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-rw-r--r--thirdparty/README.md5
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h4
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h8
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c5
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c14
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c4
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c29
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c120
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c11
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c32
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c4
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff13
12 files changed, 125 insertions, 124 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/README.md b/thirdparty/README.md
index 934d719ca6..2099bd773f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/README.md
+++ b/thirdparty/README.md
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ changes are marked with `// -- GODOT --` comments.
## mbedtls
- Upstream: https://tls.mbed.org/
-- Version: 2.16.4
+- Version: 2.16.5
- License: Apache 2.0
File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):
@@ -291,9 +291,6 @@ File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):
- LICENSE and apache-2.0.txt files
- Applied the patch in `thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/1453.diff` (PR 1453).
Soon to be merged upstream. Check it out at next update.
-- Applied the patch in `thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff`. This disables VIA
- padlock support which defines a symbol `unsupported` which clashes with
- a symbol in libwebsockets.
- Added 2 files `godot_core_mbedtls_platform.{c,h}` providing configuration
for light bundling with core.
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 8d9c31a504..834cced87f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -2542,9 +2542,7 @@
*
* This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
*/
-// -- GODOT start --
-// #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-// -- GODOT end --
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
index aeffb16699..8e2ce03c32 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -40,16 +40,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 4
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 5
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100400
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.4"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.4"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100500
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.5"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.5"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
index 6713bcbf6f..87ccf42fad 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
@@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs )
if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
- /* Actually resize up in this case */
+ /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */
if( X->n <= nblimbs )
return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) );
+ /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */
for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- )
if( X->p[i] != 0 )
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y )
if( X == Y )
return( 0 );
- if( Y->p == NULL )
+ if( Y->n == 0 )
{
mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
return( 0 );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
index 273997577b..8d010b59ac 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
@@ -361,6 +361,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
*olen = 0;
block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx );
+ if ( 0 == block_size )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
+ }
if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB )
{
@@ -396,11 +400,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
}
#endif
- if ( 0 == block_size )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
- }
-
if( input == output &&
( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size ) )
{
@@ -459,11 +458,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
*/
if( 0 != ilen )
{
- if( 0 == block_size )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
- }
-
/* Encryption: only cache partial blocks
* Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block
* Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
index 3cf3d7cc4f..6b72e0d927 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
*p_sign_tries = 0;
do
{
- if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
+ if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
*p_key_tries = 0;
do
{
- if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
+ if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
index ba56b70f77..4556f88a55 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
@@ -61,43 +61,28 @@
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#endif
#include <windows.h>
-#include <bcrypt.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
- * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
- * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
- * warning when including intsafe.h.
- */
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
-#endif
-#include <intsafe.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+#include <wincrypt.h>
int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
size_t *olen )
{
- ULONG len_as_ulong = 0;
+ HCRYPTPROV provider;
((void) data);
*olen = 0;
- /*
- * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
- * 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into
- * a ULONG.
- */
- if ( FAILED( SizeTToULong( len, &len_as_ulong ) ) )
+ if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL,
+ PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
}
- if ( !BCRYPT_SUCCESS( BCryptGenRandom( NULL, output, len_as_ulong, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG ) ) )
+ if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE )
{
+ CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
}
+ CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
*olen = len;
return( 0 );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
index ae210bca6a..d5004577a1 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
@@ -678,6 +678,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
+ * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero.
+ *
+ * The value zero is:
+ * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter
+ * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete().
+ *
+ * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to
+ * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early.
+ */
+static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X )
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
* Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key
*/
static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
@@ -729,54 +755,84 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
}
/* Import N */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- p += len;
/* Import E */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0, p, len ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, &T ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- p += len;
/* Import D */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
- p, len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ &T, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- p += len;
/* Import P */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, p, len, NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- p += len;
/* Import Q */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T,
+ NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- p += len;
- /* Complete the RSA private key */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 )
- goto cleanup;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+ /*
+ * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in
+ * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by
+ * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid
+ * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading
+ * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which
+ * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q
+ * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a
+ * description of one such attack.
+ */
+
+ /* Import DP */
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Import DQ */
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Import QP */
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+#else
+ /* Verify existance of the CRT params */
+ if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+#endif
- /* Check optional parameters */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
+ /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default
+ * implementation but is still called:
+ * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to
+ * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors)
+ * - as is also sanity-checks the key
+ *
+ * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with
+ * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example.
+ */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 )
+ {
goto cleanup;
+ }
if( p != end )
{
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
index af1a878599..09fd379fdb 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
{
int ret = 0;
int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
+#endif
int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@@ -259,6 +262,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 );
have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 );
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 );
+ have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 );
+ have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 );
+#endif
+
/*
* Check whether provided parameters are enough
* to deduce all others. The following incomplete
@@ -324,7 +333,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- if( is_priv )
+ if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) )
{
ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
&ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
index a3697f13f9..9c2e36547e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -65,19 +65,6 @@
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
- * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
- * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
- * warning when including intsafe.h.
- */
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
-#endif
-#include <intsafe.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
#else
#include <time.h>
#endif
@@ -1290,7 +1277,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
char filename[MAX_PATH];
char *p;
size_t len = strlen( path );
- int lengthAsInt = 0;
WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
HANDLE hFind;
@@ -1305,18 +1291,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
p = filename + len;
filename[len++] = '*';
- if ( FAILED ( SizeTToInt( len, &lengthAsInt ) ) )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
- /*
- * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming
- * string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the
- * incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to
- * change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the
- * incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with
- * MultiByteToWideChar().
- */
- w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, lengthAsInt, szDir,
+ w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,
MAX_PATH - 3 );
if( w_ret == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -1333,11 +1308,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )
continue;
- if ( FAILED( SizeTToInt( wcslen( file_data.cFileName ), &lengthAsInt ) ) )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
- lengthAsInt,
+ lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),
p, (int) len - 1,
NULL, NULL );
if( w_ret == 0 )
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c
index b65a11c6aa..7406a97542 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c
@@ -226,7 +226,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
/*
* Prepare signature
*/
- mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
+ ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff b/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ace48891c..0000000000
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
---- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
-+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
-@@ -2477,7 +2477,9 @@
- *
- * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
- */
--#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-+// -- GODOT start --
-+// #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-+// -- GODOT end --
-
- /**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C