Merge pull request #15664 from akien-mga/thirdparty

Bugfix updates to various thirdparty libraries

58 files changed, 692 insertions, 328 deletions

diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c
index 07e63fb424..4961254d9a 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c
@@ -94,8 +94,23 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
             TCHAR *wdir = NULL;
             /* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */
             size_t index = 0, len_0 = strlen(extdir) + 1;
-
-            wdir = (TCHAR *)calloc(len_0, sizeof(TCHAR));
+            size_t amount;
+
+            /*
+             * Size check
+             * The reasoning is that absolutely worst case, each byte in
+             * extdir will take up one TCHAR each, so the maximum size in
+             * bytes that we can tolerate is MAX_PATH TCHARs...  not counting
+             * the ending NUL.
+             */
+            if ((len_0 - 1) > MAX_PATH * sizeof(TCHAR)) {
+                free(*ctx);
+                *ctx = NULL;
+                errno = EINVAL;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            amount = len_0 * sizeof(TCHAR);
+            wdir = (TCHAR *)malloc(amount);
             if (wdir == NULL) {
                 if (extdirbuf != NULL) {
                     free(extdirbuf);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
index c429342e03..0c8bb144a0 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
@@ -136,6 +137,11 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
         goto err;
     }
 
+    if (len > INT_MAX) {
+        i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
         if ((ret = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
             return (NULL);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
index 0f56cd4e07..2e85e041e4 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x)
     int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1;
 
     n = i2d(x, NULL);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
     b = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(n);
     if (b == NULL) {
         ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9fd8b12ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* asn1t.h */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Internal ASN1 template structures and functions: not for application use */
+
+void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                            int combine);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
index aeea4eff7a..0cf7510ff0 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
@@ -61,9 +61,7 @@
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-static void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                                   int combine);
+#include "asn1_int.h"
 
 /* Free up an ASN1 structure */
 
@@ -77,8 +75,7 @@ void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
     asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, 0);
 }
 
-static void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                                   int combine)
+void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
 {
     const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt;
     const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
index 54f459d1ed..6ba90260da 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include "asn1_int.h"
 
 static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
                                     int combine);
@@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     return 1;
 
  memerr2:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
  memerr:
     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
@@ -209,7 +210,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     return 0;
 
  auxerr2:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
  auxerr:
     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
index 1fb7ad1cbf..aea0c2763c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
@@ -523,19 +523,11 @@ static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname,
 
 int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name)
 {
-    X509_NAME *in;
-
-    if (!xn || !name)
-        return (0);
-
-    if (*xn != name) {
-        in = X509_NAME_dup(name);
-        if (in != NULL) {
-            X509_NAME_free(*xn);
-            *xn = in;
-        }
-    }
-    return (*xn != NULL);
+    if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_NAME_free(*xn);
+    *xn = name;
+    return 1;
 }
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
index 2da23e4756..59f8553928 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
@@ -106,10 +106,14 @@ X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void)
     X509_PKEY *ret = NULL;
     ASN1_CTX c;
 
-    M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret, X509_PKEY);
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PKEY));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        c.line = __LINE__;
+        goto err;
+    }
     ret->version = 0;
-    M_ASN1_New(ret->enc_algor, X509_ALGOR_new);
-    M_ASN1_New(ret->enc_pkey, M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new);
+    ret->enc_algor = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    ret->enc_pkey = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
     ret->dec_pkey = NULL;
     ret->key_length = 0;
     ret->key_data = NULL;
@@ -117,8 +121,15 @@ X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void)
     ret->cipher.cipher = NULL;
     memset(ret->cipher.iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
     ret->references = 1;
-    return (ret);
-    M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW);
+    if (ret->enc_algor == NULL || ret->enc_pkey == NULL) {
+        c.line = __LINE__;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return ret;
+err:
+    X509_PKEY_free(ret);
+    ASN1_MAC_H_err(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, c.line);
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *x)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index eb3ab75934..1c82f53d5a 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
                 if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
                     short int *num;
                     num = va_arg(args, short int *);
-                    *num = currlen;
+                    *num = (short int)currlen;
                 } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { /* XXX */
                     long int *num;
                     num = va_arg(args, long int *);
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ fmtint(char **sbuffer,
     if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
         if (value < 0) {
             signvalue = '-';
-            uvalue = -(unsigned LLONG)value;
+            uvalue = 0 - (unsigned LLONG)value;
         } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)
             signvalue = '+';
         else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 195a7867a4..c4b63e44ba 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -145,10 +145,11 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
     int i, bits, ret = 0;
     BIGNUM *v, *rr;
 
-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
@@ -245,7 +246,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
     if (BN_is_odd(m)) {
 # ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD
         if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg
-            && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
+            && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)
+            && (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)
+            && (BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
             BN_ULONG A = a->d[0];
             ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL);
         } else
@@ -277,10 +280,12 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
     BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
     BN_RECP_CTX recp;
 
-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
@@ -411,7 +416,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
     BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
 
-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
     }
 
@@ -1217,10 +1224,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
 #define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
                 (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
 
-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     bn_check_top(p);
@@ -1348,10 +1356,12 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
     /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
     BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
 
-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 10b78f5126..f9c65f9f94 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
     memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
 #endif
 
+    if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+        BN_set_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
     a->top = b->top;
     a->neg = b->neg;
     bn_check_top(a);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index be95bd55d0..3af9db870b 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
         tmod.dmax = 2;
         tmod.neg = 0;
 
+        if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+            BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
         mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
 
 # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
index 3c618dc307..6b455a755f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -1032,46 +1032,6 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
             rr->top = top;
             goto end;
         }
-# if 0
-        if (i == 1 && !BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) {
-            BIGNUM *tmp_bn = (BIGNUM *)b;
-            if (bn_wexpand(tmp_bn, al) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-            tmp_bn->d[bl] = 0;
-            bl++;
-            i--;
-        } else if (i == -1 && !BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) {
-            BIGNUM *tmp_bn = (BIGNUM *)a;
-            if (bn_wexpand(tmp_bn, bl) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-            tmp_bn->d[al] = 0;
-            al++;
-            i++;
-        }
-        if (i == 0) {
-            /* symmetric and > 4 */
-            /* 16 or larger */
-            j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
-            j = 1 << (j - 1);
-            k = j + j;
-            t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-            if (al == j) {      /* exact multiple */
-                if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 2) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, al, t->d);
-            } else {
-                if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 4) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, al - j, j, t->d);
-            }
-            rr->top = top;
-            goto end;
-        }
-# endif
     }
 #endif                          /* BN_RECURSION */
     if (bn_wexpand(rr, top) == NULL)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
index efa48bdf87..f444af3fea 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
     t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t == NULL)
+        goto err;
 
     for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
         if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
@@ -255,10 +257,12 @@ int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
     int ret = 0;
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    if (!Xp1)
+    if (Xp1 == NULL)
         Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    if (!Xp2)
+    if (Xp2 == NULL)
         Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Xp1 == NULL || Xp2 == NULL)
+        goto error;
 
     if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, 0, 0))
         goto error;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index 1925428f5e..5fab45b2ec 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -469,11 +469,18 @@ void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, void *ptr)
     }
 }
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+extern int FIPS_crypto_threadid_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *));
+#endif
+
 int CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *))
 {
     if (threadid_callback)
         return 0;
     threadid_callback = func;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    FIPS_crypto_threadid_set_callback(func);
+#endif
     return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
index a882cb286e..8947a08731 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
  * ====================================================================
  */
 
+#include <e_os.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -185,3 +188,4 @@ int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
     return rv;
 }
+#endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index b58e3fa86f..6452482c87 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -207,7 +207,11 @@ static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE:
         if (p1 == -2)
             return dctx->kdf_type;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+        if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE)
+#else
         if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42)
+#endif
             return -2;
         dctx->kdf_type = p1;
         return 1;
@@ -448,7 +452,9 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
             return ret;
         *keylen = ret;
         return 1;
-    } else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) {
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) {
         unsigned char *Z = NULL;
         size_t Zlen = 0;
         if (!dctx->kdf_outlen || !dctx->kdf_oid)
@@ -479,6 +485,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
         }
         return ret;
     }
+#endif
     return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index c4fa105747..e22627f851 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     unsigned char *penc = NULL;
     int penclen;
     ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
 
     dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
     if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
@@ -159,8 +160,11 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
-                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+    aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
+    if (aobj == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
         return 1;
 
  err:
@@ -258,6 +262,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
         goto dsaerr;
     }
 
+    BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
         goto dsaerr;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 1fce0f81c2..21af2e159f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
     } else {
         p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (q == NULL)
+            goto err;
     }
 
     if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1))
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 58013a4a13..aa10dd12f6 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -224,7 +224,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 {
     BN_CTX *ctx;
     BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
+    BIGNUM l, m;
     int ret = 0;
+    int q_bits;
 
     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
@@ -233,6 +235,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 
     BN_init(&k);
     BN_init(&kq);
+    BN_init(&l);
+    BN_init(&m);
 
     if (ctx_in == NULL) {
         if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
@@ -243,6 +247,13 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
+        goto err;
+
     /* Get random k */
     do
         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
@@ -263,24 +274,23 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
 
     if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-        if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
-            goto err;
-
-        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
         /*
          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
-         * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
-         * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not
-         * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.)
+         * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the modulus.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
          */
-
-        if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
+        if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q)
+            || !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q)
+            || !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
-            if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
-                goto err;
-        }
+
+        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
         K = &kq;
     } else {
@@ -314,7 +324,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     BN_clear_free(&k);
     BN_clear_free(&kq);
-    return (ret);
+    BN_clear_free(&l);
+    BN_clear_free(&m);
+    return ret;
 }
 
 static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
index b2de7faea7..43c4330cb0 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
         BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
     if (mont != NULL)
         BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    if (one != NULL)
+        BN_free(one);
     return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index d81cc9ce6b..fcd754e448 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in)
     return (zero | two224m96p1 | two225m97p2);
 }
 
-static limb felem_is_zero_int(const felem in)
+static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in)
 {
     return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1));
 }
@@ -1391,7 +1391,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[ /* num */ ][3],
                                              sizeof(felem),
                                              tmp_felems,
                                              (void (*)(void *))felem_one,
-                                             (int (*)(const void *))
                                              felem_is_zero_int,
                                              (void (*)(void *, const void *))
                                              felem_assign,
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
index 78d191aac7..1272966fff 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static limb smallfelem_is_zero(const smallfelem small)
     return result;
 }
 
-static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const smallfelem small)
+static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const void *small)
 {
     return (int)(smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb) 1));
 }
@@ -1979,7 +1979,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, smallfelem points[][3],
                                              sizeof(smallfelem),
                                              tmp_smallfelems,
                                              (void (*)(void *))smallfelem_one,
-                                             (int (*)(const void *))
                                              smallfelem_is_zero_int,
                                              (void (*)(void *, const void *))
                                              smallfelem_assign,
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index c53a61bbfb..a1dc9946fd 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in)
     return is_zero;
 }
 
-static int felem_is_zero_int(const felem in)
+static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in)
 {
     return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1));
 }
@@ -1787,7 +1787,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[][3],
                                              sizeof(felem),
                                              tmp_felems,
                                              (void (*)(void *))felem_one,
-                                             (int (*)(const void *))
                                              felem_is_zero_int,
                                              (void (*)(void *, const void *))
                                              felem_assign,
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
index cbc21d1a27..9cc22582e4 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
@@ -225,9 +225,16 @@ ECDH_DATA *ecdh_check(EC_KEY *key)
              */
             ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
             ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+        } else if (EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(key, ecdh_data_dup,
+                                              ecdh_data_free,
+                                              ecdh_data_free) != ecdh_data) {
+            /* Or an out of memory error in EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data. */
+            ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
+            return NULL;
         }
-    } else
+    } else {
         ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+    }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode() && !(ecdh_data->flags & ECDH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
         && !(EC_KEY_get_flags(key) & EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
index 8dc1dda462..f1dd472317 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
@@ -203,9 +203,16 @@ ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa_check(EC_KEY *key)
              */
             ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
             ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+        } else if (EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(key, ecdsa_data_dup,
+                                              ecdsa_data_free,
+                                              ecdsa_data_free) != ecdsa_data) {
+            /* Or an out of memory error in EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data. */
+            ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
+            return NULL;
         }
-    } else
+    } else {
         ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+    }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode() && !(ecdsa_data->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
         && !(EC_KEY_get_flags(key) & EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index dd769609be..16d4f59b9b 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
     const EC_GROUP *group;
     int ret = 0;
+    int order_bits;
 
     if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
         ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -126,6 +127,13 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         goto err;
     }
 
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
+        goto err;
+
     do {
         /* get random k */
         do
@@ -139,13 +147,19 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         /*
          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
          * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the code
+         * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
          */
-
-        if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
+        if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
+            || !BN_add(X, r, order)
+            || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
-            if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
-                goto err;
 
         /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
         if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
index 4279dd94b1..55d3858bb1 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e)
 #endif
     ENGINE_register_RAND(e);
     ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e);
+    ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e);
     return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/err/err.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
index 0b1fcfc1f1..cfe0e8083f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
@@ -725,6 +725,8 @@ void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line)
     }
 #endif
     es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
 
     es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
     if (es->top == es->bottom)
@@ -742,6 +744,8 @@ void ERR_clear_error(void)
     ERR_STATE *es;
 
     es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
 
     for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) {
         err_clear(es, i);
@@ -806,6 +810,8 @@ static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
     unsigned long ret;
 
     es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
     if (inc && top) {
         if (file)
@@ -1016,7 +1022,6 @@ void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid)
 
 ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
 {
-    static ERR_STATE fallback;
     ERR_STATE *ret, tmp, *tmpp = NULL;
     int i;
     CRYPTO_THREADID tid;
@@ -1030,7 +1035,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
     if (ret == NULL) {
         ret = (ERR_STATE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ERR_STATE));
         if (ret == NULL)
-            return (&fallback);
+            return NULL;
         CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&ret->tid, &tid);
         ret->top = 0;
         ret->bottom = 0;
@@ -1042,7 +1047,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
         /* To check if insertion failed, do a get. */
         if (ERRFN(thread_get_item) (ret) != ret) {
             ERR_STATE_free(ret); /* could not insert it */
-            return (&fallback);
+            return NULL;
         }
         /*
          * If a race occured in this function and we came second, tmpp is the
@@ -1066,10 +1071,10 @@ void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
     int i;
 
     es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;
 
     i = es->top;
-    if (i == 0)
-        i = ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
 
     err_clear_data(es, i);
     es->err_data[i] = data;
@@ -1121,6 +1126,8 @@ int ERR_set_mark(void)
     ERR_STATE *es;
 
     es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
     if (es->bottom == es->top)
         return 0;
@@ -1133,6 +1140,8 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
     ERR_STATE *es;
 
     es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;
 
     while (es->bottom != es->top
            && (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) {
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index d114710e98..b25fc6d541 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -579,12 +579,17 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
             maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
             maxpad &= 255;
 
-            ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            ret &= mask;
+            /*
+             * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must
+             * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However,
+             * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make
+             * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic.
+             */
+            pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad);
 
             inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
-            mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
-            inp_len &= mask;
-            ret &= (int)mask;
 
             key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8;
             key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
index 917ae0751d..9a8a2ad778 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
@@ -507,10 +507,12 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
          * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
          * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
          * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
+         * But SHAEXT-capable go ahead...
          */
-        if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */
-            ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */
-             | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) &&    /* "Intel CPU"? */
+        if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 29)) ||         /* SHAEXT? */
+             ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32))) && /* AVX? */
+              ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32)))   /* XOP? */
+               | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 30))))) &&  /* "Intel CPU"? */
             plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
             (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
             SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
@@ -590,12 +592,17 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
             maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
             maxpad &= 255;
 
-            ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            ret &= mask;
+            /*
+             * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must
+             * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However,
+             * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make
+             * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic.
+             */
+            pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad);
 
             inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
-            mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
-            inp_len &= mask;
-            ret &= (int)mask;
 
             key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8;
             key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
index 5be9e336f9..cdffe1c8c4 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify)
 int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
                            int verify)
 {
-    int ret;
+    int ret = -1;
     char buff[BUFSIZ];
     UI *ui;
 
@@ -105,16 +105,18 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
         prompt = prompt_string;
     ui = UI_new();
     if (ui == NULL)
-        return -1;
-    UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
-                        (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
-    if (verify)
-        UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0,
-                             buff, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
-                             buf);
+        return ret;
+    if (UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
+                            (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len) < 0
+        || (verify
+            && UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, min,
+                                    (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
+                                    buf) < 0))
+        goto end;
     ret = UI_process(ui);
-    UI_free(ui);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ);
+ end:
+    UI_free(ui);
     return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index b7b7bdcd02..e50826b568 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -589,3 +589,170 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
     pmeth->ctrl = ctrl;
     pmeth->ctrl_str = ctrl_str;
 }
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    *pinit = pmeth->init;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_CTX *src))
+{
+    *pcopy = pmeth->copy;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    *pcleanup = pmeth->cleanup;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    if (pparamgen_init)
+        *pparamgen_init = pmeth->paramgen_init;
+    if (pparamgen)
+        *pparamgen = pmeth->paramgen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    if (pkeygen_init)
+        *pkeygen_init = pmeth->keygen_init;
+    if (pkeygen)
+        *pkeygen = pmeth->keygen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                           const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                           size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (psign_init)
+        *psign_init = pmeth->sign_init;
+    if (psign)
+        *psign = pmeth->sign;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t siglen,
+                                               const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                               size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (pverify_init)
+        *pverify_init = pmeth->verify_init;
+    if (pverify)
+        *pverify = pmeth->verify;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                    *ctx),
+                                      int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                               *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char
+                                                               *sig,
+                                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                                               const unsigned
+                                                               char *tbs,
+                                                               size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (pverify_recover_init)
+        *pverify_recover_init = pmeth->verify_recover_init;
+    if (pverify_recover)
+        *pverify_recover = pmeth->verify_recover;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                      EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *sig,
+                                                 size_t *siglen,
+                                                 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    if (psignctx_init)
+        *psignctx_init = pmeth->signctx_init;
+    if (psignctx)
+        *psignctx = pmeth->signctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                     int siglen,
+                                                     EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    if (pverifyctx_init)
+        *pverifyctx_init = pmeth->verifyctx_init;
+    if (pverifyctx)
+        *pverifyctx = pmeth->verifyctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *out,
+                                                   size_t *outlen,
+                                                   const unsigned char *in,
+                                                   size_t inlen))
+{
+    if (pencrypt_init)
+        *pencrypt_init = pmeth->encrypt_init;
+    if (pencryptfn)
+        *pencryptfn = pmeth->encrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen))
+{
+    if (pdecrypt_init)
+        *pdecrypt_init = pmeth->decrypt_init;
+    if (pdecrypt)
+        *pdecrypt = pmeth->decrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *key,
+                                               size_t *keylen))
+{
+    if (pderive_init)
+        *pderive_init = pmeth->derive_init;
+    if (pderive)
+        *pderive = pmeth->derive;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                           void *p2),
+                            int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const char *type,
+                                               const char *value))
+{
+    if (pctrl)
+        *pctrl = pmeth->ctrl;
+    if (pctrl_str)
+        *pctrl_str = pmeth->ctrl_str;
+}
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
index 108a1959ea..723b21b3d2 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
@@ -473,7 +473,14 @@ static int int_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
     if (j < mx)
         mx = j;
     if (mx > 0) {
-        if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, NULL))
+        /*
+         * Make sure the ex_data stack is at least |mx| elements long to avoid
+         * issues in the for loop that follows; so go get the |mx|'th element
+         * (if it does not exist CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns NULL), and assign
+         * to itself. This is normally a no-op; but ensures the stack is the
+         * proper size
+         */
+        if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, mx - 1)))
             goto skip;
         storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *));
         if (!storage)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 34bd8b78b4..0000000000
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/* WARNING: do not edit! */
-/* Generated by Makefile from crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in */
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_BN_CONF_H
-# define HEADER_BN_CONF_H
-
-/*
- * The contents of this file are not used in the UEFI build, as
- * both 32-bit and 64-bit builds are supported from a single run
- * of the Configure script.
- */
-
-/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
-/* Only one for the following should be defined */
-#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-
-#endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7a52dd1f1a..0000000000
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-/* WARNING: do not edit! */
-/* Generated by Makefile from crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in */
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
-# define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
-
-# define DSO_EXTENSION ".so"
-#endif
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
index f20353aea3..51bb258e74 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
@@ -101,6 +101,24 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
 
+/*
+ * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing
+ * alogrithm:
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing
+ *
+ * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table
+ * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223
+ * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf
+ *
+ * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley
+ * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as
+ * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first
+ * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt."
+ *
+ * The CACM paper is available here:
+ * https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff4d/1c5deca6269cc316bfd952172284dbf610ee.pdf
+ */
+
 const char lh_version[] = "lhash" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 #undef MIN_NODES
@@ -108,7 +126,7 @@ const char lh_version[] = "lhash" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 #define UP_LOAD         (2*LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 2) */
 #define DOWN_LOAD       (LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 1) */
 
-static void expand(_LHASH *lh);
+static int expand(_LHASH *lh);
 static void contract(_LHASH *lh);
 static LHASH_NODE **getrn(_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash);
 
@@ -182,8 +200,9 @@ void *lh_insert(_LHASH *lh, void *data)
     void *ret;
 
     lh->error = 0;
-    if (lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes))
-        expand(lh);
+    if (lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)
+            && !expand(lh))
+        return NULL;
 
     rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);
 
@@ -300,19 +319,37 @@ void lh_doall_arg(_LHASH *lh, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE func, void *arg)
     doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE)0, func, arg);
 }
 
-static void expand(_LHASH *lh)
+static int expand(_LHASH *lh)
 {
     LHASH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np;
-    unsigned int p, i, j;
-    unsigned long hash, nni;
+    unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j;
+    unsigned long hash;
+
+    nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
+    p = lh->p;
+    pmax = lh->pmax;
+    if (p + 1 >= pmax) {
+        j = nni * 2;
+        n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, (int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j));
+        if (n == NULL) {
+            lh->error++;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        lh->b = n;
+        memset(n + nni, 0, sizeof(*n) * (j - nni));
+        lh->pmax = nni;
+        lh->num_alloc_nodes = j;
+        lh->num_expand_reallocs++;
+        lh->p = 0;
+    } else {
+        lh->p++;
+    }
 
     lh->num_nodes++;
     lh->num_expands++;
-    p = (int)lh->p++;
     n1 = &(lh->b[p]);
-    n2 = &(lh->b[p + (int)lh->pmax]);
-    *n2 = NULL;                 /* 27/07/92 - eay - undefined pointer bug */
-    nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
+    n2 = &(lh->b[p + pmax]);
+    *n2 = NULL;
 
     for (np = *n1; np != NULL;) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP
@@ -330,25 +367,7 @@ static void expand(_LHASH *lh)
         np = *n1;
     }
 
-    if ((lh->p) >= lh->pmax) {
-        j = (int)lh->num_alloc_nodes * 2;
-        n = (LHASH_NODE **)OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b,
-                                           (int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j));
-        if (n == NULL) {
-            lh->error++;
-            lh->num_nodes--;
-            lh->p = 0;
-            return;
-        }
-        /* else */
-        for (i = (int)lh->num_alloc_nodes; i < j; i++) /* 26/02/92 eay */
-            n[i] = NULL;        /* 02/03/92 eay */
-        lh->pmax = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
-        lh->num_alloc_nodes = j;
-        lh->num_expand_reallocs++;
-        lh->p = 0;
-        lh->b = n;
-    }
+    return 1;
 }
 
 static void contract(_LHASH *lh)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index d4a257c33b..7a7d06094e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                     goto end;
                 }
             }
+        } else if (certs != NULL) {
+            untrusted = certs;
         } else {
             untrusted = bs->certs;
         }
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index c82b3c0ae2..865976bf8c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher)
               ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9'))))
             break;
 #else
-        if (!(isupper(c) || (c == '-') || isdigit(c)))
+        if (!(isupper((unsigned char)c) || (c == '-')
+            || isdigit((unsigned char)c)))
             break;
 #endif
         header++;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
index 5747c7366e..daf210fde0 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
     }
     p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen);
     X509_SIG_free(p8);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen);
     if (!p8inf)
         return NULL;
     ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
index 04d6319a22..e8b3a1b92c 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
         }
         p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen);
         X509_SIG_free(p8);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen);
         if (!p8inf)
             goto p8err;
         ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
index 9aa3c90c4e..1841f78f69 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
@@ -84,6 +84,12 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 {
     STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
     X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    if (pkey)
+        *pkey = NULL;
+    if (cert)
+        *cert = NULL;
+
     /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
 
     if (!p12) {
@@ -92,11 +98,6 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (pkey)
-        *pkey = NULL;
-    if (cert)
-        *cert = NULL;
-
     /* Check the mac */
 
     /*
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 
     if (!ocerts) {
         PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
     }
 
     if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {
@@ -163,10 +164,14 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 
  err:
 
-    if (pkey && *pkey)
+    if (pkey) {
         EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
-    if (cert && *cert)
+        *pkey = NULL;
+    }
+    if (cert) {
         X509_free(*cert);
+        *cert = NULL;
+    }
     if (x)
         X509_free(x);
     if (ocerts)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index cb4093128d..bc2a7d201d 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETFREE) (LPBYTE);
 #  endif                        /* 1 */
 # endif                         /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
 
+#define NOTTOOLONG(start) ((GetTickCount() - (start)) < MAXDELAY)
+
 #if !defined(UWP_ENABLED) // -- GODOT --
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
@@ -469,9 +471,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                                 do
                                     RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5);
                                 while (heap_next(&hentry)
-                                       && (!good
-                                           || (GetTickCount() - starttime) <
-                                           MAXDELAY)
+                                       && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))
                                        && --entrycnt > 0);
                             }
                         }
@@ -483,8 +483,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                             ex_cnt_limit--;
                         }
                     } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
-                             && (!good
-                                 || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)
+                             && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))
                              && ex_cnt_limit > 0);
                 }
 #  else
@@ -499,11 +498,11 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                             do
                                 RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5);
                             while (heap_next(&hentry)
+                                   && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))
                                    && --entrycnt > 0);
                         }
                     } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
-                             && (!good
-                                 || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                             && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));
                 }
 #  endif
 
@@ -521,8 +520,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                     do
                         RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9);
                     while (process_next(handle, &p)
-                           && (!good
-                               || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                           && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));
 
                 /* thread walking */
                 /*
@@ -536,8 +534,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                     do
                         RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6);
                     while (thread_next(handle, &t)
-                           && (!good
-                               || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                           && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));
 
                 /* module walking */
                 /*
@@ -551,8 +548,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                     do
                         RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9);
                     while (module_next(handle, &m)
-                           && (!good
-                               || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                           && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));
                 if (close_snap)
                     close_snap(handle);
                 else
@@ -713,14 +709,13 @@ static void readscreen(void)
     hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);
 
     /* Get bitmap properties */
-    GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR) & bm);
-    size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
-
-    bi.biSize = sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
+    GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(bm), (LPSTR)&bm);
+    size = (unsigned int)4 * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmWidth;
+    bi.biSize = sizeof(bi);
     bi.biWidth = bm.bmWidth;
     bi.biHeight = bm.bmHeight;
-    bi.biPlanes = bm.bmPlanes;
-    bi.biBitCount = bm.bmBitsPixel;
+    bi.biPlanes = 1;
+    bi.biBitCount = 32;
     bi.biCompression = BI_RGB;
     bi.biSizeImage = 0;
     bi.biXPelsPerMeter = 0;
@@ -736,7 +731,7 @@ static void readscreen(void)
 
             /* Copy the bits of the current line range into the buffer */
             GetDIBits(hScrDC, hBitmap, y, n,
-                      bmbits, (BITMAPINFO *) & bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS);
+                      bmbits, (LPBITMAPINFO)&bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS);
 
             /* Get the hash of the bitmap */
             MD(bmbits, size, md);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 951e1d5ca3..ddead3d744 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
     return 2;
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
                                         X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
 {
@@ -791,7 +792,6 @@ static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
     return pss;
 }
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
 {
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 082c8da2ef..a85493d609 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -110,6 +110,16 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
     int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 
+    /*
+     * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+     * continually regenerating the same prime values.
+     */
+    if (bits < 16) {
+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -161,21 +171,10 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
     if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
         goto err;
     for (;;) {
-        /*
-         * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
-         * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
-         * bail if it happens 3 times.
-         */
-        unsigned int degenerate = 0;
         do {
             if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
                 goto err;
-        } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
-        if (degenerate == 3) {
-            ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-            goto err;
-        }
+        } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
         if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
             goto err;
         if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 19d28c6f0e..9a01b4afc1 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -237,10 +237,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
            RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
  cleanup:
-    if (db != NULL)
+    if (db != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
         OPENSSL_free(db);
-    if (em != NULL)
+    }
+    if (em != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
         OPENSSL_free(em);
+    }
     return mlen;
 }
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index efa1fd3e99..50397c335a 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -255,8 +255,6 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
      * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
      * information at the API boundary.
-     * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
-     * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
      */
     if (!good) {
         mlen = -1;
@@ -266,8 +264,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
 
  err:
-    if (em != NULL)
+    if (em != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
         OPENSSL_free(em);
+    }
     if (mlen == -1)
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
                RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 8896e2e977..00e730ffa9 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -180,27 +180,25 @@ static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
  * FIPS mode.
  */
 
-static int pkey_fips_check_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+static int pkey_fips_check_rsa(const RSA *rsa, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+                               const EVP_MD **pmgf1md)
 {
-    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
-    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
     int rv = -1;
+
     if (!FIPS_mode())
         return 0;
     if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
         rv = 0;
     if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv)
         return -1;
-    if (rctx->md) {
-        const EVP_MD *fmd;
-        fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
-        if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+    if (*pmd != NULL) {
+        *pmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(*pmd));
+        if (*pmd == NULL || !((*pmd)->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
             return rv;
     }
-    if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) {
-        const EVP_MD *fmd;
-        fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md));
-        if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+    if (*pmgf1md != NULL) {
+        *pmgf1md = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(*pmgf1md));
+        if (*pmgf1md == NULL || !((*pmgf1md)->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
             return rv;
     }
     return 1;
@@ -214,27 +212,27 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
     int ret;
     RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
     RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    const EVP_MD *md = rctx->md;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md = rctx->mgf1md;
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-    ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+    ret = pkey_fips_check_rsa(rsa, &md, &mgf1md);
     if (ret < 0) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
         return -1;
     }
 #endif
 
-    if (rctx->md) {
-        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+    if (md != NULL) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
             RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
             return -1;
         }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
         if (ret > 0) {
             unsigned int slen;
-            ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md,
-                                       rctx->pad_mode,
-                                       rctx->saltlen,
-                                       rctx->mgf1md, sig, &slen);
+            ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, md, rctx->pad_mode,
+                                       rctx->saltlen, mgf1md, sig, &slen);
             if (ret > 0)
                 *siglen = slen;
             else
@@ -243,12 +241,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
         }
 #endif
 
-        if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
+        if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_mdc2) {
             unsigned int sltmp;
             if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
                 return -1;
-            ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
-                                             tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+            ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
+                                             rsa);
 
             if (ret <= 0)
                 return ret;
@@ -263,23 +261,20 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
                 return -1;
             }
             memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
-            rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
+            rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md));
             ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
                                       sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
         } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
             unsigned int sltmp;
-            ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
-                           tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+            ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
             if (ret <= 0)
                 return ret;
             ret = sltmp;
         } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
             if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
                 return -1;
-            if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
-                                                rctx->tbuf, tbs,
-                                                rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
-                                                rctx->saltlen))
+            if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+                                                md, mgf1md, rctx->saltlen))
                 return -1;
             ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
                                       sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
@@ -348,32 +343,31 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 {
     RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
     RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    const EVP_MD *md = rctx->md;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md = rctx->mgf1md;
     size_t rslen;
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-    int rv;
-    rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+    int rv = pkey_fips_check_rsa(rsa, &md, &mgf1md);
+
     if (rv < 0) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY,
                RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
         return -1;
     }
 #endif
-    if (rctx->md) {
+    if (md != NULL) {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
         if (rv > 0) {
-            return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa,
-                                          tbs, tbslen,
-                                          rctx->md,
-                                          rctx->pad_mode,
-                                          rctx->saltlen,
-                                          rctx->mgf1md, sig, siglen);
+            return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, md, rctx->pad_mode,
+                                          rctx->saltlen, mgf1md, sig, siglen);
 
         }
 #endif
         if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
-            return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+            return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(md), tbs, tbslen,
                               sig, siglen, rsa);
-        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
             RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
             return -1;
         }
@@ -388,8 +382,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
                                      rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
             if (ret <= 0)
                 return 0;
-            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
-                                            rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, md, mgf1md,
                                             rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
             if (ret <= 0)
                 return 0;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
index 643ae59343..03ef981cf9 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ int UI_process(UI *ui)
             }
         }
     }
+
  err:
     if (ui->meth->ui_close_session != NULL
         && ui->meth->ui_close_session(ui) <= 0)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
index 807d1c49b2..96d042f585 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
                 goto reconsider;
             } else
 #endif
-            if (bits >= 8) {
+            if (bits > 8) {
                 b = ((inp[0] << inpgap) | (inp[1] >> (8 - inpgap)));
                 b &= 0xff;
                 if (bitrem)
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
                 }
                 if (bitrem)
                     c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem);
-            } else {            /* remaining less than 8 bits */
+            } else {            /* remaining less than or equal to 8 bits */
 
                 b = (inp[0] << inpgap) & 0xff;
                 if (bitrem)
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index bbc3189381..6f0209a275 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
             if (!hent) {
                 hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_HASH));
                 if (hent == NULL) {
+                    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
                     X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                     goto finish;
                 }
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
index 43a073003d..82ce4e8d87 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@@ -92,12 +92,12 @@ static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp,
                         long argl, char **ret)
 {
     int ok = 0;
-    char *file;
+    const char *file;
 
     switch (cmd) {
     case X509_L_FILE_LOAD:
         if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
-            file = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+            file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
             if (file)
                 ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file,
                                               X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
 
     if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
         for (;;) {
-            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, "");
             if (x == NULL) {
                 if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
                      PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
 
     if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
         for (;;) {
-            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, "");
             if (x == NULL) {
                 if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
                      PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
         X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
         return 0;
     }
-    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, "");
     BIO_free(in);
     if (!inf) {
         X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
index 09b8691c86..03c9533bcc 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
                       STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
 {
     int ret;
+    int calc_ret;
     X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
     STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
     *ptree = NULL;
@@ -800,17 +801,20 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
 
     /* Tree is not empty: continue */
 
-    ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
+    calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
 
-    if (!ret)
+    if (!calc_ret)
         goto error;
 
-    if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
-        goto error;
+    ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
 
-    if (ret == 2)
+    if (calc_ret == 2)
         sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
 
+    if (!ret)
+        goto error;
+
+
     if (tree)
         *ptree = tree;
 
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index 1290dec9bb..af080a04f2 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -130,10 +130,12 @@ static int length_from_afi(const unsigned afi)
  */
 unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
 {
-    return ((f != NULL &&
-             f->addressFamily != NULL && f->addressFamily->data != NULL)
-            ? ((f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | (f->addressFamily->data[1]))
-            : 0);
+    if (f == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily->data == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily->length < 2)
+        return 0;
+    return (f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | f->addressFamily->data[1];
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
index 7f40bfabe0..9bb01ee38e 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen,
     oth = OTHERNAME_new();
     if (!oth)
         return 0;
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(oth->value);
     oth->type_id = oid;
     oth->value = value;
     GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, GEN_OTHERNAME, oth);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
index 8350429aaf..1112802483 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
@@ -286,9 +286,9 @@ void *X509V3_get_d2i(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit,
 int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
                     int crit, unsigned long flags)
 {
-    int extidx = -1;
-    int errcode;
-    X509_EXTENSION *ext, *extmp;
+    int errcode, extidx = -1;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL, *extmp;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ret = NULL;
     unsigned long ext_op = flags & X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK;
 
     /*
@@ -347,13 +347,21 @@ int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
         return 1;
     }
 
-    if (!*x && !(*x = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()))
-        return -1;
-    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(*x, ext))
-        return -1;
+    if ((ret = *x) == NULL
+         && (ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto m_fail;
+    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(ret, ext))
+        goto m_fail;
 
+    *x = ret;
     return 1;
 
+ m_fail:
+    if (ret != *x)
+        sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(ret);
+    X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    return -1;
+
  err:
     if (!(flags & X509V3_ADD_SILENT))
         X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, errcode);
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
index 2855269668..1184091ccf 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
@@ -107,6 +107,47 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
 
+/*
+ * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules.
+ * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
+ * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
+ * numeric constants below).
+ */
+static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+{
+    for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) {
+        if (*s1 != *s2) {
+            unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2;
+
+            /* Convert to lower case */
+            if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
+                c1 += 0x20;
+            if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
+                c2 += 0x20;
+
+            if (c1 == c2)
+                continue;
+
+            if (c1 < c2)
+                return -1;
+
+            /* c1 > c2 */
+            return 1;
+        } else if (*s1 == 0) {
+            /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
+{
+    /* No portable definition of SIZE_MAX, so we use (size_t)(-1) instead */
+    return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, (size_t)(-1));
+}
+
 static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
                                   X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
 {
@@ -384,7 +425,7 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
             return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
     }
 
-    if (strcasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
+    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
 
     return X509_V_OK;
@@ -404,7 +445,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
     if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
         if (eml->length > base->length) {
             emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
-            if (!strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+            if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0)
                 return X509_V_OK;
         }
         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
@@ -425,7 +466,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
     }
     emlptr = emlat + 1;
     /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
-    if (strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
 
     return X509_V_OK;
@@ -464,14 +505,14 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
     if (*baseptr == '.') {
         if (hostlen > base->length) {
             p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
-            if (!strncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length))
+            if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
                 return X509_V_OK;
         }
         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
     }
 
     if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
-        || strncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
+        || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
 
     return X509_V_OK;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
index 0b7c68180e..87a6ae1da9 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void timestamp_print(BIO *out, SCT_TIMESTAMP timestamp)
     gen = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
     ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(gen, (time_t)0,
                              (int)(timestamp / 86400000),
-                             (timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
+                             (int)(timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
     /*
      * Note GeneralizedTime from ASN1_GENERALIZETIME_adj is always 15
      * characters long with a final Z. Update it with fractional seconds.