Update OpenSSL to version 1.0.1s

1 files changed, 3244 insertions, 3057 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 0457af8789..cfa5080e6b 100644
--- a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  *
  * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
@@ -157,3225 +157,3412 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
 
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+#endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_client_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
+{
+    if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+        return (SSLv3_client_method());
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
 
 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			ssl3_get_client_method)
-
+                         ssl_undefined_function,
+                         ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
+#endif
 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
+{
+    BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+    unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+    int ret = -1;
+    int new_state, state, skip = 0;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
-	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
-	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
-	 */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-		}
-#endif
+    RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    clear_sys_error();
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = s->info_callback;
+    else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+    s->in_handshake++;
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+        SSL_clear(s);
 
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch(s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
-			/* break */
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
-			s->server=0;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-				
-			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
-			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				buf=NULL;
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			/* setup buffing BIO */
-			if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
-			if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
-				s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+    /*
+     * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+     * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+     * handshakes anyway.
+     */
+    if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+        s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+        s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    for (;;) {
+        state = s->state;
+
+        switch (s->state) {
+        case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+            s->renegotiate = 1;
+            s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+            /* break */
+        case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+        case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+        case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+        case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+            s->server = 0;
+            if (cb != NULL)
+                cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+            if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                ret = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+            s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+            if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+                if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+                    ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+                    ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                s->init_buf = buf;
+                buf = NULL;
+            }
+
+            if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+                ret = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            /* setup buffing BIO */
+            if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+            ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+            /*
+             * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+             */
+            s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+            s->shutdown = 0;
+            ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+
+            /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+            if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+                s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
+
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+            ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+
+            if (s->hit) {
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					{
-					/* receive renewed session ticket */
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-					}
-#endif
-				}
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+                if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+                    /* receive renewed session ticket */
+                    s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+                }
+#endif
+            } else
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
-			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
-			/* or PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
-			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+            /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
+            ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (ret == 1) {
+                s->hit = 1;
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+                s->init_num = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+#endif
+            /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
+            /* or PSK */
+            if (!
+                (s->s3->tmp.
+                 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+                    && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+                ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+                if (ret <= 0)
+                    goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				skip = 1;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
+                if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+                    s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+                else
+                    s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+            } else {
+                skip = 1;
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+            }
 #else
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* at this point we check that we have the
-			 * required stuff from the server */
-			if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+            } else
+                skip = 1;
+
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+            ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+
+            /*
+             * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+             * the server
+             */
+            if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+            ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+            ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-			if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP)
-				{
-				if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
-					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto end;
-					}
-				}
-#endif
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
-			ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
-			 * sent back */
-			/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
-			 * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
-			/* XXX: For now, we do not support client 
-			 * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
-			 * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
-			 * We need to skip the certificate verify 
-			 * message when client's ECDH public key is sent 
-			 * inside the client certificate.
-			 */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-				}
-			if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-				}
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
-				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+            if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+                if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+                    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+#endif
+            if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+            else
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+            ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+            ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            /*
+             * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
+             */
+            /*
+             * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+             * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+             */
+            /*
+             * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+             * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+             * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+             * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+             */
+            if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+            } else {
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+            }
+            if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+            }
+
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+            ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+            ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+                                               SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
+                                               SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 #else
-			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+            if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+            else
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 #endif
-			s->init_num=0;
+            s->init_num = 0;
 
-			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+            s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-			s->session->compress_meth=0;
+            s->session->compress_meth = 0;
 #else
-			if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-				s->session->compress_meth=0;
-			else
-				s->session->compress_meth=
-					s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
-				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			break;
+            if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+                s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+            else
+                s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                                                          SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+            {
+                ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+                goto end;
+            }
+
+            break;
 
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-				SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
-			/* clear flags */
-			s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
-				if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
-					{
-					s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-					s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-					s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-#endif
-				
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+            ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+            break;
+#endif
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+            ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
+                                     SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
+                                     SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+                                     s->method->
+                                     ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+                                     s->method->
+                                     ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+            /* clear flags */
+            s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+            if (s->hit) {
+                s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+                if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+                    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+                    s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
+                }
+            } else {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		break;
+                /*
+                 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
+                 */
+                if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                    s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+                else
 #endif
 
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
-				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			/* clean a few things up */
-			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
-				{
-				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-				s->init_buf=NULL;
-				}
-
-			/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
-			 * remove the buffering now */
-			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
-				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->renegotiate=0;
-			s->new_session=0;
-
-			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
-			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
-			ret=1;
-			/* s->server=0; */
-			s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		/* did we do anything */
-		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
-			{
-			if (s->debug)
-				{
-				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
-					goto end;
-				}
-
-			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-				{
-				new_state=s->state;
-				s->state=state;
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
-				s->state=new_state;
-				}
-			}
-		skip=0;
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
+                    s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+            }
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+            ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+            ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+#endif
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+        case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+            if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+                s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+            ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+                                    SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                goto end;
+
+            if (s->hit)
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+            else
+                s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+            s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+            if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+                ret = -1;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+            s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL_ST_OK:
+            /* clean a few things up */
+            ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+            if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+                BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+                s->init_buf = NULL;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
+             * buffering now
+             */
+            if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+                ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+            /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            s->renegotiate = 0;
+            s->new_session = 0;
+
+            ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+            if (s->hit)
+                s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+            ret = 1;
+            /* s->server=0; */
+            s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+            if (cb != NULL)
+                cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+            goto end;
+            /* break; */
+
+        case SSL_ST_ERR:
+        default:
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+            ret = -1;
+            goto end;
+            /* break; */
+        }
+
+        /* did we do anything */
+        if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+            if (s->debug) {
+                if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+
+            if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+                new_state = s->state;
+                s->state = state;
+                cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+                s->state = new_state;
+            }
+        }
+        skip = 0;
+    }
+ end:
+    s->in_handshake--;
+    if (buf != NULL)
+        BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
+{
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int i;
+    unsigned long l;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	int j;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
+    int j;
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
 #endif
 
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
-		if ((sess == NULL) ||
-			(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+    buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+        SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+        if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			!sess->session_id_length ||
+            !sess->session_id_length ||
 #else
-			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
-			(sess->not_resumable))
-			{
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
-		p=s->s3->client_random;
-
-		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
-			goto err;
-
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
-		d=p= &(buf[4]);
-
-		/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
-		 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
-		 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
-		 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
-		 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
-		 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
-		 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
-		 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
-		 * 1.0.
-		 *
-		 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
-		 * 	1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
-		 * 	2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
-		 *	3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
-		 * 	4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
-		 *	5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
-		 *	6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
-		 *	   know that is maximum server supports.
-		 *	7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
-		 *	   containing version 1.0.
-		 *
-		 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
-		 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
-		 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
-		 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
-		 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
-		 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
-		 * the negotiated version.
-		 */
+            /*
+             * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+             * "ticket" without a session ID.
+             */
+            (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+            (sess->not_resumable)) {
+            if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+        p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+        if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        /* Do the message type and length last */
+        d = p = &(buf[4]);
+
+        /*-
+         * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+         * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+         * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+         * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+         * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+         * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+         * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+         * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+         * 1.0.
+         *
+         * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+         *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+         *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+         *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+         *      4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+         *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+         *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+         *         know that is maximum server supports.
+         *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+         *         containing version 1.0.
+         *
+         * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+         * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+         * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+         * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+         * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+         * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+         * the negotiated version.
+         */
 #if 0
-		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-		s->client_version=s->version;
+        *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+        *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+        s->client_version = s->version;
 #else
-		*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
-#endif
-
-		/* Random stuff */
-		memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* Session ID */
-		if (s->new_session)
-			i=0;
-		else
-			i=s->session->session_id_length;
-		*(p++)=i;
-		if (i != 0)
-			{
-			if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
-			p+=i;
-			}
-		
-		/* Ciphers supported */
-		i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-			goto err;
-			}
+        *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
+        *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
+#endif
+
+        /* Random stuff */
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+        /* Session ID */
+        if (s->new_session)
+            i = 0;
+        else
+            i = s->session->session_id_length;
+        *(p++) = i;
+        if (i != 0) {
+            if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
+            p += i;
+        }
+
+        /* Ciphers supported */
+        i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+            goto err;
+        }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
-			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
-			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
-			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
-			 */
-			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
-				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
-				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
-#endif
-		s2n(i,p);
-		p+=i;
-
-		/* COMPRESSION */
+        /*
+         * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+         * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+         * use TLS v1.2
+         */
+        if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+            && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+            i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
+        s2n(i, p);
+        p += i;
+
+        /* COMPRESSION */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		*(p++)=1;
+        *(p++) = 1;
 #else
 
-		if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
-					|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
-			j=0;
-		else
-			j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
-		*(p++)=1+j;
-		for (i=0; i<j; i++)
-			{
-			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
-			*(p++)=comp->id;
-			}
+        if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+            || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+            j = 0;
+        else
+            j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+        *(p++) = 1 + j;
+        for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+            comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+            *(p++) = comp->id;
+        }
 #endif
-		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+        *(p++) = 0;             /* Add the NULL method */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		/* TLS extensions*/
-		if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-#endif
-		
-		l=(p-d);
-		d=buf;
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		l2n3(l,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=p-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
+        /* TLS extensions */
+        if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((p =
+             ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
+                                        buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+            NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        l = (p - d);
+        d = buf;
+        *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+        l2n3(l, d);
+
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+        /* number of bytes to write */
+        s->init_num = p - buf;
+        s->init_off = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+    return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 
 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i,al,ok;
-	unsigned int j;
-	long n;
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int i, al, ok;
+    unsigned int j;
+    long n;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
-		-1,
-		20000, /* ?? */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
-			{
-			if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-				return 1;
-				}
-			else /* already sent a cookie */
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
-		s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
-		al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p+=2;
-
-	/* load the server hello data */
-	/* load the server random */
-	memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-	/* get the session-id */
-	j= *(p++);
-
-	if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
+    SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+
+    if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+            if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
+                s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+                return 1;
+            } else {            /* already sent a cookie */
+
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+    if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+        s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
+        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* load the server hello data */
+    /* load the server random */
+    memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+    s->hit = 0;
+
+    /* get the session-id */
+    j = *(p++);
+
+    if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
-		{
-		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
-		s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
-		if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
-					     &s->session->master_key_length,
-					     NULL, &pref_cipher,
-					     s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
-			{
-			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
-				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
-			}
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
-	    && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
-	    {
-	    if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
-	       || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
-		{
-		/* actually a client application bug */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-	    s->hit=1;
-	    }
-	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
-		{
-		/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
-		 * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
-		s->hit=0;
-		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
-			{
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		s->session->session_id_length=j;
-		memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
-		}
-	p+=j;
-	c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
-	if (c == NULL)
-		{
-		/* unknown cipher */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
-	if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
-		(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
-
-	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
-	i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
-	   and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
-	   cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
-	if (s->session->cipher)
-		s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
-	if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
-		{
+    /*
+     * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+     * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+     * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+     * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+     * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+     * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+     * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+     * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+     * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+     * server wants to resume.
+     */
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+        s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+        SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+        s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+        if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+                                     &s->session->master_key_length,
+                                     NULL, &pref_cipher,
+                                     s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+            s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+                pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+    if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+        && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
+        if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+            || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+            /* actually a client application bug */
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        s->hit = 1;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+         * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+         * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+         * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+         * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
+         */
+        if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+            if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+        s->session->session_id_length = j;
+        memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
+    }
+    p += j;
+    c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+    if (c == NULL) {
+        /* unknown cipher */
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
+    if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
+        (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+        !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+    p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+
+    sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+    i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
+    if (i < 0) {
+        /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+     * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
+     * set and use it for comparison.
+     */
+    if (s->session->cipher)
+        s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+    if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
 /* Workaround is now obsolete */
 #if 0
-		if (!(s->options &
-			SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
-#endif
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-	/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
-	 * client authentication.
-	 */
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	/* lets get the compression algorithm */
-	/* COMPRESSION */
+        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
+#endif
+        {
+            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+    /*
+     * Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
+     * authentication.
+     */
+    if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
+        && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+    /* COMPRESSION */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (*(p++) != 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
-	 * using compression.
-	 */
-	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
+    if (*(p++) != 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+     * using compression.
+     */
+    if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 #else
-	j= *(p++);
-	if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (j == 0)
-		comp=NULL;
-	else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	else
-		comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
-	
-	if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
-		}
+    j = *(p++);
+    if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (j == 0)
+        comp = NULL;
+    else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+        goto f_err;
+    } else
+        comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
+
+    if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+        goto f_err;
+    } else {
+        s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+    }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* TLS extensions*/
-	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
-			{
-			/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-			goto f_err; 
-			}
-		if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (p != (d+n))
-		{
-		/* wrong packet length */
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
+    /* TLS extensions */
+    if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+        if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
+            /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (p != (d + n)) {
+        /* wrong packet length */
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 
 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
-	unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	const unsigned char *q,*p;
-	unsigned char *d;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-	SESS_CERT *sc;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
-		((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && 
-		(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	n2l3(p,llen);
-	if (llen+3 != n)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
-		{
-		n2l3(p,l);
-		if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		q=p;
-		x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
-		if (x == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (q != (p+l))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		x=NULL;
-		nc+=l+3;
-		p=q;
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
+{
+    int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
+    unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *q, *p;
+    unsigned char *d;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+    SESS_CERT *sc;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int need_cert = 1;          /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
+                                 * KRB5 */
+
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+                                   -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+
+    if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+        ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
+         (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
+        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+    if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    n2l3(p, llen);
+    if (llen + 3 != n) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+        n2l3(p, l);
+        if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        q = p;
+        x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
+        if (x == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (q != (p + l)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        x = NULL;
+        nc += l + 3;
+        p = q;
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+    if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	    && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
-		 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-		)
-		{
-		al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-		goto f_err; 
-		}
-	ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
-
-	sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-	if (sc == NULL) goto err;
-
-	if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
-	s->session->sess_cert=sc;
-
-	sc->cert_chain=sk;
-	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
-	 * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
-	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
-	sk=NULL;
- 	/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
-
-	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
-	/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-	need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
-	            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-	            ? 0 : 1;
+        && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+             (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+        ) {
+        al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    ERR_clear_error();          /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+
+    sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+    if (sc == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (s->session->sess_cert)
+        ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+    s->session->sess_cert = sc;
+
+    sc->cert_chain = sk;
+    /*
+     * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
+     * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
+     */
+    x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+    sk = NULL;
+    /*
+     * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
+     */
+
+    pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+    /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+    need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+                 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+        ? 0 : 1;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
-	printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
-	printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
-		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
-		{
-		x=NULL;
-		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
-			SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
-	if (need_cert && i < 0)
-		{
-		x=NULL;
-		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
-			SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	if (need_cert)
-		{
-		sc->peer_cert_type=i;
-		CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		/* Why would the following ever happen?
-		 * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
-		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-		sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
-		sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
-		if (s->session->peer != NULL)
-			X509_free(s->session->peer);
-		CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		s->session->peer=x;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		sc->peer_cert_type=i;
-		sc->peer_key= NULL;
-
-		if (s->session->peer != NULL)
-			X509_free(s->session->peer);
-		s->session->peer=NULL;
-		}
-	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
-	x=NULL;
-	ret=1;
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	X509_free(x);
-	sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
-	return(ret);
-	}
+    fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
+    fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
+    fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
+            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
+#endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+    if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
+        x = NULL;
+        al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+    if (need_cert && i < 0) {
+        x = NULL;
+        al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+               SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (need_cert) {
+        sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+        /*
+         * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
+         * of lines ago.
+         */
+        if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+            X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+        sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+        sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+        if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+            X509_free(s->session->peer);
+        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+        s->session->peer = x;
+    } else {
+        sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+        sc->peer_key = NULL;
+
+        if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+            X509_free(s->session->peer);
+        s->session->peer = NULL;
+    }
+    s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+    x = NULL;
+    ret = 1;
+
+    if (0) {
+ f_err:
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    X509_free(x);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
+{
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-	unsigned char *param,*p;
-	int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
-	long n,alg_k,alg_a;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+#endif
+    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+    unsigned char *param, *p;
+    int al, j, ok;
+    long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh=NULL;
+    DH *dh = NULL;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-	int curve_nid = 0;
-	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-#endif
-
-	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
-	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
-		{
+    EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+    int curve_nid = 0;
+    int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+    /*
+     * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
+     * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
+     */
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+                                   -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+        /*
+         * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+         * ciphersuite.
+         */
+        if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
-		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
-		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
-		   later.*/
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
-			{
-			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-			s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-			}
-#endif
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
-		{
+        /*
+         * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
+         * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
+         * problems later.
+         */
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+            s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+            if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+            s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+        }
+#endif
+        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+    if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-			{
-			RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
-			s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
-			}
+        if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+            RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+            s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
+        }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
-			{
-			DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
-			s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
-			}
+        if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
+            DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+            s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
+        }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
-			{
-			EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-			s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
-			}
+        if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
+            EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+            s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
+        }
 #endif
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-		}
+    } else {
+        s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+    }
 
-	param_len=0;
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+    /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
+    param_len = 0;
+
+    alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
-		{
-		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
-
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
-		/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
-		 * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the
-		 * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
-		 * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
-		if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
-		 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
-		 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
-		 * NULL-terminated string. */
-		memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
-		memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
-		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-		s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
-		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}	   
-
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-		}
-	else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+        param_len = 2;
+        if (param_len > n) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        /*
+         * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+         * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the maximum length of
+         * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+         * identity.
+         */
+        if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        p += i;
+        n -= param_len;
+    } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-		{
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
-		p++;
-		param_len+=i+1;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+        param_len = 2;
+        if (param_len > n) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+
+        if (2 > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += 2;
+
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+
+        if (1 > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += 1;
+
+        i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
+        p++;
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+
+        if (2 > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += 2;
+
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+        n -= param_len;
+
+        if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
 
 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# else
+        if (0) ;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
+                                x509);
+# endif
+    } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-#else
-		if (0)
-			;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
-#endif
-		}
-	else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-		{
-		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-
-		/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
-		rsa=NULL;
-		}
-#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-	if (0)
-		;
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+        /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+        if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        param_len = 2;
+        if (param_len > n) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+
+        if (2 > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += 2;
+
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+        n -= param_len;
+
+        /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
+        if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+        else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
+        rsa = NULL;
+    }
+#else                           /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+    if (0) ;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
-		{
-		if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-#else
-		if (0)
-			;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
-#endif
-		/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-
-		s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
-		dh=NULL;
-		}
-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+    else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+        if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        param_len = 2;
+        if (param_len > n) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+
+        if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+
+        if (2 > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += 2;
+
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+
+        if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (2 > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += 2;
+
+        n2s(p, i);
+
+        if (i > n - param_len) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += i;
+
+        if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += i;
+        n -= param_len;
+
+        if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# else
+        if (0) ;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
+                                x509);
+# endif
+        /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+        s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
+        dh = NULL;
+    } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+               SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-		{
-		EC_GROUP *ngroup;
-		const EC_GROUP *group;
-
-		if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
-		 * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
-		 * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
-		 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
-		 */
-
-		/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
-		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
-		 */
-		param_len=3;
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
-		    (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
-		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) 
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
-		if (ngroup == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
-
-		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
-
-		if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
-		    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		p+=3;
-
-		/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
-		if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
-		    ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		encoded_pt_len = *p;  /* length of encoded point */
-		p+=1;
-		param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
-		    (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, 
-			p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		n-=param_len;
-		p+=encoded_pt_len;
-
-		/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
-		 * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
-		 * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
-		 */
-		if (0) ;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
-#endif
-		/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-		EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
-		s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
-		ecdh=NULL;
-		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-		bn_ctx = NULL;
-		EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
-		srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-		}
-	else if (alg_k)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-
-	/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
-
-	/* if it was signed, check the signature */
-	if (pkey != NULL)
-		{
-		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
-			/* Should never happen */
-			if (sigalg == -1)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
-			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
-			if (md == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
+    else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+        EC_GROUP *ngroup;
+        const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+        if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+         * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
+         * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
+         * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
+         * byte for the length of the encoded point
+         */
+        param_len = 4;
+        if (param_len > n) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+            ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+        if (ngroup == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
+
+        group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+
+        if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+            (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        p += 3;
+
+        /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
+        if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
+            ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        encoded_pt_len = *p;    /* length of encoded point */
+        p += 1;
+
+        if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
+            (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
+                                p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        param_len += encoded_pt_len;
+
+        n -= param_len;
+        p += encoded_pt_len;
+
+        /*
+         * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+         * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+         * and ECDSA.
+         */
+        if (0) ;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+            pkey =
+                X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+# endif
+        /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+        EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
+        s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+        ecdh = NULL;
+        BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+        bn_ctx = NULL;
+        EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+        srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+    } else if (alg_k) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+    /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
+
+    /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+        if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            int sigalg;
+            if (2 > n) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+
+            sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+            /* Should never happen */
+            if (sigalg == -1) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+            if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+            if (md == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-			p += 2;
-			n -= 2;
-			}
-		else
-			md = EVP_sha1();
-			
-		n2s(p,i);
-		n-=2;
-		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
-		if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
-			{
-			/* wrong packet length */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
+            fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+            p += 2;
+            n -= 2;
+        } else
+            md = EVP_sha1();
+
+        if (2 > n) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2s(p, i);
+        n -= 2;
+        j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+        /*
+         * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
+         */
+        if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+            /* wrong packet length */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			int num;
-
-			j=0;
-			q=md_buf;
-			for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
-				{
-				EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
-					EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-				EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
-					?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
-				q+=i;
-				j+=i;
-				}
-			i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
-								pkey->pkey.rsa);
-			if (i < 0)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			if (i == 0)
-				{
-				/* bad signature */
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-			{
-			EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
-				{
-				/* bad signature */
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-			/* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		/* still data left over */
-		if (n != 0)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+            && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            int num;
+            unsigned int size;
+
+            j = 0;
+            q = md_buf;
+            for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+                EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+                if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+                                      (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
+                                      NULL) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
+                        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                q += size;
+                j += size;
+            }
+            i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
+            if (i < 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (i == 0) {
+                /* bad signature */
+                al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+                    || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
+                /* bad signature */
+                al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
+        if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* still data left over */
+        if (n != 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    return (1);
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (rsa != NULL)
-		RSA_free(rsa);
+    if (rsa != NULL)
+        RSA_free(rsa);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (dh != NULL)
-		DH_free(dh);
+    if (dh != NULL)
+        DH_free(dh);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
-	if (ecdh != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+    if (ecdh != NULL)
+        EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+#endif
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 
 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok,ret=0;
-	unsigned long n,nc,l;
-	unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i;
-	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-	const unsigned char *p,*q;
-	unsigned char *d;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
-		 * as we wont be doing client auth.
-		 */
-		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-			{
-			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
-		{
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
-	if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* get the certificate types */
-	ctype_num= *(p++);
-	if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
-		ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
-	for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
-		s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
-	p+=ctype_num;
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		{
-		n2s(p, llen);
-		/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
-		 * following length value.
-		 */
-		if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n)
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen))
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p += llen;
-		}
-
-	/* get the CA RDNs */
-	n2s(p,llen);
+{
+    int ok, ret = 0;
+    unsigned long n, nc, l;
+    unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p, *q;
+    unsigned char *d;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
+
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
+                                   -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+
+    s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+        /*
+         * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
+         * wont be doing client auth.
+         */
+        if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+            if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                goto err;
+        }
+        return (1);
+    }
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+    if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+    if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* get the certificate types */
+    ctype_num = *(p++);
+    if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
+        ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+    for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
+        s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
+    p += ctype_num;
+    if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+        n2s(p, llen);
+        /*
+         * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
+         * length value.
+         */
+        if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        p += llen;
+    }
+
+    /* get the CA RDNs */
+    n2s(p, llen);
 #if 0
+    {
+        FILE *out;
+        out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
+        fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
+        fclose(out);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+        n2s(p, l);
+        if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
+            if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+                goto cont;      /* netscape bugs */
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        q = p;
+
+        if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
+            /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
+            if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
+                goto cont;
+            else {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (q != (p + l)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                   SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        p += l;
+        nc += l + 2;
+    }
+
+    if (0) {
+ cont:
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+
+    /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+    s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+    s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
+    if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+    s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
+    ca_sk = NULL;
+
+    ret = 1;
+    goto done;
+ err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
+    if (ca_sk != NULL)
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
 {
-FILE *out;
-out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
-fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
-fclose(out);
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
 }
-#endif
 
-	if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n)
-		{
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
-		{
-		n2s(p,l);
-		if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
-			{
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
-				goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		q=p;
-
-		if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
-			{
-			/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
-				goto cont;
-			else
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (q != (p+l))
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		p+=l;
-		nc+=l+2;
-		}
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-cont:
-		ERR_clear_error();
-		}
-
-	/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
-	s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
-	s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
-	if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
-	s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
-	ca_sk=NULL;
-
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
-	{
-	return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
-	}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
-	long n;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned char *d;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
-		-1,
-		16384,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return((int)n);
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (n < 6)
-		{
-		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
-	n2s(p, ticklen);
-	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
-	if (ticklen + 6 != n)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
-		s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
-		}
-	s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
-	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
-	s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
-	 * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
-	 * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
-	 * client session ID matching to work and we know much 
-	 * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
-	 * 
-	 * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
-	 * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
-	 * session resumption.
-	 *
-	 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
-	 * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
-	 * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
-	 * ticket.
-	 */ 
-	EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
-			s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-							EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-#else
-							EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-#endif
-	ret=1;
-	return(ret);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
+{
+    int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
+    long n;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *d;
+    unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
+
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
+                                   SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+
+    if (n < 6) {
+        /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+    n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
+    n2s(p, ticklen);
+    /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+    if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+    if (ticklen == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+        int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+        /*
+         * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+         * one
+         */
+        if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+            /*
+             * Remove the old session from the cache
+             */
+            if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
+                if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+                    s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+                                                      s->session);
+            } else {
+                /* We carry on if this fails */
+                SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = new_sess;
+    }
+
+    if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+        OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+        s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+    }
+    s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+    if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+    s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+    s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+    /*
+     * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
+     * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
+     * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
+     * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
+     * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
+     * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
+     * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
+     * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
+     * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
+     */
+    EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
+               s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+               EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+# else
+               EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+# endif
+    ret = 1;
+    return (ret);
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 
 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok, al;
-	unsigned long resplen,n;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
-		SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
-		16384,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	if (n < 4)
-		{
-		/* need at least status type + length */
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	n2l3(p, resplen);
-	if (resplen + 4 != n)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
-	if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
-	if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int ret;
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		if (ret == 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (ret < 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	return 1;
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-	return(-1);
-	}
+{
+    int ok, al;
+    unsigned long resplen, n;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
+                                   -1, 16384, &ok);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+        /*
+         * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+         * tlsext_status_expected is set
+         */
+        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+    } else {
+        if (n < 4) {
+            /* need at least status type + length */
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+        if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2l3(p, resplen);
+        if (resplen + 4 != n) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
+        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
+    }
+    if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+        int ret;
+        ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 #endif
 
 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok,ret=0;
-	long n;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
-		SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
-		30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	if (n > 0)
-		{
-		/* should contain no data */
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	ret=1;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
+{
+    int ok, ret = 0;
+    long n;
+
+    /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
+    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
+                                   SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
+                                   SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return ((int)n);
+    if (n > 0) {
+        /* should contain no data */
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+        return -1;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int n;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    int n;
+    unsigned long alg_k;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+    unsigned char *q;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+    KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
-	const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
-	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
-	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-	BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
+    EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+    const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+    int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
 #endif
 
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[4]);
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+        d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+        p = &(d[4]);
 
-		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+        alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-		/* Fool emacs indentation */
-		if (0) {}
+        /* Fool emacs indentation */
+        if (0) {
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			RSA *rsa;
-			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
-			else
-				{
-				pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-				if ((pkey == NULL) ||
-					(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
-					(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
-				EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-				}
-				
-			tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
-			tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
-			if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
-					goto err;
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
-
-			q=p;
-			/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
-			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-				p+=2;
-			n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
-				tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
-#endif
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
-			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-				{
-				s2n(n,q);
-				n+=2;
-				}
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
-			}
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+            RSA *rsa;
+            unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+            if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+                /*
+                 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+            else {
+                pkey =
+                    X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
+                                    x509);
+                if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+                    || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+            }
+
+            tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+            tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+            if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+            q = p;
+            /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+            if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+                p += 2;
+            n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+                                   tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+            if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+                p[1]++;
+            if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+                tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+# endif
+            if (n <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+            if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+                s2n(n, q);
+                n += 2;
+            }
+
+            s->session->master_key_length =
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                            s->
+                                                            session->master_key,
+                                                            tmp_buf,
+                                                            sizeof tmp_buf);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+        }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-			{
-			krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
-			KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
-			/*  krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;  */
-			krb5_data	*enc_ticket;
-			krb5_data	authenticator, *authp = NULL;
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ciph_ctx;
-			const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
-			unsigned char	iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-			unsigned char	tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-			unsigned char	epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 
-						+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-			int 		padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
-				alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-			authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
-			if (KRB5SENDAUTH)  authp = &authenticator;
-#endif	/* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
-			krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
-				&kssl_err);
-			enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
-			if (enc == NULL)
-			    goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			{
-			printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
-			if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
-			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
-			}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-			if (krb5rc)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
-						SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-						kssl_err.reason);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/*  20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
-			**  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
-			**
-			**  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
-			**  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
-			**  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
-			**  if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
-			**    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-			**
-			**  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
-			**  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
-			**  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
-			**  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
-			**  Example:
-			**  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
-			**  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
-			**  optional authenticator omitted.
-			*/
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket		*/
-			s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
-			memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
-			p+= enc_ticket->length;
-			n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator	*/
-			if (authp  &&  authp->length)  
-				{
-				s2n(authp->length,p);
-				memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
-				p+= authp->length;
-				n+= authp->length + 2;
-				
-				free(authp->data);
-				authp->data = NULL;
-				authp->length = 0;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s2n(0,p);/*  null authenticator length	*/
-				n+=2;
-				}
- 
-			    tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
-			    tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
-			    if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
-				goto err;
-
-			/*  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
-			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
-			**	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
-			**				kssl_ctx->length);
-			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
-			*/
-
-			memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);  /* per RFC 1510 */
-			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
-				kssl_ctx->key,iv);
-			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
-				sizeof tmp_buf);
-			EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
-			outl += padl;
-			if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret	*/
-			s2n(outl,p);
-			memcpy(p, epms, outl);
-			p+=outl;
-			n+=outl + 2;
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
-			}
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+            krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+            KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+            /*  krb5_data   krb5_ap_req;  */
+            krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+            krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+            const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+            unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+            unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+            unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+            int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+                    alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+# endif                         /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+            authp = NULL;
+# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+            if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
+                authp = &authenticator;
+# endif                         /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+            krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
+            enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+            if (enc == NULL)
+                goto err;
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+            {
+                fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+                if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+                    fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
+                            kssl_err.text);
+            }
+# endif                         /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+            if (krb5rc) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*-
+             * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+             * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+             *
+             * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+             * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+             * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+             * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+             *   kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+             *
+             * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+             * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+             * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+             * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+             * Example:
+             * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+             * Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
+             * optional authenticator omitted.
+             */
+
+            /*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket              */
+            s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
+            memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+            p += enc_ticket->length;
+            n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+            /*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator       */
+            if (authp && authp->length) {
+                s2n(authp->length, p);
+                memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+                p += authp->length;
+                n += authp->length + 2;
+
+                free(authp->data);
+                authp->data = NULL;
+                authp->length = 0;
+            } else {
+                s2n(0, p);      /* null authenticator length */
+                n += 2;
+            }
+
+            tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+            tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+            if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+
+            /*-
+             * 20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+             *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+             *                              kssl_ctx->length);
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+             */
+
+            memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+            EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
+            EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
+                              sizeof tmp_buf);
+            EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
+            outl += padl;
+            if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+            /*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret    */
+            s2n(outl, p);
+            memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+            p += outl;
+            n += outl + 2;
+
+            s->session->master_key_length =
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                            s->
+                                                            session->master_key,
+                                                            tmp_buf,
+                                                            sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+        }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-			{
-			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
-				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-			else
-				{
-				/* we get them from the cert */
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			
-			/* generate a new random key */
-			if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				DH_free(dh_clnt);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
-			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
-
-			n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
-
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				DH_free(dh_clnt);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* generate master key from the result */
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,p,n);
-			/* clean up */
-			memset(p,0,n);
-
-			/* send off the data */
-			n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
-			s2n(n,p);
-			BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
-			n+=2;
-
-			DH_free(dh_clnt);
-
-			/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
-			}
+        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+            DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
+
+            if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+                dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+            else {
+                /* we get them from the cert */
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* generate a new random key */
+            if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                DH_free(dh_clnt);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
+             * clear it out afterwards
+             */
+
+            n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
+
+            if (n <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                DH_free(dh_clnt);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* generate master key from the result */
+            s->session->master_key_length =
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                            s->
+                                                            session->master_key,
+                                                            p, n);
+            /* clean up */
+            memset(p, 0, n);
+
+            /* send off the data */
+            n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+            s2n(n, p);
+            BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
+            n += 2;
+
+            DH_free(dh_clnt);
+        }
 #endif
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 
-		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
-			{
-			const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
-			EC_KEY *tkey;
-			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
-			int field_size = 0;
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Did we send out the client's
-			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
-			 * computation as part of client certificate?
-			 * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-			 */
-			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) 
-				{
-				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
-				 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
-				 * To add such support, one needs to add
-				 * code that checks for appropriate 
-				 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-				 * For example, the cert have an ECC
-				 * key on the same curve as the server's
-				 * and the key should be authorized for
-				 * key agreement.
-				 *
-				 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
-				 * to skip sending the certificate verify
-				 * message.
-				 *
-				 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
-				 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
-				 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
-				 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
-				 */
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-				{
-				tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
-				srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
-				    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
-				if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
-				    (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
-				    (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto err;
-					}
-
-				tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
-				}
-
-			srvr_group   = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
-			srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
-
-			if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
-				{ 
-				/* Reuse key info from our certificate
-				 * We only need our private key to perform
-				 * the ECDH computation.
-				 */
-				const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-				tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
-				priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-				if (priv_key == NULL)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
-				if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-
-			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
-			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards
-			 */
-
-			field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
-			if (field_size <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* generate master key from the result */
-			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-			    -> generate_master_secret(s, 
-				s->session->master_key,
-				p, n);
-
-			memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-
-			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
-				{
-				/* Send empty client key exch message */
-				n = 0;
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* First check the size of encoding and
-				 * allocate memory accordingly.
-				 */
-				encoded_pt_len = 
-				    EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
-					EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
-					POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-					NULL, 0, NULL);
-
-				encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
-				    OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * 
-					sizeof(unsigned char)); 
-				bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-				if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || 
-				    (bn_ctx == NULL)) 
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-
-				/* Encode the public key */
-				n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
-				    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
-				    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-				    encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
-
-				*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
-				/* Encoded point will be copied here */
-				p += 1; 
-				/* copy the point */
-				memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
-				/* increment n to account for length field */
-				n += 1; 
-				}
-
-			/* Free allocated memory */
-			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-			if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-			if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
-				 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
-			EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-			}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
-			{
-			/* GOST key exchange message creation */
-			EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
-			X509 *peer_cert; 
-			size_t msglen;
-			unsigned int md_len;
-			int keytype;
-			unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
-			EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
-			EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
-
-			/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
-			peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
-			if (!peer_cert) 
-				peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
-			if (!peer_cert)		{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
-					goto err;
-				}	
-				
-			pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
-			/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
-
-			 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
-			 * certificate key for key exchange
-			 */
-
-			 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
-					
-			EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
-			  /* Generate session key */	
-		    RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
-			/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
-				if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
-					/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
-					* would be used
-					*/
-					ERR_clear_error();
-				}
-			}			
-			/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
-			 * context data */
-			ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-			EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
-			EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
-			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
-				8,shared_ukm)<0) {
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-						SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-					goto err;
-				}	
-			/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
-			/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
-			*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-			msglen=255;
-			if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-				goto err;
-			}
-			if (msglen >= 0x80)
-				{
-				*(p++)=0x81;
-				*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
-				n=msglen+3;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
-				n=msglen+2;
-				}
-			memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
-			/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
-			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
-				{
-				/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
-				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
-				}
-			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
-			EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
-
-			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+            const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+            EC_KEY *tkey;
+            int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+            int field_size = 0;
+
+            if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
+             * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
+             * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+             */
+            if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
+                /*-
+                 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
+                 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+                 * To add such support, one needs to add
+                 * code that checks for appropriate
+                 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+                 * For example, the cert have an ECC
+                 * key on the same curve as the server's
+                 * and the key should be authorized for
+                 * key agreement.
+                 *
+                 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+                 * to skip sending the certificate verify
+                 * message.
+                 *
+                 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+                 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+                 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+                 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+                 */
+            }
+
+            if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+                tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+            } else {
+                /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+                srvr_pub_pkey =
+                    X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+                                    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+                if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
+                    || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+                    || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+
+                tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+            }
+
+            srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+            srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+            if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+                /*
+                 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
+                 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
+                 */
+                const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+                tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+                priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+                if (priv_key == NULL) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+                if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
+             * clear it out afterwards
+             */
+
+            field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+            if (field_size <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
+                                 clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+            if (n <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /* generate master key from the result */
+            s->session->master_key_length =
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                            s->
+                                                            session->master_key,
+                                                            p, n);
+
+            memset(p, 0, n);    /* clean up */
+
+            if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+                /* Send empty client key exch message */
+                n = 0;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
+                 * accordingly.
+                 */
+                encoded_pt_len =
+                    EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+                                       EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+                                       POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+                                       NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+                encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+                    OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
+                bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+                if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                           ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+
+                /* Encode the public key */
+                n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+                                       EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+                                       POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+                                       encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+                *p = n;         /* length of encoded point */
+                /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+                p += 1;
+                /* copy the point */
+                memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+                /* increment n to account for length field */
+                n += 1;
+            }
+
+            /* Free allocated memory */
+            BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+            if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+            if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+                EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+        }
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+            /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+            X509 *peer_cert;
+            size_t msglen;
+            unsigned int md_len;
+            int keytype;
+            unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+            EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
+            EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+
+            /*
+             * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+             */
+            peer_cert =
+                s->session->
+                sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
+            if (!peer_cert)
+                peer_cert =
+                    s->session->
+                    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
+            if (!peer_cert) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
+                                        X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+            if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /*
+             * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+             *
+             * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+             * certificate key for key exchange
+             */
+
+            /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+
+            if (pkey_ctx == NULL
+                    || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+                    /* Generate session key */
+                    || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /*
+             * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
+             */
+            if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
+                if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
+                    (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
+                     * * would be used
+                     */
+                    ERR_clear_error();
+                }
+            }
+            /*
+             * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+             * data
+             */
+            ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+            if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
+                               EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
+                    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+                                        SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+                    || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+                EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+                (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
+                 shared_ukm) < 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+            /*
+             * Encapsulate it into sequence
+             */
+            *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+            msglen = 255;
+            if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
+                <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (msglen >= 0x80) {
+                *(p++) = 0x81;
+                *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
+                n = msglen + 3;
+            } else {
+                *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
+                n = msglen + 2;
+            }
+            memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
+            /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+                (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
+                /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
+                s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+            s->session->master_key_length =
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                            s->
+                                                            session->master_key,
+                                                            premaster_secret,
+                                                            32);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
+
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-			{
-			if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
-				{
-				/* send off the data */
-				n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
-				s2n(n,p);
-				BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
-				n+=2;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
-			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
-			if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+            if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
+                /* send off the data */
+                n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+                s2n(n, p);
+                BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
+                n += 2;
+            } else {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+            s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+            if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+                 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
+                                                   s->session->master_key)) <
+                0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
-			{
-			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
-			unsigned char *t = NULL;
-			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
-			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
-			int psk_err = 1;
-
-			n = 0;
-			if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
-				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
-				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
-			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-			else if (psk_len == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-
-			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
-			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
-			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
-			memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-			memset(t, 0, psk_len);
-			t+=psk_len;
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-
-			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
-				s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
-			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-
-			s->session->master_key_length =
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 
-			n = strlen(identity);
-			s2n(n, p);
-			memcpy(p, identity, n);
-			n+=2;
-			psk_err = 0;
-		psk_err:
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
-			if (psk_err != 0)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		else
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
-			    SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=n+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+            /*
+             * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+             * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+             * strnlen.
+             */
+            char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
+            size_t identity_len;
+            unsigned char *t = NULL;
+            unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
+            unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+            int psk_err = 1;
+
+            n = 0;
+            if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+                                             identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+                                             psk_or_pre_ms,
+                                             sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+            if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto psk_err;
+            } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+                goto psk_err;
+            }
+            identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+            identity_len = strlen(identity);
+            if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto psk_err;
+            }
+            /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+            pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
+            t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+            memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+            s2n(psk_len, t);
+            memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+            t += psk_len;
+            s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+            if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+            s->session->psk_identity_hint =
+                BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+            if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
+                && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto psk_err;
+            }
+
+            if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+            s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+            if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto psk_err;
+            }
+
+            s->session->master_key_length =
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                            s->
+                                                            session->master_key,
+                                                            psk_or_pre_ms,
+                                                            pre_ms_len);
+            s2n(identity_len, p);
+            memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
+            n = 2 + identity_len;
+            psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+            if (psk_err != 0) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        else {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+        l2n3(n, d);
+
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+        /* number of bytes to write */
+        s->init_num = n + 4;
+        s->init_off = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+    return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-	if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
-		EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-#endif
-	return(-1);
-	}
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+    if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+        EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 
 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
-	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
-	unsigned u=0;
-	unsigned long n;
-	int j;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[4]);
-		pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
+{
+    unsigned char *p, *d;
+    unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+    unsigned u = 0;
+    unsigned long n;
+    int j;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
+        d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+        p = &(d[4]);
+        pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
-		pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
-		EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
-		if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
-			{
-			if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-						NID_sha1,
-						&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			}
-		/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
-		 * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
-		 */
-		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			long hdatalen = 0;
-			void *hdata;
-			const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
-			hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
-								&hdata);
-			if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-						ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			p += 2;
+        pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+        if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
+            if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+                                                     NID_sha1,
+                                                     &(data
+                                                       [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+        } else {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+        /*
+         * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
+         * digest and cached handshake records.
+         */
+        if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            long hdatalen = 0;
+            void *hdata;
+            const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
+            hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+            if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            p += 2;
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-			fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
-							EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-			if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
-				|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
-				|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-						ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(u,p);
-			n = u + 4;
-			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
+            fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
+                    EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+            if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+                || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+                || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s2n(u, p);
+            n = u + 4;
+            if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                goto err;
+        } else
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-			{
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-				NID_md5,
-			 	&(data[0]));
-			if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
-					 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(u,p);
-			n=u+2;
-			}
-		else
+        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+            s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
+            if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+                         MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+                         &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s2n(u, p);
+            n = u + 2;
+        } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
-			{
-			if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
-				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
-				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(j,p);
-			n=j+2;
-			}
-		else
+        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+            if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+                          &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+                          SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+                          (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s2n(j, p);
+            n = j + 2;
+        } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-			{
-			if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
-				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
-				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-				    ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(j,p);
-			n=j+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-		if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 
-		{
-		unsigned char signbuf[64];
-		int i;
-		size_t sigsize=64;
-		s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-			NID_id_GostR3411_94,
-			data);
-		if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-			ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
-			p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
-		}	
-		s2n(j,p);
-		n=j+2;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
-		s->init_num=(int)n+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
+        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+            if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+                            &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+                            SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+                            (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s2n(j, p);
+            n = j + 2;
+        } else
+#endif
+        if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
+                || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+            unsigned char signbuf[64];
+            int i;
+            size_t sigsize = 64;
+            s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+                                                 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
+            if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
+                p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
+            }
+            s2n(j, p);
+            n = j + 2;
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+        l2n3(n, d);
+
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+        s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
+        s->init_off = 0;
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    return (-1);
+}
 
 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	X509 *x509=NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state ==	SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
-		{
-		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
-		else
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
-		}
-
-	/* We need to get a client cert */
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
-		{
-		/* If we get an error, we need to
-		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
-		 * We then get retied later */
-		i=0;
-		i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
-		if (i < 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
-			{
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
-			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
-				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
-				i=0;
-			}
-		else if (i == 1)
-			{
-			i=0;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
-			}
-
-		if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
-		if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
-				return(1);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
-				}
-			}
-
-		/* Ok, we have a cert */
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
-		{
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
-		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
-			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
-		s->init_num=(int)l;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-#define has_bits(i,m)	(((i)&(m)) == (m))
+{
+    X509 *x509 = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int i;
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
+        if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+            (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+            (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+        else
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+    }
+
+    /* We need to get a client cert */
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
+        /*
+         * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+         * return(-1); We then get retied later
+         */
+        i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+        if (i < 0) {
+            s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+            return (-1);
+        }
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+            if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+                i = 0;
+        } else if (i == 1) {
+            i = 0;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                   SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+        }
+
+        if (x509 != NULL)
+            X509_free(x509);
+        if (pkey != NULL)
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        if (i == 0) {
+            if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+                s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+                return (1);
+            } else {
+                s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Ok, we have a cert */
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+    }
+
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+        l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+                                   (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
+                                    2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
+        if (!l) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        s->init_num = (int)l;
+        s->init_off = 0;
+    }
+    /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+    return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+#define has_bits(i,m)   (((i)&(m)) == (m))
 
 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,idx;
-	long alg_k,alg_a;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	SESS_CERT *sc;
+{
+    int i, idx;
+    long alg_k, alg_a;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int pkey_bits;
+    SESS_CERT *sc;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *rsa;
+    RSA *rsa;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh;
+    DH *dh;
 #endif
+    int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-	/* we don't have a certificate */
-	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-		return(1);
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 
-	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
-	if (sc == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err;
-		}
+    /* we don't have a certificate */
+    if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+        return (1);
 
+    sc = s->session->sess_cert;
+    if (sc == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+    rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+    dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
 #endif
 
-	/* This is the passed certificate */
+    /* This is the passed certificate */
 
-	idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
+    idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
-		{
-		if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
-		    						s) == 0) 
-			{ /* check failed */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		else 
-			{
-			return 1;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
-	i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
-	
-	/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
-	if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
+    if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
+        if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
+            /* check failed */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+            goto f_err;
+        } else {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+    pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+    pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+    i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+    /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+    if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
+    else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+        if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+            !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                   SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+            goto f_err;
+        } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+            if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+                if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                           SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                if (rsa != NULL) {
+                    /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif
-#endif
-
-	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
-		{
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+               SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+# endif
+
+    /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+        int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+        if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024)
+            || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+    if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+        pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			if (rsa == NULL
-			    || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+            if (rsa == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                       SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+                goto f_err;
+            } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
+                SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+                /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
+                al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                       SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-			if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-			    {
-			    if (dh == NULL
-				|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-err:
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned int len, padding_len;
-	unsigned char *d;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
-		{
-		len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-		padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
-		d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		d[4] = len;
-		memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
-		d[5 + len] = padding_len;
-		memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
-		l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
-		s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
-		s->init_off = 0;
-		}
-
-	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+            if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
+                SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+                /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
+                al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                       SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+            /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
+            al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                   SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+                goto f_err;
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                   SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+    return (1);
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+    return (0);
 }
-#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
 
-/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
+ * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
+ * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
+ * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
+ * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
+ * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
+ * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
  */
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
+        !s->session->tlsext_tick)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
+    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+    /*
+     * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
+     * so permit appropriate message length.
+     * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
+     * and not its length.
+     */
+    s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                               SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+                               SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+                               -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+    s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return -1;
+
+    s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
+    if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	long n;
-	/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
-	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		return 1;
-	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
-	 * message, so permit appropriate message length */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
-		return 2;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned int len, padding_len;
+    unsigned char *d;
+
+    if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
+        len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+        padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+        d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+        d[4] = len;
+        memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
+        d[5 + len] = padding_len;
+        memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
+        *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+        l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
+        s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
+        s->init_off = 0;
+    }
+
+    return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
-	{
-	int i = 0;
+{
+    int i = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
-		{
-		i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
-						SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
-						px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-		if (i != 0)
-			return i;
-		}
-#endif
-	if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
-		i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
-	return i;
-	}
+    if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
+        i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+                                        SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+                                        px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        if (i != 0)
+            return i;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+        i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+    return i;
+}