mbedtls: Update to upstream version 2.16.5

Fixes https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02

Drop patch to disable VIA padlock since we no longer use libwebsockets,
so there's no conflict anymore.

12 files changed, 125 insertions, 124 deletions

diff --git a/thirdparty/README.md b/thirdparty/README.md
index 934d719ca6..2099bd773f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/README.md
+++ b/thirdparty/README.md
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ changes are marked with `// -- GODOT --` comments.
 ## mbedtls
 
 - Upstream: https://tls.mbed.org/
-- Version: 2.16.4
+- Version: 2.16.5
 - License: Apache 2.0
 
 File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):
@@ -291,9 +291,6 @@ File extracted from upstream release tarball (`-apache.tgz` variant):
 - LICENSE and apache-2.0.txt files
 - Applied the patch in `thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/1453.diff` (PR 1453).
   Soon to be merged upstream. Check it out at next update.
-- Applied the patch in `thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff`. This disables VIA
-  padlock support which defines a symbol `unsupported` which clashes with
-  a symbol in libwebsockets.
 - Added 2 files `godot_core_mbedtls_platform.{c,h}` providing configuration
   for light bundling with core.
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 8d9c31a504..834cced87f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -2542,9 +2542,7 @@
  *
  * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
  */
-// -- GODOT start --
-// #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-// -- GODOT end --
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
 
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
index aeffb16699..8e2ce03c32 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -40,16 +40,16 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR  2
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  16
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  4
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  5
 
 /**
  * The single version number has the following structure:
  *    MMNNPP00
  *    Major version | Minor version | Patch version
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x02100400
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "2.16.4"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "mbed TLS 2.16.4"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x02100500
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "2.16.5"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "mbed TLS 2.16.5"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
index 6713bcbf6f..87ccf42fad 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
@@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs )
     if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
 
-    /* Actually resize up in this case */
+    /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */
     if( X->n <= nblimbs )
         return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) );
+    /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */
 
     for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- )
         if( X->p[i] != 0 )
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y )
     if( X == Y )
         return( 0 );
 
-    if( Y->p == NULL )
+    if( Y->n == 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
         return( 0 );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
index 273997577b..8d010b59ac 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
@@ -361,6 +361,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
 
     *olen = 0;
     block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx );
+    if ( 0 == block_size )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
+    }
 
     if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB )
     {
@@ -396,11 +400,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
     }
 #endif
 
-    if ( 0 == block_size )
-    {
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
-    }
-
     if( input == output &&
        ( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size ) )
     {
@@ -459,11 +458,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
          */
         if( 0 != ilen )
         {
-            if( 0 == block_size )
-            {
-                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT );
-            }
-
             /* Encryption: only cache partial blocks
              * Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block
              * Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
index 3cf3d7cc4f..6b72e0d927 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
     *p_sign_tries = 0;
     do
     {
-        if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
+        if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 )
         {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
             goto cleanup;
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
         *p_key_tries = 0;
         do
         {
-            if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
+            if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 )
             {
                 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
                 goto cleanup;
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
index ba56b70f77..4556f88a55 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
@@ -61,43 +61,28 @@
 #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
 #endif
 #include <windows.h>
-#include <bcrypt.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
- * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
- * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
- * warning when including intsafe.h.
- */
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
-#endif
-#include <intsafe.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+#include <wincrypt.h>
 
 int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
                            size_t *olen )
 {
-    ULONG len_as_ulong = 0;
+    HCRYPTPROV provider;
     ((void) data);
     *olen = 0;
 
-    /*
-     * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
-     * 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into
-     * a ULONG.
-     */
-    if ( FAILED( SizeTToULong( len, &len_as_ulong ) ) )
+    if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL,
+                              PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE )
     {
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
     }
 
-    if ( !BCRYPT_SUCCESS( BCryptGenRandom( NULL, output, len_as_ulong, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG ) ) )
+    if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE )
     {
+        CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
     }
 
+    CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 );
     *olen = len;
 
     return( 0 );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
index ae210bca6a..d5004577a1 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
@@ -678,6 +678,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
 /*
+ * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero.
+ *
+ * The value zero is:
+ * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter
+ * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete().
+ *
+ * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to
+ * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early.
+ */
+static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p,
+                                 const unsigned char *end,
+                                 mbedtls_mpi *X )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
  * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key
  */
 static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
@@ -729,54 +755,84 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
     }
 
     /* Import N */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                                      MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-                                        NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL,
+                                        NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
-    p += len;
 
     /* Import E */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                                      MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-                                        NULL, 0, p, len ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                        NULL, &T ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
-    p += len;
 
     /* Import D */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                                      MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-                                        p, len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                        &T, NULL ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
-    p += len;
 
     /* Import P */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                                      MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, p, len, NULL, 0,
-                                        NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL,
+                                        NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
-    p += len;
 
     /* Import Q */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                                      MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len,
-                                        NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T,
+                                        NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
-    p += len;
 
-    /* Complete the RSA private key */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 )
-        goto cleanup;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+    /*
+    * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in
+    * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by
+    * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid
+    * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading
+    * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which
+    * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q
+    * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a
+    * description of one such attack.
+    */
+
+    /* Import DP */
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 )
+       goto cleanup;
+
+    /* Import DQ */
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 )
+       goto cleanup;
+
+    /* Import QP */
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 )
+       goto cleanup;
+
+#else
+    /* Verify existance of the CRT params */
+    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
+       goto cleanup;
+#endif
 
-    /* Check optional parameters */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
+    /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default
+     * implementation but is still called:
+     * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to
+     *   pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors)
+     * - as is also sanity-checks the key
+     *
+     * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with
+     * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example.
+     */
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 ||
+        ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 )
+    {
         goto cleanup;
+    }
 
     if( p != end )
     {
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
index af1a878599..09fd379fdb 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
 {
     int ret = 0;
     int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
+#endif
     int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
 
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@@ -259,6 +262,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
     have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 );
     have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 );
 
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 );
+    have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 );
+    have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 );
+#endif
+
     /*
      * Check whether provided parameters are enough
      * to deduce all others. The following incomplete
@@ -324,7 +333,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
      */
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if( is_priv )
+    if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) )
     {
         ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P,  &ctx->Q,  &ctx->D,
                                       &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP );
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
index a3697f13f9..9c2e36547e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -65,19 +65,6 @@
 
 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
 #include <windows.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
- * <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
- * These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
- * warning when including intsafe.h.
- */
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
-#endif
-#include <intsafe.h>
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
 #else
 #include <time.h>
 #endif
@@ -1290,7 +1277,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
     char filename[MAX_PATH];
     char *p;
     size_t len = strlen( path );
-    int lengthAsInt = 0;
 
     WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
     HANDLE hFind;
@@ -1305,18 +1291,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
     p = filename + len;
     filename[len++] = '*';
 
-    if ( FAILED ( SizeTToInt( len, &lengthAsInt ) ) )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
-    /*
-     * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming
-     * string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the
-     * incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to
-     * change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the
-     * incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with
-     * MultiByteToWideChar().
-     */
-    w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, lengthAsInt, szDir,
+    w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,
                                  MAX_PATH - 3 );
     if( w_ret == 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -1333,11 +1308,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
         if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )
             continue;
 
-        if ( FAILED( SizeTToInt( wcslen( file_data.cFileName ), &lengthAsInt ) ) )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
         w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
-                                     lengthAsInt,
+                                     lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),
                                      p, (int) len - 1,
                                      NULL, NULL );
         if( w_ret == 0 )
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c
index b65a11c6aa..7406a97542 100644
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c
@@ -226,7 +226,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
     /*
      * Prepare signature
      */
-    mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
+    ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len,
                                  f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff b/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ace48891c..0000000000
--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/padlock.diff
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
---- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
-+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h
-@@ -2477,7 +2477,9 @@
-  *
-  * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
-  */
--#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-+// -- GODOT start --
-+// #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-+// -- GODOT end --
- 
- /**
-  * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C