diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 2729 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2729 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9fadf92e11..0000000000 --- a/drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2729 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include <stdio.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/ocsp.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> - -const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess); -#endif - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ - tls1_enc, - tls1_mac, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - }; - -long tls1_default_timeout(void) - { - /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec - * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ - return(60*60*2); - } - -int tls1_new(SSL *s) - { - if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); - s->method->ssl_clear(s); - return(1); - } - -void tls1_free(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ - ssl3_free(s); - } - -void tls1_clear(SSL *s) - { - ssl3_clear(s); - s->version = s->method->version; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - -static int nid_list[] = - { - NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ - NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ - }; - -static int pref_list[] = - { - NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ - }; - -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) - { - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > - sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) - return 0; - return nid_list[curve_id-1]; - } - -int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) - { - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - switch (nid) - { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - default: - return 0; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - -/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this - * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. - */ - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ -#else -#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, -#endif - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ -#else -#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, -#endif - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA -#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ -#else -#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, -#endif - -#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) - -static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) -#endif -}; - -int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) - { - size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); - if (p) - memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); - return (int)slen; - } - -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION - && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; - - ret+=2; - - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) - { - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - unsigned long size_str; - long lenmax; - - /* check for enough space. - 4 for the servername type and entension length - 2 for servernamelist length - 1 for the hostname type - 2 for hostname length - + hostname length - */ - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 - || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); - s2n(size_str+5,ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str+3,ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str,ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret+=size_str; - } - - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) - { - int el; - - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* Add SRP username if there is one */ - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ - - int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - /* check for enough space. - 4 for the srp type type and entension length - 1 for the srp user identity - + srp user identity length - */ - if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; - - /* fill in the extension */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); - s2n(login_len+1,ret); - (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; - memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); - ret+=login_len; - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ - long lenmax; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); - s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - } - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ - long lenmax; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); - s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); - - /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for - * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. - * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html - * resolves this to two bytes. - */ - s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); - ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) - { - int ticklen; - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) - { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return NULL; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, - ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - } - else - ticklen = 0; - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) - goto skip_ext; - /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len - * rest for ticket - */ - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); - s2n(ticklen,ret); - if (ticklen) - { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; - } - } - skip_ext: - - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); - s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); - s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); - memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); - ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); - } - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) - return NULL; - if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); - s2n(col + 2, ret); - s2n(col, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); - ret += col; - } -#endif - - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - int i; - long extlen, idlen, itmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - - idlen = 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) - { - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (itmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += itmp + 2; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) - { - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (extlen < 0) - return NULL; - } - else - extlen = 0; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) - { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(itmp, q); - } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); - s2n(1,ret); - /* Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) - { - /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its - * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) - { - int el; - - ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -#endif - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding - /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. - * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 - * - * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing - * extensions it MUST always appear last. - */ - { - int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the - * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does - * not. */ - if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) - hlen -= 5; - if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) - { - hlen = 0x200 - hlen; - if (hlen >= 4) - hlen -= 4; - else - hlen = 0; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); - s2n(hlen, ret); - memset(ret, 0, hlen); - ret += hlen; - } - } -#endif - - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen,p); - return ret; - } - -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - int next_proto_neg_seen; -#endif - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; - - ret+=2; - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) - { - int el; - - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ - long lenmax; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); - s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - - } - /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected - && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) - return NULL; - if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); - s2n(sol + 2, ret); - s2n(sol, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); - ret += sol; - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if(s->srtp_profile) - { - int el; - - ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret+=el; - } -#endif - - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) - { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { - 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ - 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ - 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, - 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, - 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, - 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; - if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; - memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); - ret+=36; - - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) - { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); - s2n(1,ret); - /* Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) - { - const unsigned char *npa; - unsigned int npalen; - int r; - - r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); - s2n(npalen,ret); - memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); - ret += npalen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } - } -#endif - - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen,p); - return ret; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X - * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. - * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: - * SNI, - * elliptic_curves - * ec_point_formats - * - * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, - * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. - * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from - * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). - */ -static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { - unsigned short type, size; - static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ - 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ - 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ - 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ - 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ - - 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ - 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ - 0x01, /* 1 point format */ - 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - }; - - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ - 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ - 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ - 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ - 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ - }; - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - return; - data += 2; - - if (data > (d+n-4)) - return; - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - return; - - if (data+size > d+n) - return; - data += size; - - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - - if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; - if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) - return; - } - else - { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - - if (data + len != d+n) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; - } - - s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; -} -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - int sigalg_seen = 0; - - s->servername_done = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - goto ri_check; - n2s(data,len); - - if (data > (d+n-len)) - goto ri_check; - - while (data <= (d+n-4)) - { - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); -#endif - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); -/* The servername extension is treated as follows: - - - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, - in which case an fatal alert is generated. - - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order - to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - the value of the Host: field. - - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, - i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. - - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. - -*/ - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - { - unsigned char *sdata; - int servname_type; - int dsize; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - sdata = data; - while (dsize > 3) - { - servname_type = *(sdata++); - n2s(sdata,len); - dsize -= 3; - - if (len > dsize) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) - { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } - else - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - dsize -= len; - } - if (dsize != 0) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) - { - if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) - return -1; - memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); - s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; - - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); - } -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr,"\n"); -#endif - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); - ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); - - if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || - ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); - } -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr,"\n"); -#endif - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) - { - int dsize; - if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sigalg_seen = 1; - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - - if (size < 5) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; - size--; - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - { - const unsigned char *sdata; - int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - while (dsize > 0) - { - OCSP_RESPID *id; - int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, idsize); - dsize -= 2 + idsize; - size -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, - &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (data != sdata) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) - { - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) - { - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, - X509_EXTENSION_free); - } - - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, - &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts - || (data + dsize != sdata)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - /* We don't know what to do with any other type - * so ignore it. - */ - else - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) - { - switch(data[0]) - { - case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - break; - case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - break; - default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) - { - /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a - * renegotiation. - * - * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we - * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when - * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an - * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing - * anything like that, but this might change). - - * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake - * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > - * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen - * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new - * Finished message could have been computed.) */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } -#endif - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) - { - if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, - al)) - return 0; - } -#endif - - data+=size; - } - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Need RI if renegotiating */ - - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No - * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill - * the length of the block. */ -static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) - { - unsigned int off = 0; - - while (off < len) - { - if (d[off] == 0) - return 0; - off += d[off]; - off++; - } - - return off == len; - } -#endif - -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short length; - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int tlsext_servername = 0; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -#endif - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - goto ri_check; - - n2s(data,length); - if (data+length != d+n) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - while(data <= (d+n-4)) - { - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - tlsext_servername = 1; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || - ecpointformatlist_length < 1) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr,"\n"); -#endif - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - || (size > 0)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested - * a status request message. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) - { - unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char selected_len; - - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* The data must be valid */ - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) - { - switch(data[0]) - { - case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - break; - case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - break; - default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) - { - if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, - al)) - return 0; - } -#endif - - data+=size; - } - - if (data != d+n) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) - { - if (s->tlsext_hostname) - { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) - { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) - { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - } - else - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to - * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server - * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an - * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server - * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI - * absence on initial connect only. - */ - if (!renegotiate_seen - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - - -int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats - * and elliptic curves we support. - */ - int using_ecc = 0; - int i; - unsigned char *j; - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) - { - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); - - alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) - { - using_ecc = 1; - break; - } - } - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); - if (using_ecc) - { - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - - /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; - if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) - { - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < - sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) - { - int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); - s2n(id,j); - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - { - int r = 1; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) - { - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); - if (!r) - return -1; - } - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) - { - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } - - if (r == 2) - /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } -#endif - - return 1; - } - -int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support - * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not - * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. - */ - - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); - - if (using_ecc) - { - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - return 1; - } - -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) - { - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ - /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ -#endif - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - { - /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), - * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, - * so this has to happen here in - * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ - - int r = 1; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) - { - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); - if (!r) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) - { - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) - { - /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input - * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } - } - - if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, - * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; - * abort the handshake. - */ - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - } - } - - err: -#endif - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done=0; - default: - return 1; - } - } - -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) - { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - int al; - - /* If status request then ask callback what to do. - * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case - * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher - * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int r; - CERT_PKEY *certpkey; - certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ - if (certpkey == NULL) - { - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - return 1; - } - /* Set current certificate to one we will use so - * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. - */ - s->cert->key = certpkey; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (r) - { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - - err: - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - default: - return 1; - } - } - -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension - * it must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) - { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) - { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } - } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) - { - /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. - * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - } - - /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check - * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - } -#endif - - /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one - * tell the callback - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int r; - /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows - * there is no response. - */ - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } - - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done=0; - default: - return 1; - } - } - -/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the - * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle - * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. - * - * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will - * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket - * extension, if any. - * len: the length of the session ID. - * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. - * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to - * point to the resulting session. - * - * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key - * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will - * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. - * - * Returns: - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. - * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). - * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports - * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. - * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but - * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. - * - * Side effects: - * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue - * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support - * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have - * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if - * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. - * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. - */ -int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) - { - /* Point after session ID in client hello */ - const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; - unsigned short i; - - *ret = NULL; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present - * to permit stateful resumption. - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 0; - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) - return 0; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - i = *(p++); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - } - /* Skip past cipher list */ - n2s(p, i); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p > limit) - return -1; - /* Now at start of extensions */ - if ((p + 2) >= limit) - return 0; - n2s(p, i); - while ((p + 4) <= limit) - { - unsigned short type, size; - n2s(p, type); - n2s(p, size); - if (p + size > limit) - return 0; - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - int r; - if (size == 0) - { - /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't - * currently have one. */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 1; - } - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) - { - /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be - * decrypted rather than generating the session - * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated - * handshake based on external mechanism to - * calculate the master secret later. */ - return 2; - } - r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); - switch (r) - { - case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 2; - case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ - return r; - case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 3; - default: /* fatal error */ - return -1; - } - } - p += size; - } - return 0; - } - -/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. - * - * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. - * sess_id: points at the session ID. - * sesslen: the length of the session ID. - * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to - * point to the resulting session. - * - * Returns: - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. - * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. - * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. - */ -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess) - { - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *sdec; - const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; - unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - return 2; - /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) - { - unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); - if (rv < 0) - return -1; - if (rv == 0) - return 2; - if (rv == 2) - renew_ticket = 1; - } - else - { - /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - return 2; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); - } - /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and - * integrity checks on ticket. - */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); - if (mlen < 0) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - eticklen -= mlen; - /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) - return 2; - /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ - /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) - return 2; - slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - p = sdec; - - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - if (sess) - { - /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to - * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to - * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero - * as required by standard. - */ - if (sesslen) - memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); - sess->session_id_length = sesslen; - *psess = sess; - if (renew_ticket) - return 4; - else - return 3; - } - ERR_clear_error(); - /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new - * ticket. */ - return 2; - } - -/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ - -typedef struct - { - int nid; - int id; - } tls12_lookup; - -static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 - {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 - {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} -#endif -}; - -static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} -#endif -}; - -static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) - { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) - { - if (table[i].nid == nid) - return table[i].id; - } - return -1; - } -#if 0 -static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) - { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) - { - if (table[i].id == id) - return table[i].nid; - } - return -1; - } -#endif - -int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) - { - int sig_id, md_id; - if (!md) - return 0; - md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, - sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - if (md_id == -1) - return 0; - sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); - if (sig_id == -1) - return 0; - p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; - p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; - return 1; - } - -int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) - { - return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, - sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - } - -const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) - { - switch(hash_alg) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: - return EVP_sha1(); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: - return EVP_sha224(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: - return EVP_sha256(); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 - case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: - return EVP_sha384(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: - return EVP_sha512(); -#endif - default: - return NULL; - - } - } - -/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ - -int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) - { - int i, idx; - const EVP_MD *md; - CERT *c = s->cert; - /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) - return 1; - /* Should never happen */ - if (!c) - return 0; - - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; - - for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) - { - unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; - - switch(sig_alg) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; - break; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: - idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; - break; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; - break; -#endif - default: - continue; - } - - if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) - { - md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); - if (md) - { - c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; - } - } - - } - - - /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not - * supported it stays as NULL. - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) - { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); -#endif - return 1; - } - -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS -int -tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; - unsigned short hbtype; - unsigned int payload; - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Read type and payload length first */ - if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) - return 0; /* silently discard */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) - return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ - pl = p; - - if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) - { - unsigned char *buffer, *bp; - int r; - - /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes - * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus - * payload, plus padding - */ - buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - bp = buffer; - - /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ - *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; - s2n(payload, bp); - memcpy(bp, pl, payload); - bp += payload; - /* Random padding */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); - - r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); - - if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buffer, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) - { - unsigned int seq; - - /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), - * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the - * sequence number */ - n2s(pl, seq); - - if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) - { - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - } - } - - return 0; - } - -int -tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *buf, *p; - int ret; - unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ - if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || - s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return -1; - } - - /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding - * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. - */ - OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); - - /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add - * some random stuff. - * - Message Type, 1 byte - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) - * - Padding - */ - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - p = buf; - /* Message Type */ - *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; - /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ - s2n(payload, p); - /* Sequence number */ - s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); - /* 16 random bytes */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); - p += 16; - /* Random padding */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); - - ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); - if (ret >= 0) - { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buf, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; - } - - OPENSSL_free(buf); - - return ret; - } -#endif |