openssl: Update to pristine 1.0.2n (security update)

3 files changed, 36 insertions, 17 deletions

diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index c4fa105747..e22627f851 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     unsigned char *penc = NULL;
     int penclen;
     ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
 
     dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
     if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
@@ -159,8 +160,11 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
-                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+    aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
+    if (aobj == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
         return 1;
 
  err:
@@ -258,6 +262,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
         goto dsaerr;
     }
 
+    BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
         goto dsaerr;
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 1fce0f81c2..21af2e159f 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
     } else {
         p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
         q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (q == NULL)
+            goto err;
     }
 
     if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1))
diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 58013a4a13..aa10dd12f6 100644
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -224,7 +224,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 {
     BN_CTX *ctx;
     BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
+    BIGNUM l, m;
     int ret = 0;
+    int q_bits;
 
     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
@@ -233,6 +235,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 
     BN_init(&k);
     BN_init(&kq);
+    BN_init(&l);
+    BN_init(&m);
 
     if (ctx_in == NULL) {
         if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
@@ -243,6 +247,13 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
+        goto err;
+
     /* Get random k */
     do
         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
@@ -263,24 +274,23 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
 
     if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-        if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
-            goto err;
-
-        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
         /*
          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
-         * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
-         * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not
-         * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.)
+         * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the modulus.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
          */
-
-        if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
+        if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q)
+            || !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q)
+            || !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
-            if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
-                goto err;
-        }
+
+        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
         K = &kq;
     } else {
@@ -314,7 +324,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     BN_clear_free(&k);
     BN_clear_free(&kq);
-    return (ret);
+    BN_clear_free(&l);
+    BN_clear_free(&m);
+    return ret;
 }
 
 static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,