diff options
author | Rémi Verschelde <rverschelde@gmail.com> | 2016-10-12 23:06:17 +0200 |
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committer | Rémi Verschelde <rverschelde@gmail.com> | 2016-10-15 11:50:41 +0200 |
commit | 422196759f93df249db38619f136cabd5dcf42cd (patch) | |
tree | 1e5846507af0f8f1bc7ca294ccfb0d4ac3392d17 /thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | |
parent | d9a291f6411f2e571c181da0ac89f550ba73f681 (diff) |
openssl: Move to a module and split thirdparty lib
Same rationale as the previous commits.
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c')
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 2077 |
1 files changed, 2077 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..302464e643 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -0,0 +1,2077 @@ +/* ssl/ssl_ciph.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +# include <openssl/comp.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +# include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif +#include "ssl_locl.h" + +#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 +#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 +#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 +#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 +#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 +#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 +#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 +#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 +#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 +#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 +#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 14 + +static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL +}; + +#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 +#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 +#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 + +static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; + +#define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 +#define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 +#define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 +#define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 +#define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 +#define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 +/* + * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined + * in the ssl_locl.h + */ +#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST +static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL +}; + +/* + * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation + * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is + * found + */ +static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC +}; + +static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA, + SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94, 0, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, + SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 +}; + +#define CIPHER_ADD 1 +#define CIPHER_KILL 2 +#define CIPHER_DEL 3 +#define CIPHER_ORD 4 +#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 + +typedef struct cipher_order_st { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + int active; + int dead; + struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; +} CIPHER_ORDER; + +static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { + /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ + {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* + * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in + * ALL!) + */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* + * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here + * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kEDH + * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) + */ + {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHr, 0, SSL_kDHr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHd, 0, SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kKRB5, 0, SSL_kKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHr, 0, SSL_kECDHr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHe, 0, SSL_kECDHe, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* server authentication aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aKRB5, 0, 0, SSL_aKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + /* no such ciphersuites supported! */ + {0, SSL_TXT_aDH, 0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aECDH, 0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST94, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ + {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, 0, SSL_kEDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, 0, SSL_kEECDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_KRB5, 0, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* symmetric encryption aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128 | SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0}, + + /* MAC aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* protocol version aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV2, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* export flag */ + {0, SSL_TXT_EXP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* strength classes */ + {0, SSL_TXT_EXP40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXP40, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_EXP56, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXP56, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, 0, 0, 0}, + /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ + {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0}, + /* "DHE-" aliases to "EDH-" labels (for forward compatibility) */ + {0, SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, + 0, 0, 0,}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, + 0, 0, 0,}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, + SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0,}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, + 0, 0, 0,}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, + 0, 0, 0,}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, + SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0,}, +}; + +/* + * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if + * it is available. Otherwise return 0 + */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + +static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) +{ + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; + int pkey_id = 0; + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); + if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) > 0) { + return pkey_id; + } + return 0; +} + +#else + +static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) +{ + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; + ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; + int pkey_id = 0; + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); + if (ameth) { + if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) <= 0) + pkey_id = 0; + } + if (tmpeng) + ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); + return pkey_id; +} + +#endif + +void ssl_load_ciphers(void) +{ + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_cbc); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_ede3_cbc); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc4); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc2_cbc); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_idea_cbc); +#else + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] = NULL; +#endif + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_cbc); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_cbc); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_128_cbc); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_256_cbc); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_gost89_cnt); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc); + + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_gcm); + ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] = + EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_gcm); + + ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5); + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] = + EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]); + OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0); + ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1); + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] = + EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]); + OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0); + ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] = + EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94); + if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]) { + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] = + EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]); + OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0); + } + ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = + EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC); + ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac"); + if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) { + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; + } + + ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha256); + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] = + EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]); + ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha384); + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] = + EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + +static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) +{ + return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); +} + +static void load_builtin_compressions(void) +{ + int got_write_lock = 0; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL) { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + got_write_lock = 1; + + if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL) { + SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; + + MemCheck_off(); + ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); + if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { + comp = (SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP)); + if (comp != NULL) { + comp->method = COMP_zlib(); + if (comp->method && comp->method->type == NID_undef) + OPENSSL_free(comp); + else { + comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; + comp->name = comp->method->name; + sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp); + } + } + sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); + } + MemCheck_on(); + } + } + + if (got_write_lock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); +} +#endif + +int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, + const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, + int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp) +{ + int i; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + c = s->cipher; + if (c == NULL) + return (0); + if (comp != NULL) { + SSL_COMP ctmp; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + load_builtin_compressions(); +#endif + + *comp = NULL; + ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; + if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { + i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); + if (i >= 0) + *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); + else + *comp = NULL; + } + } + + if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) + return (0); + + switch (c->algorithm_enc) { + case SSL_DES: + i = SSL_ENC_DES_IDX; + break; + case SSL_3DES: + i = SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX; + break; + case SSL_RC4: + i = SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX; + break; + case SSL_RC2: + i = SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX; + break; + case SSL_IDEA: + i = SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX; + break; + case SSL_eNULL: + i = SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX; + break; + case SSL_AES128: + i = SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX; + break; + case SSL_AES256: + i = SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA128: + i = SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA256: + i = SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX; + break; + case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: + i = SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX; + break; + case SSL_SEED: + i = SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX; + break; + case SSL_AES128GCM: + i = SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX; + break; + case SSL_AES256GCM: + i = SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX; + break; + default: + i = -1; + break; + } + + if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX)) + *enc = NULL; + else { + if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) + *enc = EVP_enc_null(); + else + *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i]; + } + + switch (c->algorithm_mac) { + case SSL_MD5: + i = SSL_MD_MD5_IDX; + break; + case SSL_SHA1: + i = SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX; + break; + case SSL_SHA256: + i = SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX; + break; + case SSL_SHA384: + i = SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX; + break; + case SSL_GOST94: + i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX; + break; + case SSL_GOST89MAC: + i = SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX; + break; + default: + i = -1; + break; + } + if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)) { + *md = NULL; + if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) + *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; + if (mac_secret_size != NULL) + *mac_secret_size = 0; + if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) + mac_pkey_type = NULL; + } else { + *md = ssl_digest_methods[i]; + if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) + *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; + if (mac_secret_size != NULL) + *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; + } + + if ((*enc != NULL) && + (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) + && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { + const EVP_CIPHER *evp; + + if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || + s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) + return 1; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (FIPS_mode()) + return 1; +#endif + + if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + return (1); + } else + return (0); +} + +int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md) +{ + if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) { + return 0; + } + *mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx]; + if (*mask) + *md = ssl_digest_methods[idx]; + else + *md = NULL; + return 1; +} + +#define ITEM_SEP(a) \ + (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) + +static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) +{ + if (curr == *tail) + return; + if (curr == *head) + *head = curr->next; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + (*tail)->next = curr; + curr->prev = *tail; + curr->next = NULL; + *tail = curr; +} + +static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) +{ + if (curr == *head) + return; + if (curr == *tail) + *tail = curr->prev; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + (*head)->prev = curr; + curr->next = *head; + curr->prev = NULL; + *head = curr; +} + +static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, + unsigned long *enc, unsigned long *mac, + unsigned long *ssl) +{ + *mkey = 0; + *auth = 0; + *enc = 0; + *mac = 0; + *ssl = 0; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + *mkey |= SSL_kRSA; + *auth |= SSL_aRSA; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + *auth |= SSL_aDSS; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH + *mkey |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH; + *auth |= SSL_aDH; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + *mkey |= SSL_kKRB5; + *auth |= SSL_aKRB5; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + *auth |= SSL_aECDSA; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + *mkey |= SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHr; + *auth |= SSL_aECDH; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + *mkey |= SSL_kPSK; + *auth |= SSL_aPSK; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + *mkey |= SSL_kSRP; +#endif + /* + * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they do not + * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange + */ + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) { + *auth |= SSL_aGOST94; + } + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) { + *auth |= SSL_aGOST01; + } + /* + * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * + */ + if ((*auth & (SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01)) == (SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01)) { + *mkey |= SSL_kGOST; + } +#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL + *enc |= SSL_eNULL; +#endif + + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_DES : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_3DES : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_RC4 : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_RC2 : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128 : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256 : 0; + *enc |= + (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] == + NULL) ? SSL_AES128GCM : 0; + *enc |= + (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] == + NULL) ? SSL_AES256GCM : 0; + *enc |= + (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] == + NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128 : 0; + *enc |= + (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] == + NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256 : 0; + *enc |= + (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] == + NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT : 0; + *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SEED : 0; + + *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 : 0; + *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1 : 0; + *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA256 : 0; + *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA384 : 0; + *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94 : 0; + *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL + || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == + NID_undef) ? SSL_GOST89MAC : 0; + +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, + int num_of_ciphers, + unsigned long disabled_mkey, + unsigned long disabled_auth, + unsigned long disabled_enc, + unsigned long disabled_mac, + unsigned long disabled_ssl, + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + int i, co_list_num; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + /* + * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the + * method selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). + * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num + * entries. + */ + + /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ + co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { + c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); + /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ + if ((c != NULL) && c->valid && +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + (!FIPS_mode() || (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) && +#endif + !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) && + !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) && + !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) && + !(c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac) && + !(c->algorithm_ssl & disabled_ssl)) { + co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; + co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; + co_list_num++; +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n", i, c->name, c->id, + c->algorithm_mkey, c->algorithm_auth); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + /* + * if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err; + */ + } + } + + /* + * Prepare linked list from list entries + */ + if (co_list_num > 0) { + co_list[0].prev = NULL; + + if (co_list_num > 1) { + co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; + + for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { + co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; + co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; + + *head_p = &co_list[0]; + *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; + } +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, + int num_of_group_aliases, + unsigned long disabled_mkey, + unsigned long disabled_auth, + unsigned long disabled_enc, + unsigned long disabled_mac, + unsigned long disabled_ssl, + CIPHER_ORDER *head) +{ + CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; + int i; + unsigned long mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; + unsigned long mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; + unsigned long mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; + unsigned long mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; + unsigned long mask_ssl = ~disabled_ssl; + + /* + * First, add the real ciphers as already collected + */ + ciph_curr = head; + ca_curr = ca_list; + while (ciph_curr != NULL) { + *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; + ca_curr++; + ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; + } + + /* + * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. + * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which + * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), + * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { + unsigned long algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; + unsigned long algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; + unsigned long algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; + unsigned long algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; + unsigned long algorithm_ssl = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_ssl; + + if (algorithm_mkey) + if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_auth) + if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_enc) + if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_mac) + if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_ssl) + if ((algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) == 0) + continue; + + *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); + ca_curr++; + } + + *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ +} + +static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id, + unsigned long alg_mkey, + unsigned long alg_auth, + unsigned long alg_enc, + unsigned long alg_mac, + unsigned long alg_ssl, + unsigned long algo_strength, int rule, + int strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; + const SSL_CIPHER *cp; + int reverse = 0; + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n", + rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, + algo_strength, strength_bits); +#endif + + if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) + reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between + * currently deleted ciphers */ + + head = *head_p; + tail = *tail_p; + + if (reverse) { + next = tail; + last = head; + } else { + next = head; + last = tail; + } + + curr = NULL; + for (;;) { + if (curr == last) + break; + + curr = next; + + if (curr == NULL) + break; + + next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; + + cp = curr->cipher; + + /* + * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits + * or the algorithms used. + */ + if (strength_bits >= 0) { + if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) + continue; + } else { +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", + cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, + cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, + cp->algo_strength); +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + if (cipher_id && cipher_id != cp->id) + continue; +#endif + if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) + continue; + if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) + continue; + if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) + continue; + if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) + continue; + if (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) + && !(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) + && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT) + && !(cp->algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT)) + continue; + } + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); +#endif + + /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ + if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (!curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 1; + } + } + /* Move the added cipher to this location */ + else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { + /* reverse == 1 */ + if (curr->active) { + /* + * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for + * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works + * in reverse to maintain the order) + */ + ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 0; + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (head == curr) + head = curr->next; + else + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + if (tail == curr) + tail = curr->prev; + curr->active = 0; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + curr->next = NULL; + curr->prev = NULL; + } + } + + *head_p = head; + *tail_p = tail; +} + +static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses; + CIPHER_ORDER *curr; + + /* + * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting + * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting + * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. + */ + max_strength_bits = 0; + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) + max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; + curr = curr->next; + } + + number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int)); + if (!number_uses) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int)); + + /* + * Now find the strength_bits values actually used + */ + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active) + number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; + curr = curr->next; + } + /* + * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending + * order. + */ + for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) + if (number_uses[i] > 0) + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, + tail_p); + + OPENSSL_free(number_uses); + return (1); +} + +static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list) +{ + unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, + algo_strength; + const char *l, *buf; + int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; + unsigned long cipher_id = 0; + char ch; + + retval = 1; + l = rule_str; + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + + if (ch == '\0') + break; /* done */ + if (ch == '-') { + rule = CIPHER_DEL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '+') { + rule = CIPHER_ORD; + l++; + } else if (ch == '!') { + rule = CIPHER_KILL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '@') { + rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; + l++; + } else { + rule = CIPHER_ADD; + } + + if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { + l++; + continue; + } + + alg_mkey = 0; + alg_auth = 0; + alg_enc = 0; + alg_mac = 0; + alg_ssl = 0; + algo_strength = 0; + + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + buf = l; + buflen = 0; +#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC + while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || + ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || + ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.')) +#else + while (isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.')) +#endif + { + ch = *(++l); + buflen++; + } + + if (buflen == 0) { + /* + * We hit something we cannot deal with, + * it is no command or separator nor + * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + retval = found = 0; + l++; + break; + } + + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { + found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ + break; /* special treatment */ + } + + /* check for multi-part specification */ + if (ch == '+') { + multi = 1; + l++; + } else + multi = 0; + + /* + * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful + * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation + * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher + * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. + * So additionally check whether the cipher name found + * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: + * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is + * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot + * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) + */ + j = found = 0; + cipher_id = 0; + while (ca_list[j]) { + if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) && + (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { + found = 1; + break; + } else + j++; + } + + if (!found) + break; /* ignore this entry */ + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { + if (alg_mkey) { + alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + if (!alg_mkey) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { + if (alg_auth) { + alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + if (!alg_auth) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { + if (alg_enc) { + alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + if (!alg_enc) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { + if (alg_mac) { + alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + if (!alg_mac) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) { + if (algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) { + algo_strength &= + (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) | + ~SSL_EXP_MASK; + if (!(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { + if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { + algo_strength &= + (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | + ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; + if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + algo_strength |= + ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT) { + algo_strength |= SSL_NOT_DEFAULT; + } + + if (ca_list[j]->valid) { + /* + * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not + * become part of the search pattern! + */ + + cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; + } else { + /* + * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the + * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern + */ + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl) { + if (alg_ssl) { + alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl; + if (!alg_ssl) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else + alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl; + } + } + + if (!multi) + break; + } + + /* + * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it + */ + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ + ok = 0; + if ((buflen == 8) && !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8)) + ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); + else + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + if (ok == 0) + retval = 0; + /* + * We do not support any "multi" options + * together with "@", so throw away the + * rest of the command, if any left, until + * end or ':' is found. + */ + while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) + l++; + } else if (found) { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, + alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, + alg_ssl, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, + tail_p); + } else { + while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) + l++; + } + if (*l == '\0') + break; /* done */ + } + + return (retval); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, + const char **prule_str) +{ + unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; + if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { + suiteb_comb2 = 1; + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; + } + + if (suiteb_flags) { + c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; + } else + suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + + if (!suiteb_flags) + return 1; + /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ + + if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { + if (meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + else + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; + } +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + switch (suiteb_flags) { + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: + if (suiteb_comb2) + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + else + *prule_str = + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + break; + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; + break; + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + break; + } + /* Set auto ECDH parameter determination */ + c->ecdh_tmp_auto = 1; + return 1; +# else + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; +# endif +} +#endif + +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **cipher_list_by_id, + const char *rule_str, CERT *c) +{ + int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases; + unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, + disabled_ssl; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list; + const char *rule_p; + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; + + /* + * Return with error if nothing to do. + */ + if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) + return NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) + return NULL; +#endif + + /* + * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled + * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. + */ + ssl_cipher_get_disabled(&disabled_mkey, &disabled_auth, &disabled_enc, + &disabled_mac, &disabled_ssl); + + /* + * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled + * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so + * it is used for allocation. + */ + num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", + num_of_ciphers); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + co_list = + (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers); + if (co_list == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); /* Failure */ + } + + ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, + disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, + disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, co_list, &head, + &tail); + + /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: */ + + /* + * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key + * exchange mechanisms + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* AES is our preferred symmetric cipher */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Low priority for MD5 */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* + * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain + * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but + * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + /* + * ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, + * &head, &tail); + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* + * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains + * in force within each class + */ + if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return NULL; + } + + /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* + * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. + * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names + * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. + * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher + * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise + * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). + */ + num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER); + num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; + ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max); + if (ca_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); /* Failure */ + } + ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, + disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, + disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, head); + + /* + * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule + * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. + */ + ok = 1; + rule_p = rule_str; + if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, + &head, &tail, ca_list); + rule_p += 7; + if (*rule_p == ':') + rule_p++; + } + + if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list); + + OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ + + if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error + * if we cannot get one. + */ + if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added + * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). + */ + for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (curr->active + && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) +#else + if (curr->active) +#endif + { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher); +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); +#endif + } + } + OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ + + tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); + if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + return NULL; + } + if (*cipher_list != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); + *cipher_list = cipherstack; + if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); + *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, + ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); + return (cipherstack); +} + +char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) +{ + int is_export, pkl, kl; + const char *ver, *exp_str; + const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; + unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, alg2; +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + static const char *format = + "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n"; +#else + static const char *format = + "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n"; +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; + alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; + alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; + alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl; + + alg2 = cipher->algorithm2; + + is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher); + pkl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); + kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher); + exp_str = is_export ? " export" : ""; + + if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) + ver = "SSLv2"; + else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3) + ver = "SSLv3"; + else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) + ver = "TLSv1.2"; + else + ver = "unknown"; + + switch (alg_mkey) { + case SSL_kRSA: + kx = is_export ? (pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)") : "RSA"; + break; + case SSL_kDHr: + kx = "DH/RSA"; + break; + case SSL_kDHd: + kx = "DH/DSS"; + break; + case SSL_kKRB5: + kx = "KRB5"; + break; + case SSL_kEDH: + kx = is_export ? (pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)") : "DH"; + break; + case SSL_kECDHr: + kx = "ECDH/RSA"; + break; + case SSL_kECDHe: + kx = "ECDH/ECDSA"; + break; + case SSL_kEECDH: + kx = "ECDH"; + break; + case SSL_kPSK: + kx = "PSK"; + break; + case SSL_kSRP: + kx = "SRP"; + break; + case SSL_kGOST: + kx = "GOST"; + break; + default: + kx = "unknown"; + } + + switch (alg_auth) { + case SSL_aRSA: + au = "RSA"; + break; + case SSL_aDSS: + au = "DSS"; + break; + case SSL_aDH: + au = "DH"; + break; + case SSL_aKRB5: + au = "KRB5"; + break; + case SSL_aECDH: + au = "ECDH"; + break; + case SSL_aNULL: + au = "None"; + break; + case SSL_aECDSA: + au = "ECDSA"; + break; + case SSL_aPSK: + au = "PSK"; + break; + case SSL_aSRP: + au = "SRP"; + break; + case SSL_aGOST94: + au = "GOST94"; + break; + case SSL_aGOST01: + au = "GOST01"; + break; + default: + au = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_enc) { + case SSL_DES: + enc = (is_export && kl == 5) ? "DES(40)" : "DES(56)"; + break; + case SSL_3DES: + enc = "3DES(168)"; + break; + case SSL_RC4: + enc = is_export ? (kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)") + : ((alg2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) ? "RC4(64)" : "RC4(128)"); + break; + case SSL_RC2: + enc = is_export ? (kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)") : "RC2(128)"; + break; + case SSL_IDEA: + enc = "IDEA(128)"; + break; + case SSL_eNULL: + enc = "None"; + break; + case SSL_AES128: + enc = "AES(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256: + enc = "AES(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(256)"; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA128: + enc = "Camellia(128)"; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA256: + enc = "Camellia(256)"; + break; + case SSL_SEED: + enc = "SEED(128)"; + break; + case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: + enc = "GOST89(256)"; + break; + default: + enc = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_mac) { + case SSL_MD5: + mac = "MD5"; + break; + case SSL_SHA1: + mac = "SHA1"; + break; + case SSL_SHA256: + mac = "SHA256"; + break; + case SSL_SHA384: + mac = "SHA384"; + break; + case SSL_AEAD: + mac = "AEAD"; + break; + case SSL_GOST89MAC: + mac = "GOST89"; + break; + case SSL_GOST94: + mac = "GOST94"; + break; + default: + mac = "unknown"; + break; + } + + if (buf == NULL) { + len = 128; + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (buf == NULL) + return ("OPENSSL_malloc Error"); + } else if (len < 128) + return ("Buffer too small"); + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac, + exp_str, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl); +#else + BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac, + exp_str); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + return (buf); +} + +char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i; + + if (c == NULL) + return ("(NONE)"); + i = (int)(c->id >> 24L); + if (i == 3) + return ("TLSv1/SSLv3"); + else if (i == 2) + return ("SSLv2"); + else + return ("unknown"); +} + +/* return the actual cipher being used */ +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + if (c != NULL) + return (c->name); + return ("(NONE)"); +} + +/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ +int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (c != NULL) { + if (alg_bits != NULL) + *alg_bits = c->alg_bits; + ret = c->strength_bits; + } + return (ret); +} + +unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + return c->id; +} + +SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) +{ + SSL_COMP *ctmp; + int i, nn; + + if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) + return (NULL); + nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); + for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { + ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); + if (ctmp->id == n) + return (ctmp); + } + return (NULL); +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm) +{ + return 1; +} + +const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp) +{ + return NULL; +} +#else +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) +{ + load_builtin_compressions(); + return (ssl_comp_methods); +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) + *meths) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; + ssl_comp_methods = meths; + return old_meths; +} + +static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) +{ + OPENSSL_free(cm); +} + +void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; + ssl_comp_methods = NULL; + sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); +} + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) +{ + SSL_COMP *comp; + + if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef) + return 1; + + /*- + * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the + * compression number ranges should be the following: + * + * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF + * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA + * 193 to 255: reserved for private use + */ + if (id < 193 || id > 255) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, + SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); + return 0; + } + + MemCheck_off(); + comp = (SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP)); + comp->id = id; + comp->method = cm; + load_builtin_compressions(); + if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(comp); + MemCheck_on(); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, + SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); + return (1); + } else if ((ssl_comp_methods == NULL) + || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { + OPENSSL_free(comp); + MemCheck_on(); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (1); + } else { + MemCheck_on(); + return (0); + } +} + +const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) +{ + if (comp) + return comp->name; + return NULL; +} +#endif +/* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */ +int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; + + alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; + + if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + /* + * we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH since no certificate is needed + * for anon ECDH and for authenticated EECDH, the check for the auth + * algorithm will set i correctly NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC + * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA we need an RSA cert. Placing the + * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA checks ensures the correct cert is + * chosen. + */ + return SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + return SSL_PKEY_ECC; + else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) + return SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; + else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) + return SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) + return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) + /* VRS something else here? */ + return -1; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) + return SSL_PKEY_GOST94; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) + return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + return -1; +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); + if (c == NULL || c->valid == 0) + return NULL; + return c; +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) +{ + return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); +} |