Update OpenSSL to version 1.0.1s

1 files changed, 419 insertions, 434 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index aee1c30b0a..5c13d57765 100644
--- a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
 
 #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
 # ifndef NDEBUG
-#   define NDEBUG
+#  define NDEBUG
 # endif
 #endif
 
@@ -133,475 +133,460 @@
 # define PREDICT
 #endif
 
-/* #define PREDICT	1 */
+/* #define PREDICT      1 */
 
-#define STATE_SIZE	1023
-static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
-static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+#define STATE_SIZE      1023
+static int state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
+static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static long md_count[2]={0,0};
-static double entropy=0;
-static int initialized=0;
+static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
+
+static double entropy = 0;
+static int initialized = 0;
 
 static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
-                                           * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
-                                           * (to prevent double locking) */
+                                           * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to
+                                           * prevent double locking) */
 /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-
+/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
-int rand_predictable=0;
+int rand_predictable = 0;
 #endif
 
-const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RAND_version[] = "RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
 
-RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
-	ssleay_rand_seed,
-	ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
-	ssleay_rand_cleanup,
-	ssleay_rand_add,
-	ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
-	ssleay_rand_status
-	}; 
+RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth = {
+    ssleay_rand_seed,
+    ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
+    ssleay_rand_cleanup,
+    ssleay_rand_add,
+    ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
+    ssleay_rand_status
+};
 
 RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
-	{
-	return(&rand_ssleay_meth);
-	}
+{
+    return (&rand_ssleay_meth);
+}
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
-	{
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
-	state_num=0;
-	state_index=0;
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	md_count[0]=0;
-	md_count[1]=0;
-	entropy=0;
-	initialized=0;
-	}
+{
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
+    state_num = 0;
+    state_index = 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    md_count[0] = 0;
+    md_count[1] = 0;
+    entropy = 0;
+    initialized = 0;
+}
 
 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-	{
-	int i,j,k,st_idx;
-	long md_c[2];
-	unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	EVP_MD_CTX m;
-	int do_not_lock;
-
-	if (!num)
-		return;
-
-	/*
-	 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
-	 *
-	 * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
-	 * the last block).  Each of these blocks is run through the hash
-	 * function as follows:  The data passed to the hash function
-	 * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
-	 * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
-	 * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
-	 * (which is incremented after each use).
-	 * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
-	 * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
-         * hash function.
-	 */
-
-	/* check if we already have the lock */
-	if (crypto_lock_rand)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-		CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		}
-	else
-		do_not_lock = 0;
-
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-	st_idx=state_index;
-
-	/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
-	 * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the
-	 * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_
-	 * difference */
-	md_c[0] = md_count[0];
-	md_c[1] = md_count[1];
-
-	memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
-
-	/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
-	state_index += num;
-	if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE)
-		{
-		state_index%=STATE_SIZE;
-		state_num=STATE_SIZE;
-		}
-	else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE)	
-		{
-		if (state_index > state_num)
-			state_num=state_index;
-		}
-	/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
-
-	/* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE]
-	 * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them
-	 * as well */
-
-	md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
-
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
-	for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
-		{
-		j=(num-i);
-		j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
-
-		MD_Init(&m);
-		MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-		k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
-		if (k > 0)
-			{
-			MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
-			MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
-			}
-		else
-			MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
-		/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
-		MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
-		/* We know that line may cause programs such as
-		   purify and valgrind to complain about use of
-		   uninitialized data.  The problem is not, it's
-		   with the caller.  Removing that line will make
-		   sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
-		   other problems such as very insecure keys. */
-
-		MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-		MD_Final(&m,local_md);
-		md_c[1]++;
-
-		buf=(const char *)buf + j;
-
-		for (k=0; k<j; k++)
-			{
-			/* Parallel threads may interfere with this,
-			 * but always each byte of the new state is
-			 * the XOR of some previous value of its
-			 * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost).
-			 * Alway using locking could hurt performance more
-			 * than necessary given that conflicts occur only
-			 * when the total seeding is longer than the random
-			 * state. */
-			state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k];
-			if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
-				st_idx=0;
-			}
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
-
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-	/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
-	 * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
-	 * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
-	 * much entropy as fits into md. */
-	for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
-		{
-		md[k] ^= local_md[k];
-		}
-	if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
-	    entropy += add;
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-	
+{
+    int i, j, k, st_idx;
+    long md_c[2];
+    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_MD_CTX m;
+    int do_not_lock;
+
+    if (!num)
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
+     *
+     * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
+     * the last block).  Each of these blocks is run through the hash
+     * function as follows:  The data passed to the hash function
+     * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
+     * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
+     * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
+     * (which is incremented after each use).
+     * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
+     * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
+     * hash function.
+     */
+
+    /* check if we already have the lock */
+    if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+        CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+        CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+        do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+    } else
+        do_not_lock = 0;
+
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+    st_idx = state_index;
+
+    /*
+     * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
+     * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
+     * _some_ difference
+     */
+    md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+    md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+
+    memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+    /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+    state_index += num;
+    if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
+        state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
+        state_num = STATE_SIZE;
+    } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
+        if (state_index > state_num)
+            state_num = state_index;
+    }
+    /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+
+    /*
+     * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
+     * will use now, but other threads may use them as well
+     */
+
+    md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+        j = (num - i);
+        j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
+
+        MD_Init(&m);
+        MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
+        if (k > 0) {
+            MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k);
+            MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k);
+        } else
+            MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j);
+
+        /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+        MD_Update(&m, buf, j);
+        /*
+         * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
+         * to complain about use of uninitialized data.  The problem is not,
+         * it's with the caller.  Removing that line will make sure you get
+         * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
+         * insecure keys.
+         */
+
+        MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c));
+        MD_Final(&m, local_md);
+        md_c[1]++;
+
+        buf = (const char *)buf + j;
+
+        for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+            /*
+             * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
+             * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
+             * local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
+             * could hurt performance more than necessary given that
+             * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
+             * random state.
+             */
+            state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
+            if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
+                st_idx = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+    /*
+     * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
+     * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
+     * counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
+     * md.
+     */
+    for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
+        md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+    }
+    if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+        entropy += add;
+    if (!do_not_lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-	assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
+    assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
 #endif
-	}
+}
 
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-	{
-	ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
-	}
-
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
-	{
-	static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
-	int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
-	int num_ceil;
-	int ok;
-	long md_c[2];
-	unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	EVP_MD_CTX m;
+{
+    ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+}
+
+int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
+{
+    static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
+    int i, j, k, st_num, st_idx;
+    int num_ceil;
+    int ok;
+    long md_c[2];
+    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    EVP_MD_CTX m;
 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
-	pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+    pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
 #endif
-	int do_stir_pool = 0;
+    int do_stir_pool = 0;
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
-	if (rand_predictable)
-		{
-		static unsigned char val=0;
-
-		for (i=0; i<num; i++)
-			buf[i]=val++;
-		return(1);
-		}
-#endif
+    if (rand_predictable) {
+        static unsigned char val = 0;
 
-	if (num <= 0)
-		return 1;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
-	/* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
-	num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
-
-	/*
-	 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
-	 *
-	 * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
-	 *
-	 * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
-	 * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
-	 * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
-	 * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
-	 * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
-	 * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
-	 * 
-	 * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
-	 * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
-	 * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
-	 * global 'md'.
-	 */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	/* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */
-	if (!FIPS_mode())
+        for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+            buf[i] = val++;
+        return (1);
+    }
 #endif
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
-	/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-	crypto_lock_rand = 1;
-
-	if (!initialized)
-		{
-		RAND_poll();
-		initialized = 1;
-		}
-	
-	if (!stirred_pool)
-		do_stir_pool = 1;
-	
-	ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-	if (!ok)
-		{
-		/* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
-		 * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
-		 * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
-		 * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
-		 * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
-		 * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
-		 *
-		 * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
-		 * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected
-		 * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the
-		 * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached.
-		 */
-		entropy -= num;
-		if (entropy < 0)
-			entropy = 0;
-		}
-
-	if (do_stir_pool)
-		{
-		/* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
-		 * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
-		 * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
-		 * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
-		 * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
-		 */
-
-		int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
-		while (n > 0)
-			{
+
+    if (num <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+    /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+    num_ceil =
+        (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+
+    /*
+     * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
+     *
+     * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
+     *
+     * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+     * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+     * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+     * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+     * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+     * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+     *
+     * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
+     * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
+     * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
+     * global 'md'.
+     */
+    if (lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+    /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+    CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+    crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+
+    if (!initialized) {
+        RAND_poll();
+        initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!stirred_pool)
+        do_stir_pool = 1;
+
+    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+    if (!ok) {
+        /*
+         * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
+         * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
+         * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
+         * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
+         * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
+         * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
+         * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
+         * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
+         * entropy limit has been reached.
+         */
+        entropy -= num;
+        if (entropy < 0)
+            entropy = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (do_stir_pool) {
+        /*
+         * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
+         * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
+         * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
+         * function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
+         * suitable for this purpose.
+         */
+
+        int n = STATE_SIZE;     /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
+        while (n > 0) {
 #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
 #endif
 #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
-			/* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
-			 * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */
-			ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
-			n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-			}
-		if (ok)
-			stirred_pool = 1;
-		}
-
-	st_idx=state_index;
-	st_num=state_num;
-	md_c[0] = md_count[0];
-	md_c[1] = md_count[1];
-	memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
-
-	state_index+=num_ceil;
-	if (state_index > state_num)
-		state_index %= state_num;
-
-	/* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
-	 * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
-
-	md_count[0] += 1;
-
-	/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
-	crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (!FIPS_mode())
-#endif
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
-	while (num > 0)
-		{
-		/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
-		j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
-		num-=j;
-		MD_Init(&m);
+            /*
+             * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
+             * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash.
+             */
+            ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+            n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+        }
+        if (ok)
+            stirred_pool = 1;
+    }
+
+    st_idx = state_index;
+    st_num = state_num;
+    md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+    md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+    memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+    state_index += num_ceil;
+    if (state_index > state_num)
+        state_index %= state_num;
+
+    /*
+     * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
+     * ours (but other threads may use them too)
+     */
+
+    md_count[0] += 1;
+
+    /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+    crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+    if (lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+    while (num > 0) {
+        /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+        j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
+        num -= j;
+        MD_Init(&m);
 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
-		if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
-			{
-			MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
-			curr_pid = 0;
-			}
+        if (curr_pid) {         /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+            MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid);
+            curr_pid = 0;
+        }
 #endif
-		MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-		MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-
-#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
-		/* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
-		 * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
-		 * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
-		 * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
-		 * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
-		 * security.
-		 */
-		MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
+        MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c));
+
+#ifndef PURIFY                  /* purify complains */
+        /*
+         * The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small source of
+         * entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised it may cause
+         * programs such as purify or valgrind to complain. So for those
+         * builds it is not used: the removal of such a small source of
+         * entropy has negligible impact on security.
+         */
+        MD_Update(&m, buf, j);
 #endif
 
-		k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
-		if (k > 0)
-			{
-			MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
-			MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
-			}
-		else
-			MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
-		MD_Final(&m,local_md);
-
-		for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
-			{
-			state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
-			if (st_idx >= st_num)
-				st_idx=0;
-			if (i < j)
-				*(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
-			}
-		}
-
-	MD_Init(&m);
-	MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-	MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (!FIPS_mode())
-#endif
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-	MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	MD_Final(&m,md);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (!FIPS_mode())
-#endif
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
-	if (ok)
-		return(1);
-	else if (pseudo)
-		return 0;
-	else 
-		{
-		RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
-		ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
-			"http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
-		return(0);
-		}
-	}
+        k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
+        if (k > 0) {
+            MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k);
+            MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k);
+        } else
+            MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+        MD_Final(&m, local_md);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
+            /* may compete with other threads */
+            state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
+            if (st_idx >= st_num)
+                st_idx = 0;
+            if (i < j)
+                *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
+        }
+    }
+
+    MD_Init(&m);
+    MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c));
+    MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    if (lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+    MD_Update(&m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    MD_Final(&m, md);
+    if (lock)
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+    if (ok)
+        return (1);
+    else if (pseudo)
+        return 0;
+    else {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+        ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+                           "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
+        return (0);
+    }
+}
 
 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-	{
-	return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
-	}
+{
+    return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 1);
+}
 
-/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
-   unpredictable */
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 
-	{
-	return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
-	}
+/*
+ * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
+ */
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1, 1);
+}
 
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
-	{
-	CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-	int ret;
-	int do_not_lock;
-
-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
-	/* check if we already have the lock
-	 * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
-	if (crypto_lock_rand)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		}
-	else
-		do_not_lock = 0;
-	
-	if (!do_not_lock)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-		
-		/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		crypto_lock_rand = 1;
-		}
-	
-	if (!initialized)
-		{
-		RAND_poll();
-		initialized = 1;
-		}
-
-	ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
-
-	if (!do_not_lock)
-		{
-		/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
-		crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-		
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-		}
-	
-	return ret;
-	}
+{
+    CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+    int ret;
+    int do_not_lock;
+
+    CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+    /*
+     * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
+     * implementation calls RAND_status())
+     */
+    if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+        do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+    } else
+        do_not_lock = 0;
+
+    if (!do_not_lock) {
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+        /*
+         * prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
+         */
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+        CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+        crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!initialized) {
+        RAND_poll();
+        initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+    ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+
+    if (!do_not_lock) {
+        /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+        crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}