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authorFabio Alessandrelli <fabio.alessandrelli@gmail.com>2018-02-08 19:17:31 +0100
committerFabio Alessandrelli <fabio.alessandrelli@gmail.com>2018-02-14 01:26:34 +0100
commit6fcc8b7e1f415db55c6627630f622a37f6973714 (patch)
tree80c267a7a5b36b5537d9bb4038687f391ce159e5 /thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
parent308b03b377fc0001542ad4cfe876fca3c2f49a00 (diff)
Deleting OpenSSL module and library
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c')
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c835
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 835 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 03c9533bcc..0000000000
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,835 +0,0 @@
-/* pcy_tree.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "pcy_int.h"
-
-/*
- * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
- * evaluation.
- */
-
-/*
- * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
- */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
-
-static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
-{
- if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
- || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
- BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n");
- else {
- int i;
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
- BIO_puts(err, " Expected: ");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
- if (i)
- BIO_puts(err, ", ");
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
- }
- BIO_puts(err, "\n");
- }
-}
-
-static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
-{
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i;
- BIO *err;
- err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (!curr)
- curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
- else
- curr++;
- BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
- BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
- for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
- plev - tree->levels, plev->flags);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
- X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
- expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
- BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
- }
- if (plev->anyPolicy)
- X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
- }
-
- BIO_free(err);
-
-}
-#else
-
-# define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */
-
-#endif
-
-/*-
- * Initialize policy tree. Return values:
- * 0 Some internal error occurred.
- * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
- * 1 Tree initialized OK.
- * 2 Policy tree is empty.
- * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
- * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
- */
-
-static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int ret = 1;
- int i, n;
- int explicit_policy;
- int any_skip;
- int map_skip;
- *ptree = NULL;
- n = sk_X509_num(certs);
-
-#if 0
- /* Disable policy mapping for now... */
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
-#endif
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
- explicit_policy = 0;
- else
- explicit_policy = n + 1;
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
- any_skip = 0;
- else
- any_skip = n + 1;
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
- map_skip = 0;
- else
- map_skip = n + 1;
-
- /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
- if (n == 1)
- return 1;
- /*
- * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
- * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
- * explicit_policy value at this point.
- */
- for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
- cache = policy_cache_set(x);
- /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
- if (cache == NULL)
- return 0;
- /*
- * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
- */
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
- ret = -1;
- /*
- * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
- * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
- */
- else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
- ret = 2;
- if (explicit_policy > 0) {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- explicit_policy--;
- if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1)
- && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
- explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
- }
- }
-
- if (ret != 1) {
- if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
- return 6;
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
-
- tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
-
- if (!tree)
- return 0;
-
- tree->flags = 0;
- tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
- tree->nlevel = 0;
- tree->extra_data = NULL;
- tree->auth_policies = NULL;
- tree->user_policies = NULL;
-
- if (!tree->levels) {
- OPENSSL_free(tree);
- return 0;
- }
-
- memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
-
- tree->nlevel = n;
-
- level = tree->levels;
-
- /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
-
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
-
- if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
- goto bad_tree;
-
- for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
- level++;
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- cache = policy_cache_set(x);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- level->cert = x;
-
- if (!cache->anyPolicy)
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
-
- /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
- if (any_skip == 0) {
- /*
- * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
- * last in the chain.
- */
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
- } else {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- any_skip--;
- if ((cache->any_skip >= 0)
- && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
- any_skip = cache->any_skip;
- }
-
- if (map_skip == 0)
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
- else {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- map_skip--;
- if ((cache->map_skip >= 0)
- && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
- map_skip = cache->map_skip;
- }
-
- }
-
- *ptree = tree;
-
- if (explicit_policy)
- return 1;
- else
- return 5;
-
- bad_tree:
-
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
-{
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i, matched = 0;
- /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
- if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL))
- return 0;
- matched = 1;
- }
- }
- if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
- * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
- */
-
-static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
-{
- int i;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
- data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
- /*
- * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
- * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
- * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
- * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
- * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
- * it later.
- */
-#if 0
- if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
- && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
- continue;
-#endif
- /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
- * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
- */
-
-static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-{
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- if (id == NULL)
- id = node->data->valid_policy;
- /*
- * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
- * node.
- */
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
- policy_data_free(data);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-{
- const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
- int i;
-
- if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
- || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
- /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
- if (node->nchild)
- return 1;
- if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
- return 0;
- /* Add it */
- } else {
- /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
- if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
- return 1;
- /* Locate unmatched nodes */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
- if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
- continue;
- if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-{
- int i;
- /*
- * X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- */
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
-
- if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
- return 0;
-
-#if 0
-
- /*
- * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
- * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
- * may have multiple children
- */
- if (node->nchild)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
- * unmatched node.
- */
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
- node_critical(node));
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
- policy_data_free(data);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-
- }
- /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
- if (last->anyPolicy) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
- * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
- * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
- */
-
-static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i;
- nodes = curr->nodes;
- if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
- for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
- /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
- if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
- node->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- --curr;
- nodes = curr->nodes;
- for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
- if (node->nchild == 0) {
- node->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
- }
- }
- if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
- if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
- curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
- curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
- }
- if (curr == tree->levels) {
- /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
- if (!curr->anyPolicy)
- return 2;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
-{
- if (!*pnodes) {
- *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
- if (!*pnodes)
- return 0;
- } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
- return 1;
-
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
- * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
- * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
- * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
- * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
- * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
- */
-
-static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
-{
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
- int i, j;
- curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
-
- /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
- if (curr->anyPolicy) {
- if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
- return 0;
- addnodes = pnodes;
- } else
- /* Add policies to authority set */
- addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
-
- curr = tree->levels;
- for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
- /*
- * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
- * levels so end search.
- */
- if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
- break;
- curr++;
- for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
- if ((node->parent == anyptr)
- && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (addnodes == pnodes)
- return 2;
-
- *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
-{
- int i;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
-
- X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
-
- /*
- * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
- * will happen if it is a leaf node.
- */
-
- if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
- return 1;
-
- anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
- tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
- node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
- if (!node) {
- if (!anyPolicy)
- continue;
- /*
- * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
- * from anyPolicy.
- */
- extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
- if (!extra)
- return 0;
- extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
- extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
- | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
- }
- if (!tree->user_policies) {
- tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
- if (!tree->user_policies)
- return 1;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-{
- int ret, i;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
-
- for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
- cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
- return 0;
-
- if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
- && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
- return 0;
- tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
- ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
- if (ret != 1)
- return ret;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
-{
- if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
- OPENSSL_free(node);
-}
-
-void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-{
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
- int i;
-
- if (!tree)
- return;
-
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
-
- for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
- if (curr->cert)
- X509_free(curr->cert);
- if (curr->nodes)
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
- if (curr->anyPolicy)
- policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
- }
-
- if (tree->extra_data)
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
-
- OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
- OPENSSL_free(tree);
-
-}
-
-/*-
- * Application policy checking function.
- * Return codes:
- * 0 Internal Error.
- * 1 Successful.
- * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
- * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
- */
-
-int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
-{
- int ret;
- int calc_ret;
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
- *ptree = NULL;
-
- *pexplicit_policy = 0;
- ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
-
- switch (ret) {
-
- /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
- case 2:
- return 1;
-
- /* Some internal error */
- case -1:
- return -1;
-
- /* Some internal error */
- case 0:
- return 0;
-
- /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
-
- case 6:
- *pexplicit_policy = 1;
- return -2;
-
- /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
- case 5:
- *pexplicit_policy = 1;
- break;
-
- /* Tree OK: continue */
-
- case 1:
- if (!tree)
- /*
- * tree_init() returns success and a null tree
- * if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
- * I'm not sure that returning success here is
- * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
- * as an internal error which our caller
- * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
- */
- return 1;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!tree)
- goto error;
- ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
-
- tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto error;
-
- /* Return value 2 means tree empty */
- if (ret == 2) {
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
- if (*pexplicit_policy)
- return -2;
- else
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Tree is not empty: continue */
-
- calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
-
- if (!calc_ret)
- goto error;
-
- ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
-
- if (calc_ret == 2)
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
-
- if (!ret)
- goto error;
-
-
- if (tree)
- *ptree = tree;
-
- if (*pexplicit_policy) {
- nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
- if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
- return -2;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- error:
-
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-
- return 0;
-
-}