diff options
author | Rémi Verschelde <rverschelde@gmail.com> | 2016-10-12 23:06:17 +0200 |
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committer | Rémi Verschelde <rverschelde@gmail.com> | 2016-10-15 11:50:41 +0200 |
commit | 422196759f93df249db38619f136cabd5dcf42cd (patch) | |
tree | 1e5846507af0f8f1bc7ca294ccfb0d4ac3392d17 /drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | |
parent | d9a291f6411f2e571c181da0ac89f550ba73f681 (diff) |
openssl: Move to a module and split thirdparty lib
Same rationale as the previous commits.
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 454 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 454 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c deleted file mode 100644 index d4a257c33b..0000000000 --- a/drivers/builtin_openssl2/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,454 +0,0 @@ -/* ocsp_vfy.c */ -/* - * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project - * 2000. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <openssl/ocsp.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <string.h> - -static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, - STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st, - unsigned long flags); -static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id); -static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, - unsigned long flags); -static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, - OCSP_CERTID **ret); -static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, - STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp); -static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags); -static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, - X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags); - -/* Verify a basic response message */ - -int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) -{ - X509 *signer, *x; - STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; - int i, ret = 0; - ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags); - if (!ret) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, - OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); - goto end; - } - if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) - flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) { - EVP_PKEY *skey; - skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); - if (skey) { - ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); - } - if (!skey || ret <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); - goto end; - } - } - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { - int init_res; - if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) { - untrusted = NULL; - } else if (bs->certs && certs) { - untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs); - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { - if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; - } - } - } else { - untrusted = bs->certs; - } - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted); - if (!init_res) { - ret = -1; - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - goto end; - } - - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); - ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - if (ret <= 0) { - i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, - OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); - goto end; - } - if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) { - ret = 1; - goto end; - } - /* - * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it - * against the OCSP issuer criteria. - */ - ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags); - - /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */ - if (ret != 0) - goto end; - - /* - * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit - * trust - */ - if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) - goto end; - - x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); - if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED); - goto end; - } - ret = 1; - } - - end: - if (chain) - sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); - if (bs->certs && certs) - sk_X509_free(untrusted); - return ret; -} - -static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, - STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st, - unsigned long flags) -{ - X509 *signer; - OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId; - if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) { - *psigner = signer; - return 2; - } - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) && - (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) { - *psigner = signer; - return 1; - } - /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */ - - *psigner = NULL; - return 0; -} - -static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id) -{ - int i; - unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash; - X509 *x; - - /* Easy if lookup by name */ - if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) - return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName); - - /* Lookup by key hash */ - - /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */ - if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) - return NULL; - keyhash = id->value.byKey->data; - /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); - X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL); - if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - return x; - } - return NULL; -} - -static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, - unsigned long flags) -{ - STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp; - X509 *signer, *sca; - OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL; - int i; - sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses; - - if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN); - return -1; - } - - /* See if the issuer IDs match. */ - i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid); - - /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */ - if (i <= 0) - return i; - - signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); - /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */ - if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) { - sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1); - i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp); - if (i < 0) - return i; - if (i) { - /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */ - if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) - return 1; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */ - return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp); -} - -/* - * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with - * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates - * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check - * equality against one of them. - */ - -static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret) -{ - OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid; - int i, idcount; - - idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); - if (idcount <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, - OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA); - return -1; - } - - cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId; - - *ret = NULL; - - for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) { - tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; - /* Check to see if IDs match */ - if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) { - /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */ - if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm, - cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)) - return 2; - /* Else mismatch */ - return 0; - } - } - - /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */ - *ret = cid; - return 1; -} - -static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, - STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp) -{ - /* If only one ID to match then do it */ - if (cid) { - const EVP_MD *dgst; - X509_NAME *iname; - int mdlen; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, - OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST); - return -1; - } - - mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); - if (mdlen < 0) - return -1; - if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) || - (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen)) - return 0; - iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert); - if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) - return -1; - if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen)) - return 0; - X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL); - if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen)) - return 0; - - return 1; - - } else { - /* We have to match the whole lot */ - int i, ret; - OCSP_CERTID *tmpid; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) { - tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; - ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL); - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; - } - return 1; - } - -} - -static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags) -{ - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN)) - return 1; - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response - * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given - * trust value. - */ - -int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags) -{ - X509 *signer; - X509_NAME *nm; - GENERAL_NAME *gen; - int ret; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; - if (!req->optionalSignature) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED); - return 0; - } - gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName; - if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, - OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE); - return 0; - } - nm = gen->d.directoryName; - ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags); - if (ret <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, - OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); - return 0; - } - if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) - flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) { - EVP_PKEY *skey; - skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); - ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey); - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); - if (ret <= 0) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - } - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { - int init_res; - if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL); - else - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, - req->optionalSignature->certs); - if (!init_res) { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return 0; - } - - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST); - ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - if (ret <= 0) { - ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, - OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret)); - return 0; - } - } - return 1; -} - -static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, - X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) -{ - X509 *signer; - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) { - signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm); - if (signer) { - *psigner = signer; - return 1; - } - } - - signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm); - if (signer) { - *psigner = signer; - return 2; - } - return 0; -} |