diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_srvr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_srvr.c | 3594 |
1 files changed, 3594 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_srvr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..503bed3fe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -0,0 +1,3594 @@ +/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG +#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "kssl_lcl.h" +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 +#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/md5.h> + +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); + +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) + { + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) + return(SSLv3_server_method()); + else + return(NULL); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) + { + int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; + + *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && + (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) + { + if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) + { + /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, + we do so if There is no srp login name */ + ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + } + else + { + ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); + } + } + return ret; + } +#endif + +IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, + ssl3_accept, + ssl_undefined_function, + ssl3_get_server_method) + +int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + { + BUF_MEM *buf; + unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; + int ret= -1; + int new_state,state,skip=0; + + RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); + ERR_clear_error(); + clear_sys_error(); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->ctx->info_callback; + + /* init things to blank */ + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); + + if (s->cert == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + return(-1); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we + * already got and don't await it anymore, because + * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. + */ + if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) + { + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; + s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + } +#endif + + for (;;) + { + state=s->state; + + switch (s->state) + { + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: + s->renegotiate=1; + /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ + + case SSL_ST_BEFORE: + case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + + s->server=1; + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); + + if ((s->version>>8) != 3) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) + { + if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + s->init_buf=buf; + } + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + + s->init_num=0; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; + + if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) + { + /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that + * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) + */ + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + } + else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + { + /* Server attempting to renegotiate with + * client that doesn't support secure + * renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + else + { + /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, + * we will just send a HelloRequest */ + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: + + s->shutdown=0; + ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->init_num=0; + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: + s->state=SSL_ST_OK; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: + + s->shutdown=0; + if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) + { + ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + { + int al; + if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) + { + /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ + s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + goto end; + } + if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + /* This is not really an error but the only means to + for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ + if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + } +#endif + + s->renegotiate = 2; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: + ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->hit) + { + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + } +#else + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; +#endif + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ + /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) + { + ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else + } + else + skip=1; + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* clear this, it may get reset by + * send_server_key_exchange */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + ) + /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key + * even when forbidden by protocol specs + * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to + * be able to handle this) */ + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; + else + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; + + + /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or + * RSA but we have a sign only certificate + * + * PSK: may send PSK identity hints + * + * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange + * message only if the cipher suite is either + * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the + * server certificate contains the server's + * public key for key exchange. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp + /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity + * hint if provided */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ + || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) +#endif + || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) + || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) + || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) + && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) + ) + ) + ) + ) + { + ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + } + else + skip=1; + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: + if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || + /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, + * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ + ((s->session->peer != NULL) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || + /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites + * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts + * and in RFC 2246): */ + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && + /* ... except when the application insists on verification + * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || + /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) + /* With normal PSK Certificates and + * Certificate Requests are omitted */ + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) + { + /* no cert request */ + skip=1; + s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } + else + { + s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; + ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; +#else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; +#endif + s->init_num=0; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: + ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: + + /* This code originally checked to see if + * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO + * and then flushed. This caused problems + * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed + * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue + * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING + * still exist. So instead we just flush + * unconditionally. + */ + + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + + s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: + /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ + ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 2) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; + else { + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) + { + ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + } + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 2) + { + /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when + * the client sends its ECDH pub key in + * a certificate, the CertificateVerify + * message is not sent. + * Also for GOST ciphersuites when + * the client uses its key from the certificate + * for key exchange. + */ +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#endif + s->init_num = 0; + } + else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num=0; + if (!s->session->peer) + break; + /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer + * at this point and digest cached records. + */ + if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } + else + { + int offset=0; + int dgst_num; + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num=0; + + /* We need to get hashes here so if there is + * a client cert, it can be verified + * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify + * should be generalized. But it is next step + */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) + if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) + { + int dgst_size; + + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); + dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); + if (dgst_size < 0) + { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + offset+=dgst_size; + } + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: + + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* we should decide if we expected this one */ + ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#endif + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: + ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num = 0; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + break; +#endif + + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL_ST_OK; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; +#endif + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#endif + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: + + s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) + { ret= -1; goto end; } + + ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, + SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); + + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: + ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, + SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, + s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, + s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + if (s->hit) + { +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + { + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + } + else + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#endif + } + else + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL_ST_OK: + /* clean a few things up */ + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf=NULL; + + /* remove buffering on output */ + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + + s->init_num=0; + + if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ + { + s->renegotiate=0; + s->new_session=0; + + ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + /* s->server=1; */ + s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; + + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + + default: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); + ret= -1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + } + + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) + { + if (s->debug) + { + if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) + goto end; + } + + + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) + { + new_state=s->state; + s->state=state; + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); + s->state=new_state; + } + } + skip=0; + } +end: + /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ + + s->in_handshake--; + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); + return(ret); + } + +int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) + { + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; + *(p++)=0; + *(p++)=0; + *(p++)=0; + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num=4; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) + { + int ok; + long n; + + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, + * so permit appropriate message length */ + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + if (!ok) return((int)n); + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) + { + /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per + * negotiation. */ + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); + return -1; + } + /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, + * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) + { + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); + s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) + { + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; + } +#endif + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; + return 2; + } + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + { + int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; + unsigned int cookie_len; + long n; + unsigned long id; + unsigned char *p,*d,*q; + SSL_CIPHER *c; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; +#endif + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; + + /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. + * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, + * This down switching should be handled by a different method. + * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with + * TLSv1. + */ + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A + ) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; + } + s->first_packet=1; + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + s->first_packet=0; + d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header + * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ + s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; + p+=2; + + if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || + (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && + !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) + { + /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ + s->version = s->client_version; + } + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + + /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't + * contain one, just return since we do not want to + * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... + */ + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) + { + unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); + + if (cookie_length == 0) + return 1; + } + + /* load the client random */ + memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* get the session-id */ + j= *(p++); + + s->hit=0; + /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. + * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests + * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather + * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security + * won't even compile against older library versions). + * + * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request + * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, + * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + * setting will be ignored. + */ + if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) + { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) + goto err; + } + else + { + i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); + if (i == 1) + { /* previous session */ + s->hit=1; + } + else if (i == -1) + goto err; + else /* i == 0 */ + { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) + goto err; + } + } + + p+=j; + + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + /* cookie stuff */ + cookie_len = *(p++); + + /* + * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the + * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it + * does not cause an overflow. + */ + if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) + { + /* too much data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && + cookie_len > 0) + { + memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); + + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) + { + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, + cookie_len) == 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + /* else cookie verification succeeded */ + } + else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + ret = 2; + } + + p += cookie_len; + } + + n2s(p,i); + if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) + { + /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); + goto f_err; + } + if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) + { + /* not enough data */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) + == NULL)) + { + goto err; + } + p+=i; + + /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ + if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) + { + j=0; + id=s->session->cipher->id; + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); +#endif + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) + { + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", + i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); +#endif + if (c->id == id) + { + j=1; + break; + } + } +/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade + * attack: CVE-2010-4180. + */ +#if 0 + if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) + { + /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may + * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to + * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server + * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not + * enabled, though. */ + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) + { + s->session->cipher = c; + j = 1; + } + } +#endif + if (j == 0) + { + /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher + * list if we are asked to reuse it */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* compression */ + i= *(p++); + if ((p+i) > (d+n)) + { + /* not enough data */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + q=p; + for (j=0; j<i; j++) + { + if (p[j] == 0) break; + } + + p+=i; + if (j >= i) + { + /* no compress */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); + goto f_err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) + { + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto f_err; + } + } + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + + /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this + * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate + * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow + * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ + { + unsigned char *pos; + pos=s->s3->server_random; + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) + { + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; + + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, + ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) + { + s->hit=1; + s->session->ciphers=ciphers; + s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; + + ciphers=NULL; + + /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ + pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + if (pref_cipher == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; + + if (s->cipher_list) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); + + if (s->cipher_list_by_id) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); + + s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); + s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); + } + } +#endif + + /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other + * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression + * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) + { + int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; + /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ + /* Can't disable compression */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } + /* Look for resumed compression method */ + for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) + { + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); + if (comp_id == comp->id) + { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; + break; + } + } + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ + for (m = 0; m < i; m++) + { + if (q[m] == comp_id) + break; + } + if (m >= i) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } + } + else if (s->hit) + comp = NULL; + else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) + { /* See if we have a match */ + int m,nn,o,v,done=0; + + nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + for (m=0; m<nn; m++) + { + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); + v=comp->id; + for (o=0; o<i; o++) + { + if (v == q[o]) + { + done=1; + break; + } + } + if (done) break; + } + if (done) + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; + else + comp=NULL; + } +#else + /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } +#endif + + /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must + * pick a cipher */ + + if (!s->hit) + { +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + s->session->compress_meth=0; +#else + s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; +#endif + if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); + s->session->ciphers=ciphers; + if (ciphers == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); + goto f_err; + } + ciphers=NULL; + c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, + SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + + if (c == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; + } + else + { + /* Session-id reuse */ +#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; + SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; + + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) + { + sk=s->session->ciphers; + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) + { + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); + if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) + nc=c; + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) + ec=c; + } + if (nc != NULL) + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; + else if (ec != NULL) + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; + else + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; + } + else +#endif + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; + } + + if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) + { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* we now have the following setup. + * client_random + * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers + * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers + * compression - basically ignored right now + * ssl version is set - sslv3 + * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. + * s->hit - session reuse flag + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. + */ + + /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + } + + if (ret < 0) ret=1; + if (0) + { +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + } +err: + if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); + return(ret); + } + +int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p,*d; + int i,sl; + unsigned long l; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) + { + buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + p=s->s3->server_random; + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) + return -1; +#endif + /* Do the message type and length last */ + d=p= &(buf[4]); + + *(p++)=s->version>>8; + *(p++)=s->version&0xff; + + /* Random stuff */ + memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* There are several cases for the session ID to send + * back in the server hello: + * - For session reuse from the session cache, + * we send back the old session ID. + * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) + * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" + * (which doesn't actually identify the session). + * - If it is a new session, we send back the new + * session ID. + * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, + * we send back a 0-length session ID. + * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ + if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) + && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length=0; + + sl=s->session->session_id_length; + if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + *(p++)=sl; + memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); + p+=sl; + + /* put the cipher */ + i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); + p+=i; + + /* put the compression method */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + *(p++)=0; +#else + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + *(p++)=0; + else + *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + return -1; + } + if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } +#endif + /* do the header */ + l=(p-d); + d=buf; + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; + l2n3(l,d); + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num=p-buf; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) + { + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; + *(p++)=0; + *(p++)=0; + *(p++)=0; + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num=4; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char *q; + int j,num; + RSA *rsa; + unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned int u; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + int encodedlen = 0; + int curve_id = 0; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; +#endif + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + unsigned char *p,*d; + int al,i; + unsigned long type; + int n; + CERT *cert; + BIGNUM *r[4]; + int nr[4],kn; + BUF_MEM *buf; + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) + { + type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + cert=s->cert; + + buf=s->init_buf; + + r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; + n=0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (type & SSL_kRSA) + { + rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; + if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) + { + rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); + if(rsa == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + RSA_up_ref(rsa); + cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; + } + if (rsa == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + r[0]=rsa->n; + r[1]=rsa->e; + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (type & SSL_kEDH) + { + dhp=cert->dh_tmp; + if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) + dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); + if (dhp == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; + if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || + dhp->priv_key == NULL || + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) + { + if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + else + { + dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); + dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); + if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || + (dh->priv_key == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + r[0]=dh->p; + r[1]=dh->g; + r[2]=dh->pub_key; + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (type & SSL_kEECDH) + { + const EC_GROUP *group; + + ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; + if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) + { + ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); + } + if (ecdhp == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ + if (ecdhp == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; + if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) + { + if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + + /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH + * keys over named (not generic) curves. For + * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. + */ + if ((curve_id = + tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) + == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + goto err; + } + + /* Encode the public key. + * First check the size of encoding and + * allocate memory accordingly. + */ + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, NULL); + + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); + + if (encodedlen == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; + + /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not + * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. + * In this situation, we need four additional bytes + * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams + * structure. + */ + n = 4 + encodedlen; + + /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message + * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs + */ + r[0]=NULL; + r[1]=NULL; + r[2]=NULL; + r[3]=NULL; + } + else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (type & SSL_kPSK) + { + /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ + n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + } + else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (type & SSL_kSRP) + { + if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); + goto err; + } + r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; + r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; + r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; + r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; + } + else +#endif + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) + { + nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) + n+=1+nr[i]; + else +#endif + n+=2+nr[i]; + } + + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) + { + if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) + == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + } + else + { + pkey=NULL; + kn=0; + } + + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); + goto err; + } + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p= &(d[4]); + + for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) + { + *p = nr[i]; + p++; + } + else +#endif + s2n(nr[i],p); + BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); + p+=nr[i]; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (type & SSL_kEECDH) + { + /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. + * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: + * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] + * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by + * the actual encoded point itself + */ + *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; + p += 1; + *p = 0; + p += 1; + *p = curve_id; + p += 1; + *p = encodedlen; + p += 1; + memcpy((unsigned char*)p, + (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, + encodedlen); + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + encodedPoint = NULL; + p += encodedlen; + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (type & SSL_kPSK) + { + /* copy PSK identity hint */ + s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); + strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); + p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + } +#endif + + /* not anonymous */ + if (pkey != NULL) + { + /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) + * and p points to the space at the end. */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA + && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + q=md_buf; + j=0; + for (num=2; num > 0; num--) + { + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) + ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, + (unsigned int *)&i); + q+=i; + j+=i; + } + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); + goto err; + } + s2n(u,p); + n+=u+2; + } + else +#endif + if (md) + { + /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature + * algorithm */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) + { + /* Should never happen */ + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + p+=2; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); + if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto err; + } + s2n(i,p); + n+=i+2; + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + n+= 2; + } + else + { + /* Is this error check actually needed? */ + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + l2n3(n,d); + + /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send + * it off */ + s->init_num=n+4; + s->init_off=0; + } + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); +err: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); +#endif + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p,*d; + int i,j,nl,off,n; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; + X509_NAME *name; + BUF_MEM *buf; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) + { + buf=s->init_buf; + + d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); + + /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ + p++; + n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); + d[0]=n; + p+=n; + n++; + + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); + s2n(nl, p); + p += nl + 2; + n += nl + 2; + } + + off=n; + p+=2; + n+=2; + + sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); + nl=0; + if (sk != NULL) + { + for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) + { + name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); + j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) + { + s2n(j,p); + i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); + n+=2+j; + nl+=2+j; + } + else + { + d=p; + i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); + j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; + n+=j; + nl+=j; + } + } + } + /* else no CA names */ + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); + s2n(nl,p); + + d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + l2n3(n,d); + + /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send + * it off */ + + s->init_num=n+4; + s->init_off=0; +#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; + *(p++)=0; + *(p++)=0; + *(p++)=0; + s->init_num += 4; +#endif + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +err: + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) + { + int i,al,ok; + long n; + unsigned long alg_k; + unsigned char *p; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsa=NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + BIGNUM *pub=NULL; + DH *dh_srvr; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + KSSL_ERR kssl_err; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; + EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + 2048, /* ??? */ + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + { + /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) + { + if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) + rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; + /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should + * be sent already */ + if (rsa == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); + goto f_err; + + } + } + else + { + pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; + if ( (pkey == NULL) || + (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || + (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); + goto f_err; + } + rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; + } + + /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + n2s(p,i); + if (n != i+2) + { + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto err; + } + else + p-=2; + } + else + n=i; + } + + i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + + al = -1; + + if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ + } + + if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) + { + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). + * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol + * version instead if the server does not support the requested + * protocol version. + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ + if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && + (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ + + /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version + * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would + * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext + * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except + * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, + * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ + } + } + + if (al != -1) + { + /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure + * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding + * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ + ERR_clear_error(); + i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ + goto err; + } + + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, + p,i); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) + { + n2s(p,i); + if (n != i+2) + { + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto err; + } + else + { + p-=2; + i=(int)n; + } + } + + if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); + goto f_err; + } + else + { + if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + else + dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; + } + + pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); + if (pub == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); + + if (i <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + BN_clear_free(pub); + goto err; + } + + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); + s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; + + BN_clear_free(pub); + pub=NULL; + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key,p,i); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) + { + krb5_error_code krb5rc; + krb5_data enc_ticket; + krb5_data authenticator; + krb5_data enc_pms; + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + int padl, outl; + krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; + krb5_ticket_times ttimes; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); + + if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); + + n2s(p,i); + enc_ticket.length = i; + + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; + p+=enc_ticket.length; + + n2s(p,i); + authenticator.length = i; + + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + authenticator.data = (char *)p; + p+=authenticator.length; + + n2s(p,i); + enc_pms.length = i; + enc_pms.data = (char *)p; + p+=enc_pms.length; + + /* Note that the length is checked again below, + ** after decryption + */ + if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + + enc_pms.length + 6)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, + &kssl_err)) != 0) + { +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); + if (kssl_err.text) + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, + ** but will return authtime == 0. + */ + if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, + &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) + { +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); + if (kssl_err.text) + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); + if (enc == NULL) + goto err; + + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ + + if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, + (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + outl += padl; + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) + { + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). + * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of + * the protocol version. + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. + * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) + */ + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); + + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, pms, outl); + + if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) + { + size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); + if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) + { + s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; + memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); + } + } + + + /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, + ** but it caused problems for apache. + ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); + ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; + */ + } + else +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) + { + int ret = 1; + int field_size = 0; + const EC_KEY *tkey; + const EC_GROUP *group; + const BIGNUM *priv_key; + + /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ + if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Let's get server private key and group information */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) + { + /* use the certificate */ + tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; + } + else + { + /* use the ephermeral values we saved when + * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. + */ + tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; + } + + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); + + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || + !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* Let's get client's public key */ + if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (n == 0L) + { + /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ + + if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) + == NULL) || + (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) + { + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client + * authentication using ECDH certificates + * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is + * never executed. When that support is + * added, we ought to ensure the key + * received in the certificate is + * authorized for key agreement. + * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that + * the two ECDH shares are for the same + * group. + */ + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); + goto f_err; + } + + if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ + } + else + { + /* Get client's public key from encoded point + * in the ClientKeyExchange message. + */ + if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get encoded point length */ + i = *p; + p += 1; + if (n != 1 + i) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, + clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer + * currently, so set it to the start + */ + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + } + + /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); + if (field_size <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); + if (i <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; + + /* Compute the master secret */ + s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ + generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); + return (ret); + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) + { + unsigned char *t = NULL; + unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; + unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; + int psk_err = 1; + char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; + + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + + n2s(p,i); + if (n != i+2) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto psk_err; + } + if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto psk_err; + } + if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); + goto psk_err; + } + + /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity + * string for the callback */ + memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); + memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); + psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, + psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); + + if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } + else if (psk_len == 0) + { + /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + goto psk_err; + } + + /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ + pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; + t = psk_or_pre_ms; + memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); + s2n(psk_len, t); + memset(t, 0, psk_len); + t+=psk_len; + s2n(psk_len, t); + + if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && + s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); + psk_err = 0; + psk_err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + if (psk_err != 0) + goto f_err; + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) + { + int param_len; + + n2s(p,i); + param_len=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + p+=i; + } + else +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ + if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) + { + int ret = 0; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; + EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; + unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; + size_t outlen=32, inlen; + unsigned long alg_a; + int Ttag, Tclass; + long Tlen; + + /* Get our certificate private key*/ + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; + + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); + EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe + * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from + * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use + * a client certificate for authorization only. */ + client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (client_pub_pkey) + { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) + ERR_clear_error(); + } + /* Decrypt session key */ + if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || + Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || + Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto gerr; + } + start = p; + inlen = Tlen; + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) + + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto gerr; + } + /* Generate master secret */ + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + ret = 2; + else + ret = 1; + gerr: + EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + if (ret) + return ret; + else + goto err; + } + else + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + return(1); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) +err: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); + if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); +#endif + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + unsigned char *p; + int al,ok,ret=0; + long n; + int type=0,i,j; + X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, + -1, + 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */ + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + { + peer=s->session->peer; + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); + type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); + } + else + { + peer=NULL; + pkey=NULL; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) + { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + ret=1; + goto end; + } + + if (peer == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + + /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ + /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare + * signature without length field */ + if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || + pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) + { + i=64; + } + else + { + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); + /* Should never happen */ + if (sigalg == -1) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ + if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); + if (md == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG +fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + p += 2; + n -= 2; + } + n2s(p,i); + n-=2; + if (i > n) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + long hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) + { + i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, + pkey->pkey.rsa); + if (i < 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + goto f_err; + } + if (i == 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) + { + j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); + if (j <= 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) + { + j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); + if (j <= 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) + { unsigned char signature[64]; + int idx; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); + EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); + if (i!=64) { + fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); + } + for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { + signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; + } + j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + if (j<=0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; + goto f_err; + } + + + ret=1; + if (0) + { +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + } +end: + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + { + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return(ret); + } + +int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) + { + int i,ok,al,ret= -1; + X509 *x=NULL; + unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; + const unsigned char *p,*q; + unsigned char *d; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) + { + if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto f_err; + } + /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ + if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + return(1); + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + n2l3(p,llen); + if (llen+3 != n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) + { + n2l3(p,l); + if ((l+nc+3) > llen) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + q=p; + x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); + if (x == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (p != (q+l)) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + x=NULL; + nc+=l+3; + } + + if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) + { + /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ + else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto f_err; + } + /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + else + { + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); + if (i <= 0) + { + al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ + X509_free(s->session->peer); + s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + + /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL + * when we arrive here. */ + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) + sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); + s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; + /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the + * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ + + sk=NULL; + + ret=1; + if (0) + { +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + } +err: + if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); + if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); + return(ret); + } + +int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) + { + unsigned long l; + X509 *x; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) + { + x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); + if (x == NULL) + { + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return(0); + } + } + + l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; + s->init_num=(int)l; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ +int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) + { + unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; + const unsigned char *const_p; + int len, slen_full, slen; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned int hlen; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char key_name[16]; + + /* get session encoding length */ + slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); + /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is + * too long + */ + if (slen_full > 0xFF00) + return -1; + senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); + if (!senc) + return -1; + p = senc; + i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); + + /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ + const_p = senc; + sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); + if (sess == NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(senc); + return -1; + } + sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ + + slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); + if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ + { + OPENSSL_free(senc); + return -1; + } + p = senc; + i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length + * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, + 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) + return -1; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; + /* Skip message length for now */ + p += 3; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present + * it does all the work otherwise use generated values + * from parent ctx. + */ + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) + { + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, + &hctx, 1) < 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(senc); + return -1; + } + } + else + { + RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + } + + /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): + * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), + * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long + * as their sessions. */ + l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); + + /* Skip ticket length for now */ + p += 2; + /* Output key name */ + macstart = p; + memcpy(p, key_name, 16); + p += 16; + /* output IV */ + memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); + p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + /* Encrypt session data */ + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); + p += len; + EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); + p += len; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + + p += hlen; + /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ + /* Total length */ + len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; + l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ + p += 4; + s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ + + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num= len; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; + s->init_off=0; + OPENSSL_free(senc); + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) + { + unsigned char *p; + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) + * + (ocsp response) + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) + return -1; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + /* message length */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); + /* status type */ + *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; + /* length of OCSP response */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); + /* actual response */ + memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It + * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ +int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) + { + int ok; + int proto_len, padding_len; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + + /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the + * extension in their ClientHello */ + if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); + return -1; + } + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, + SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, + 514, /* See the payload format below */ + &ok); + + if (!ok) + return((int)n); + + /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received + * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset + * by ssl3_get_finished). */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return -1; + } + + if (n < 2) + return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + /* The payload looks like: + * uint8 proto_len; + * uint8 proto[proto_len]; + * uint8 padding_len; + * uint8 padding[padding_len]; + */ + proto_len = p[0]; + if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) + return 0; + padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; + if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) + return 0; + + s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); + if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); + s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; + + return 1; + } +# endif +#endif |