + /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ + ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + + /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); + + /* Cancel timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Handshake layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. + * + * - fill in handshake headers + * - update handshake checksum + * - DTLS: save message for resending + * - then pass to the record layer + * + * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be + * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). + * + * Inputs: + * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len + * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) + * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) + * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body + * + * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): + * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents + * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; + const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * Sanity checks + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + /* Whenever we send anything different from a + * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */ + if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) && + ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } +#endif + + /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds + * of the outgoing record buffer. + * This should never fail as the various message + * writing functions must obey the bounds of the + * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. + * + * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. + */ + if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_msglen, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Fill handshake headers + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( hs_len ); + ssl->out_msg[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( hs_len ); + ssl->out_msg[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( hs_len ); + + /* + * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, + * between the length field and the actual payload: + * uint16 message_seq; + * uint24 fragment_offset; + * uint24 fragment_length; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ + if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + hs_len, + (size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len ); + ssl->out_msglen += 8; + + /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ); + } + else + { + ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; + ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; + } + + /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, + * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ + memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 ); + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + } + + /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Record layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write current record. + * + * Uses: + * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) + * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: record content + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; + uint8_t flush = force_flush; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL && + ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + len = ssl->out_msglen; + } +#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + done = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + if( !done ) + { + unsigned i; + size_t protected_record_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, + * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 ); + + memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, ssl->out_len, 0); + + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf ); + rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; + rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf; + + memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver ); + rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */ + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec.data_offset != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Update the record content type and CID. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ) + memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->out_len, 0 ); + } + + protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed + * the remaining space in the datagram. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */ + ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], + ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size ); + + ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; + ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH ) + { + size_t remaining; + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + remaining = (size_t) ret; + if( remaining == 0 ) + { + flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[11] ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[8] ); +} + +static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; + + msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( frag_off > msg_len ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) + */ +static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; + + start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 ); + if( start_bits != 8 ) + { + size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; + + /* Special case */ + if( len <= start_bits ) + { + for( ; len != 0; len-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len ); + + /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ + return; + } + + offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ + len -= start_bits; + + for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 ); + } + + end_bits = len % 8; + if( end_bits != 0 ) + { + size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8; + + len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ + + for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- ) + mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits ); + } + + memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 ); +} + +/* + * Check that bitmask is full + */ +static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ ) + if( mask[i] != 0xFF ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ ) + if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ +static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len, + unsigned add_bitmap ) +{ + size_t alloc_len; + + alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ + alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ + + if( add_bitmap ) + alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */ + + return( alloc_len ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[3] ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen =" + " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + + if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) || + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid + * too many retransmissions. + * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ + if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, " + "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: " + "message_seq = %u, expected = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ + + /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future + * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and + * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the + * handshake logic layer. */ + if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen ); + } + + /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + + /* Increment handshake sequence number */ + hs->in_msg_seq++; + + /* + * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. + */ + + /* Free first entry */ + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Shift all other entries */ + for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; + offset++, hs_buf++ ) + { + *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); + } + + /* Create a fresh last entry */ + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 + * + * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). + * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. + * + * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of + * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 + * not seen yet). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->in_window_top = 0; + ssl->in_window = 0; +} + +static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf ) +{ + return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) ); +} + +static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *original_in_ctr; + + // save original in_ctr + original_in_ctr = ssl->in_ctr; + + // use counter from record + ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl ); + + // restore the counter + ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + uint64_t bit; + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + return( 0 ); + + bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit >= 64 ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Update replay window on new validated record + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return; + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + { + /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ + uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; + + if( shift >= 64 ) + ssl->in_window = 1; + else + { + ssl->in_window <<= shift; + ssl->in_window |= 1; + } + + ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; + } + else + { + /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ + uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */ + ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with + * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. + * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. + * + * - if cookie is valid, return 0 + * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, + * fill obuf and set olen, then + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED + * - otherwise return a specific error code + */ +static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t sid_len, cookie_len; + unsigned char *p; + + /* + * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, + * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be + * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks + * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) + * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) + * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) + * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content + * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content + * ... + * + * Minimum length is 61 bytes. + */ + if( in_len < 61 || + in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || + in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + sid_len = in[59]; + if( sid_len > in_len - 61 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + + cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; + if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + + if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 ) + { + /* Valid cookie */ + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request + * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff + * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie + * + * Minimum length is 28. + */ + if( buf_len < 28 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ + memcpy( obuf, in, 25 ); + obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + obuf[25] = 0xfe; + obuf[26] = 0xff; + + /* Generate and write actual cookie */ + p = obuf + 28; + if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie, + &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + *olen = p - obuf; + + /* Go back and fill length fields */ + obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 ); + + obuf[14] = obuf[22] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *olen - 25 ); + obuf[15] = obuf[23] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *olen - 25 ); + obuf[16] = obuf[24] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 25 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 13, obuf, 11 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +} + +/* + * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet + * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). + * + * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record + * that looks like a ClientHello. + * + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, + * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then return 0 + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * reset the session of the current context, and + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code + * + * This function is called (through ssl_check_client_reconnect()) when an + * unexpected record is found in ssl_get_next_record(), which will discard the + * record if we return 0, and bubble up the return value otherwise (this + * includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected + * errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases). + */ +static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL ) + { + /* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer, + * drop the record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no cookie callbacks, " + "can't check reconnect validity" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + ssl->conf->f_cookie_write, + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check, + ssl->conf->p_cookie, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, + ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, + ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + int send_ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_buf, len ); + /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. + * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, + * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ + send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret ); + (void) send_ret; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type ) +{ + if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * ContentType type; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only + * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only + * uint16 length; + * + * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. + * + * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: + * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 + * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD + * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value + * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. + * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received + * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. + */ +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int major_ver, minor_ver; + + size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; + size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; + + size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset + + rec_hdr_type_len; + size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2; + + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t rec_epoch; + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + + rec_hdr_version_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */ + size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2; + + /* + * Check minimum lengths for record header. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len; + } + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record content type + */ + + rec->type = buf[ rec_hdr_type_offset ]; + + /* Check record content type */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec->cid_len = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 && + rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID ) + { + /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID + * struct { + * ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; + * uint48 sequence_number; + * opaque cid[cid_length]; // Additional field compared to + * // default DTLS record format + * uint16 length; + * opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length]; + * } DTLSCiphertext; + */ + + /* So far, we only support static CID lengths + * fixed in the configuration. */ + rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len; + rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len; + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */ + rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type %u", + (unsigned) rec->type ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record version + */ + + rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ]; + rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ]; + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, + &rec->ver[0] ); + + if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* + * Parse/Copy record sequence number. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset, + rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + /* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + + /* + * Parse record length. + */ + + rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; + rec->data_len = ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 0 ] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, + major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) ); + + rec->buf = buf; + rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + + /* + * DTLS-related tests. + * Check epoch before checking length constraint because + * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec + * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, + * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs + * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than + * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. + * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, + * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid + * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_epoch = ( rec->ctr[0] << 8 ) | rec->ctr[1]; + + /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record + * of the advertised length. */ + if( len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded. + * (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in + * the caller). */ + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: " + "expected %u, received %lu", + ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) ); + + /* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering + * (concretely: early Finished messages). */ + if( rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + /* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their + * sequence number has been seen before. */ + else if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl, + &rec->ctr[0] ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; + + /* + * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to + * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we + * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the + * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. + */ + if( rec_epoch == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_left > 13 && + ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect " + "from the same port" ) ); + return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * If applicable, decrypt record content + */ +static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network", + rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + done = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, + rec ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && + ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid + == MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring unexpected CID" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( ret ); + } + + if( old_msg_type != rec->type ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", + old_msg_type, rec->type ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt", + rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* We have already checked the record content type + * in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently + * dropping the record in the case of an unknown type. + * + * Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type + * might change during decryption, re-check the record + * content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */ + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + ssl->nb_zero++; + + /* + * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack + * (excessive CPU consumption). + */ + if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty " + "messages, possible DoS attack" ) ); + /* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated, + * thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed + * by the configured bad MAC threshold. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + } + else + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ + } + else +#endif + { + unsigned i; + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); + } +#endif + + /* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Read a record. + * + * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, + * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. + * + */ + +/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) + { + do { + + ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + int have_buffered = 0; + + /* We only check for buffered messages if the + * current datagram is fully consumed. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 ) + have_buffered = 1; + } + + if( have_buffered == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ) + continue; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + /* Buffer future message */ + ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret ); + + if( 0 != ret ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + update_hs_digest == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) ); + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf; + int ret = 0; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. + * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ + if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) ); + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) ); + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->in_msglen = 1; + ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; + + /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + /* Debug only */ + { + unsigned offset; + for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + { + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", + hs->in_msg_seq + offset, + hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the + * next handshake message. */ + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) ) + { + /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ + size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) | + ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) | + hs_buf->data[3]; + + /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered + * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", + hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; + ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; + memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen ); + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", + hs->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + ret = -1; + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t desired ) +{ + int offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", + (unsigned) desired ) ); + + /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake + * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, + * starting with the most distant one. */ + for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; + offset >= 0; offset-- ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", + offset ) ); + + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + + switch( ssl->in_msgtype ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) ); + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: + { + unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; + + /* We should never receive an old handshake + * message - double-check nonetheless. */ + if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + { + /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " + "buffering window %u - %u", + recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) ); + + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", + recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) ); + + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ]; + + /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ + if( !hs_buf->is_valid ) + { + size_t reassembly_buf_sz; + + hs_buf->is_fragmented = + ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ); + + /* We copy the message back into the input buffer + * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. + * This is an implementation-specific limitation + * and not one from the standard, hence it is not + * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + /* Ignore message */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ + if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len, + hs_buf->is_fragmented ); + + if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 ) + { + /* If we can't buffer a future message because + * of space limitations -- ignore. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + } + + if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed" + " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- fail\n", + msg_len, + reassembly_buf_sz, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + msg_len ) ); + + hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz ); + if( hs_buf->data == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; + + /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, + * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ + memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 ); + memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 ); + memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 ); + + hs_buf->is_valid = 1; + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; + } + else + { + /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ + if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) ); + /* Ignore */ + goto exit; + } + } + + if( !hs_buf->is_complete ) + { + size_t frag_len, frag_off; + unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; + + /* + * Check and copy current fragment + */ + + /* Validation of header fields already done in + * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + frag_off, frag_len ) ); + memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len ); + + if( hs_buf->is_fragmented ) + { + unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; + ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len ); + hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask, + msg_len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + hs_buf->is_complete = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete", + hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) ); + } + + break; + } + + default: + /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ + break; + } + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Consume last content-layer message and potentially + * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' + * consumption state. + * + * (1) Handshake messages: + * Remove last handshake message, move content + * and adapt in_msglen. + * + * (2) Alert messages: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (3) Change cipher spec: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (4) Application data: + * Don't do anything - the record layer provides + * the application data as a stream transport + * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. + * + */ + + /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ + if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) + { + /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data + * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during + * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Get next Handshake message in the current record + */ + + /* Notes: + * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the + * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake + * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment + * size instead. Using the total handshake message + * size here is faulty and should be changed at + * some point. + * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one + * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen + * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. + * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. + * The following check is therefore mandatory, and + * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. + * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of + * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected + * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; + memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, + ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + } + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + } + /* Case (4): Application data */ + else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= + hs->buffering.future_record.len; + + mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data ); + hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; + } +} + +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char * rec; + size_t rec_len; + unsigned rec_epoch; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 0 ); + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; + rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; + rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; + + if( rec == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only consider loading future records if the + * input buffer is empty. */ + if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) ); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) ); + + /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ + if( rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len ); + ssl->in_left = rec_len; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested + * in Finished messages). */ + if( rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ + if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Buffer record */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u", + ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records + * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ + hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; + hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len; + + hs->buffering.future_record.data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len ); + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL ) + { + /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a + * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ + return( 0 ); + } + + memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_record rec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, + * and if the epoch matches now, load it. + * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to + * the length of the buffered record, so that + * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will + * essentially be no-ops. */ + ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form + * of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS, + * with no space for CIDs counted in). */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + + /* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + + ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect( ssl ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + else + { + /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + + /* Get next record */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + else +#endif + { + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + /* + * Fetch record contents from underlying transport. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, rec.buf_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + /* + * Decrypt record contents. + */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl, &rec ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Silently discard invalid records */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here + * probably means something went wrong in the handshake + * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && + ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } +#endif + + /* As above, invalid records cause + * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif + { + /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + } + + + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + + /* The record content type may change during decryption, + * so re-read it. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; + /* Also update the input buffer, because unfortunately + * the server-side ssl_parse_client_hello() reparses the + * record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating + * a renegotiation. */ + ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type; + ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL && + ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check actual (decompress) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Handle particular types of records + */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x", + ssl->in_msg[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 ) + { + /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert + to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't + currently support this. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]", + ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + + /* + * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", + ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) ); + /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) ); + /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, + * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msg[0] = level; + ssl->out_msg[1] = message; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) ); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->out_msglen = 1; + ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', + * so we don't need to check this here. */ + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) ); + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + /* Increment epoch */ + if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so + treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; +#endif + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; + } + + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; + /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( transform ); +} + +/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* This function sets the pointers to match the case + * of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv + * and ssl->in_msg pointing to the beginning of the record + * content. + * + * When decrypting a protected record, ssl->in_msg + * will be shifted to point to the beginning of the + * record plaintext. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* This sets the header pointers to match records + * without CID. When we receive a record containing + * a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in + * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; +#endif + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; + } + + /* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */ + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; + } + + /* Derive other internal pointers. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl ); +} + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Case A: We're currently holding back + * a message for further processing. + */ + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. + */ + + if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case D: An application data message is being processed + */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. + * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if + * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t transform_expansion = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; + unsigned block_size; + + size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + return( (int) out_hdr_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + + switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( transform->out_cid_len != 0 ) + transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( (int)( out_hdr_len + transform_expansion ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/* + * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. + */ +static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); + int in_ctr_cmp; + int out_ctr_cmp; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + + if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ + while( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) + { + /* Start timer if not already running */ + if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && + ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* + * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + continue; + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + continue; + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) ) + { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so + we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been + * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: + * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record + * has been read yet. + * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. + * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting + * the ServerHello. + * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: + * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check + * if it's application data. + * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data + * is present, hence continue is the same as break + * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record + * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client + * when expecting the ServerHello. + */ + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) + { + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " + "but not honored by client" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + + /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, + * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. + * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch + * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + } + + n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) + ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n ); + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) + { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + else + { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); + + return( (int) n ); +} + +/* + * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max + * fragment length and buffer size. + * + * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: + * + * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are + * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. + * + * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the + * corresponding return code is 0 on success. + */ +static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl ); + const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( len > max_len ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) " + "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + len, max_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else +#endif + len = max_len; + } + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + /* + * The user has previously tried to send the data and + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially + * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function + * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + /* + * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to + * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure + * to keep track of partial writes + */ + ssl->out_msglen = len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. + * + * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, + * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so + * remember whether we already did the split or not. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == + MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || + len <= 1 || + ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ) + != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) ); + } + + if( ssl->split_done == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + ssl->split_done = 1; + } + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + ssl->split_done = 0; + + return( ret + 1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +/* + * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) ); + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len ); +#else + ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) ); + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + if( transform == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate ); + inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate ); +#endif + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset ); +} + +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; + + if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + return; + + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len ); + mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data ); + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Convert version numbers to/from wire format + * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. + * + * For TLS this is the identity. + * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: + * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) + * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + + ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) ); + ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) ); + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; + ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; + *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; + + if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + *major = ver[0]; + *minor = ver[1]; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c index cbf6142ac2..1a63173204 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) @@ -60,10 +29,13 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include <string.h> @@ -110,7 +82,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; const unsigned char *p; @@ -174,6 +146,48 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->f_psk != NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) @@ -184,7 +198,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || - mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); @@ -211,7 +225,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: @@ -286,20 +300,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" - " match sig %d and hash %d", - sig_cur, md_cur ) ); + " match sig %u and hash %u", + (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur ) ); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " - "hash alg %d not supported", md_cur ) ); + "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur ) ); } } return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -415,7 +429,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) { @@ -458,6 +472,78 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + if( len < 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ + if( ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default + * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, @@ -535,7 +621,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_session session; mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); @@ -549,7 +635,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len ) ); if( len == 0 ) return( 0 ); @@ -692,6 +778,126 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i,j; + size_t profile_length; + uint16_t mki_length; + /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ + const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + + /* + * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) + * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length + * and one of srtp_mki length + */ + if( len < size_of_lengths ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ + profile_length = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + buf += 2; + + /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ + if( profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || + profile_length % 2 != 0 ) /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + /* + * parse the extension list values are defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + */ + for( j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2 ) + { + uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; + client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( protection_profile_value ); + + if( client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + } + else + { + continue; + } + /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ + for( i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + break; + } + buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ + mki_length = *buf; + buf++; + + if( mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || + mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && + mki_length > 0 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + /* * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions */ @@ -750,6 +956,7 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) { + flags = 0; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", cur->cert ); @@ -831,7 +1038,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; #endif @@ -842,7 +1049,8 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name ) ); if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver ) @@ -888,13 +1096,11 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && - ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && - ( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || - ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) + ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) ); return( 0 ); @@ -902,7 +1108,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) @@ -912,13 +1118,13 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " - "for signature algorithm %d", sig_type ) ); + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) ); return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* @@ -1043,7 +1249,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5]; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %d, sess_len: %d, chal_len: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %u, sess_len: %u, chal_len: %u", ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) ); /* @@ -1118,8 +1324,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) { if( p[0] == 0 && - p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && - p[2] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); @@ -1150,8 +1355,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif { if( p[0] != 0 || - p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || - p[2] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i] ) continue; got_common_suite = 1; @@ -1180,7 +1384,7 @@ have_ciphersuite_v2: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; /* * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks @@ -1228,10 +1432,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed * signature-hash pairs. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); @@ -1265,7 +1469,7 @@ read_record_header: return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) ); #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); /* * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello @@ -1354,7 +1558,7 @@ read_record_header: } if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -1363,7 +1567,7 @@ read_record_header: /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ); else #endif ssl->in_left = 0; @@ -1425,7 +1629,7 @@ read_record_header: if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: " - "%d (expected %d)", cli_msg_seq, + "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } @@ -1683,8 +1887,7 @@ read_record_header: ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 ) | ( buf[ext_offset + 1] ); - if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) || - msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) + if( msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, @@ -1744,7 +1947,7 @@ read_record_header: break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) ); @@ -1755,7 +1958,7 @@ read_record_header: sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1808,6 +2011,16 @@ read_record_header: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) ); @@ -1848,21 +2061,23 @@ read_record_header: break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); } ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; ext += 4 + ext_size; - - if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) } @@ -1871,8 +2086,7 @@ read_record_header: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) { - if( p[0] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && - p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) + if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); @@ -1892,7 +2106,7 @@ read_record_header: #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client @@ -1909,7 +2123,7 @@ read_record_header: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -1990,8 +2204,7 @@ read_record_header: for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) #endif { - if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || - p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) + if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i] ) continue; got_common_suite = 1; @@ -2024,7 +2237,7 @@ have_ciphersuite: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; ssl->state++; @@ -2036,7 +2249,7 @@ have_ciphersuite: /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info ); @@ -2050,7 +2263,7 @@ have_ciphersuite: else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " - "%d - should not happen", sig_alg ) ); + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg ) ); } } #endif @@ -2075,8 +2288,8 @@ static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -2085,6 +2298,53 @@ static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if + * the client hasn't offered it. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + return; + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2118,8 +2378,8 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -2145,8 +2405,8 @@ static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret " "extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -2170,8 +2430,8 @@ static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; @@ -2194,8 +2454,8 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) @@ -2235,8 +2495,8 @@ static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 1; @@ -2265,8 +2525,8 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 2; @@ -2283,7 +2543,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t kkpp_len; @@ -2291,7 +2551,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) return; @@ -2303,8 +2563,8 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return; } - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, @@ -2315,8 +2575,8 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return; } - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; *olen = kkpp_len + 4; } @@ -2341,27 +2601,93 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * 6 . 6 protocol name length * 7 . 7+n protocol name */ - buf[0] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - buf[1] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0); *olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ); - buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 ); - buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 ); - buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 7 ) ) & 0xFF ); + buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 7 ); memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t profile_value = 0; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) ) + { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : + * - 2 bytes for the extension tag + * - 2 bytes for the total size + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile + * - 1 byte for the mki length + * + the actual mki length + * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ + if( (size_t)( end - buf ) < mki_len + 9 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + /* extension */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0 ); + /* + * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) + */ + ext_len = 5 + mki_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, buf, 2 ); + + /* protection profile length: 2 */ + buf[4] = 0x00; + buf[5] = 0x02; + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, buf, 6 ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "use_srtp extension invalid profile" ) ); + return; + } + + buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; + memcpy( &buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + + *olen = 9 + mki_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; @@ -2430,12 +2756,61 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ +static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; + mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). + * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 ) + return; + if( session->id_len == 0 ) + return; + if( ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL ) + return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + return; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session_tmp ); + + session_tmp.id_len = session->id_len; + memcpy( session_tmp.id, session->id, session->id_len ); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, + &session_tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite || + session->compression != session_tmp.compression ) + { + /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Move semantics */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + *session = session_tmp; + memset( &session_tmp, 0, sizeof( session_tmp ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + +exit: + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session_tmp ); +} + static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t; #endif - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; unsigned char *buf, *p; @@ -2477,12 +2852,11 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( t ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 ); + p += 4; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); #else if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -2499,22 +2873,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 ); - /* - * Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). - * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). - * If not, try looking up session ID in our cache. - */ - if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 && -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE && -#endif - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != 0 && - ssl->conf->f_get_cache != NULL && - ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session_negotiate ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); - ssl->handshake->resume = 1; - } + ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( ssl ); if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) { @@ -2570,19 +2929,19 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->compression ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->session_negotiate->compression ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", - ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) @@ -2606,6 +2965,11 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext_len += olen; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); ext_len += olen; @@ -2641,13 +3005,18 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ext_len += olen; #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); if( ext_len > 0 ) { - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); - p += ext_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + ext_len; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) @@ -2665,24 +3034,15 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -2692,13 +3052,13 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; - size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ unsigned char *buf, *p; const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; @@ -2716,11 +3076,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) || authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); @@ -2799,8 +3155,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif } - p[0] = (unsigned char)( sa_len >> 8 ); - p[1] = (unsigned char)( sa_len ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sa_len, p, 0 ); sa_len += 2; p += sa_len; } @@ -2816,6 +3171,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED ) { + /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned + * via a CA callback (configured through + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the + * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; @@ -2825,18 +3185,18 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) { - dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; + /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length + * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ + dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; - if( end < p || - (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || - (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); break; } - *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( dn_size, p, 0 ); + p += 2; memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); p += dn_size; @@ -2850,8 +3210,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - ssl->out_msg[4 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[5 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len ); ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); @@ -2859,18 +3218,13 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) { @@ -2891,7 +3245,7 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *signature_len ) @@ -2914,7 +3268,7 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret ); return( ret ); } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including @@ -2924,17 +3278,18 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *signature_len ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) (void) signature_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ @@ -2950,7 +3305,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( @@ -2987,10 +3342,10 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * - DHE key exchanges */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) @@ -3026,7 +3381,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( ret ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif @@ -3037,12 +3392,12 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ /* * - ECDHE key exchanges */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* @@ -3055,7 +3410,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ @@ -3090,7 +3445,7 @@ curve_matching_done: return( ret ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif @@ -3099,7 +3454,7 @@ curve_matching_done: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ /* * @@ -3107,13 +3462,17 @@ curve_matching_done: * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. * */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) { size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; size_t hashlen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#else unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - int ret; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: @@ -3160,7 +3519,7 @@ curve_matching_done: md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %d for signing", md_alg ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg ) ); /* * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed @@ -3275,7 +3634,7 @@ curve_matching_done: return( ret ); } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ return( 0 ); } @@ -3286,28 +3645,28 @@ curve_matching_done: * machine. */ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t signature_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange * is not needed. */ if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) ) { /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters * from certificate at this point. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) ) { ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ @@ -3315,9 +3674,9 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->state++; return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing * signature operation, resume signing. */ @@ -3327,7 +3686,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ { /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ @@ -3350,11 +3709,11 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* If there is a signature, write its length. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if( signature_len != 0 ) { - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)( signature_len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)( signature_len ); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( signature_len ); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( signature_len ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature", ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, @@ -3363,7 +3722,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* Skip over the already-written signature */ ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ /* Add header and send. */ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; @@ -3383,7 +3742,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) ); @@ -3487,7 +3846,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *peer_pmslen, size_t peer_pmssize ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk; size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key ); @@ -3510,12 +3869,13 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) { - if ( p + 2 > end ) { + if ( p + 2 > end ) + { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } - if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || - *p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) ) + if( *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ) || + *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); @@ -3576,7 +3936,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *end, size_t pms_offset ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; unsigned char ver[2]; unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; @@ -3617,16 +3977,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) ); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif + mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( diff ); /* * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding @@ -3668,16 +4019,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ) { int ret = 0; - size_t n; + uint16_t n; - if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && - ( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || - ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) + if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); @@ -3695,7 +4044,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; - if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) ) + if( n == 0 || n > end - *p ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); @@ -3711,7 +4060,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || - mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; } @@ -3729,15 +4078,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; unsigned char *p, *end; - ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) ); @@ -3857,6 +4206,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically + * and skip the intermediate PMS. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -3888,6 +4244,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret ); @@ -3917,6 +4279,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + if( p != end ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); @@ -3948,6 +4316,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); @@ -4011,24 +4385,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( 0 ); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -4038,7 +4403,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -4051,21 +4416,33 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); ssl->state++; return( 0 ); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ ); @@ -4087,6 +4464,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* * struct { * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only @@ -4101,8 +4489,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) hashlen = 36; /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, - MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) { hash_start += 16; hashlen -= 16; @@ -4157,7 +4544,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); @@ -4188,9 +4575,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ - ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash ); + { + size_t dummy_hlen; + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen ); + } - if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk, md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -4204,17 +4594,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t tlen; uint32_t lifetime; @@ -4244,14 +4629,8 @@ static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) tlen = 0; } - ssl->out_msg[4] = ( lifetime >> 24 ) & 0xFF; - ssl->out_msg[5] = ( lifetime >> 16 ) & 0xFF; - ssl->out_msg[6] = ( lifetime >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - ssl->out_msg[7] = ( lifetime ) & 0xFF; - - ssl->out_msg[8] = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - ssl->out_msg[9] = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF ); - + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8 ); ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; /* diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c index bbde8e4ceb..046ed1b2ff 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) @@ -62,6 +31,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include <string.h> @@ -99,7 +69,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) static int ssl_ticket_gen_key( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, unsigned char index ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES]; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; @@ -159,7 +129,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, uint32_t lifetime ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; ctx->f_rng = f_rng; @@ -180,11 +150,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) - { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + /* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA, + * so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); - } if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 0 ) ) != 0 || ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 1 ) ) != 0 ) @@ -196,115 +182,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, } /* - * Serialize a session in the following format: - * 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) - * n . n+2 peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate) - * n+3 . n+2+m peer cert ASN.1 - */ -static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen ) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t left = buf_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if( left < sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - memcpy( p, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); - left -= sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) - cert_len = 0; - else - cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; - - if( left < 3 + cert_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len ) & 0xFF ); - - if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) - memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); - - p += cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - *olen = p - buf; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Unserialise session, see ssl_save_session() - */ -static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - const unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if( sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > (size_t)( end - p ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); - p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; - p += 3; - - if( cert_len == 0 ) - { - session->peer_cert = NULL; - } - else - { - int ret; - - if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); - - if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, - p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); - mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - return( ret ); - } - - p += cert_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* * Create session ticket, with the following structure: * * struct { @@ -325,14 +202,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *ticket_lifetime ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; unsigned char *key_name = start; unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; - unsigned char *tag; size_t clear_len, ciph_len; *tlen = 0; @@ -362,33 +238,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; /* Dump session state */ - if( ( ret = ssl_save_session( session, - state, end - state, &clear_len ) ) != 0 || + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, + state, end - state, + &clear_len ) ) != 0 || (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535 ) { goto cleanup; } - state_len_bytes[0] = ( clear_len >> 8 ) & 0xff; - state_len_bytes[1] = ( clear_len ) & 0xff; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( clear_len, state_len_bytes, 0 ); /* Encrypt and authenticate */ - tag = state + clear_len; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &key->ctx, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, - state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, - tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, &ciph_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } - if( ciph_len != clear_len ) + if( ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } - *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len; + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len - TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES; cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -423,14 +299,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; unsigned char *key_name = buf; unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; - unsigned char *tag; size_t enc_len, clear_len; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) @@ -448,7 +323,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; - tag = ticket + enc_len; if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len ) { @@ -466,13 +340,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, } /* Decrypt and authenticate */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, - ticket, enc_len, - ticket, &clear_len, - tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; @@ -486,7 +360,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, } /* Actually load session */ - if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c index 127276486b..2e6469de83 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * SSLv3/TLSv1 shared functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, @@ -52,11 +25,7 @@ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) @@ -68,202 +37,120 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include <string.h> +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif -static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); - -/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ -static inline size_t ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 2 ); -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Start a timer. - * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. - */ -static void ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ) -{ - if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL ) - return; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) ); - ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs ); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +/* Top-level Connection ID API */ -/* - * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. - */ -static int ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + size_t len, + int ignore_other_cid ) { - if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) - return( 0 ); + if( len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 ) + if( ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL && + ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) ); - return( -1 ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } + conf->ignore_unexpected_cid = ignore_other_cid; + conf->cid_len = len; return( 0 ); } -static void ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); -static void ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); - -#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 -#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ -static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint8_t slot ); -static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); - - if( mtu != 0 && mtu < MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) - return( mtu ); - - return( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); -} - -static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ) { - size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; - size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl ); + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone - * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ - if( bytes_written > mtu ) + ssl->negotiate_cid = enable; + if( enable == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) { - /* Should never happen... */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) ); -} - -static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - size_t remaining, expansion; - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl ); - - if( max_len > mfl ) - max_len = mfl; - - /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension - * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory - * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size - * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's - * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. - * - * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never - * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. - */ - if( max_len <= ssl->out_left ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Disable use of CID extension." ) ); return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Enable use of CID extension." ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Own CID", own_cid, own_cid_len ); - max_len -= ssl->out_left; -#endif - - ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - remaining = (size_t) ret; - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - expansion = (size_t) ret; - - if( remaining <= expansion ) - return( 0 ); + if( own_cid_len != ssl->conf->cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "CID length %u does not match CID length %u in config", + (unsigned) own_cid_len, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->cid_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } - remaining -= expansion; - if( remaining >= max_len ) - remaining = max_len; + memcpy( ssl->own_cid, own_cid, own_cid_len ); + /* Truncation is not an issue here because + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */ + ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len; - return( (int) remaining ); + return( 0 ); } -/* - * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, - * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. - */ -static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ) { - uint32_t new_timeout; - - if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) - return( -1 ); + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; - /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 - * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first - * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. - * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be - * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work - * on most non-IP stacks too. */ - if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min ) + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) { - ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID extensions + * were used, but client and server requested the empty CID. + * This is indistinguishable from not using the CID extension + * in the first place. */ + if( ssl->transform_in->in_cid_len == 0 && + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } - /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ - if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || - new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + if( peer_cid_len != NULL ) { - new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; + *peer_cid_len = ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len; + if( peer_cid != NULL ) + { + memcpy( peer_cid, ssl->transform_in->out_cid, + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len ); + } } - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs", - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; return( 0 ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %d millisecs", - ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); -} #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) @@ -295,8 +182,8 @@ static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length( int mfl ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ) { mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst ); memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); @@ -306,9 +193,11 @@ static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) if( src->peer_cert != NULL ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); if( dst->peer_cert == NULL ) @@ -324,6 +213,21 @@ static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session return( ret ); } } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( src->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + dst->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest, + src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type; + dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) @@ -339,22 +243,95 @@ static int ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static int resize_buffer( unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old ) +{ + unsigned char* resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len_new ); + if( resized_buffer == NULL ) + return -1; + + /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and + * len_old bytes when upsizing, so we choose the smaller of two sizes, + * to fit one buffer into another. Size checks, ensuring that no data is + * lost, are done outside of this function. */ + memcpy( resized_buffer, *buffer, + ( len_new < *len_old ) ? len_new : *len_old ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buffer, *len_old ); + mbedtls_free( *buffer ); + + *buffer = resized_buffer; + *len_old = len_new; + + return 0; +} + +static void handle_buffer_resizing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, + size_t in_buf_new_len, + size_t out_buf_new_len ) +{ + int modified = 0; + size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0; + size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0; + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { + written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf; + len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len : + ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->in_buf, in_buf_new_len, &ssl->in_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "input buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + in_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { + written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + iv_offset_out = ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf; + len_offset_out = ssl->out_len - ssl->out_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->out_buf_len > out_buf_new_len && ssl->out_left < out_buf_new_len : + ssl->out_buf_len < out_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->out_buf, out_buf_new_len, &ssl->out_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "output buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + out_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + if( modified ) + { + /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */ + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record + * splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */ + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_buf + len_offset_out; + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_buf + iv_offset_out; + + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_buf + len_offset_in; + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_buf + iv_offset_in; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ /* * Key material generation @@ -429,16 +406,22 @@ static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, size_t nb, hs; size_t i, j, k; const unsigned char *S1, *S2; - unsigned char tmp[128]; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; unsigned char h_i[20]; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - if( sizeof( tmp ) < 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + tmp_len = 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } hs = ( slen + 1 ) / 2; S1 = secret; @@ -459,7 +442,9 @@ static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, } if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { goto exit; + } ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S1, hs ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -511,7 +496,9 @@ static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, } if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { goto exit; + } ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S2, hs ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -554,14 +541,144 @@ static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, exit: mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); - return( 0 ); + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t* derivation, + psa_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char* seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char* label, size_t label_length, + size_t capacity ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup( derivation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + NULL, 0 ); + } + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key ); + } + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( derivation, capacity ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if( slen != 0 ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, + master_key, alg, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen( label ), + dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, dstbuf, dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( master_key ) ) + status = psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const char *label, @@ -570,11 +687,12 @@ static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, { size_t nb; size_t i, j, k, md_len; - unsigned char tmp[128]; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); @@ -583,8 +701,13 @@ static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - if( sizeof( tmp ) < md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + tmp_len = md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } nb = strlen( label ); memcpy( tmp + md_len, label, nb ); @@ -638,12 +761,14 @@ static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, exit: mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); - return( 0 ); -} + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const char *label, @@ -655,7 +780,7 @@ static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) static int tls_prf_sha384( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const char *label, const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, @@ -664,7 +789,7 @@ static int tls_prf_sha384( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); @@ -675,207 +800,265 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned c #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t * ); static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char*, size_t * ); static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, int ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char * ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) { - int ret = 0; - unsigned char tmp[64]; - unsigned char keyblk[256]; - unsigned char *key1; - unsigned char *key2; - unsigned char *mac_enc; - unsigned char *mac_dec; - size_t mac_key_len; - size_t iv_copy_len; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) ); - - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher ); - if( cipher_info == NULL ) + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %d not found", - transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( transform->ciphersuite_info->mac ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %d not found", - transform->ciphersuite_info->mac ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + return( 0 ); } - /* - * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS / TLS1.2 functions - */ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf ) +{ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + if( tls_prf == ssl3_prf ) { - handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3 ); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + if( tls_prf == tls1_prf ) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 ); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - transform->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384 ) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 ); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256 ) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 ); } else #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ - /* - * SSLv3: - * master = - * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'A' + premaster + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'BB' + premaster + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( premaster + SHA1( 'CCC' + premaster + randbytes ) ) - * - * TLSv1+: - * master = PRF( premaster, "master secret", randbytes )[0..47] - */ - if( handshake->resume == 0 ) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; + + switch( prf ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", handshake->premaster, - handshake->pmslen ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3: + tls_prf = ssl3_prf; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1: + tls_prf = tls1_prf; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) - { - unsigned char session_hash[48]; - size_t hash_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using extended master secret" ) ); + return( tls_prf( secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} - ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash ); +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac == - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) - { - hash_len = 48; - } - else +/* + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] trunc_hmac + * - [in] compression + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL: whole context (non-const) + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg + */ +static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + int trunc_hmac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + int compression, #endif - hash_len = 32; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - hash_len = 36; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash", session_hash, hash_len ); + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + int minor_ver, + unsigned endpoint, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + const +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int psa_fallthrough; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + unsigned keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, - "extended master secret", - session_hash, hash_len, - session->master, 48 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif - } - else + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; #endif - ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, - "master secret", - handshake->randbytes, 64, - session->master, 48 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + transform->minor_ver = minor_ver; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster, - sizeof(handshake->premaster) ); - } - else - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy( transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof( transform->randbytes ) ); +#endif /* - * Swap the client and server random values. + * Get various info structures */ - memcpy( tmp, handshake->randbytes, 64 ); - memcpy( handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 ); - memcpy( handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite ); + if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" ) ); + + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len ); + + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ /* - * SSLv3: - * key block = - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'A' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'BB' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'CCC' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * MD5( master + SHA1( 'DDDD' + master + randbytes ) ) + - * ... - * - * TLSv1: - * key block = PRF( master, "key expansion", randbytes ) + * Compute key block using the PRF */ - ret = handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, "key expansion", - handshake->randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 ); + ret = tls_prf( master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 ); if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); @@ -883,56 +1066,70 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite = %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( session->ciphersuite ) ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", session->master, 48 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", handshake->randbytes, 64 ); + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ciphersuite ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", master, 48 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64 ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "key block", keyblk, 256 ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->randbytes, - sizeof( handshake->randbytes ) ); - /* * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. */ - transform->keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) { - size_t taglen, explicit_ivlen; + size_t explicit_ivlen; transform->maclen = 0; mac_key_len = 0; - - /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs; - * GCM and CCM has 4 implicit and 8 explicit bytes - * ChachaPoly has all 12 bytes implicit + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). */ transform->ivlen = 12; - if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } else - transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; - - /* All modes have 128-bit tags, except CCM_8 (ciphersuite flag) */ - taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags & - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + else + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + taglen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) { /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; } /* Get MAC length */ @@ -945,7 +1142,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4), * so we only need to adjust the length here. */ - if( session->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) + if( trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) { transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN; @@ -973,7 +1170,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if( session->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + if( encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) { transform->minlen = transform->maclen + cipher_info->block_size; @@ -987,14 +1184,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) ; /* No need to adjust minlen */ else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || + minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; } @@ -1002,23 +1199,32 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; } } } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %d, minlen: %d, ivlen: %d, maclen: %d", - transform->keylen, transform->minlen, transform->ivlen, - transform->maclen ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen ) ); /* * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) { key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + transform->keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; mac_enc = keyblk; mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; @@ -1028,16 +1234,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) */ iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + transform->keylen, iv_copy_len ); - memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + transform->keylen + iv_copy_len, + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, iv_copy_len ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + transform->keylen; + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; @@ -1048,24 +1254,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) */ iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + transform->keylen, iv_copy_len ); - memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + transform->keylen + iv_copy_len, + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, iv_copy_len ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) { - if( mac_key_len > sizeof transform->mac_enc ) + if( mac_key_len > sizeof( transform->mac_enc ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; } memcpy( transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); @@ -1075,7 +1284,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + if( minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) { /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ @@ -1084,59 +1293,151 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto end; ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto end; } } else #endif { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL ) { + ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, transform->keylen, + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, keylen, transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec, iv_copy_len, mac_enc, mac_dec, mac_key_len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto end; } } +#else + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL ) { ssl->conf->f_export_keys( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, - session->master, keyblk, - mac_key_len, transform->keylen, + master, keyblk, + mac_key_len, keylen, iv_copy_len ); } + + if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext != NULL ) + { + ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, + master, keyblk, + mac_key_len, keylen, + iv_copy_len, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type( tls_prf ) ); + } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 1 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + if( psa_fallthrough == 1 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; } if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, @@ -1144,7 +1445,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; } if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, @@ -1152,7 +1453,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) @@ -1162,37 +1463,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; } if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto end; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) ); + /* Initialize Zlib contexts */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - // Initialize compression - // - if( session->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + if( compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) { - if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) ); - ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); - if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Initializing zlib states" ) ); memset( &transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_deflate ) ); @@ -1203,18 +1490,317 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) inflateInit( &transform->ctx_inflate ) != Z_OK ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to initialize compression" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; + goto end; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS 1.0/1.1 / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - SSL/TLS minor version + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + int minor_ver, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) ) + (void) hash; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + (SSL3) session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf + */ +static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes; + size_t salt_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if( handshake->resume != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) + { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + salt = session_hash; + handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash, &salt_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, salt_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion" ) ); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( ssl ); + + if( hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, psk, alg, + salt, salt_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen( lbl ), + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, salt, salt_len, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) ); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs( ssl->handshake, + ssl->minor_ver, + ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master( ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compute_master", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy( tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + ssl->session_negotiate->compression, +#endif + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->randbytes ) ); + + /* Allocate compression buffer */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE && + ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) ); + ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); + if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive keys" ) ); return( 0 ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) +void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) { mbedtls_md5_context md5; mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; @@ -1252,7 +1838,9 @@ void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, hash + 16, 20 ); mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 36 ); + *hlen = 36; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); @@ -1263,7 +1851,9 @@ void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) { mbedtls_md5_context md5; mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; @@ -1276,10 +1866,12 @@ void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 36 ); + *hlen = 36; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); @@ -1291,8 +1883,34 @@ void ssl_calc_verify_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha256" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 32; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); @@ -1302,18 +1920,46 @@ void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, hash ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 32 ); + *hlen = 32; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha384" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 48; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); @@ -1323,29 +1969,35 @@ void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash ) mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, hash ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, 48 ); + *hlen = 48; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ) { unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; unsigned char *end = p + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ); - const unsigned char *psk = ssl->conf->psk; - size_t psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; - /* If the psk callback was called, use its result */ - if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ) { - psk = ssl->handshake->psk; - psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } /* @@ -1361,8 +2013,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch if( end - p < 2 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1391,7 +2043,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ @@ -1402,9 +2054,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); return( ret ); } - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( len ); - p += len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + len; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); } @@ -1413,7 +2064,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t zlen; if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, @@ -1424,9 +2075,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch return( ret ); } - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( zlen >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( zlen ); - p += zlen; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + zlen; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); @@ -1442,8 +2092,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch if( end - p < 2 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len >> 8 ); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)( psk_len ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1455,1302 +2105,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exch return( 0 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -/* - * SSLv3.0 MAC functions - */ -#define SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ -static int ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, - const unsigned char *secret, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, - const unsigned char *ctr, int type, - unsigned char out[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES] ) -{ - unsigned char header[11]; - unsigned char padding[48]; - int padlen; - int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); - int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info ); - int ret; - - /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ - if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) - padlen = 48; - else - padlen = 40; - - memcpy( header, ctr, 8 ); - header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type; - header[ 9] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - header[10] = (unsigned char)( len ); - - memset( padding, 0x36, padlen ); - ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen ); - ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) -#define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC -#endif - -/* - * Encryption/decryption functions - */ -static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; - int auth_done = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) ); - - if( ssl->session_out == NULL || ssl->transform_out == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - /* - * Add MAC before if needed - */ -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || - ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - && ssl->session_out->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#endif - ) ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - unsigned char mac[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; - int ret; - - ret = ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, - ssl->transform_out->mac_enc, - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen, - ssl->out_ctr, ssl->out_msgtype, - mac ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - { - unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - int ret; - - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_hdr, 3 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_len, 2 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - - hmac_failed_etm_disabled: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", - ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, - ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - - ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->maclen; - auth_done++; - } -#endif /* AEAD not the only option */ - - /* - * Encrypt - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) - { - int ret; - size_t olen = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, " - "including %d bytes of padding", - ssl->out_msglen, 0 ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc, - ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen, - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen, - ssl->out_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->out_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) - { - int ret; - size_t enc_msglen, olen; - unsigned char *enc_msg; - unsigned char add_data[13]; - unsigned char iv[12]; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; - unsigned char taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags & - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; - size_t explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - - /* - * Prepare additional authenticated data - */ - memcpy( add_data, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - add_data[8] = ssl->out_msgtype; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 ); - add_data[11] = ( ssl->out_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - add_data[12] = ssl->out_msglen & 0xFF; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 ); - - /* - * Generate IV - */ - if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 4 ) - { - /* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (=seqnum) */ - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_enc, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( ssl->out_iv, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - - } - else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 ) - { - /* ChachaPoly: fixed XOR sequence number */ - unsigned char i; - - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_enc, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - iv[i+4] ^= ssl->out_ctr[i]; - } - else - { - /* Reminder if we ever add an AEAD mode with a different size */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)", - iv, transform->ivlen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)", - ssl->out_iv, explicit_ivlen ); - - /* - * Fix message length with added IV - */ - enc_msg = ssl->out_msg; - enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen; - ssl->out_msglen += explicit_ivlen; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, " - "including 0 bytes of padding", - ssl->out_msglen ) ); - - /* - * Encrypt and authenticate - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, 13, - enc_msg, enc_msglen, - enc_msg, &olen, - enc_msg + enc_msglen, taglen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( olen != enc_msglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->out_msglen += taglen; - auth_done++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", enc_msg + enc_msglen, taglen ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - int ret; - unsigned char *enc_msg; - size_t enc_msglen, padlen, olen = 0, i; - - padlen = ssl->transform_out->ivlen - ( ssl->out_msglen + 1 ) % - ssl->transform_out->ivlen; - if( padlen == ssl->transform_out->ivlen ) - padlen = 0; - - for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ ) - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; - - ssl->out_msglen += padlen + 1; - - enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen; - enc_msg = ssl->out_msg; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* - * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per - * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) - */ - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - /* - * Generate IV - */ - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_iv, ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen ); - - /* - * Fix pointer positions and message length with added IV - */ - enc_msg = ssl->out_msg; - enc_msglen = ssl->out_msglen; - ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->ivlen; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, " - "including %d bytes of IV and %d bytes of padding", - ssl->out_msglen, ssl->transform_out->ivlen, - padlen + 1 ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc, - ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen, - enc_msg, enc_msglen, - enc_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( enc_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 - */ - memcpy( ssl->transform_out->iv_enc, - ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, - ssl->transform_out->ivlen ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if( auth_done == 0 ) - { - unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - - /* - * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + - * TLSCipherText.type + - * TLSCipherText.version + - * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + - * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 - * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); - */ - unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); - - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->out_hdr, 3 ); - pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->out_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->out_msglen ) & 0xFF ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, - ssl->out_iv, ssl->out_msglen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - - memcpy( ssl->out_iv + ssl->out_msglen, mac, - ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - - ssl->out_msglen += ssl->transform_out->maclen; - auth_done++; - - hmac_failed_etm_enabled: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ - if( auth_done != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) -/* - * Constant-flow conditional memcpy: - * - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len), - * - otherwise, a no-op, - * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2. - * - * Use only bit operations to avoid branches that could be used by some - * compilers on some platforms to translate comparison operators. - */ -static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, size_t c2 ) -{ - /* diff = 0 if c1 == c2, non-zero otherwise */ - const size_t diff = c1 ^ c2; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to c1 != c2 */ - const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff ); - - /* diff1 = c1 != c2 */ - const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); - - /* mask = c1 != c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ - const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) -diff1; - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - /* dst[i] = c1 != c2 ? dst[i] : src[i] */ - size_t i; - for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) - dst[i] = ( dst[i] & mask ) | ( src[i] & ~mask ); -} - -/* - * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. - * - * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384. - * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( - mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - /* - * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() - * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. - * - * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means - * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit - * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. - * - * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to - * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen - * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. - * - * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. - */ - const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); - /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, - * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ - const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; - const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; - const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; - const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); - - unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - mbedtls_md_context_t aux; - size_t offset; - int ret; - - mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); - -#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ - do { \ - ret = (func_call); \ - if( ret != 0 ) \ - goto cleanup; \ - } while( 0 ) - - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); - - /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, - * so we can start directly with the message */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); - - /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ - for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) - { - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); - /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ - mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, - offset, data_len_secret ); - - if( offset < max_data_len ) - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); - } - - /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) ); - - /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); - - /* Done, get ready for next time */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); - -#undef MD_CHK - -cleanup: - mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer. - * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len) - * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst, - const unsigned char *src_base, - size_t offset_secret, - size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max, - size_t len ) -{ - size_t offset; - - for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len, - offset, offset_secret ); - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; - int auth_done = 0; -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) ); - - if( ssl->session_in == NULL || ssl->transform_in == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec ); - - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "in_msglen (%d) < minlen (%d)", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->minlen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) - { - int ret; - size_t olen = 0; - - padlen = 0; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec, - ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen, - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->in_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) - { - int ret; - size_t dec_msglen, olen; - unsigned char *dec_msg; - unsigned char *dec_msg_result; - unsigned char add_data[13]; - unsigned char iv[12]; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_in; - unsigned char taglen = transform->ciphersuite_info->flags & - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; - size_t explicit_iv_len = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - - /* - * Compute and update sizes - */ - if( ssl->in_msglen < explicit_iv_len + taglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) " - "+ taglen (%d)", ssl->in_msglen, - explicit_iv_len, taglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen - explicit_iv_len - taglen; - - dec_msg = ssl->in_msg; - dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg; - ssl->in_msglen = dec_msglen; - - /* - * Prepare additional authenticated data - */ - memcpy( add_data, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - add_data[8] = ssl->in_msgtype; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 ); - add_data[11] = ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - add_data[12] = ssl->in_msglen & 0xFF; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 ); - - /* - * Prepare IV - */ - if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 4 ) - { - /* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (transmitted) */ - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->in_iv, 8 ); - - } - else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 ) - { - /* ChachaPoly: fixed XOR sequence number */ - unsigned char i; - - memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen ); - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - iv[i+4] ^= ssl->in_ctr[i]; - } - else - { - /* Reminder if we ever add an AEAD mode with a different size */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", dec_msg + dec_msglen, taglen ); - - /* - * Decrypt and authenticate - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec, - iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, 13, - dec_msg, dec_msglen, - dec_msg_result, &olen, - dec_msg + dec_msglen, taglen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret ); - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - - return( ret ); - } - auth_done++; - - if( olen != dec_msglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) - if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - /* - * Decrypt and check the padding - */ - int ret; - unsigned char *dec_msg; - unsigned char *dec_msg_result; - size_t dec_msglen; - size_t minlen = 0; - size_t olen = 0; - - /* - * Check immediate ciphertext sanity - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - minlen += ssl->transform_in->ivlen; -#endif - - if( ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->ivlen || - ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->maclen + 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) " - "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - - dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen; - dec_msg = ssl->in_msg; - dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg; - - /* - * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) - { - unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); - - dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; - - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 ); - pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen ) & 0xFF ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, - ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); - - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; - goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; - } - auth_done++; - - hmac_failed_etm_enabled: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - - /* - * Check length sanity - */ - if( ssl->in_msglen % ssl->transform_in->ivlen != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* - * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up - */ - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - unsigned char i; - dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen; - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen; - - for( i = 0; i < ssl->transform_in->ivlen; i++ ) - ssl->transform_in->iv_dec[i] = ssl->in_iv[i]; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec, - ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen, - dec_msg, dec_msglen, - dec_msg_result, &olen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( dec_msglen != olen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 - */ - memcpy( ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, - ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, - ssl->transform_in->ivlen ); - } -#endif - - padlen = 1 + ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen - 1]; - - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->maclen + padlen && - auth_done == 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen, padlen ) ); -#endif - padlen = 0; - correct = 0; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( padlen > ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %d, " - "should be no more than %d", - padlen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) ); -#endif - correct = 0; - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - /* - * TLSv1+: always check the padding up to the first failure - * and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding - */ - size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1; - size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen; - size_t i; - - /* - * Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if: - * 1. padlen > ssl->in_msglen - * - * 2. padding_idx > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + - * ssl->transform_in->maclen - * - * In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to - * prevent out-of-buffer reads. - */ - correct &= ( padlen <= ssl->in_msglen ); - correct &= ( padding_idx <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - - padding_idx *= correct; - - for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) - { - real_count &= ( i < padlen ); - pad_count += real_count * - ( ssl->in_msg[padding_idx + i] == padlen - 1 ); - } - - correct &= ( pad_count == padlen ); /* Only 1 on correct padding */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 ) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) ); -#endif - padlen &= correct * 0x1FF; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->in_msglen -= padlen; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); -#endif - - /* - * Authenticate if not done yet. - * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). - */ -#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if( auth_done == 0 ) - { - unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - int ret = 0; - - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; - - ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ); - ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - ret = ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, - ssl->transform_in->mac_dec, - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype, - mac_expect ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - memcpy( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - unsigned char add_data[13]; - - /* - * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of - * in_msglen over all padlen values. - * - * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did - * in_msglen -= padlen. - * - * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer - * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. - */ - const size_t max_len = ssl->in_msglen + padlen; - const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; - - memcpy( add_data + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( add_data + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 ); - memcpy( add_data + 11, ssl->in_len, 2 ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, - add_data, sizeof( add_data ), - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, - min_len, max_len, - mac_expect ); - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret ); - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - - mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg, - ssl->in_msglen, - min_len, max_len, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); -#endif - - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect, - ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); -#endif - correct = 0; - } - auth_done++; - - hmac_failed_etm_disabled: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_peer, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * Finally check the correct flag - */ - if( correct == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); -#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - - /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ - if( auth_done != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 - && ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - ssl->nb_zero++; - - /* - * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack - * (excessive CPU consumption). - */ - if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty " - "messages, possible DoS attack" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } - } - else - ssl->nb_zero = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ - } - else -#endif - { - unsigned char i; - for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) - if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#undef MAC_NONE -#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT -#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) -/* - * Compression/decompression functions - */ -static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; - ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) ); - - if( len_pre == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->out_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - bytes_written; - - ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); - if( ret != Z_OK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); - } - - ssl->out_msglen = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->out_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; - ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) ); - - if( len_pre == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - header_bytes; - - ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); - if( ret != Z_OK ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); - } - - ssl->in_msglen = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %d, ", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -static int ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ @@ -2777,2795 +2138,42 @@ static int ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -/* - * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. - * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. - * - * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are - * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code - * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). - * - * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but - * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, - * since we always read a whole datagram at once. - * - * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when - * they're done reading a record. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) ); - - if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " - "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( nb_want > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - uint32_t timeout; - - /* Just to be sure */ - if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use " - "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* - * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we - * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. - * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the - * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. - */ - - /* - * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable - */ - if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 ) - { - if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; - - if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %d", - ssl->next_record_offset ) ); - memmove( ssl->in_hdr, - ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, - ssl->in_left ); - } - - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d", - ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); - - /* - * Done if we already have enough data. - */ - if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but - * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something - * wrong. - */ - if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * Don't even try to read if time's out already. - * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages - * that will end up being dropped. - */ - if( ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; - } - else - { - len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ); - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; - else - timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %u ms", timeout ) ); - - if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) - ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, - timeout ); - else - ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); - } - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) ); - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_resend_hello_request", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - } - - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ssl->in_left = ret; - } - else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d", - ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); - - while( ssl->in_left < nb_want ) - { - len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; - - if( ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; - else - { - if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) - { - ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, - ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, - ssl->conf->read_timeout ); - } - else - { - ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, - ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d", - ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); - - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, - ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requested", - ret, (unsigned long)len ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->in_left += ret; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Flush any data not yet written - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char *buf; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) ); - - if( ssl->f_send == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " - "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ - if( ssl->out_left == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - while( ssl->out_left > 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %d, out_left: %d", - mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) ); - - buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; - ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret ); - - if( ret <= 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, - ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sent", - ret, (unsigned long)ssl->out_left ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - ssl->out_left -= ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; - } - else -#endif - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; - } - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight - */ -static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - - /* Allocate space for current message */ - if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed", - sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %d bytes failed", ssl->out_msglen ) ); - mbedtls_free( msg ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ - memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; - msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; - msg->next = NULL; - - /* Append to the current flight */ - if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL ) - ssl->handshake->flight = msg; - else - { - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; - while( cur->next != NULL ) - cur = cur->next; - cur->next = msg; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) ); - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Free the current flight of handshake messages - */ -static void ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; - - while( cur != NULL ) - { - next = cur->next; - - mbedtls_free( cur->p ); - mbedtls_free( cur ); - - cur = next; - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -/* - * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones - */ -static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; - unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - int ret; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - - if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); - - /* Swap transforms */ - tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; - ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; - - /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ - memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 ); - memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 ); - - /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Retransmit the current flight of messages. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. - * - * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns - * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. - * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); - - if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) ); - - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; - if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; - } - - while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL ) - { - size_t max_frag_len; - const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; - - int const is_finished = - ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ); - - uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? - SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; - - /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after - * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. - * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ - if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); - if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; - - /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ - if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - if( max_frag_len == 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - continue; - } - - memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len ); - ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; - ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; - - /* Update position inside current message */ - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; - } - else - { - const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; - const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; - const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 ); - const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; - size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; - - if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) - { - if( is_finished ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - continue; - } - max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; - - cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? - max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; - - if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", - (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, - (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) ); - } - - /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, - * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. - * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ - memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 ); - - ssl->out_msg[6] = ( ( frag_off >> 16 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[7] = ( ( frag_off >> 8 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[8] = ( ( frag_off ) & 0xff ); - - ssl->out_msg[ 9] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 16 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[10] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 8 ) & 0xff ); - ssl->out_msg[11] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len ) & 0xff ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 ); - - /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len ); - ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; - ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; - - /* Update position inside current message */ - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; - } - - /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ - if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len ) - { - if( cur->next != NULL ) - { - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; - } - else - { - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; - } - } - - /* Actually send the message out */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Update state and set timer */ - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; - else - { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; - ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ - ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight ); - ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; - ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; - - /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ - ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; - - /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ - ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; - - /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ - ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); - - /* Cancel timer */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) - { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; - } - else - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; -} - -/* - * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl ); - ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) - { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; - } - else - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -/* - * Handshake layer functions - */ - -/* - * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. - * - * - fill in handshake headers - * - update handshake checksum - * - DTLS: save message for resending - * - then pass to the record layer - * - * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be - * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). - * - * Inputs: - * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len - * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) - * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) - * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body - * - * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): - * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents - * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) - * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; - const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) ); - - /* - * Sanity checks - */ - if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } - - /* Whenever we send anything different from a - * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */ - if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) && - ssl->handshake == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } -#endif - - /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds - * of the outgoing record buffer. - * This should never fail as the various message - * writing functions must obey the bounds of the - * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. - * - * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. - */ - if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: " - "size %u, maximum %u", - (unsigned) ssl->out_msglen, - (unsigned) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * Fill handshake headers - */ - if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 16 ); - ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)( hs_len ); - - /* - * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, - * between the length field and the actual payload: - * uint16 message_seq; - * uint24 fragment_offset; - * uint24 fragment_length; - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ - if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: " - "size %u, maximum %u", - (unsigned) ( hs_len ), - (unsigned) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len ); - ssl->out_msglen += 8; - - /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ - if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) - { - ssl->out_msg[4] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8 ) & 0xFF; - ssl->out_msg[5] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ) & 0xFF; - ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ); - } - else - { - ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; - ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; - } - - /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, - * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ - memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 ); - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ - if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) - ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); - } - - /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Record layer functions - */ - -/* - * Write current record. - * - * Uses: - * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) - * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) - * - ssl->out_msg: record content - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ) -{ - int ret, done = 0; - size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; - uint8_t flush = force_flush; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->transform_out != NULL && - ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - len = ssl->out_msglen; - } -#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - - if( ret == 0 ) - done = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - if( !done ) - { - unsigned i; - size_t protected_record_size; - - ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 ); - - memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); - ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len ); - - if( ssl->transform_out != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - len = ssl->out_msglen; - ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 ); - ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len ); - } - - protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed - * the remaining space in the datagram. */ - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret ) - { - /* Should never happen */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %d, " - "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d", - ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], - ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", - ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size ); - - ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; - ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); - - for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) - if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH ) - { - size_t remaining; - ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); - if( ret < 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", - ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - remaining = (size_t) ret; - if( remaining == 0 ) - { - flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) && - ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || - memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 || - memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 ) - { - return( 1 ); - } - return( 0 ); -} - -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) | - ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) | - ssl->in_msg[11] ); -} - -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) | - ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) | - ssl->in_msg[8] ); -} - -static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; - - msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); - frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); - frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); - - if( frag_off > msg_len ) - return( -1 ); - - if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off ) - return( -1 ); - - if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen ) - return( -1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) - */ -static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len ) -{ - unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; - - start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 ); - if( start_bits != 8 ) - { - size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; - - /* Special case */ - if( len <= start_bits ) - { - for( ; len != 0; len-- ) - mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len ); - - /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ - return; - } - - offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ - len -= start_bits; - - for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- ) - mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 ); - } - - end_bits = len % 8; - if( end_bits != 0 ) - { - size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8; - - len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ - - for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- ) - mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits ); - } - - memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 ); -} - -/* - * Check that bitmask is full - */ -static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len ) -{ - size_t i; - - for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ ) - if( mask[i] != 0xFF ) - return( -1 ); - - for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ ) - if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 ) - return( -1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ -static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len, - unsigned add_bitmap ) -{ - size_t alloc_len; - - alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ - alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ - - if( add_bitmap ) - alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */ - - return( alloc_len ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) -{ - return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) | - ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) | - ssl->in_msg[3] ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %d", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen =" - " %d, type = %d, hslen = %d", - ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - int ret; - unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; - - if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && - ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && - recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) || - ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) ) - { - if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", - recv_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } - - /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid - * too many retransmissions. - * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ - if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, " - "message_seq = %d, start_of_flight = %d", - recv_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: " - "message_seq = %d, expected = %d", - recv_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); - } - /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ - - /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future - * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and - * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the - * handshake logic layer. */ - if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL ) - { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen ); - } - - /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake != NULL ) - { - unsigned offset; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; - - /* Increment handshake sequence number */ - hs->in_msg_seq++; - - /* - * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. - */ - - /* Free first entry */ - ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 ); - - /* Shift all other entries */ - for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; - offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; - offset++, hs_buf++ ) - { - *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); - } - - /* Create a fresh last entry */ - memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); - } -#endif -} - -/* - * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 - * - * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). - * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. - * - * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of - * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 - * not seen yet). - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -static void ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - ssl->in_window_top = 0; - ssl->in_window = 0; -} - -static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf ) -{ - return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | - ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) ); -} - -/* - * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); - uint64_t bit; - - if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) - return( 0 ); - - if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) - return( 0 ); - - bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; - - if( bit >= 64 ) - return( -1 ); - - if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 ) - return( -1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Update replay window on new validated record - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); - - if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) - return; - - if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) - { - /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ - uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; - - if( shift >= 64 ) - ssl->in_window = 1; - else - { - ssl->in_window <<= shift; - ssl->in_window |= 1; - } - - ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; - } - else - { - /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ - uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; - - if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */ - ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Forward declaration */ -static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); - -/* - * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with - * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. - * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. - * - * - if cookie is valid, return 0 - * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, - * fill obuf and set olen, then - * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED - * - otherwise return a specific error code - */ -static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( - mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, - mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, - void *p_cookie, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, - const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) -{ - size_t sid_len, cookie_len; - unsigned char *p; - - if( f_cookie_write == NULL || f_cookie_check == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, - * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be - * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks - * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. - * - * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake - * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied - * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 - * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied - * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) - * - * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) - * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) - * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied - * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 - * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) - * - * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) - * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) - * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content - * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content - * ... - * - * Minimum length is 61 bytes. - */ - if( in_len < 61 || - in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || - in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || - in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - } - - sid_len = in[59]; - if( sid_len > in_len - 61 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - - cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; - if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); - - if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, - cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 ) - { - /* Valid cookie */ - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. - * - * 0-0 ContentType type; copied - * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied - * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied - * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied - * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 - * - * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request - * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 - * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied - * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied - * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 - * - * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff - * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie - * - * Minimum length is 28. - */ - if( buf_len < 28 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ - memcpy( obuf, in, 25 ); - obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; - obuf[25] = 0xfe; - obuf[26] = 0xff; - - /* Generate and write actual cookie */ - p = obuf + 28; - if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie, - &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - *olen = p - obuf; - - /* Go back and fill length fields */ - obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 ); - - obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 ); - obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 8 ); - obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) ); - - obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >> 8 ); - obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); -} - -/* - * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet - * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). - * - * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record - * that looks like a ClientHello. - * - * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, - * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then - * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED - * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, - * reset the session of the current context, and - * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT - * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code - * - * mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will ignore the record if anything else than - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or 0 is returned, although this function - * cannot not return 0. - */ -static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - size_t len; - - ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( - ssl->conf->f_cookie_write, - ssl->conf->f_cookie_check, - ssl->conf->p_cookie, - ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, - ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, - ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret ); - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) - { - int send_ret; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", - ssl->out_buf, len ); - /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. - * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, - * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ - send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret ); - (void) send_ret; - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); - } - - if( ret == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) ); - if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ); - } - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -/* - * ContentType type; - * ProtocolVersion version; - * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only - * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only - * uint16 length; - * - * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. - * - * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: - * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 - * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD - * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value - * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. - * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received - * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. - */ -static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int major_ver, minor_ver; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); - - ssl->in_msgtype = ssl->in_hdr[0]; - ssl->in_msglen = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1]; - mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->in_hdr + 1 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %d, " - "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d", - ssl->in_msgtype, - major_ver, minor_ver, ssl->in_msglen ) ); - - /* Check record type */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && - ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* Silently ignore invalid DTLS records as recommended by RFC 6347 - * Section 4.1.2.7 */ - if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - /* Check version */ - if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - /* Check length against the size of our buffer */ - if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - (size_t)( ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - /* - * DTLS-related tests. - * Check epoch before checking length constraint because - * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec - * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, - * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs - * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than - * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. - * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, - * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid - * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; - - /* Check epoch (and sequence number) with DTLS */ - if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: " - "expected %d, received %d", - ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /* - * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to - * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we - * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the - * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. - */ - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && - rec_epoch == 0 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_left > 13 && - ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect " - "from the same port" ) ); - return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - /* Consider buffering the record. */ - if( rec_epoch == (unsigned int) ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - /* Replay detection only works for the current epoch */ - if( rec_epoch == ssl->in_epoch && - mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } -#endif - - /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, - * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) -#endif - ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - - /* Check length against bounds of the current transform and version */ - if( ssl->transform_in == NULL ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 || - ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - } - else - { - if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->in_msglen > ssl->transform_in->minlen + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* - * TLS encrypted messages can have up to 256 bytes of padding - */ - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 && - ssl->in_msglen > ssl->transform_in->minlen + - MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 256 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } -#endif - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * If applicable, decrypt (and decompress) record content - */ -static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret, done = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network", - ssl->in_hdr, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->in_msglen ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) ); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } - - if( ret == 0 ) - done = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - - if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->transform_in != NULL && - ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -static void ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* - * Read a record. - * - * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, - * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. - * - */ - -/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ -static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned update_hs_digest ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); - - if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) - { - do { - - ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - int have_buffered = 0; - - /* We only check for buffered messages if the - * current datagram is fully consumed. */ - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 ) - { - if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 ) - have_buffered = 1; - } - - if( have_buffered == 0 ) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl ); - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ) - continue; - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) - { - /* Buffer future message */ - ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret ); - - if( 0 != ret ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - update_hs_digest == 1 ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) ); - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) - return( 1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf; - int ret = 0; - - if( hs == NULL ) - return( -1 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) ); - - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. - * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ - if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) ); - ret = -1; - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) ); - ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - ssl->in_msglen = 1; - ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; - - /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ - ssl->in_left = 0; - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - - hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - /* Debug only */ - { - unsigned offset; - for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) - { - hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; - if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", - hs->in_msg_seq + offset, - hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) ); - } - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ - - /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the - * next handshake message. */ - hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; - if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) ) - { - /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ - size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) | - ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) | - hs_buf->data[3]; - - /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered - * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ - if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", - hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 ); - - ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; - ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; - memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen ); - - ret = 0; - goto exit; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", - hs->in_msg_seq ) ); - } - - ret = -1; - -exit: - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); - return( ret ); -} - -static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - size_t desired ) -{ - int offset; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", - (unsigned) desired ) ); - - /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ - ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); - - /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ - if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake - * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, - * starting with the most distant one. */ - for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; - offset >= 0; offset-- ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", - offset ) ); - - ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset ); - - /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ - if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - } - - return( -1 ); -} - -static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - - if( hs == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) ); - - switch( ssl->in_msgtype ) - { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) ); - - hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: - { - unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; - unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; - size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; - - /* We should never receive an old handshake - * message - double-check nonetheless. */ - if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; - if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) - { - /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, - ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " - "buffering window %u - %u", - recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) ); - - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", - recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) ); - - hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ]; - - /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ - if( !hs_buf->is_valid ) - { - size_t reassembly_buf_sz; - - hs_buf->is_fragmented = - ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ); - - /* We copy the message back into the input buffer - * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. - * This is an implementation-specific limitation - * and not one from the standard, hence it is not - * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ - if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) - { - /* Ignore message */ - goto exit; - } - - /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ - if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > - MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len, - hs_buf->is_fragmented ); - - if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 ) - { - /* If we can't buffer a future message because - * of space limitations -- ignore. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", - (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - goto exit; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", - (unsigned) msg_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - } - - if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %u (%u with bitmap) would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- fail\n", - (unsigned) msg_len, - (unsigned) reassembly_buf_sz, - MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - goto exit; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %d", - msg_len ) ); - - hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz ); - if( hs_buf->data == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; - - /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, - * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ - memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 ); - memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 ); - memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 ); - - hs_buf->is_valid = 1; - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; - } - else - { - /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ - if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) ); - /* Ignore */ - goto exit; - } - } - - if( !hs_buf->is_complete ) - { - size_t frag_len, frag_off; - unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; - - /* - * Check and copy current fragment - */ - - /* Validation of header fields already done in - * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ - frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); - frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %d, length = %d", - frag_off, frag_len ) ); - memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len ); - - if( hs_buf->is_fragmented ) - { - unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; - ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len ); - hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask, - msg_len ) == 0 ); - } - else - { - hs_buf->is_complete = 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete", - hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) ); - } - - break; - } - - default: - /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ - break; - } - -exit: - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) ); - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* - * Consume last content-layer message and potentially - * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' - * consumption state. - * - * (1) Handshake messages: - * Remove last handshake message, move content - * and adapt in_msglen. - * - * (2) Alert messages: - * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. - * - * (3) Change cipher spec: - * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. - * - * (4) Application data: - * Don't do anything - the record layer provides - * the application data as a stream transport - * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. - * - */ - - /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ - if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) - { - /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data - * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during - * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ - if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - /* - * Get next Handshake message in the current record - */ - - /* Notes: - * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the - * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake - * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment - * size instead. Using the total handshake message - * size here is faulty and should be changed at - * some point. - * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one - * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen - * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. - * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. - * The following check is therefore mandatory, and - * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. - * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of - * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected - * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. - */ - if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) - { - ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; - memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, - ssl->in_msglen ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); - } - else - { - ssl->in_msglen = 0; - } - - ssl->in_hslen = 0; - } - /* Case (4): Application data */ - else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) - { - return( 0 ); - } - /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ - else - { - ssl->in_msglen = 0; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) - return( 1 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - -static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - if( hs == NULL ) - return; - - if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) - { - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= - hs->buffering.future_record.len; - - mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data ); - hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; - } -} - -static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - unsigned char * rec; - size_t rec_len; - unsigned rec_epoch; - - if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 0 ); - - if( hs == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; - rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; - rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; - - if( rec == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Only consider loading future records if the - * input buffer is empty. */ - if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); - - if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) ); - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) ); - - /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ - if( rec_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - - memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len ); - ssl->in_left = rec_len; - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - - ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); - -exit: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); - return( 0 ); -} - -static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - size_t const rec_hdr_len = 13; - size_t const total_buf_sz = rec_hdr_len + ssl->in_msglen; - - /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ - if( hs == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested - * in Finished messages). */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ - if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ - if( total_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", - (unsigned) total_buf_sz, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, - (unsigned) hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* Buffer record */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u", - ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", ssl->in_hdr, - rec_hdr_len + ssl->in_msglen ); - - /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records - * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ - hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; - hs->buffering.future_record.len = total_buf_sz; - - hs->buffering.future_record.data = - mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len ); - if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL ) - { - /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a - * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ - return( 0 ); - } - - memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, ssl->in_hdr, total_buf_sz ); - - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += total_buf_sz; - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, - * and if the epoch matches now, load it. - * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to - * the length of the buffered record, so that - * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will - * essentially be no-ops. */ - ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - if( ( ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) - { - ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; - } - - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ) - { - /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ - ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen - + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record " - "(header)" ) ); - } - else - { - /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_left = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record " - "(header)" ) ); - } - - /* Get next record */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); - } -#endif - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * Read and optionally decrypt the message contents - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->in_msglen ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); - if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) ); - } - } - else -#endif - ssl->in_left = 0; - - if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - /* Silently discard invalid records */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD || - ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - { - /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here - * probably means something went wrong in the handshake - * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); - } -#endif - return( ret ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && - ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); - } -#endif - - /* As above, invalid records cause - * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ - - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_left = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); - } - - return( ret ); - } - else -#endif - { - /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); - } -#endif - return( ret ); - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; - - /* - * Handle particular types of records - */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %d", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x", - ssl->in_msg[0] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) - { - if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); - } -#endif - } - - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 ) - { - /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert - to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't - currently support this. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %d", - ssl->in_msglen ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%d:%d]", - ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); - - /* - * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation - */ - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", - ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ); - } - - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) - if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) ); - /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ - return( 0 ); - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) ); - /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ - return( 0 ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) { - int ret; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ) != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) { - return( ret ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; } - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char level, - unsigned char message ) -{ - int ret; - - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); - - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; - ssl->out_msglen = 2; - ssl->out_msg[0] = level; - ssl->out_msg[1] = message; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert_digest ); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); - - return( 0 ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /* * Handshake functions */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -5578,14 +2186,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -5596,7 +2202,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } -#else +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) @@ -5604,14 +2210,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t i, n; const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); ssl->state++; @@ -5677,22 +2281,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) n = crt->raw.len; if( n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %d > %d", - i + 3 + n, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE ); } - ssl->out_msg[i ] = (unsigned char)( n >> 16 ); - ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = (unsigned char)( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); i += 3; memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n ); i += n; crt = crt->next; } - ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) >> 16 ); - ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) >> 8 ); - ssl->out_msg[6] = (unsigned char)( ( i - 7 ) ); + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( i - 7 ); + ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( i - 7 ); + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( i - 7 ); ssl->out_msglen = i; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; @@ -5715,63 +2320,68 @@ write_msg: return( ret ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if( peer_crt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len ) ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( peer_cert_digest_type ); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if( peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info ); + if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN ) + return( -1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller */ -static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt=0; +#endif size_t i, n; uint8_t alert; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * Check if the client sent an empty certificate - */ - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) ); - - /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send - one. The client should know what's going on, so we - don't send an alert. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && - memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); - - /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send - one. The client should know what's going on, so we - don't send an alert. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); @@ -5805,43 +2415,32 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } - /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */ - if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - } - - if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, - sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", - sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); - + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ i += 3; + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ while( i < ssl->in_hslen ) { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 ) | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; i += 3; @@ -5849,161 +2448,207 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); } - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ssl->in_msg + i, n ); + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) ); + if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ switch( ret ) { - case 0: /*ok*/ - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: - /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a - prior certificate was already trusted. */ - break; + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; - default: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; - crt_parse_der_failed: - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); - return( ret ); + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); + return( ret ); } i += n; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", chain ); + return( 0 ); +} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) /* - * On client, make sure the server cert doesn't change during renego to - * avoid "triple handshake" attack: https://secure-resumption.com/ + * Check if the client sent an empty certificate */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) { - if( ssl->session->peer_cert == NULL ) + if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); } - if( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len != - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.len || - memcmp( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.p, - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.p, - ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server cert changed during renegotiation" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); - } + return( -1 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - return( 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) { - int ret; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET - ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode - : ssl->conf->authmode; -#else - const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; -#endif - void *rs_ctx = NULL; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); - - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); - } + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); - ssl->state++; - return( 0 ); + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + } } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) - { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED ); +} - ssl->state++; +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) return( 0 ); - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify ) + if( ssl->f_vrfy != NULL ) { - goto crt_verify; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use context-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; } -#endif - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + else { - /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We - let it decide whether to alert. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use configuration-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; } - if( ( ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE && - authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) - { - ret = 0; - } -#endif - - ssl->state++; - return( ret ); + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" ) ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; - -crt_verify: - if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) - rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; -#endif - - if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ { mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; @@ -6021,232 +2666,327 @@ crt_verify: ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; } - /* - * Main check: verify certificate - */ + if( ca_chain != NULL ) + have_ca_chain = 1; + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ca_chain, ca_crl, - ssl->conf->cert_profile, - ssl->hostname, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, - ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx ); + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ); + } - if( ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret ); - } + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret ); + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ); #endif - /* - * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 - */ + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - { - const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; - - /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */ - if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && - mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) - { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); - if( ret == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; - if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, - ciphersuite_info, - ! ssl->conf->endpoint, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && + mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); if( ret == 0 ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a - * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, - * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds - * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy - * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of - * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ - if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && - ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || - ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) ) - { - ret = 0; - } + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain, + ciphersuite_info, + ! ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + } - if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; - } + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) ) + { + ret = 0; + } - if( ret != 0 ) - { - uint8_t alert; - - /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. - Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send - may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ - if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; - else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; - else - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - alert ); - } + if( have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x", - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); - } + if( ret != 0 ) + { + uint8_t alert; + + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; else - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert ); } - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ return( ret ); } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED - !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) ); + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest ); - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - ssl->out_msglen = 1; - ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; - ssl->state++; + return( ret ); +} - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + if( ret != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); - return( ret ); + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) ); - return( 0 ); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( ssl, authmode ); + if( crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + goto exit; + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify ) + { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; + } +#endif if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); + goto exit; } - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( ssl ) == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', - * so we don't need to check this here. */ + if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; - /* - * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound - * data. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) ); - ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( chain == NULL ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( chain ); + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl, chain ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; + +crt_verify: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; #endif - /* Increment epoch */ - if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); - /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so - treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); - } + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + { + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; + + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ + + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; + + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; + + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + chain = NULL; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( ssl, crt_start, crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( ssl, pk_start, pk_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) +exit: + + if( ret == 0 ) + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); - } + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; } #endif - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) ); + if( chain != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + } - return( 0 ); + return( ret ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ) @@ -6260,7 +3000,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; else @@ -6286,11 +3026,21 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); #endif +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ } @@ -6304,11 +3054,19 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); #endif +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ } @@ -6327,15 +3085,23 @@ static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ @@ -6491,13 +3257,44 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( { int len = 12; const char *sender; - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; unsigned char padbuf[32]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; if( !session ) session = ssl->session; + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha256" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha256" ) ); @@ -6515,39 +3312,65 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( sha256.state, sizeof( sha256.state ) ); #endif - sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, padbuf ); + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, padbuf, 32, buf, len ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); - mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) { int len = 12; const char *sender; - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; unsigned char padbuf[48]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; if( !session ) session = ssl->session; + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha384" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48 ); +#else mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha384" ) ); @@ -6564,10 +3387,6 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) sha512.state, sizeof( sha512.state ) ); #endif - - sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; /* mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret's output parameter is declared as a * 64-byte buffer, but sice we're using SHA-384, we know that the * output fits in 48 bytes. This is correct C, but GCC 11.1 warns @@ -6582,21 +3401,22 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( #pragma GCC diagnostic pop #endif + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, padbuf, 48, buf, len ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); - mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -static void ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); @@ -6668,7 +3488,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->handshake->flight != NULL ) { /* Cancel handshake timer */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ @@ -6676,7 +3496,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } else #endif - ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); ssl->state++; @@ -6689,7 +3509,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished" ) ); - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint ); @@ -6809,7 +3629,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned int hash_len; unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; @@ -6850,7 +3670,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) goto exit; } - if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), buf, hash_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); @@ -6904,19 +3724,29 @@ static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else mbedtls_sha256_init( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else mbedtls_sha512_init( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); #endif +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs ); #endif @@ -6934,24 +3764,31 @@ static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) #endif #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif } -static void ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) { memset( transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif } void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) @@ -6987,6 +3824,12 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params) ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); +#endif /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ if( ssl->handshake == NULL || @@ -7008,7 +3851,7 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* Initialize structures */ mbedtls_ssl_session_init( ssl->session_negotiate ); - ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate ); ssl_handshake_params_init( ssl->handshake ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -7021,7 +3864,7 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) else ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); } #endif @@ -7057,78 +3900,6 @@ static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy( void *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the - * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. - * - * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number - * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, - * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. - */ - -static void ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; - ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 11; - ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 13; - } - else -#endif - { - ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; - ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; - ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; - } - - /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ - if( transform != NULL && - ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv + transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - } - else - ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; -} - -/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the - * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. - * - * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number - * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, - * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. - */ - -static void ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; - ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 11; - ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 13; - } - else -#endif - { - ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; - ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; - ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; - } - - /* Offset in_msg from in_iv to allow space for explicit IV, if used. */ - if( transform != NULL && - ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - { - ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv + transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - } - else - ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; -} - /* * Initialize an SSL context */ @@ -7141,31 +3912,12 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * Setup an SSL context */ -static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; - ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; - ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; - } - - /* Derive other internal pointers. */ - ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); - ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); -} - int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; ssl->conf = conf; @@ -7176,23 +3928,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ ssl->out_buf = NULL; - ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_buf_len ); if( ssl->in_buf == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) ); ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; goto error; } - ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_buf_len ); if( ssl->out_buf == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) ); ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; goto error; } - ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset( &ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info) ); +#endif if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) goto error; @@ -7205,6 +3967,10 @@ error: ssl->conf = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; +#endif ssl->in_buf = NULL; ssl->out_buf = NULL; @@ -7230,9 +3996,16 @@ error: * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) */ -static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) @@ -7242,7 +4015,7 @@ static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; @@ -7255,7 +4028,7 @@ static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); ssl->in_msgtype = 0; ssl->in_msglen = 0; @@ -7264,7 +4037,7 @@ static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) ssl->in_epoch = 0; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); #endif ssl->in_hslen = 0; @@ -7288,14 +4061,14 @@ static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) ssl->session_in = NULL; ssl->session_out = NULL; - memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); + memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) if( partial == 0 ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ { ssl->in_left = 0; - memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); + memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) @@ -7351,7 +4124,7 @@ static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - return( ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); } /* @@ -7462,7 +4235,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) @@ -7480,7 +4253,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ssl == NULL || session == NULL || @@ -7490,7 +4263,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - if( ( ret = ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, session ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, + session ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); ssl->handshake->resume = 1; @@ -7572,7 +4346,29 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, { conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; + + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) @@ -7599,6 +4395,16 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) /* * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake @@ -7625,24 +4431,24 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, - const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ) -{ - if( psk == NULL || psk_identity == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ - if( ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 || - psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } - + /* This and the following branch should never + * be taken simultaenously as we maintain the + * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never + * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard, + * though, `else` is omitted here. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if( conf->psk != NULL ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); @@ -7651,41 +4457,80 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, conf->psk = NULL; conf->psk_len = 0; } + + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) { mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); conf->psk_identity = NULL; conf->psk_identity_len = 0; } +} - if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL || - ( conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ) ) == NULL ) +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if( psk_identity == NULL || + ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) { - mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); - mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - conf->psk_len = psk_len; - conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ); + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); - memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len ); + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); return( 0 ); } -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ) { - if( psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */ + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if( psk == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len ); + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + { + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, @@ -7693,6 +4538,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk ); ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; } +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ) +{ + if( psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); @@ -7703,6 +4560,43 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( 0 ); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */ + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ) +{ + if( ( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) || + ( ssl->handshake == NULL ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -7711,14 +4605,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, conf->f_psk = f_psk; conf->p_psk = p_psk; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) @@ -7736,7 +4630,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 ) @@ -7751,7 +4645,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P ) ) != 0 || ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G ) ) != 0 ) @@ -7776,7 +4670,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures */ @@ -7785,7 +4679,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, { conf->sig_hashes = hashes; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* @@ -7889,6 +4783,86 @@ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ) +{ + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ) +{ + if( mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len ); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; + + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for( p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( *p ) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + list_size++; + } + else + { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } + } + + if( list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH ) + { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if( dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } + else + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy( dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) { conf->max_major_ver = major; @@ -8018,6 +4992,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; } + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, + void *p_export_keys ) +{ + conf->f_export_keys_ext = f_export_keys_ext; + conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) @@ -8060,66 +5042,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * SSL get accessors */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - /* - * Case A: We're currently holding back - * a message for further processing. - */ - - if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } - - /* - * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* - * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. - */ - - if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } - - /* - * Case D: An application data message is being processed - */ - if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) ); - return( 1 ); - } - - /* - * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. - * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if - * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. - */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) ); - return( 0 ); -} - uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { if( ssl->session != NULL ) @@ -8177,61 +5099,43 @@ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } } -int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - size_t transform_expansion = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; - unsigned block_size; - - if( transform == NULL ) - return( (int) mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); -#endif + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; - switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) ) + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) { - case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: - case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: - transform_expansion = transform->minlen; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: - - block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( - &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); - - /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ - transform_expansion += transform->maclen; - - /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; - * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use - * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ - transform_expansion += block_size; - - /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added - * after the record header. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - transform_expansion += block_size; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + } - break; + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } - default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } } - return( (int)( mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + transform_expansion ) ); + return( max_len ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { size_t max_len; @@ -8256,10 +5160,17 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( max_len ); } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && @@ -8288,16 +5199,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl ); + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); if( max_len > mfl ) max_len = mfl; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 ) + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 ) { - const size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; @@ -8329,12 +5240,17 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ss if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) return( NULL ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) return( ssl->session->peer_cert ); +#else + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *dst ) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst ) { if( ssl == NULL || dst == NULL || @@ -8344,10 +5260,567 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - return( ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return( ssl->session ); +} + +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ + +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint16_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT ) ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * uint64 start_time; + * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard + * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * + * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except + * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come + * together in one block. + */ +static int ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Add version identifier + */ + + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( start, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 2 /* ciphersuite */ + + 1 /* compression */ + + 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof( session->id ) + + sizeof( session->master ) + + 4; /* verify_result */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( session->ciphersuite, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->compression ); + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->id_len ); + memcpy( p, session->id, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( p, session->master, 48 ); + p += 48; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session->verify_result, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } + + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + cert_len = 0; + else + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + + used += 3 + cert_len; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cert_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cert_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cert_len ); + + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } + else + { + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( session->ticket_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( session->ticket_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->ticket_len ); + + if( session->ticket != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = session->mfl_code; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->trunc_hmac ) & 0xFF ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->encrypt_then_mac ); +#endif + + /* Done */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + return( ssl_session_save( session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen ) ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +static int ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( 8 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + start = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if( 2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ciphersuite = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + session->compression = *p++; + + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy( session->id, p, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( session->master, p, 48 ); + p += 48; + + session->verify_result = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; +#else + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( cert_len != 0 ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 2 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( session->peer_cert_digest_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( session->ticket_len != 0 ) + { + if( session->ticket_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->ticket_len ); + if( session->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if( 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_lifetime = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->mfl_code = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->trunc_hmac = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; +#endif + + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_session_load( session, 0, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + + return( ret ); +} + /* * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake */ @@ -8377,11 +5850,24 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret = 0; + /* Sanity checks */ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> handshake" ) ); + /* Main handshake loop */ while( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl ); @@ -8402,7 +5888,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) */ static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) ); @@ -8431,9 +5917,9 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. */ -static int ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) ); @@ -8505,9 +5991,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( ( ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); return( ret ); } } @@ -8523,708 +6009,785 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( ret ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -/* - * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. - */ -static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert ) { - size_t ep_len = ssl_ep_len( ssl ); - int in_ctr_cmp; - int out_ctr_cmp; + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || - ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + while( cur != NULL ) { - return( 0 ); + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); - out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if( handshake == NULL ) + return; - if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) { - return( 0 ); + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel( ssl ); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) ); - return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -/* - * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_free( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache ); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves ); +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->psk != NULL ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->psk ); } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /* - * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is - * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through - * if an unexpected packet is received while the client - * is waiting for the ServerHello. - * - * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on - * the server-side as it is not treated as within - * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello - * after a renegotiation request.) + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0 ) + if( handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); - return( ret ); - } -#endif + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0 ) + while( cur != NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); - return( ret ); + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ - while( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); + if( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL ) { - /* Start timer if not already running */ - if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && - ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 ) - { - ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) - return( 0 ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + } +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - /* - * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) - return( 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie ); + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight ); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake, + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); - /* - * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. - * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. - * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. - */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( ssl ), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl ) ); +#endif +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + if( session == NULL ) + return; - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - continue; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert( session ); #endif - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) ); - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - continue; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( session->ticket ); #endif - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ - if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || - ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == - MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) ) - { - /* - * Accept renegotiation request - */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); +} - /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) - { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; - } -#endif - ret = ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - { - /* - * Refuse renegotiation - */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so - we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ - /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been - * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: - * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record - * has been read yet. - * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received - * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. - * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received - * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting - * the ServerHello. - * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: - * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check - * if it's application data. - * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data - * is present, hence continue is the same as break - * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record - * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client - * when expecting the ServerHello. - */ - continue; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) - { - if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " - "but not honored by client" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); - } +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint32_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT ) | \ + 0u ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), +}; - ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; - /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, - * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) - ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Initial handshake isn't over" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Handshake isn't completed" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if( ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Serialised structures aren't ready" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending incoming data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending outgoing data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Protocol must be DLTS, not TLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only DTLS is supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if( ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( ssl->transform ) != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only AEAD ciphersuites supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Renegotiation must not be enabled" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. - * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch - * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_resend_hello_request", ret ); - return( ret ); - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); } - n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) - ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + return( ret ); + + used += 4 + session_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session_len, p, 0 ); + p += 4; - memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); - ssl->in_msglen -= n; + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); - /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data - from the memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n ); + p += session_len; + } - if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) + /* + * Transform + */ + used += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + if( used <= buf_len ) { - /* all bytes consumed */ - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); } - else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) { - /* more data available */ - ssl->in_offt += n; + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + used += 4; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ - return( (int) n ); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( ssl->in_window_top, p, 0 ); + p += 8; -/* - * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max - * fragment length and buffer size. - * - * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: - * - * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are - * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. - * - * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the - * corresponding return code is 0 on success. - */ -static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) -{ - int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl ); - const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( ssl->in_window, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - if( ret < 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 1; + if( used <= buf_len ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret ); - return( ret ); + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - if( len > max_len ) + used += 8; + if( used <= buf_len ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) " - "maximum fragment length: %d > %d", - len, max_len ) ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else -#endif - len = max_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + p += 8; } - if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) { - /* - * The user has previously tried to send the data and - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially - * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function - * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->mtu, p, 0 ); + p += 2; } - else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) { - /* - * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to - * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure - * to keep track of partial writes - */ - ssl->out_msglen = len; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; - memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len ); + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ) + : 0; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); - return( ret ); + *p++ = alpn_len; + + if( ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len ); + p += alpn_len; + } } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; - return( (int) len ); + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "saved context", buf, used ); + + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); } /* - * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. - * - * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, - * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so - * remember whether we already did the split or not. + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( int ciphersuite_id ) { - int ret; - - if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == - MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || - len <= 1 || - ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || - mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ) - != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) - { - return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) ); - } - - if( ssl->split_done == 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 ) - return( ret ); - ssl->split_done = 1; - } - - if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 ) - return( ret ); - ssl->split_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); - return( ret + 1 ); + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + return( tls_prf_sha384 ); +#else + (void) ciphersuite_id; +#endif + return( tls_prf_sha256 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ /* - * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +static int ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) { - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) ); + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + /* + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) + */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL ) + { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || #endif - - if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + 0 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len ); -#else - ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "context to load", buf, len ); - return( ret ); -} + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -/* - * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - int ret; + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); - if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + /* + * Session + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) ); + session_len = ( (size_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (size_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; - if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) - return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < session_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_session_load( ssl->session, 1, p, session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret ); - return( ret ); - } + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + return( ret ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) ); + p += session_len; - return( 0 ); -} + /* + * Transform + */ -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ - if( transform == NULL ) - return; + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl->session->trunc_hmac, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate ); - inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate ); + ssl->session->compression, #endif + ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( ssl->session->ciphersuite ), + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); - mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); - mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); - mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); - mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) ); -} + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - while( cur != NULL ) - { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free( cur ); - cur = next; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + memcpy( ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; -static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - unsigned offset; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( hs == NULL ) - return; + memcpy( ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) - ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset ); -} + ssl->badmac_seen = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ -static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint8_t slot ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) - return; + ssl->in_window_top = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + ssl->in_window = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) - { - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len ); - mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data ); - memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); - } -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( handshake == NULL ) - return; + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8 ); + p += 8; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->mtu = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) { - ssl->conf->f_async_cancel( ssl ); - handshake->async_in_progress = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_free( &handshake->fin_md5 ); - mbedtls_sha1_free( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache ); - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; -#endif -#endif + alpn_len = *p++; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ - mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves ); -#endif + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL ) + { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + if( strlen( *cur ) == alpn_len && + memcmp( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) - if( handshake->psk != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len ); - mbedtls_free( handshake->psk ); + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + p += alpn_len; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /* - * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves - * since the belong to the SNI callback + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. */ - if( handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; - while( cur != NULL ) - { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free( cur ); - cur = next; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); -#endif + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie ); - ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight ); - ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); + ssl->in_epoch = 1; #endif - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake, - sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + } + + /* + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); } -void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +/* + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) { - if( session == NULL ) - return; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); - mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); - } -#endif + int ret = ssl_context_load( context, buf, len ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free( session->ticket ); -#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_free( context ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + return( ret ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ /* * Free an SSL context @@ -9238,14 +6801,28 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; } if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) @@ -9313,10 +6890,12 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) @@ -9336,7 +6915,7 @@ static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { 0 }; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, @@ -9363,7 +6942,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint, int transport, int preset ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #endif /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, @@ -9465,7 +7044,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; #endif @@ -9504,7 +7083,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; #endif @@ -9530,7 +7109,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if( conf->psk != NULL ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); @@ -9605,7 +7184,7 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, @@ -9653,7 +7232,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX @@ -9676,9 +7255,11 @@ mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); #endif @@ -9708,9 +7289,11 @@ unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 ); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 ); #endif @@ -9739,7 +7322,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_i } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. @@ -9758,7 +7341,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return( -1 ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, @@ -9851,59 +7434,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -/* - * Convert version numbers to/from wire format - * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. - * - * For TLS this is the identity. - * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: - * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) - * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2] ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) - --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - - ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) ); - ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) ); - } - else -#else - ((void) transport); -#endif - { - ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; - ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; - } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2] ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; - *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; - - if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) - ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - } - else -#else - ((void) transport); -#endif - { - *major = ver[0]; - *minor = ver[1]; - } -} - int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) @@ -9923,7 +7453,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ) break; #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; break; @@ -10034,6 +7564,70 @@ exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + if( ( status = psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, + hash_alg ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_setup", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, ssl->handshake->randbytes, + 64 ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, + data, data_len ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + hashlen ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_finish", status ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#else + int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, @@ -10044,6 +7638,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); /* @@ -10088,6 +7684,8 @@ exit: return( ret ); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3de6f03fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + .name = string, + +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = +{ + /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one + * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; + +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +/* + * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: + * + * struct HkdfLabel { + * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material + * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " + * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash + * }; + * + * Parameters: + * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material + * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to + * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than + * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most + * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by + * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. + * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, clen): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, + * This MUST be a writable buffer of size + * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. + * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + */ + +static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \ + ( 2 /* expansion length */ \ + + 1 /* label length */ \ + + label_len \ + + 1 /* context length */ \ + + context_len ) + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + +static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( + size_t desired_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen ) +{ + size_t total_label_len = + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; + size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen ); + + unsigned char *p = dst; + + /* Add the size of the expanded key material. + * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use + * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ + value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" +#endif + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( desired_length ); + + /* Add label incl. prefix */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( total_label_len ); + memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) ); + p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); + memcpy( p, label, llen ); + p += llen; + + /* Add context value */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( clen ); + if( clen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, ctx, clen ); + + /* Return total length to the caller. */ + *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ]; + size_t hkdf_label_len; + + if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN ) + { + /* Should never happen since this is an internal + * function, and we know statically which labels + * are allowed. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen, + label, llen, + ctx, clen, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len ); + + return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, + secret, slen, + hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, + buf, blen ) ); +} + +/* + * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: + * + * - One secret value per sender. + * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated + * - The desired lengths of key and IV. + * + * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) + * + * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided + * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side + * keys in a single function call. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + keys->key_len = key_len; + keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + } + else + { + if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) ) + { + /* This should never happen since this function is internal + * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. + * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk + * of getting a stack overflow. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen ); + } + + return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + secret, slen, + label, llen, + hashed_context, clen, + dstbuf, buflen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t hlen, ilen; + unsigned char tmp_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") + * on the old secret. */ + if( secret_old != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + secret_old, hlen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ), + NULL, 0, /* context */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + tmp_secret, hlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + + if( input != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len ); + ilen = input_len; + } + else + { + ilen = hlen; + } + + /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. + * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material + * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, + tmp_secret, hlen, + tmp_input, ilen, + secret_new ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7089049ce2 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H + +/* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union + * below. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( finished , "finished" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( resumption , "resumption" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( traffic_upd , "traffic upd" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exporter , "exporter" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( key , "key" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( iv , "iv" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_e_traffic , "c e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_e_traffic , "s e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( e_exp_master, "e exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_master , "res master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exp_master , "exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( ext_binder , "ext binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_binder , "res binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( derived , "derived" ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + const unsigned char name [ sizeof(string) - 1 ]; + +union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( LABEL ) \ + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL, \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ + sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union ) + +/* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. + * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can + * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ + MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE + +/* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated + * by HKDF-Expand-Label. + * + * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation + * ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion + * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 + +/** + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * <tt> + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) + * </tt> + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p clen Bytes. + * \param clen The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * It extracts key and IV for the actual client/server traffic + * from the client/server traffic secrets. + * + * From RFC 8446: + * + * <tt> + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv", "", iv_length)* + * </tt> + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used + * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. + * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param slen Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * \p server_secret in Bytes. + * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param keys The address of the structure holding the generated + * keys and IVs. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ); + + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +/** + * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * <tt> + * Derive-Secret( Secret, Label, Messages ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, + * Hash( Messages ), + * Hash.Length ) ) + * </tt> + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the + * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument + * itself, depending on \p context_already_hashed. + * \param clen The length of \p hash. + * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of + * the \c Messages argument in the application of the + * \c Derive-Secret function + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED), or whether + * it is the content of \c Messages itself, in which case + * the function takes care of the hashing + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). + * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of + * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule proceeds as follows to compute + * the three main secrets during the handshake: The early + * secret for early data, the handshake secret for all + * other encrypted handshake messages, and the master + * secret for all application traffic. + * + * <tt> + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret + * </tt> + * + * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further + * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: + * + * <tt> + * old_secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * input -> HKDF-Extract = new_secret + * </tt> + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret_old The address of the buffer holding the old secret + * on function entry. If not \c NULL, this must be a + * readable buffer whose size matches the output size + * of the hash function represented by \p hash_alg. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input The address of the buffer holding the additional + * input for the key derivation (e.g., the PSK or the + * ephemeral (EC)DH secret). If not \c NULL, this must be + * a readable buffer whose size \p input_len Bytes. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input_len The length of \p input in Bytes. + * \param secret_new The address of the buffer holding the new secret + * on function exit. This must be a writable buffer + * whose size matches the output size of the hash + * function represented by \p hash_alg. + * This may be the same as \p secret_old. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c index 0dc5488c1a..2de117f52a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Threading abstraction layer * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* @@ -52,11 +25,7 @@ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -102,8 +71,8 @@ static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) * mutex. This is a workaround for not being able to return an error * code for this function. The lock/unlock functions return an error * if is_valid is nonzero. The Mbed TLS unit test code uses this field - * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see helpers.function for - * details. */ + * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see + * tests/src/threading_helpers for details. */ mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init( &mutex->mutex, NULL ) == 0; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c index 50a22165a6..eb41461320 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -65,7 +34,7 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) #error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h" #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version.c index 5733288f62..32a0d7d584 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Version information * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c index 8c8e815e9d..40c95201bc 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * Version feature information * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) @@ -56,7 +25,7 @@ #include <string.h> -static const char *features[] = { +static const char * const features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", @@ -97,6 +66,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ @@ -253,6 +225,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ @@ -277,12 +252,6 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ @@ -298,6 +267,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -388,6 +360,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ @@ -448,6 +423,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ @@ -463,6 +441,24 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ @@ -472,12 +468,27 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ @@ -490,6 +501,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ @@ -520,6 +534,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ @@ -532,6 +549,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ @@ -553,6 +573,15 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) "MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS", #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ @@ -562,6 +591,12 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ @@ -571,6 +606,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ @@ -730,6 +768,18 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ @@ -802,7 +852,7 @@ static const char *features[] = { int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ) { - const char **idx = features; + const char * const *idx = features; if( *idx == NULL ) return( -2 ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c index 0c820eca90..f21e9e6944 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 common functions for parsing and verification * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -54,16 +27,13 @@ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include <stdio.h> @@ -108,21 +78,21 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); if( **p != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE | 2 ) && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); serial->tag = *(*p)++; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &serial->len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, ret ) ); serial->p = *p; *p += serial->len; @@ -139,10 +109,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -153,10 +123,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -173,7 +143,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *end; mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid; @@ -181,39 +151,39 @@ static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md /* Make sure we got a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ if( alg->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); - p = (unsigned char *) alg->p; + p = alg->p; end = p + alg->len; if( p >= end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); /* Parse md_oid */ md_oid.tag = *p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &md_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); md_oid.p = p; p += md_oid.len; /* Get md_alg from md_oid */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &md_oid, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); /* Make sure params is absent of NULL */ if( p == end ) return( 0 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 || len != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -234,7 +204,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, int *salt_len ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *end, *end2; size_t len; @@ -247,8 +217,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, /* Make sure params is a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); p = (unsigned char *) params->p; end = p + params->len; @@ -269,14 +239,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &alg_id, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -295,19 +265,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, /* Only MFG1 is recognised for now */ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1, &alg_id ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ) ); /* Parse HashAlgorithm */ if( ( ret = x509_get_hash_alg( &alg_params, mgf_md ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -321,14 +291,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, end2 = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, salt_len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -344,21 +314,21 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, end2 = p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, &trailer_field ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); if( trailer_field != 1 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); } else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); if( p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -377,54 +347,54 @@ static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; mbedtls_x509_buf *oid; mbedtls_x509_buf *val; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); end = *p + len; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); oid = &cur->oid; oid->tag = **p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &oid->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); oid->p = *p; *p += oid->len; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); if( **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); val = &cur->val; val->tag = *(*p)++; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &val->len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); val->p = *p; *p += val->len; if( *p != end ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } cur->next = NULL; @@ -458,7 +428,7 @@ static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t set_len; const unsigned char *end_set; @@ -470,7 +440,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); end_set = *p + set_len; @@ -564,7 +534,7 @@ static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t ) static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen @@ -629,13 +599,13 @@ static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len, year_len; unsigned char tag; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); tag = **p; @@ -644,32 +614,32 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, else if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) year_len = 4; else - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); (*p)++; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, tm ); } int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; int tag_type; if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); tag_type = **p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, ret ) ); sig->tag = tag_type; sig->len = len; @@ -687,13 +657,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x50 mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, void **sig_opts ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( *sig_opts != NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG, ret ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) @@ -735,7 +705,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x50 int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; /* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual @@ -744,7 +714,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); ext->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag; ext->p = *p; @@ -755,11 +725,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( end != *p + len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -770,7 +740,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, */ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n; unsigned char c, merge = 0; const mbedtls_x509_name *name; @@ -811,7 +781,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) break; c = name->val.p[i]; - if( c < 32 || c == 127 || ( c > 128 && c < 160 ) ) + if( c < 32 || c >= 127 ) s[i] = '?'; else s[i] = c; } @@ -832,7 +802,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) */ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, n, nr; char *p; @@ -868,7 +838,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *s mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const void *sig_opts ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; char *p = buf; size_t n = size; const char *desc = NULL; @@ -894,7 +864,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *s ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) : "???", mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( mgf_md_info ) : "???", - pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); + (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; } #else @@ -913,7 +883,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ) { char *p = buf; size_t n = buf_size; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s key size", name ); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c index 0dbd679a93..056bbaa786 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 base functions for creating certificates / CSRs * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,39 +15,15 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include <string.h> @@ -266,7 +236,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, */ static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p; size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len; @@ -299,7 +269,7 @@ static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = first; @@ -320,7 +290,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size ) @@ -350,7 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *ext ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->val.p + 1, @@ -388,7 +358,7 @@ static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_ext = first; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c index dba71fad58..ac4fc75de3 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 Certidicate Revocation List (CRL) parsing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -54,15 +27,12 @@ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -99,7 +69,7 @@ static int x509_crl_get_version( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *ver ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -109,7 +79,7 @@ static int x509_crl_get_version( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -126,7 +96,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( *p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -155,7 +125,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, /* Get enclosing sequence tag */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); end_ext_data = *p + len; @@ -163,7 +133,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); } *p += len; @@ -172,29 +142,29 @@ static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); } /* Data should be octet string type */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); /* Ignore data so far and just check its length */ *p += len; if( *p != end_ext_data ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* Abort on (unsupported) critical extensions */ if( is_critical ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -206,7 +176,7 @@ static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* OPTIONAL */ @@ -228,27 +198,27 @@ static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext( unsigned char **p, ext->p = NULL; return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); } end = *p + ext->len; if( end != *p + ext->len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); while( *p < end ) { if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); *p += len; } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -260,7 +230,7 @@ static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t entry_len; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry; @@ -325,7 +295,7 @@ static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; @@ -394,8 +364,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } /* @@ -407,7 +377,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; @@ -451,7 +421,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crl->issuer ) ) != 0 ) @@ -474,10 +444,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( &p, end, &crl->next_update ) ) != 0 ) { - if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) && - ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ) + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) && + ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ) ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); return( ret ); @@ -516,8 +486,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } end = crl->raw.p + crl->raw.len; @@ -551,8 +521,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -564,8 +534,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - int ret; - size_t use_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len = 0; mbedtls_pem_context pem; int is_pem = 0; @@ -628,7 +598,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -655,7 +625,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; char *p; const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c index 52f6de8fc0..60312bf2f5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 certificate parsing and verification * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -56,15 +29,12 @@ * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -74,6 +44,11 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -133,10 +108,6 @@ typedef struct { * concerns. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) - /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */ - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) | -#endif /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | @@ -409,6 +380,10 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( } ver_chain->len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ } /* @@ -418,7 +393,7 @@ static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *ver ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, @@ -430,17 +405,17 @@ static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = *p + len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -455,12 +430,12 @@ static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, mbedtls_x509_time *from, mbedtls_x509_time *to ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); end = *p + len; @@ -471,8 +446,8 @@ static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, return( ret ); if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -484,7 +459,7 @@ static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( *p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -497,7 +472,7 @@ static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) return( 0 ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } uid->p = *p; @@ -511,7 +486,7 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, int *ca_istrue, int *max_pathlen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; /* @@ -524,7 +499,7 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( *p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -535,7 +510,7 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( *ca_istrue != 0 ) *ca_istrue = 1; @@ -545,17 +520,17 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ if( *max_pathlen == INT_MAX ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); (*max_pathlen)++; @@ -566,15 +541,15 @@ static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, unsigned char *ns_cert_type) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( bs.len != 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); /* Get actual bitstring */ *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; @@ -585,16 +560,16 @@ static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, unsigned int *key_usage) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( bs.len < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); /* Get actual bitstring */ *key_usage = 0; @@ -615,15 +590,15 @@ static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -652,13 +627,14 @@ static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, * partyName [1] DirectoryString } * - * NOTE: we only parse and use dNSName at this point. + * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName + * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. */ static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len, tag_len; mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; unsigned char tag; @@ -667,35 +643,51 @@ static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, /* Get main sequence tag */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( *p + len != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); while( *p < end ) { - if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; + memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) ); tag = **p; (*p)++; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) != MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); } - /* Skip everything but DNS name */ - if( tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2 ) ) + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf ); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) { - *p += tag_len; - continue; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return( ret ); } /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ @@ -707,8 +699,8 @@ static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); if( cur->next == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); cur = cur->next; } @@ -724,23 +716,187 @@ static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, cur->next = NULL; if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } /* + * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } + * + * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } + * + * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation + * + * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, + * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } + * + * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, + * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } + * + * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers + * + * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } + * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } + * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } + * + * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) + * + * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { + * cPSuri CPSuri, + * userNotice UserNotice } + * + * CPSuri ::= IA5String + * + * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { + * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, + * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } + * + * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + * organization DisplayText, + * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } + * + * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { + * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), + * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), + * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), + * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } + * + * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point + * as defined in RFC 5280. + */ +static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret, parse_ret = 0; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Cannot be an empty sequence. + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; + const unsigned char *policy_end; + + /* + * Get the policy sequence + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + policy_oid.len = len; + policy_oid.p = *p; + + /* + * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this + * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * is configured. + */ + parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &( cur->buf ); + buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; + buf->p = policy_oid.p; + buf->len = policy_oid.len; + + *p += len; + + /* + * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end + * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. + */ + if( *p < policy_end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + /* + * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. + */ + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != policy_end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( parse_ret ); +} + +/* * X.509 v3 extensions * */ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; - unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet; if( *p == end ) return( 0 ); @@ -763,14 +919,14 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); end_ext_data = *p + len; /* Get extension ID */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; extn_oid.p = *p; @@ -779,18 +935,19 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, /* Get optional critical */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); /* Data should be octet string type */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + start_ext_octet = *p; end_ext_octet = *p + len; if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); /* * Detect supported extensions @@ -799,6 +956,16 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, if( ret != 0 ) { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet ); + if( ret != 0 && is_critical ) + return( ret ); + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + /* No parser found, skip extension */ *p = end_ext_octet; @@ -806,8 +973,8 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, if( is_critical ) { /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); } #endif continue; @@ -856,14 +1023,52 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, return( ret ); break; + case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: + /* Parse certificate policies type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension + * if it contains unsupported policies */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL && + cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, + start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet ) == 0 ) + break; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + return( ret ); + else +#endif + /* + * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we + * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to + * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, + * unless the extension is critical. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + } + break; + default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + else +#endif + *p = end_ext_octet; } } if( *p != end ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); return( 0 ); } @@ -871,10 +1076,14 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, /* * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format */ -static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *buf, - size_t buflen ) +static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; @@ -889,7 +1098,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - // Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length + /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ p = (unsigned char*) buf; len = buflen; end = p + len; @@ -907,25 +1116,26 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); } - if( len > (size_t) ( end - p ) ) - { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - } - crt_end = p + len; - - // Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field + end = crt_end = p + len; crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; - crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); - if( p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + if( make_copy != 0 ) + { + /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ + crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); + if( crt->raw.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); - memcpy( p, buf, crt->raw.len ); + memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len ); + crt->own_buffer = 1; - // Direct pointers to the new buffer - p += crt->raw.len - len; - end = crt_end = p + len; + p += crt->raw.len - len; + end = crt_end = p + len; + } + else + { + crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf; + crt->own_buffer = 0; + } /* * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -936,7 +1146,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; @@ -983,7 +1193,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1016,7 +1226,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1030,11 +1240,13 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * /* * SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ + crt->pk_raw.p = p; if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); return( ret ); } + crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; /* * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, @@ -1068,7 +1280,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * if( crt->version == 3 ) #endif { - ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt ); + ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx ); if( ret != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); @@ -1079,8 +1291,8 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } end = crt_end; @@ -1118,8 +1330,8 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -1129,10 +1341,14 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char * * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a * chained list */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, - size_t buflen ) +static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; /* @@ -1162,7 +1378,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *bu crt = crt->next; } - if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen ) ) != 0 ) + ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) { if( prev ) prev->next = NULL; @@ -1176,11 +1393,37 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *bu return( 0 ); } +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + /* * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained * list */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; @@ -1213,7 +1456,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_pem_context pem; /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ @@ -1297,7 +1540,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -1409,6 +1652,8 @@ cleanup: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + memset( &sb, 0, sizeof( sb ) ); + while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) { snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name, @@ -1451,32 +1696,201 @@ cleanup: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +/* + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; + + if( ( subject_alt_name->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) != + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) ) + { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; + + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, + sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix ) { - size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n = *size; char *p = *buf; const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; - const char *sep = ""; - size_t sep_len = 0; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; while( cur != NULL ) { - if( cur->buf.len + sep_len >= n ) + memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) ); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san ); + if( parse_ret != 0 ) { - *p = '\0'; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; } - n -= cur->buf.len + sep_len; - for( i = 0; i < sep_len; i++ ) - *p++ = sep[i]; - for( i = 0; i < cur->buf.len; i++ ) - *p++ = cur->buf.p[i]; + switch( san.type ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - sep = ", "; - sep_len = 2; + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p, + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len ); + p += other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + + n -= other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len ); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } cur = cur->next; } @@ -1489,6 +1903,56 @@ static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, return( 0 ); } +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch( san_buf->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy( &san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ): + { + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; + + memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + #define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ { \ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \ @@ -1503,7 +1967,7 @@ static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, unsigned char ns_cert_type ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n = *size; char *p = *buf; const char *sep = ""; @@ -1530,7 +1994,7 @@ static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, unsigned int key_usage ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n = *size; char *p = *buf; const char *sep = ""; @@ -1554,7 +2018,7 @@ static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const char *desc; size_t n = *size; char *p = *buf; @@ -1580,6 +2044,35 @@ static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, return( 0 ); } +static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + /* * Return an informational string about the certificate. */ @@ -1588,7 +2081,7 @@ static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; char *p; char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; @@ -1675,11 +2168,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name : ", prefix ); + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix ); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n, - &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); } @@ -1711,6 +2205,16 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return( ret ); } + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; @@ -1749,7 +2253,7 @@ static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; char *p = buf; size_t n = size; @@ -1949,16 +2453,35 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - + size_t hash_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md ); + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#else + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md ); + + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( -1 ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) { - /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ return( -1 ); } + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) ) return( -1 ); @@ -1967,7 +2490,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) { return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk, - child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) ); } #else @@ -1975,7 +2498,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, #endif return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, - child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) ); } @@ -2069,9 +2592,9 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( unsigned self_cnt, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; - int signature_is_good, fallback_signature_is_good; + int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* did we have something in progress? */ @@ -2192,7 +2715,7 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent( unsigned self_cnt, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; *parent_is_trusted = 1; @@ -2317,13 +2840,15 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t *flags; mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; mbedtls_x509_crt *child; @@ -2332,6 +2857,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( int child_is_trusted; int signature_is_good; unsigned self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ @@ -2391,8 +2917,32 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) find_parent: #endif + + /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, + * or use statically provided list. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; + + ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + ((void) f_ca_cb); + ((void) p_ca_cb); + cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; + } + /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ - ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent, + ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); @@ -2481,6 +3031,25 @@ static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, } /* + * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 + */ +static int x509_crt_check_san( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) +{ + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + + /* dNSName */ + if( san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ) + return( x509_crt_check_cn( name, cn, cn_len ) ); + + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + + /* Unrecognized type */ + return( -1 ); +} + +/* * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! */ static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, @@ -2495,7 +3064,7 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, { for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) { - if( x509_crt_check_cn( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) + if( x509_crt_check_san( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) break; } @@ -2527,7 +3096,7 @@ static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned i; uint32_t cur_flags; const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; @@ -2548,36 +3117,6 @@ static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( } /* - * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, - mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, - const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy ) -{ - return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, - &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, cn, flags, - f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); -} - -/* - * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) - */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, - mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, - const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy ) -{ - return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, - profile, cn, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); -} - -/* * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version * * This function: @@ -2586,17 +3125,26 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently * - builds and verifies the chain * - then calls the callback and merges the flags + * + * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` + * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the + * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will + * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list + * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list + * of CRLs. */ -int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, +static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; uint32_t ee_flags; @@ -2625,7 +3173,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; /* Check the chain */ - ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, + ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, &ver_chain, rs_ctx ); if( ret != 0 ) @@ -2638,6 +3187,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); exit: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx ); @@ -2661,6 +3217,77 @@ exit: return( 0 ); } + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, + cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback, + * not restartable). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, NULL, NULL, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ) ); +} + + /* * Initialize a certificate chain */ @@ -2730,7 +3357,17 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); } - if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL ) + seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len ); mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c index 663047d516..e259410d07 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -54,15 +27,12 @@ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -93,7 +63,7 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *ver ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -103,7 +73,7 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, return( 0 ); } - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -115,7 +85,7 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; unsigned char *p, *end; mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params; @@ -161,8 +131,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } /* @@ -174,7 +144,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } end = p + len; @@ -206,7 +176,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &csr->subject ) ) != 0 ) @@ -240,7 +210,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); } p += len; @@ -274,8 +244,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, if( p != end ) { mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); } return( 0 ); @@ -287,7 +257,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t use_len; mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif @@ -337,7 +307,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, siz */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; @@ -361,7 +331,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; char *p; char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c index aaffd14c86..184c90cd33 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 certificate writing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * References: @@ -50,19 +23,16 @@ * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include <string.h> @@ -70,16 +40,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ -/* - * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature - * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) - */ -#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN -#else -#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#endif - void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) ); @@ -138,7 +98,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->serial, serial ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -175,7 +135,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int is_ca, int max_pathlen ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[9]; unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); size_t len = 0; @@ -209,7 +169,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); size_t len = 0; @@ -237,7 +197,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ct int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof( buf ); size_t len = 0; @@ -270,46 +230,33 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert * } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -static size_t crt_get_unused_bits_for_named_bitstring( unsigned char bitstring, - size_t bit_offset ) -{ - size_t unused_bits; - - /* Count the unused bits removing trailing 0s */ - for( unused_bits = bit_offset; unused_bits < 8; unused_bits++ ) - if( ( ( bitstring >> unused_bits ) & 0x1 ) != 0 ) - break; - - return( unused_bits ); -} - int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage ) { - unsigned char buf[4], ku; + unsigned char buf[5] = {0}, ku[2] = {0}; unsigned char *c; - int ret; - size_t unused_bits; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | - MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN; + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; /* Check that nothing other than the allowed flags is set */ if( ( key_usage & ~allowed_bits ) != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); - c = buf + 4; - ku = (unsigned char)key_usage; - unused_bits = crt_get_unused_bits_for_named_bitstring( ku, 1 ); - ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ku, 8 - unused_bits ); + c = buf + 5; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( key_usage, ku, 0 ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, ku, 9 ); if( ret < 0 ) return( ret ); - else if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + else if( ret < 3 || ret > 5 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, @@ -324,18 +271,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type ) { - unsigned char buf[4]; + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; unsigned char *c; - size_t unused_bits; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; c = buf + 4; - unused_bits = crt_get_unused_bits_for_named_bitstring( ns_cert_type, 0 ); - ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, - buf, - &ns_cert_type, - 8 - unused_bits ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) return( ret ); @@ -351,7 +293,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *t, size_t size ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* @@ -384,12 +326,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; unsigned char hash[64]; - unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; @@ -578,7 +520,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( crt, buf, size, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c index 60cf12379f..afda950341 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,27 +15,6 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ /* * References: @@ -49,19 +22,21 @@ * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> @@ -69,16 +44,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif -/* - * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature - * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) - */ -#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN -#else -#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #else @@ -124,35 +89,17 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, 0, val, val_len ); } -static size_t csr_get_unused_bits_for_named_bitstring( unsigned char bitstring, - size_t bit_offset ) -{ - size_t unused_bits; - - /* Count the unused bits removing trailing 0s */ - for( unused_bits = bit_offset; unused_bits < 8; unused_bits++ ) - if( ( ( bitstring >> unused_bits ) & 0x1 ) != 0 ) - break; - - return( unused_bits ); -} - int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ) { - unsigned char buf[4]; + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; unsigned char *c; - size_t unused_bits; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; c = buf + 4; - unused_bits = csr_get_unused_bits_for_named_bitstring( key_usage, 0 ); - ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 8 - unused_bits ); - - if( ret < 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) return( ret ); - else if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), @@ -166,22 +113,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned ch int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type ) { - unsigned char buf[4]; + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; unsigned char *c; - size_t unused_bits; - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; c = buf + 4; - unused_bits = csr_get_unused_bits_for_named_bitstring( ns_cert_type, 0 ); - ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, - buf, - &ns_cert_type, - 8 - unused_bits ); - - if( ret < 0 ) - return( ret ); - else if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) return( ret ); ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, @@ -200,7 +139,7 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; @@ -208,6 +147,11 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ctx->md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ c = buf + size; @@ -273,10 +217,23 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, * Sign the written CSR data into the sig buffer * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, c, len ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); - +#endif if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -341,7 +298,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int ret; unsigned char *sig; - if( ( sig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) ) == NULL ) + if( ( sig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) ) == NULL ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); } @@ -361,18 +318,17 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) { - int ret; - unsigned char output_buf[4096]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen = 0; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf), + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, buf, size, f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) { return( ret ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CSR, PEM_END_CSR, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + buf + size - ret, ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c index 4e62817579..77f6cb6f67 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c @@ -2,13 +2,7 @@ * An 32-bit implementation of the XTEA algorithm * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. - * - * ********** - * Apache License 2.0: + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,34 +15,9 @@ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. - * - * ********** - * - * ********** - * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along - * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. - * - * ********** */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) @@ -68,29 +37,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE -#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ - | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ -} -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE -#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ -{ \ - (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ -} -#endif - void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) { memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); @@ -115,7 +61,7 @@ void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) { - GET_UINT32_BE( ctx->k[i], key, i << 2 ); + ctx->k[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, i << 2 ); } } @@ -129,8 +75,8 @@ int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, k = ctx->k; - GET_UINT32_BE( v0, input, 0 ); - GET_UINT32_BE( v1, input, 4 ); + v0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + v1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT ) { @@ -155,8 +101,8 @@ int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, } } - PUT_UINT32_BE( v0, output, 0 ); - PUT_UINT32_BE( v1, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( v0, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( v1, output, 4 ); return( 0 ); } |