diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 3372 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3372 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c deleted file mode 100644 index a6b3c01afa..0000000000 --- a/drivers/builtin_openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3372 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include "kssl_lcl.h" -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#include <openssl/fips.h> -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include <openssl/dh.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#endif - -static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); - -static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) - { - if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) - return(SSLv3_client_method()); - else - return(NULL); - } - -IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl3_connect, - ssl3_get_client_method) - -int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - { - BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; - unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - int ret= -1; - int new_state,state,skip=0; - - RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); - ERR_clear_error(); - clear_sys_error(); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; - - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we - * already got and don't await it anymore, because - * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) - { - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - } -#endif - - for (;;) - { - state=s->state; - - switch(s->state) - { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate=1; - s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; - /* break */ - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_CONNECT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: - case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: - - s->server=0; - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); - - if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ - s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT; - - if (s->init_buf == NULL) - { - if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->init_buf=buf; - buf=NULL; - } - - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } - - /* setup buffing BIO */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; } - - /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: - - s->shutdown=0; - ret=ssl3_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num=0; - - /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ - if (s->bbio != s->wbio) - s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio); - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - - if (s->hit) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - { - /* receive renewed session ticket */ - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } -#endif - } - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - if (ret == 2) - { - s->hit = 1; - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - } -#endif - /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ - /* or PSK */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && - !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - else - { - skip = 1; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } -#else - } - else - skip=1; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; -#endif - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num=0; - - /* at this point we check that we have the - * required stuff from the server */ - if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: - ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) - { - if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto end; - } - } -#endif - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: - ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert - * sent back */ - /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain - * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ - /* XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with - * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. - * We need to skip the certificate verify - * message when client's ECDH public key is sent - * inside the client certificate. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; - } - else - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - } - - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: - ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num=0; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: - ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - -#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -#else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -#endif - s->init_num=0; - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - s->session->compress_meth=0; -#else - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - s->session->compress_meth=0; - else - s->session->compress_meth= - s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; -#endif - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - break; - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: - ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - break; -#endif - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, - s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, - s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; - - /* clear flags */ - s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; - if (s->hit) - { - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; - if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) - { - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; - s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; - } - } - else - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else -#endif - - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - } - s->init_num=0; - break; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; -#endif - - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: - - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - - if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - else - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - if (s->init_buf != NULL) - { - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf=NULL; - } - - /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, - * remove the buffering now */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ - - s->init_num=0; - s->renegotiate=0; - s->new_session=0; - - ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); - if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; - - ret=1; - /* s->server=0; */ - s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; - - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); - - goto end; - /* break; */ - - default: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret= -1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - } - - /* did we do anything */ - if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) - { - if (s->debug) - { - if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) - goto end; - } - - if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) - { - new_state=s->state; - s->state=state; - cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1); - s->state=new_state; - } - } - skip=0; - } -end: - s->in_handshake--; - if (buf != NULL) - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret); - return(ret); - } - - -int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i; - unsigned long l; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int j; - SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - - buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) - { - SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; - if ((sess == NULL) || - (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - !sess->session_id_length || -#else - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || -#endif - (sess->not_resumable)) - { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - goto err; - } - /* else use the pre-loaded session */ - - p=s->s3->client_random; - - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d=p= &(buf[4]); - - /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from - * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version - * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also - * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can - * choke if we initially report a higher version then - * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This - * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it - * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports - * 1.0. - * - * Possible scenario with previous logic: - * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 - * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 - * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. - * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. - * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now - * know that is maximum server supports. - * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret - * containing version 1.0. - * - * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the - * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely - * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't - * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with - * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using - * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to - * the negotiated version. - */ -#if 0 - *(p++)=s->version>>8; - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; - s->client_version=s->version; -#else - *(p++)=s->client_version>>8; - *(p++)=s->client_version&0xff; -#endif - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* Session ID */ - if (s->new_session) - i=0; - else - i=s->session->session_id_length; - *(p++)=i; - if (i != 0) - { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i); - p+=i; - } - - /* Ciphers supported */ - i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); - goto err; - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH - /* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes - * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers - * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2 - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION - && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) - i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; -#endif - s2n(i,p); - p+=i; - - /* COMPRESSION */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++)=1; -#else - - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) - || !s->ctx->comp_methods) - j=0; - else - j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - *(p++)=1+j; - for (i=0; i<j; i++) - { - comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i); - *(p++)=comp->id; - } -#endif - *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* TLS extensions*/ - if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } -#endif - - l=(p-d); - d=buf; - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; - l2n3(l,d); - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num=p-buf; - s->init_off=0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) - { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i,al,ok; - unsigned int j; - long n; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, - -1, - 20000, /* ?? */ - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) - { - if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return 1; - } - else /* already sent a cookie */ - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - } - - if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1]; - al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - p+=2; - - /* load the server hello data */ - /* load the server random */ - memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* get the session-id */ - j= *(p++); - - if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) - { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; - s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, - NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) - { - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? - pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j); - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ - - if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length - && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0) - { - if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length - || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length)) - { - /* actually a client application bug */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; - } - s->hit=1; - } - else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ - { - /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new - * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ - s->hit=0; - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) - { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - s->session->session_id_length=j; - memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */ - } - p+=j; - c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); - if (c == NULL) - { - /* unknown cipher */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */ - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && - (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); - - sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c); - if (i < 0) - { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher - and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that - cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ - if (s->session->cipher) - s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; - if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) - { -/* Workaround is now obsolete */ -#if 0 - if (!(s->options & - SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)) -#endif - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; - /* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for - * client authentication. - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - /* lets get the compression algorithm */ - /* COMPRESSION */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (*(p++) != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session - * using compression. - */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } -#else - j= *(p++); - if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - if (j == 0) - comp=NULL; - else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); - goto f_err; - } - else - comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j); - - if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - else - { - s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* TLS extensions*/ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) - { - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) - { - /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto f_err; - } - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - - if (p != (d+n)) - { - /* wrong packet length */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) - { - int al,i,ok,ret= -1; - unsigned long n,nc,llen,l; - X509 *x=NULL; - const unsigned char *q,*p; - unsigned char *d; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; - SESS_CERT *sc; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) || - ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - n2l3(p,llen); - if (llen+3 != n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) - { - n2l3(p,l); - if ((l+nc+3) > llen) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - q=p; - x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l); - if (x == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; - } - if (q != (p+l)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x=NULL; - nc+=l+3; - p=q; - } - - i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); - if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - ) - { - al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ - - sc=ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (sc == NULL) goto err; - - if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); - s->session->sess_cert=sc; - - sc->cert_chain=sk; - /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's - * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ - x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); - sk=NULL; - /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ - - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); - - /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) - ? 0 : 1; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x); - printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey)); - printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) - { - x=NULL; - al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey); - if (need_cert && i < 0) - { - x=NULL; - al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (need_cert) - { - sc->peer_cert_type=i; - CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - /* Why would the following ever happen? - * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ - if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) - X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); - sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x; - sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) - X509_free(s->session->peer); - CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - s->session->peer=x; - } - else - { - sc->peer_cert_type=i; - sc->peer_key= NULL; - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) - X509_free(s->session->peer); - s->session->peer=NULL; - } - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - x=NULL; - ret=1; - - if (0) - { -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - } -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - X509_free(x); - sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); - return(ret); - } - -int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; -#endif - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - unsigned char *param,*p; - int al,i,j,param_len,ok; - long n,alg_k,alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa=NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh=NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - int curve_nid = 0; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; -#endif - - /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() - * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be - omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set - session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems - later.*/ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) - { - s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) - OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; - } -#endif - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } - - param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) - { - RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) - { - DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) - { - EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; - } -#endif - } - else - { - s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); - } - - param_len=0; - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) - { - char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; - - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used - * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the - * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as - * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */ - if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL - * characters, the hint is truncated from the first - * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a - * NULL-terminated string. */ - memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i); - memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - } - else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) - { - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); - p++; - param_len+=i+1; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - -/* We must check if there is a certificate */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); -#else - if (0) - ; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); -#endif - } - else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - - /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; - rsa=NULL; - } -#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - if (0) - ; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) - { - if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); -#else - if (0) - ; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); -#endif - /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - - s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; - dh=NULL; - } - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) - { - EC_GROUP *ngroup; - const EC_GROUP *group; - - if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the - * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. - * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in - * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. - */ - - /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves - * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. - */ - param_len=3; - if ((param_len > n) || - (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || - ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); - if (ngroup == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) - { - al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - - p+=3; - - /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ - if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || - ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ - p+=1; - param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len); - if ((param_len > n) || - (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, - p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); - goto f_err; - } - - n-=param_len; - p+=encoded_pt_len; - - /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention - * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server - * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. - */ - if (0) ; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); -#endif - /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; - ecdh=NULL; - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - } - else if (alg_k) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ - - - /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ - - /* if it was signed, check the signature */ - if (pkey != NULL) - { - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); - /* Should never happen */ - if (sigalg == -1) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ - if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); - if (md == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG -fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - p += 2; - n -= 2; - } - else - md = EVP_sha1(); - - n2s(p,i); - n-=2; - j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - - if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) - { - /* wrong packet length */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - int num; - - j=0; - q=md_buf; - for (num=2; num > 0; num--) - { - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, - EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) - ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i); - q+=i; - j+=i; - } - i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, - pkey->pkey.rsa); - if (i < 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - goto f_err; - } - if (i == 0) - { - /* bad signature */ - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else -#endif - { - EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) - { - /* bad signature */ - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - } - else - { - if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) - /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */ - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - /* still data left over */ - if (n != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (rsa != NULL) - RSA_free(rsa); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (dh != NULL) - DH_free(dh); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - if (ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(ecdh); -#endif - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) - { - int ok,ret=0; - unsigned long n,nc,l; - unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i; - X509_NAME *xn=NULL; - const unsigned char *p,*q; - unsigned char *d; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - /* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records - * as we wont be doing client auth. - */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - } - return(1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto err; - } - - /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - { - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); - goto err; - } - } - - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the certificate types */ - ctype_num= *(p++); - if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) - ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER; - for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++) - s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i]; - p+=ctype_num; - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - n2s(p, llen); - /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and - * following length value. - */ - if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += llen; - } - - /* get the CA RDNs */ - n2s(p,llen); -#if 0 -{ -FILE *out; -out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w"); -fwrite(p,1,llen,out); -fclose(out); -} -#endif - - if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - - for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) - { - n2s(p,l); - if ((l+nc+2) > llen) - { - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) - goto cont; /* netscape bugs */ - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - q=p; - - if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL) - { - /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG) - goto cont; - else - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - if (q != (p+l)) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - p+=l; - nc+=l+2; - } - - if (0) - { -cont: - ERR_clear_error(); - } - - /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1; - s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num; - if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free); - s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk; - ca_sk=NULL; - - ret=1; -err: - if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free); - return(ret); - } - -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) - { - return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) - { - int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen; - long n; - const unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *d; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, - -1, - 16384, - &ok); - - if (!ok) - return((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - if (n < 6) - { - /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); - n2s(p, ticklen); - /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ - if (ticklen + 6 != n) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->session->tlsext_tick) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. - * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server - * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal - * client session ID matching to work and we know much - * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. - * - * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the - * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine - * session resumption. - * - * We choose the former approach because this fits in with - * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set - * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the - * ticket. - */ - EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, - s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - EVP_sha256(), NULL); -#else - EVP_sha1(), NULL); -#endif - ret=1; - return(ret); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) - { - int ok, al; - unsigned long resplen,n; - const unsigned char *p; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, - 16384, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - if (n < 4) - { - /* need at least status type + length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - n2l3(p, resplen); - if (resplen + 4 != n) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; - if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (ret == 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - goto f_err; - } - if (ret < 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - return 1; -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return(-1); - } -#endif - -int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) - { - int ok,ret=0; - long n; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, - SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, - 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - if (n > 0) - { - /* should contain no data */ - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - return -1; - } - ret=1; - return(ret); - } - - -int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p,*d; - int n; - unsigned long alg_k; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; - const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; - BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL; -#endif - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) - { - d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - p= &(d[4]); - - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - /* Fool emacs indentation */ - if (0) {} -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - RSA *rsa; - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) - rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; - else - { - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - if ((pkey == NULL) || - (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || - (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } - - tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; - tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) - goto err; - - s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; - - q=p; - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - p+=2; - n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, - tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); -#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70; -#endif - if (n <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); - goto err; - } - - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - { - s2n(n,q); - n+=2; - } - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) - { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ - krb5_data *enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", - alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - authp = NULL; -#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH - if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator; -#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ - - krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, - &kssl_err); - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); - if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) - printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (krb5rc) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ - ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: - ** - ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) - ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; - ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); - ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) - ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); - ** - ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper - ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) - ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced - ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. - ** Example: - ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms - ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with - ** optional authenticator omitted. - */ - - /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ - s2n(enc_ticket->length,p); - memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); - p+= enc_ticket->length; - n = enc_ticket->length + 2; - - /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ - if (authp && authp->length) - { - s2n(authp->length,p); - memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); - p+= authp->length; - n+= authp->length + 2; - - free(authp->data); - authp->data = NULL; - authp->length = 0; - } - else - { - s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */ - n+=2; - } - - tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; - tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. - ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); - ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, - ** kssl_ctx->length); - ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); - */ - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL, - kssl_ctx->key,iv); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf, - sizeof tmp_buf); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl); - outl += padl; - if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ - s2n(outl,p); - memcpy(p, epms, outl); - p+=outl; - n+=outl + 2; - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) - { - DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; - - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto err; - } - - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) - dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; - else - { - /* we get them from the cert */ - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); - goto err; - } - - /* generate a new random key */ - if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - - /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but - * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ - - n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt); - - if (n <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - - /* generate master key from the result */ - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key,p,n); - /* clean up */ - memset(p,0,n); - - /* send off the data */ - n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); - s2n(n,p); - BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p); - n+=2; - - DH_free(dh_clnt); - - /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/ - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) - { - const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; - EC_KEY *tkey; - int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; - int field_size = 0; - - /* Did we send out the client's - * ECDH share for use in premaster - * computation as part of client certificate? - * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - */ - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) - { - /* XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication using ECDH certificates. - * To add such support, one needs to add - * code that checks for appropriate - * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - * For example, the cert have an ECC - * key on the same curve as the server's - * and the key should be authorized for - * key agreement. - * - * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect - * to skip sending the certificate verify - * message. - * - * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && - * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == - * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) - * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; - */ - } - - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) - { - tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; - } - else - { - /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ - srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \ - sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); - if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || - (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || - (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; - } - - srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); - - if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) - { - /* Reuse key info from our certificate - * We only need our private key to perform - * the ECDH computation. - */ - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); - if (priv_key == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - else - { - /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ - if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but - * make sure to clear it out afterwards - */ - - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); - if (field_size <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); - if (n <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* generate master key from the result */ - s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ - -> generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - p, n); - - memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ - - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) - { - /* Send empty client key exch message */ - n = 0; - } - else - { - /* First check the size of encoding and - * allocate memory accordingly. - */ - encoded_pt_len = - EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - NULL, 0, NULL); - - encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * - sizeof(unsigned char)); - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || - (bn_ctx == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Encode the public key */ - n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); - - *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ - /* Encoded point will be copied here */ - p += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); - /* increment n to account for length field */ - n += 1; - } - - /* Free allocated memory */ - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); - } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ - else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) - { - /* GOST key exchange message creation */ - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - X509 *peer_cert; - size_t msglen; - unsigned int md_len; - int keytype; - unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; - EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; - EVP_PKEY *pub_key; - - /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ - peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509; - if (!peer_cert) - peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509; - if (!peer_cert) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); - goto err; - } - - pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL); - /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key - - * parameters match those of server certificate, use - * certificate key for key exchange - */ - - /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ - - EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); - /* Generate session key */ - RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32); - /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { - /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key - * would be used - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } - /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific - * context data */ - ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, - 8,shared_ukm)<0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ - /*Encapsulate it into sequence */ - *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - msglen=255; - if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - if (msglen >= 0x80) - { - *(p++)=0x81; - *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; - n=msglen+3; - } - else - { - *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; - n=msglen+2; - } - memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) - { - /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); - EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); - - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) - { - if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) - { - /* send off the data */ - n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); - s2n(n,p); - BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p); - n+=2; - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) - { - char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; - unsigned char *t = NULL; - unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; - unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; - int psk_err = 1; - - n = 0; - if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); - goto err; - } - - psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, - identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN, - psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto psk_err; - } - else if (psk_len == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - goto psk_err; - } - - /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ - pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len; - t = psk_or_pre_ms; - memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); - s2n(psk_len, t); - memset(t, 0, psk_len); - t+=psk_len; - s2n(psk_len, t); - - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && - s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); - if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); - n = strlen(identity); - s2n(n, p); - memcpy(p, identity, n); - n+=2; - psk_err = 0; - psk_err: - OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); - OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - if (psk_err != 0) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - else - { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - l2n3(n,d); - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num=n+4; - s->init_off=0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); -err: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); -#endif - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p,*d; - unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX mctx; - unsigned u=0; - unsigned long n; - int j; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) - { - d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - p= &(d[4]); - pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey; -/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ - pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); - EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0) - { - if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_sha1, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); - } - else - { - ERR_clear_error(); - } - /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature - * using agreed digest and cached handshake records. - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest; - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, - &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 2; -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n", - EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) - || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(u,p); - n = u + 4; - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - } - else -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) - { - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_md5, - &(data[0])); - if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, - &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(u,p); - n=u+2; - } - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) - { - if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(j,p); - n=j+2; - } - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - { - if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(j,p); - n=j+2; - } - else -#endif - if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) - { - unsigned char signbuf[64]; - int i; - size_t sigsize=64; - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_id_GostR3411_94, - data); - if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) { - p[2+j]=signbuf[i]; - } - s2n(j,p); - n=j+2; - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - l2n3(n,d); - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; - s->init_num=(int)n+4; - s->init_off=0; - } - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); -err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) - { - X509 *x509=NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - int i; - unsigned long l; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) - { - if ((s->cert == NULL) || - (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) || - (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } - - /* We need to get a client cert */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) - { - /* If we get an error, we need to - * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); - * We then get retied later */ - i=0; - i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); - if (i < 0) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return(-1); - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || - !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey)) - i=0; - } - else if (i == 1) - { - i=0; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); - } - - if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); - if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (i == 0) - { - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - { - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); - return(1); - } - else - { - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2; - } - } - - /* Ok, we have a cert */ - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; - l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, - (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509); - s->init_num=(int)l; - s->init_off=0; - } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } - -#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) - -int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) - { - int i,idx; - long alg_k,alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - SESS_CERT *sc; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh; -#endif - - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* we don't have a certificate */ - if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) - return(1); - - sc=s->session->sess_cert; - if (sc == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; -#endif - - /* This is the passed certificate */ - - idx=sc->peer_cert_type; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) - { - if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, - s) == 0) - { /* check failed */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); - goto f_err; - } - else - { - return 1; - } - } -#endif - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); - i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - - /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ - if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && - !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && - !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#endif -#endif - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP)) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - if (rsa == NULL - || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - } - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) - { - if (dh == NULL - || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - } - else -#endif - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -err: - return(0); - } - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) - { - unsigned int len, padding_len; - unsigned char *d; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) - { - len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; - padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - d[4] = len; - memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - d[5 + len] = padding_len; - memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; - l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; - s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; - s->init_off = 0; - } - - return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); -} -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ - -/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a - * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of - * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. - */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) - { - int ok; - long n; - /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return 1; - /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate - * message, so permit appropriate message length */ - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - if (!ok) return((int)n); - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) - return 2; - - return 1; - } -#endif - -int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) - { - int i = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) - { - i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, - SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), - px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); - if (i != 0) - return i; - } -#endif - if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) - i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey); - return i; - } |