diff options
author | Fabio Alessandrelli <fabio.alessandrelli@gmail.com> | 2018-06-07 16:25:01 +0200 |
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committer | Fabio Alessandrelli <fabio.alessandrelli@gmail.com> | 2018-06-07 18:50:44 +0200 |
commit | 888379e5131c34278c26c4696918a6cdcebc886b (patch) | |
tree | 276ec9cdaa0b97444e4a86000de73907f25ef142 /thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c | |
parent | 9d23f1bf1a5b8c1b17a69d928834f92635eedd78 (diff) |
Bump mbedTLS to version 2.10.0
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c')
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c | 166 |
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c index 88864b8136..7455e99d2e 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -48,10 +48,7 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ -static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { - volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0; -} +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) @@ -355,7 +352,7 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 6; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -717,6 +714,49 @@ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) return( 0 ); } +/** + * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. + * + * \param suite_info cipher suite to validate + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite + * \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite + * + * \return 0 if valid, else 1 + */ +static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, + const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, + int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) +{ + (void) ssl; + if( suite_info == NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver || + suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && + suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret; @@ -869,31 +909,11 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuites[i] ); - if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) != 0 ) continue; - if( ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver || - ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) - continue; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ( ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) - continue; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - ciphersuite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) - continue; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && - mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) - continue; -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x", ciphersuites[i] ) ); @@ -938,7 +958,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* - * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: is many records come + * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is * an actual need for it. @@ -1261,7 +1281,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1690,22 +1710,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) ); - suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); - if( suite_info == NULL -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - || ( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) -#endif - ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); - + /* + * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. + */ i = 0; while( 1 ) { @@ -1724,6 +1731,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } } + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE @@ -2673,10 +2691,27 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) buf = ssl->in_msg; /* certificate_types */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )]; n = cert_type_len; - if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) + /* + * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf: + * * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of + * SSL is 3), + * * distinguished name length otherwise. + * Both reach at most the index: + * ...hdr_len + 2 + n, + * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that + * regardless of the actual code path. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, @@ -2691,9 +2726,32 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - unsigned char* sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n; + unsigned char* sig_alg; size_t i; +#endif + + /* + * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: + * sig_alg[i + 1], + * where: + * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, + * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. + * Therefore the furthest access is: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], + * which reduces to: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], + * which is one less than we need the buf to be. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n; for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d" @@ -2702,14 +2760,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif n += 2 + sig_alg_len; - - if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); - } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ @@ -3289,8 +3339,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ticket_len == 0 ) return( 0 ); - mbedtls_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket ); ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; |