diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/t1_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/t1_enc.c | 1250 |
1 files changed, 1250 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/t1_enc.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/t1_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac8c153996 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,1250 @@ +/* ssl/t1_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +#include <openssl/comp.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG +#include <openssl/des.h> +#endif + +/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ +static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, + int sec_len, + const void *seed1, int seed1_len, + const void *seed2, int seed2_len, + const void *seed3, int seed3_len, + const void *seed4, int seed4_len, + const void *seed5, int seed5_len, + unsigned char *out, int olen) + { + int chunk; + size_t j; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; + EVP_PKEY *mac_key; + unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + size_t A1_len; + int ret = 0; + + chunk=EVP_MD_size(md); + OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); + if (!mac_key) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) + goto err; + if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) + goto err; + if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) + goto err; + if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) + goto err; + if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) + goto err; + if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) + goto err; + + for (;;) + { + /* Reinit mac contexts */ + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len)) + goto err; + if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) + goto err; + if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) + goto err; + if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) + goto err; + if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) + goto err; + if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) + goto err; + + if (olen > chunk) + { + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j)) + goto err; + out+=j; + olen-=j; + /* calc the next A1 value */ + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) + goto err; + } + else /* last one */ + { + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) + goto err; + memcpy(out,A1,olen); + break; + } + } + ret = 1; +err: + EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); + OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1)); + return ret; + } + +/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ +static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, + const void *seed1, int seed1_len, + const void *seed2, int seed2_len, + const void *seed3, int seed3_len, + const void *seed4, int seed4_len, + const void *seed5, int seed5_len, + const unsigned char *sec, int slen, + unsigned char *out1, + unsigned char *out2, int olen) + { + int len,i,idx,count; + const unsigned char *S1; + long m; + const EVP_MD *md; + int ret = 0; + + /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ + count=0; + for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { + if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; + } + len=slen/count; + if (count == 1) + slen = 0; + S1=sec; + memset(out1,0,olen); + for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { + if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { + if (!md) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1), + seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len, + out2,olen)) + goto err; + S1+=len; + for (i=0; i<olen; i++) + { + out1[i]^=out2[i]; + } + } + } + ret = 1; +err: + return ret; +} +static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, + unsigned char *tmp, int num) + { + int ret; + ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), + TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, + s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + NULL,0,NULL,0, + s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, + km,tmp,num); +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", + s->session->master_key_length); + { + int i; + for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) + { + printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); + } + printf("\n"); } +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + return ret; + } + +int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) + { + static const unsigned char empty[]=""; + unsigned char *p,*mac_secret; + unsigned char *exp_label; + unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; + unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; + unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv; + int client_write; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; + const EVP_CIPHER *c; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + const SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + const EVP_MD *m; + int mac_type; + int *mac_secret_size; + EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; + EVP_PKEY *mac_key; + int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl; + int reuse_dd = 0; + + is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; + m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash; + mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression; +#endif + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); + printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, + comp); + printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); + printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", + c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len); + printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); + { + int i; + for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) + printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) + { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; + + if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) + reuse_dd = 1; + else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) + goto err; + else + /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); + dd= s->enc_read_ctx; + mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (s->expand != NULL) + { + COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); + s->expand=NULL; + } + if (comp != NULL) + { + s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); + if (s->expand == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); + goto err2; + } + if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) + s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); + if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) + goto err; + } +#endif + /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */ + if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8); + mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); + mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); + } + else + { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; + if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + reuse_dd = 1; + else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + dd= s->enc_write_ctx; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + { + mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if (!mac_ctx) + goto err; + s->write_hash = mac_ctx; + } + else + mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (s->compress != NULL) + { + COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); + s->compress=NULL; + } + if (comp != NULL) + { + s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); + if (s->compress == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); + goto err2; + } + } +#endif + /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */ + if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8); + mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); + mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); + } + + if (reuse_dd) + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); + + p=s->s3->tmp.key_block; + i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; + + cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); + j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? + cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; + /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ + /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; + else + k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); + if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || + (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) + { + ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i; + key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j; + iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k; + exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; + exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; + client_write=1; + } + else + { + n=i; + ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j; + key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k; + iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k; + exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; + exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; + client_write=0; + } + + if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } + + memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i); + + if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) + { + mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, + mac_secret,*mac_secret_size); + EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key); + EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); + } +#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +#endif + if (is_export) + { + /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the + * same value since only the correct one will be used :-). + */ + if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), + exp_label,exp_label_len, + s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + NULL,0,NULL,0, + key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) + goto err2; + key=tmp1; + + if (k > 0) + { + if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), + TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, + s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + NULL,0,NULL,0, + empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2)) + goto err2; + if (client_write) + iv=iv1; + else + iv= &(iv1[k]); + } + } + + s->session->key_arg_length=0; +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { + int i; + printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); + printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]); + printf("\n"); + printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]); + printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + { + EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv); + } + else + EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); + + /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size) + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, + *mac_secret_size,mac_secret); + +#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +printf("\niv="); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +printf("\n"); +#endif + + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2)); + return(1); +err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +err2: + return(0); + } + +int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *c; + const EVP_MD *hash; + int num; + SSL_COMP *comp; + int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0; + int ret=0; + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) + return(1); + + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); + return(0); + } + + s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c; + s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash; + s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; + s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; + num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); + num*=2; + + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num; + s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1; + + if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +printf("client random\n"); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +printf("server random\n"); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +printf("pre-master\n"); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +#endif + if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num)) + goto err; +#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +printf("\nkey block\n"); +{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } +#endif + + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) + && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) + { + /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with + * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) + */ + s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; + + if (s->session->cipher != NULL) + { + if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) + s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 + if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) + s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; +#endif + } + } + + ret = 1; +err: + if (p2) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num); + OPENSSL_free(p2); + } + return(ret); + } + +/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. + * + * Returns: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too + * short etc). + * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. + * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, + * an internal error occured. + */ +int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; + int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) + { + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) + { + int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); + } + ds=s->enc_write_ctx; + rec= &(s->s3->wrec); + if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) + enc=NULL; + else + { + int ivlen; + enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); + /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ + if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION + && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); + else + ivlen = 0; + if (ivlen > 1) + { + if ( rec->data != rec->input) + /* we can't write into the input stream: + * Can this ever happen?? (steve) + */ + fprintf(stderr, + "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", + __FILE__, __LINE__); + else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) + return -1; + } + } + } + else + { + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) + { + int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); + } + ds=s->enc_read_ctx; + rec= &(s->s3->rrec); + if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) + enc=NULL; + else + enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); + } + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) + { + memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length); + rec->input=rec->data; + ret = 1; + } + else + { + l=rec->length; + bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); + + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) + { + unsigned char buf[13],*seq; + + seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence; + + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq; + + s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p); + memcpy(p,&seq[2],6); + memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8); + } + else + { + memcpy(buf,seq,8); + for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */ + { + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) break; + } + } + + buf[8]=rec->type; + buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8); + buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version); + buf[11]=rec->length>>8; + buf[12]=rec->length&0xff; + pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf); + if (send) + { + l+=pad; + rec->length+=pad; + } + } + else if ((bs != 1) && send) + { + i=bs-((int)l%bs); + + /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ + + /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ + j=i-1; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) + { + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) + j++; + } + for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++) + rec->input[k]=j; + l+=i; + rec->length+=i; + } + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { + unsigned long ui; + printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", + ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); + printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", + ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, + DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, + ds->cipher->iv_len); + printf("\t\tIV: "); + for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); + printf("\n"); + printf("\trec->input="); + for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]); + printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) + return 0; + } + + i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) + ?(i<0) + :(i==0)) + return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) + { + rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + } + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { + unsigned long i; + printf("\trec->data="); + for (i=0; i<l; i++) + printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + ret = 1; + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if ((bs != 1) && !send) + ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); + if (pad && !send) + rec->length -= pad; + } + return ret; + } + +int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) + { + unsigned int ret; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL; + int i; + + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return 0; + + for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) + { + if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) + { + d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; + break; + } + } + if (!d) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); + return 0; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return((int)ret); + } + +int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, + const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) + { + unsigned int i; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *q,buf2[12]; + int idx; + long mask; + int err=0; + const EVP_MD *md; + + q=buf; + + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return 0; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + + for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++) + { + if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) + { + int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; + if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf))) + { + /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ + err = 1; + } + else + { + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || + !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) || + (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) + err = 1; + q+=hashsize; + } + } + } + + if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), + str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0, + s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, + out,buf2,sizeof buf2)) + err = 1; + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + if (err) + return 0; + else + return sizeof buf2; + } + +int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + unsigned char *seq; + EVP_MD_CTX *hash; + size_t md_size, orig_len; + int i; + EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; + unsigned char header[13]; + int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); + int t; + + if (send) + { + rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec); + seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); + hash=ssl->write_hash; + } + else + { + rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec); + seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); + hash=ssl->read_hash; + } + + t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); + OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); + md_size=t; + + /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ + if (stream_mac) + { + mac_ctx = hash; + } + else + { + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash)) + return -1; + mac_ctx = &hmac; + } + + if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; + + s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); + memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); + + memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); + } + else + memcpy(header, seq, 8); + + /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ + orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8); + rec->type &= 0xff; + + header[8]=rec->type; + header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); + header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); + header[11]=(rec->length)>>8; + header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff; + + if (!send && + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) + { + /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any + * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of + * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a + * timing-oracle. */ + ssl3_cbc_digest_record( + mac_ctx, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, orig_len, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, + 0 /* not SSLv3 */); + } + else + { + EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header)); + EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); + t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size); + OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (!send && FIPS_mode()) + tls_fips_digest_extra( + ssl->enc_read_ctx, + mac_ctx, rec->input, + rec->length, orig_len); +#endif + } + + if (!stream_mac) + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); +#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +printf("seq="); +{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); } +printf("rec="); +{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); } +#endif + + if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + for (i=7; i>=0; i--) + { + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) break; + } + } + +#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); } +#endif + return(md_size); + } + +int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, + int len) + { + unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; + int col = 0, sol = 0; + + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input + if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && + s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 && + s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) + { + co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; + col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; + so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; + sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */ + } +#endif + + tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), + TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, + s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + co, col, + s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + so, sol, + p,len, + s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff); +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); + BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); + fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); + BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); + BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); + BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); +#endif + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); + } + +int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, + const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, + size_t contextlen, int use_context) + { + unsigned char *buff; + unsigned char *val = NULL; + size_t vallen, currentvalpos; + int rv; + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); + if (buff == NULL) goto err2; + + /* construct PRF arguments + * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate + * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values + * does not create a prohibited label. + */ + vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; + if (use_context) + { + vallen += 2 + contextlen; + } + + val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); + if (val == NULL) goto err2; + currentvalpos = 0; + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); + currentvalpos += llen; + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + if (use_context) + { + val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; + currentvalpos++; + val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; + currentvalpos++; + if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) + { + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); + } + } + + /* disallow prohibited labels + * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = + * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the + * comparisons won't have buffer overflow + */ + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, + TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, + TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, + TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, + TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; + + rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), + val, vallen, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, + out,buff,olen); + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + goto ret; +err1: + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); + rv = 0; + goto ret; +err2: + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rv = 0; +ret: + if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff); + if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val); + return(rv); + } + +int tls1_alert_code(int code) + { + switch (code) + { + case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); + case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); + case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); + case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1); + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); + case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); + case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); + case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); + case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); + case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); + case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); + case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); + case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); + case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); +#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ + case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return + (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); +#endif + default: return(-1); + } + } |