Update OpenSSL to version 1.0.2g

1 files changed, 41 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index d659ed428e..fe30ec7d00 100644
--- a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 
         p = s->packet;
 
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                            s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
         /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
         rr->type = *(p++);
         ssl_major = *(p++);
@@ -1488,10 +1492,10 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
     unsigned char *p, *pseq;
     int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
     int prefix_len = 0;
+    int eivlen;
     SSL3_RECORD *wr;
     SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
     SSL_SESSION *sess;
-    int bs;
 
     /*
      * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out.  This
@@ -1570,27 +1574,41 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 
     *(p++) = type & 0xff;
     wr->type = type;
-
-    *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
-    *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+    /*
+     * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
+     * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
+     * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
+     */
+    if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+        *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
+        *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
+    } else {
+        *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+        *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+    }
 
     /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
     pseq = p;
     p += 10;
 
-    /* lets setup the record stuff. */
-
-    /*
-     * Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. (this is a bit of a
-     * boundary violation, but what the heck).
-     */
-    if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
-        (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
-        bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
-    else
-        bs = 0;
+    /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
+        int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+            eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+            if (eivlen <= 1)
+                eivlen = 0;
+        }
+        /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+        else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+            eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+        else
+            eivlen = 0;
+    } else
+        eivlen = 0;
 
-    wr->data = p + bs;          /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
+    /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+    wr->data = p + eivlen;      /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
     wr->length = (int)len;
     wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
 
@@ -1616,7 +1634,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
      */
 
     if (mac_size != 0) {
-        if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1) < 0)
+        if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
             goto err;
         wr->length += mac_size;
     }
@@ -1625,14 +1643,8 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
     wr->input = p;
     wr->data = p;
 
-    /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
-    if (bs) {                   /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
-        RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, bs);
-        /*
-         * master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness
-         */
-        wr->length += bs;
-    }
+    if (eivlen)
+        wr->length += eivlen;
 
     if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
         goto err;
@@ -1656,6 +1668,10 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
     pseq += 6;
     s2n(wr->length, pseq);
 
+    if (s->msg_callback)
+        s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                        DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
     /*
      * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
      * wr->length long